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ABSTRACT 
The privatisation of the British railway industry was announced in 1992, and a central plank 
of the government's strategy was to liberalise British Rail's (BR's) passenger market at the 
time of its divestiture. Competition was to be introduced both for the market, through 
franchising, and in the market, by freeing up access to the rail network. This thesis examines 
the policy adopted to promote competition in the British passenger railway industry. Its 
central aim is to assess the extent to which the promotion of competition between passenger 
train operators was an appropriate policy goal. In pursuit of this aim, the thesis critically 
evaluates the evolution, outcome and future prospects of rail liberalisation policy and 
closely examines the translation of neoliberalism - the theory of political economy upon 
which rail privatisation was based - into practical policy measures. A significant original 
investigation, drawing upon the experiences of key personnel involved in framing, executing 
and operating within the policy, augments secondary data to provide an in-depth level of 
analysis not currently available within the literature. The study employs predominantly 
inductive, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, which together constitute a 
relatively novel investigative approach within transport geography. 
The empirical results are presented and discussed against the background of the other 
`network' industry privatisations of the 1980s and early 1990s. The main findings are that, 
despite the sale of BR having been considered by the government for more than a decade, 
the privatisation and liberalisation strategy advanced by the 1992 White Paper, New 
Opportunities for the Railways, was not the result of a coherent policy analysis. The 
opportunities for, and even appropriateness of, a neoliberal agenda to promote competition 
between train operators were not sufficiently well understood by government when the 
proposals were adopted. Competition for the market, nevertheless, would appear to be a 
workable and `successful' policy option, with the scope to offer long-term benefits to the 
rail industry should future governments choose to seek them. Competition in the market, on 
the other hand, is far less appropriate and continued emphasis on this aspect of rail policy 
could damage the industry's prospects in the coming years. Finally, the overall success of 
franchising seems to have occurred despite the muddled circumstances in which the 
Conservatives formulated rail privatisation policy, whereas the general failure of `on-rail' 
competition seems to reflect them. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 The privatisation of British Rail 
The dominant political ideology in Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s was that of the 
New Right, whose economic beliefs, based upon neoliberalism, prioritised reducing public 
sector involvement in society and the economy by promoting a `free' market driven by 
competition (Barry, 1987; Farnham and Horton, 1993; Green, 1987; Hayes, 1994). For this 
and other reasons, the privatisation of public sector industries was of central importance to 
successive Conservative governments in the 1979-1997 period (Foster, 1992; Heald, 1983), 
and the most recent major divestiture was that of British Rail (BR). 
The Conservatives argued that selling BR was necessary in order to "see better use made of 
the railways, greater responsiveness to the customer, and a higher quality of service and 
better value for money for the people who travel by rail" (Department of Transport, 1992a). 
However, they acknowledged that rail privatisation was likely to be more complex than 
many earlier divestitures (Shaw, 2000). Although BR was one of the most efficient railways 
in western Europe (Nash and Preston, 1994), its passenger operations still made heavy 
losses. Many of BR's routes, although unprofitable, were seen as socially and politically 
necessary, and any method of sale would need to maintain pre-privatisation service levels 
and therefore incorporate a means of providing the private sector with continuing subsidies 
from the state. Moreover, experience from previous sell-offs had convinced ministers that 
the liberalisation of BR's market was essential if the potential benefits of privatisation were 
to be realised. A key objective of the Major administration was therefore to end BR's 
monopoly and introduce a competitive structure into the railway industry. The White Paper 
New Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a), published in July 
1992, committed the government to radically restructuring BR in advance of privatisation. 
The method of divestiture adopted, the `track authority' model, would resolve the subsidy 
question by franchising passenger rail services, and would promote competition by splitting 
BR into 92 companies to create an internal market (Department of Transport, 1996). 
Academic interest in the BR sell-off has been widespread. Various studies have traced the 
evolution of policy from empirical and theoretical perspectives, whilst others have provided 
generalised policy analyses or focused upon specifics such as the economics of rail 
1 
privatisation. ' The centrality of market liberalisation to the government's plans has also 
prompted a considerable amount of research. Studies in the early 1990s reviewed ex ante 
the theoretical prospects for, and implications of, competition among passenger operators 
(Dnes 1993; Jones et al., 1993; Preston, 1997; Shires et al., 1994a; Starkie, 1993; Williams, 
1992) whilst Bradshaw (1997), Charlton et al. (1997) and Shaw et al. (1998) have 
described ex post where competition has materialised in the railway industry. 
But despite the rapidly expanding literature on rail privatisation, there remain omissions and 
considerable scope for original investigation into the subject. This is particularly true with 
regard to railway competition, and there is certainly a need to further augment academic 
understanding of the policy adopted to promote it. Although the above studies have 
contributed significantly to current knowledge, they have tended to be narrow in focus, 
assessing the policy either in terms of economic theory or without extending their analyses 
much beyond the bounds of the railway industry. Little attempt has been made to examine 
the evolution of railway competition policy, or to discuss it in the wider context of political 
economy. Moreover, none of the studies has examined the outcome of the policy in any 
significant detail. Concern has instead revolved around general concepts rather than 
comprehensive reviews of specifics. Finally, those studies which review the policy's 
prospects of promoting competition in the future are now somewhat dated and need 
revisiting in the light of recent events. 
This study therefore focuses on the policy adopted to promote competition in the British 
railway industry at the time of its privatisation. The research was designed in light of 
shortcomings in the literature and seeks to answer numerous research questions. Key among 
these are: Why did competition become central to the government's rail privatisation plans? 
How did policy makers' wish to liberalise BR influence the policy advanced in New 
Opportunities for the Railways? Precisely where do opportunities for competition now 
exist, and are they being exploited by the private sector? What are the future prospects for 
railway competition? Has the policy been, or is it likely to be, a success? In order to address 
such questions, it will be necessary to gain an in-depth level of policy understanding not 
currently available from the literature. A significant original investigation, drawing upon the 
1 On policy evolution: Gibb et al., 1998; Grantham, 1988; Knilt and Lehmkuhl, 1998; Truelove, 1991; 
Zahariadis, 1995,1996. General critiques, see, for example: Bradshaw, 1996a; Curwen, 1997; Glaister and 
Travers, 1993; Knowles, 1998; Nash, 1993; Nash and Preston, 1993; Welsby and Nicholls, 1999. On the 
economics of rail privatisation, see, for example, Bradshaw, 1996b; Else, 1993; Foster, 1994; Harris and 
Godward, 1997; Helm, 1996; Jones et al., 1993; Nash and Preston, 1992; Powell, 1997; Preston, 
1996; 
Shires et al., 1994a; Stittle, 1996; White, 1998. These and other studies are discussed later in the thesis. 
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experiences of key personnel involved in framing, executing and operating within the policy, 
will be needed to augment existing secondary data. As such, the study draws heavily upon 
interviews with former Secretaries and Ministers of State for Transport, senior and mid- 
level civil servants, government advisors, industry experts, British Railways Board (BRB) 
members and employees, industry regulators, franchise bidders and senior managers within 
the `new' railway. The originality of this thesis lies not only in the fact that it seeks to 
answer the research questions outlined above, but also in its methodological approach. In- 
depth, qualitative interviewing of key actors is relatively novel in transport geography 
(although see Bird, 1982,1988; Hoyle, 1993,1994a, 1994b, 1995), and engaging such a 
range and number of actors in an academic study of rail privatisation policy has not yet been 
attempted (see Grantham, 1998; Preston, 1997). 
1.2 Aims and objectives of the study 
Against this background, the central aim of this study is to evaluate the extent to which the 
promotion of competition was an appropriate policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. 
In pursuit of this aim, the thesis critically evaluates the evolution, outcome and future 
prospects of the policy adopted to liberalise BR's market, and closely examines the 
translation of neoliberal political philosophy into practical policy measures. As such, there 
are three key objectives: 
To establish why and how the liberalisation of the passenger train market became an 
important goal of rail privatisation policy; 
" To assess the outcome of rail privatisation policy in terms of the extent to which the 
passenger rail market has been liberalised; 
" To review the future prospects for competition developing between passenger train 
operators. 
Although the potential for competition was introduced throughout much of the rail industry 
at the time of privatisation, this thesis focuses specifically upon competition among 
passenger train operators. 2 For the most part, the passenger railway was chosen as the 
principal object of study because of its relative importance to policy makers. As one 
2 In its broadest sense, the passenger rail industry includes infrastructure (track, bridges, signalling), the 
ownership of rolling stock, heavy maintenance depots and so on. However, as chapter four will show, 
BR 
was fragmented to such an extent that `Train Operating Companies' (TOCs) now do little else than their 
name suggests. They own neither infrastructure nor rolling stock, and they must buy in almost all of the 
services upon which they depend. It is therefore the competition between these TOCs with which this study 
is primarily concerned. 
3 
commentator has observed, producing change in the delivery of passenger, rather than 
freight, services was uppermost in ministers' minds when they sold the railways (Clarke, 
2000), and in this sense it is appropriate to review the passenger business before embarking 
upon a study of other industry components. In addition, however, it was crucial, given the 
limited resources available for doctoral studies, not to compromise the detail of the 
investigation by over-extending its scope. 
It is also important to stress that the study does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of 
railway competition in terms of its impact upon service output. It is not the case, therefore, 
that operators' efficiency, investment records, and quality and frequency of service are 
scrutinised for comparison with pre-privatisation levels. Rather, the thesis seeks to identify 
precisely the circumstances in which competitive opportunities are now available in the new 
railway structure, whether or not they are being exploited, and why. The rationale 
supporting this line of investigation is that many of the opportunities for competition are 
subtle and/or complex - indeed, some are still being discovered by train operators at the 
time of writing - and it is argued that these must be revealed and understood before any 
large-scale survey of their impact upon service output can begin. Moreover, those which 
had been identified were in a rather embryonic stage of development when data for this 
thesis were being collected and no reasonable judgement about their impacts could have 
been made after such a short period of time. The central aim of the study does not demand a 
comprehensive review of the impact of service competition. Focus here is on the viability of 
promoting competition as a goal of rail privatisation policy, i. e. whether or not the railway 
industry is capable of supporting competition as an organising principle and why. 
1.3 Scope of the study 
The privatisation of BR followed the sales of numerous British transport concerns. 
Transport, particularly since World War Two, was perceived to be an industry which 
required the control and supervision of the state (Lowndes, 1997), but the Conservatives 
under Thatcher were more inclined to believe that the "best way to ensure the public 
interest is to promote free competition between the providers and free choice between the 
users" (Conservative Party, 1977: 364). The first Thatcher administration sold the National 
Freight Corporation to a management buy-out team and liberalised the long distance coach 
industry. BR's Hovercraft, Hotels and Holidays businesses were also disposed of. 
4 
Subsequent transport privatisations included those of Sealink, British Airways, the British 
Airports Authority, and the National and Scottish Bus Companies. 3 
Primarily because of the nature of their business, the transport companies sold by the 
Conservatives share key characteristics with BR. This is particularly true of the bus 
industry. Not only does it require continuing subsidy to fund its loss-making yet socially 
necessary services, but ministers also perceived the need to introduce service competition 
between operators. Both the National and Scottish Bus Companies were fragmented and 
the successor businesses were transferred to the private sector by competitive tender. 
Furthermore, the market was liberalised by way of the `42-day rule', which entitled new 
operators to compete with incumbents provided they gave six weeks' notice of their 
proposals (White and Farrington, 1998). Thus, from having been a statutory monopoly, the 
bus industry was restructured to allow competition for the market, through competitive 
tendering, and competition in the market, as a result of the 42-day rule. As will become 
apparent, the privatised railway industry was also restructured to accommodate both these 
forms of competition. 
It is perhaps logical to assume that the model adopted to privatise BR was a direct 
descendant of that used for the disposal of the bus companies. However, it has been argued 
elsewhere that this may not necessarily be the case (Charlton et al., 1997; Helm, 1996; 
Mountford, 1996). The track authority model of rail privatisation was originally suggested 
in the mid-1980s (Gylie, 1984; Starkie, 1984), but became influential after a variant had 
successfully been applied to the privatisation of the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB), part of a `network' industry. Such industries - examples are telecommunications, 
gas, water and electricity - were viewed by some policy makers as analogous to BR in the 
sense that they share a network element: wires, pipes or, in the case of BR, track. The track 
authority model adopted to restructure BR can be seen as further experimentation with the 
method used to sell the CEGB (Charlton, et al., 1997; Helm, 1996) and, in this sense, is 
based upon a model of privatisation adopted for other network industries rather than 
companies in the transport sector. 
In light of these issues, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two examines the 
privatisation of the network industries. It begins by outlining the key assumptions of 
3 The new Labour administration, elected in may 1997, is continuing the policy of privatisation 
in the 
transport industry. It has recently been announced that the National Air Traffic Control Service and parts of 
5 
neoliberal thought and continues by exploring the interaction between privatisation policy 
and abstract theoretical ideals. The network industry sell-offs are then assessed in terms of 
the extent to which they promoted a `free' market driven by competition, whilst the 
chapter's conclusions establish the political and economic contexts in which ministers were 
to consider the privatisation of BR. However, before the study turns to address the railway 
industry, chapter three describes the methods used to collect and analyse the primary data 
used in the study. It emphasises the qualitative, inductive nature of the techniques adopted 
and, because of their relative novelty in transport geography, justifies their use and explains 
their characteristics in detail. 
The remainder of the thesis documents and critically assesses the privatisation of BR in 
terms of the aims and objectives stated in section 1.2. Chapter four traces the evolution of 
rail privatisation policy in order to establish why and how the liberalisation of the passenger 
rail market became an important goal therein. The chapter shows that debates over rail 
privatisation within the Conservative Party can be traced back to the late 1960s, and that 
BR was considered as a candidate for divestiture throughout most of the 1980s. Potential 
policy options advanced from both within and outside of government are explained, and 
events leading up to the adoption of the track authority model are reviewed. Finally, the 
chapter outlines the structure of the `new' railway industry and identifies key shortcomings 
in the policy contained in New Opportunities for the Railways. 
Chapters five and six assess the extent to which the passenger rail market has been 
liberalised. Chapter five focuses on the passenger rail franchising process, or competition 
for the market. The chapter begins by examining the private sector's attitude towards the 
BR sale in the early 1990s and explains its potential impact on the outcome of rail 
privatisation policy. The development of franchising policy is then discussed in this context. 
The remainder of the chapter assesses the degree to which competition for the market 
developed among franchise bidders, suggests various reasons as to why this was so and 
concludes by considering rail franchising's contribution to attaining the neoliberal policy 
aims outlined in chapter two. Chapter six is concerned with competition in the market, or 
`on rail' competition between train operators. Field interviews for this chapter were 
undertaken in early 1998, four years after the railway industry was restructured, and results 
presented in the chapter pertain to that period. The chapter first reviews the appropriateness 
of on-rail competition in the new railway industry and highlights several weaknesses in the 
the London Underground are to be sold off. 
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case for such liberalisation. The opportunities for competition in the passenger rail market 
are then identified and compared with those which the government originally envisaged. The 
chapter concludes by comparing the policy outcome of rail privatisation with those of the 
telecommunications, gas and water industry divestitures in the 1980s. 
Finally, chapter seven summarises the findings of the above chapters, before moving on to 
evaluate the prospects for competition developing between passenger rail operators in the 
future. Overall conclusions pertaining to the central aim of the study are then presented in a 
discussion which re-evaluates, in light of potential future trends, the fundamental themes 
addressed throughout this thesis. As noted above, the text now turns to examine the 
privatisation of the network industries in order to establish the political and economic bases 
on which this thesis will proceed. 
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Chapter Two 
Privatisation and the network industries 
2.1 Introduction 
The sale of BR was the last in a series of network industry privatisations undertaken by 
Conservative governments in the period 1992-1997. When ministers considered various 
means of divesting the rail industry, and establishing a competitive regime therein, their 
decisions were in large part informed by experience gained from the sales of BT, British Gas 
(BG) and the water and electricity industries. For this reason it is appropriate to place the 
forthcoming assessment of rail privatisation policy, which develops during chapters four 
through seven, in the context of issues arising from other network industry privatisations. In 
turn, these issues are best discussed with regard to the theoretical assumptions upon which 
privatisation per se is based. Why and how did a policy of privatisation arise in the first 
place? Why was competition considered to be so important? What was the outcome of the 
network industry privatisations and what lessons were learnt as the programme developed? 
This chapter will address such questions. 
The privatisation programme was a central plank of the New Right political philosophy, 
whose economic strand, based upon neoliberalism, prioritised reducing public sector 
involvement in the economy by promoting a free market driven by competition (Barry, 
1987; Farnham and Horton, 1993). Although it began slowly, the programme was 
enthusiastically endorsed by government, with one policy advisor suggesting that 
denationalisation would help ministers succeed in "halving the size of the state sector" 
(Mount, quoted in Letwin, 1988: 11). At first glance, as Graham and Prosser (1988) point 
out, the policy of privatisation would appear to have contributed significantly to reducing 
the role of government and replacing it with market forces: by the mid 1990s, more than 
two thirds of the state's industrial sector - 50 major businesses - had been sold, raising over 
£65 billion in sale receipts; around one million jobs were transferred from the public to the 
private sector; and almost one in four adults, compared to less than one in ten in 1979, had 
become shareholders as a result of privatisations (Conservative Party, 1996). 
However, it can be argued that such figures are misleading, and that in certain cases, most 
notably the network industries, privatisation has in fact done far less than the above figures 
suggest to alter the role of government in industrial affairs. The monopolies enjoyed 
by the 
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utilities whilst they were in the public sector were, to a large extent, conferred upon the 
private sector following divestiture. In the absence of market forces to protect consumers, 
the government was forced to create a host of regulatory mechanisms and institutions in 
order to prevent the utilities from abusing their monopoly powers. Thus, although utility 
privatisation reduced the physical size of the state, it is questionable how far its influence 
was diminished. Following an introduction to the theoretical assumptions which underpin 
privatisation, and a discussion of how they influenced initial policy formulation, this chapter 
seeks to explain why the network industries were sold as "virtual monopolies" throughout 
the 1980s (Moore, 1985a: 94). The nature and scope of utility regulation is then considered, 
and the extent to which this enabled the state to maintain a continuing role in the 
companies' affairs is assessed. The privatisation of British Telecom is used as a case study, 
although references are made to BG and the water industry where appropriate. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by reviewing the key issues which arose from the privatisation of the 
utilities throughout the 1980s, and suggests that they prompted a notable reorientation of 
policy in the 1990s which resulted in market liberalisation being accorded a new priority in 
the privatisation of BR. 
2.2 Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism draws upon the works and ideas of economists (Friedman, 1962,1980; 
Hayek, 1944,1960,1976), public choice theorists (Buchanan et al., 1978; Mueller, 1979; 
Niskanen, 1971) and political scientists (Lindblom, 1977). It emphasises the importance of 
three key concepts: individual liberty, a minimal role for the state in society and the `free' 
market. The first of these ideas is held most sacred, with the other two being seen as 
essential to its existence and defence (Atkinson and Savage, 1994; King, 1987). As Ashford 
(1991: 185) summarises, neoliberalism "argues that the consequences of allowing 
individuals the freedom to pursue their own interests... will generally be more beneficial 
than government action. " Following a brief overview of its history, this section discusses 
each of neoliberalism's three main concepts. It should be noted, however, that what follows 
is intended neither as a critique nor an exhaustive review of neoliberalism. Such discussions 
are beyond the scope of the present thesis and, in any case, have been extensively rehearsed 
elsewhere: see, for example, Barry, 1983,1987; Gray, 1995; Hayes, 1994; King, 1987; 
Peck and Tickell, 1994. Rather, the aim here is to provide an understanding of the 
theoretical basis from which the policy analysed in this thesis arose. 
9 
Neoliberalism is a restatement of classical liberal values (Gray, 1995; Green, 1987). The 
roots of classical liberalism stem from the individualistic beliefs of radical Protestants in the 
seventeenth century, which maintained that everyone should be free to choose their own 
path to eternal salvation rather than be bound by the wishes of the church (Bradley, 1985; 
Hardin, 1993). Since that time, liberals have fought to protect the status of the individual 
confronted with the demands of larger social groups: they have supported movements to 
emancipate people from political, economic and other constraints upon their activities, and 
they have campaigned for a society which is open, tolerant and diversified, rather than 
paternalist and authoritarian (Eccleshall, 1994). Despite a commitment to the sanctity of the 
individual, however, liberals are not anarchists and have always recognised the need to set 
certain, defined, limits to people's freedom in order to prevent them from abusing it and 
harming others. Thus, as The Economist (1996a: 20) notes, "perhaps the individual is the 
best judge of his own interest, perhaps not; but, unless the well being of others is 
jeopardised, he should be the judge. " 
Although its defining characteristic is a commitment to individual liberty, it is insufficient 
simply to refer to neoliberalism as the `philosophy of freedom' because there are ambiguities 
associated with the concept. To illustrate, many interventionists would claim to support a 
`free' society, yet they disagree with neoliberals about many fundamentals (Farnham and 
Horton, 1993; Gray, 1995; King, 1987). Such ambiguities are best resolved by drawing a 
distinction between two kinds of freedom, positive and negative. The former relates to 
interventionist notions of liberty, whereas the latter describes the neoliberal conception. 
Positive freedom is a moral concept. It suggests that individuals have the right to expect a 
given standard of material wealth to enable them to participate fully within society (Heald, 
1983). Social matters such as poverty, ill-health and poor education are identified as 
coercive factors in addition to harm imposed by other individuals. In consequence, it is 
argued that the state should provide social services such as education and healthcare, and 
establish a redistributive wealth allocation system capable of achieving a `just' 
apportionment of income (The Economist, 1996). Positive freedom is thus so-called 
because it provides individuals with opportunities which the state is duty-bound to enhance 
and secure - positive outcomes are not the sole responsibility of the individual (Heald, 
1983). 
In contrast, the negative conception of freedom employed by neoliberals overlooks material 
considerations entirely, and is concerned solely with minimising harm, or `coercion', 
from 
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other human beings. Hayek (1960: 20-21) accords coercion a highly specific definition, 
arguing that it is: 
"... such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid 
greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another. 
Except in the sense of choosing the lesser evil in a situation forced on him by another, he is unable either to 
use his own intelligence or knowledge to follow his own aims and beliefs. Coercion is evil precisely because 
it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in his 
achievement of the ends of another. " 
Because to Hayek coercion is a personal attribute, manifested solely by other individuals, 
his conception makes no mention of the range of physical options available to someone at 
any given time (King, 1987). This allows him to contend that even where individuals are not 
controlled by others, but in fact have no real choices available to them, they are still free. 
This point is illustrated with reference to a rock climber: 
"Freedom refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement on it is 
coercion by men. This means, in particular, that the range of physical possibilites from which a person can 
choose at a given moment has no direct relevance to freedom. The rock climber on a difficult pitch who sees 
only one way out to save his life is unquestionably free, though we would hardly say he has any choice" 
(Hayek, 1960: 12). 
Thus negative freedom carries with it no worth or value in any moral sense and, unlike its 
positive counterpart, does not assure individuals of any material opportunities. Negative 
freedom requires only that individuals are able to act for a purpose of their own choosing. 
Whether or not individuals achieve their goals, or even have a selection of realisable goals 
from which to choose, is irrelevant from Hayek's standpoint (Newman, 1984). In this sense 
wealth inequalities within society, for example, are not viewed as assaults on freedom 
because they do not preclude choice, however unpalatable it may be. As Joseph and 
Sumption (1977: 49 and 52) point out with "impeccable liberal logic" (Hayes, 1994: 34): 
"... a person who cannot afford to buy food may well have a justifiable grievance... but it would be 
wrong to describe his grievance as lack of freedom... [L]iberty is liberty, not something else. And a slave is 
a slave, you do not set him free by feeding him. " 
The role of the state is central to maintaining and defending a neoliberal free society, 
because government can promote liberty through the enforcement of law. To Hayek (1960), 
the law upholds impartial rules of just conduct, which are based on the traditions and 
customs of a society. As such, the law is not a tool with which the government can or 
should secure its own objectives - instead, it represents end-independent values which 
delimit the scope of freedom and protect the realm of private activity (Hayes, 1994): one 
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person's freedom to murder his neighbour must be sacrificed in order to preserve the 
freedom of the neighbour to live; likewise, "my freedom to move my fist must be limited by 
the proximity of your chin" (Friedman, 1962: 26). The law therefore provides individuals 
with known and predictable rules around which to build their lives and, because everything 
which is not prohibited by law is allowed, the existence of a vast number of diverse 
individual purposes is recognised and facilitated (Hayek, 1960). Beyond law enforcement, 
however, neoliberals are deeply sceptical of the state because, somewhat paradoxically, it in 
fact constitutes the greatest threat to the freedom which it promotes (Atkinson and Savage, 
1994). The relationship between the state and individuals is viewed as personal in character 
- decisions are taken by individuals on behalf of other individuals - and a potentially 
unlimited scope therefore exists for a government to coerce its citizens. For example, every 
time a government programme is implemented, it necessarily involves a subjective 
(coercive) allocation of resources which often benefits the few at the expense of the many. 
Although it is acknowledged that each new programme may harm individuals only a little, it 
is argued, most forcefully by Hayek (1944), that the cumulative effect will inevitably be 
totalitarianism - the widespread coercion of all. 
Neoliberals therefore favour the free market as the most effective means of organising 
economic and social affairs to protect individual liberty (Lindblom, 1977). The market is 
embraced almost uncritically because, unlike those of the government, its mechanisms are 
viewed as being entirely impersonal. The market itself has no ends and purposes, and 
market phenomena are merely what emerge from the actions of individuals pursuing their 
own ends and purposes by voluntarily exchanging private property. Goods and services are 
thus allocated `objectively' according to supply and demand (Hayek, 1976). The need for 
coercive, statutory co-ordination of economic and social affairs is negated because markets 
"harmonise as far as possible diverse individual purposes and leave maximum scope for non- 
conformity, voluntary experimentation and personal fulfilment" (Harris, 1978: 240-241). 
The market system works so well, according to neoliberals, because it allows risk-taking 
entrepreneurs to seek profit whilst simultaneously benefiting others - the so-called invisible 
hand principle (Smith, quoted in Friedman, 1980). 
In the same way that the state upholds the rule of law in relation to non-market 
transactions, so it also should in the economic sphere. Thus, the law should enforce 
contracts, protect private property, prevent fraud, inhibit restrictive practices and grant 
people authority to control their own labour (Lindblom, 1977). In addition, and of specific 
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relevance to this thesis, the law has a role to play in promoting competition. Competition is 
seen as a spur to increase the efficiency, quality and diversity of services offered to 
consumers. It is also believed to prevent coercion by maximising choice: the consumer is 
protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers from whom he 
can buy, and the seller is protected from coercion by the consumer because of other 
consumers to whom he can sell (Friedman, 1962). If entrepreneurs become monopolists, 
they could become inefficient and, more worryingly from the neoliberal point of view, 
coerce consumers because the latter lose their ability to engage in voluntary transactions. 
Hayek (1960) has argued that market imperfections such as monopolies will arise, but that 
they are acceptable so long as market entry is not restricted - especially by government - 
because monopolists will be subject to potential competition. For Friedman, however, this 
position is too simplistic. He notes that if a monopolist is large enough, it can engage in 
anti-competitive practices - such as heavy internal cross-subsidisation - to prevent market 
entry and maintain its market dominance (see section 2.4). Friedman (1962: 132) stresses 
that, because of monopolists' effect upon liberty, not only must governments not restrict 
market entry, but they must also uphold vigorous anti-trust laws as a "first and most urgent 
necessity. " That said, Friedman accepts that some industries do possess unavoidable 
`natural' monopoly characteristics. Natural monopoly occurs where a single firm can 
produce total industry outputs more efficiently than two or more firms (Yarrow, 1994). A 
traditional example has been a utility: the cost of building, say, a second national grid to 
compete with the existing one would be prohibitive. In such situations, Friedman (1962) 
concludes that the natural monopoly should be conferred upon a private sector firm subject 
to regulatory control. 
Neoliberals concede that the state also has a limited market role pertaining to the provision 
of public goods. King (1987) defines these as goods and services which have the 
characteristics of indivisibility (their use cannot be meaningfully divided among individuals) 
and nonexcludability (individuals or groups cannot be excluded from using them). An 
example is national defence. As Friedman (1962: 23) points out, "I cannot get the amount 
of national defense I want and you [cannot get] a different amount. " The armed forces 
protect everyone to the same degree whether or not they pay for, or approve of, their 
existence. Externalities, such as pollution, are also categorised as public goods. Car owners 
do not necessarily intend to pollute the environment, but they inescapably force everyone to 
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exchange clean air for dirty (Pearce et al., 1989). In this example, the government might 
insist that certain anti-pollution measures are adhered to by motorists. 
Although they accept the case for government provision of public goods, neoliberals remain 
suspicious of such action even in this diminutive incarnation. In addition to concerns 
regarding freedom, Friedman (1962,1980) asserts that, because it is not subject to market 
forces such as profit, risk and competition, the public sector lacks motivation to satisfy 
consumers and will therefore perform inefficiently. Furthermore, Buchanan et al. (1978) 
contend that public servants seek to manipulate government activities to maximise their own 
interest rather than those of consumers. Such bureaucratic self-interest is regarded as 
particularly dangerous because it can result in a stealthy and rapid expansion of government 
activity beyond that which is judged appropriate (Friedman, 1980). Accordingly, neoliberals 
seek to extend the rule of law to constitutionally circumscribe government activity (Hayes, 
1994). In this way it is argued that, with the few exceptions noted above, the politicisation 
of society can be prevented, and its citizens do not have to surrender their liberty by 
"putting [their] heads under a yoke imposed by bureaucratic bunglers" (The Economist, 
1919: 472). 
The defining characteristic of neoliberalism is its commitment to a negative conception of 
individual liberty. This, it is believed, is best defended and maintained by limiting the role of 
the state and maximising that of the competitive, free market. However, these abstract 
concepts are of limited value without some indication of how they might be translated into 
practical policy measures. Hayek (1960) urged that government policies should primarily 
have regard to promoting freedom through the minimisation of coercion. By neoliberal 
standards, government in the late 1970s constituted a powerful coercive force. The welfare 
state consensus, based on Keynesian economic principles, had involved successive 
administrations assuming a prominent responsibility for economic and social planning. By 
1979, nationalisation programmes had brought the major basic industries - coal, steel, gas, 
electricity, healthcare, the airlines, the buses and the railways - under government control, 
and many of these were statutory monopolies; around seven million people were employed 
in the public sector, and many millions more in the private sector were dependent upon 
government contracts, funding or subsidies for their employment; other government 
schemes, particularly those in the welfare state, had grown rapidly and state spending as a 
proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) stood at 40.5 per cent (Veljanovski, 1987; 
Farnham and Horton, 1993). Policies designed to promote freedom would therefore need to 
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reverse the trend of government intervention in the economy and society by transferring 
power from the state back to liberated, risk-taking, competitive individuals. Key among 
these policies was the privatisation of state-owned industry. 
2.3 Neoliberalism and the initial development of privatisation policy 
Privatisation has been variously defined (see, for example, Beesley and Littlechild, 1983; 
Wiltshire, 1987). In essence, it is the transfer of at least part of the operations of a state- 
owned enterprise to private control (Heald, 1983). As Pirie (1988) points out, privatisation 
can be accomplished in numerous different ways, although the three most practised have 
been: denationalisation, which involves the direct sale of public assets; contracting out, 
where the production of state-financed goods and services is franchised to private firms, 
usually for a finite period; and liberalisation, which requires the abolition of statutory 
monopoly to promote competition in markets previously characterised by restricted entry 
(Kay and Silbertson, 1984; Kay and Thompson, 1986). Each of these policy strands can be 
pursued separately - for example, the denationalisation of BT in 1984, the contracting out 
of municipal services throughout the 1980s and the liberalisation of long distance coach 
services in 1980 (Foster, 1992; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; White 1995) - or together, as 
was the case with the privatisation of British Rail in the mid 1990s (see chapter four). 
Supporters of privatisation now offer political and economic experience, as well as 
theoretical assertions, to justify pursuing the policy. In terms of politics, studies have shown 
that people who bought shares in denationalised companies, or council houses under the 
`Right to Buy' scheme, have been, in the short term at least, more likely to vote for the 
government in office (Saunders, 1991). In addition, revenue raised from privatisation can be 
used - in some cases explicitly - to fend off tax increases or public expenditure reductions 
(Jenkins, 1995; Segall, 1998). From an economic perspective, private firms have often 
performed more efficiently than their nationalised counterparts as they were subjected to 
market disciplines and `freed' from government involvement in their day to day operations 
(The Economist, 1995a). 
However, the welter of attention paid to the political and economic experience of 
privatisation has tended to result in many authors downplaying the role of neoliberal theory 
in the development of privatisation policy. Kay and Thompson (1986: 18) refer to the latter 
as being "in search of a rationale, " and Jenkins (1995: 24) suggests that the Conservatives' 
initial endorsement of privatisation was "hardly a ringing ideological crusade. " Atkinson and 
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Savage (1994: 7), whilst acknowledging the influence of neoliberalism within the academic 
community, have questioned whether the theories of Hayek, Friedman and Buchanan had 
"real effects upon `pragmatic' politicians such as Thatcher who were primarily concerned 
with achieving and retaining power. " Farnham and Horton (1993) rightly point out that it 
would be naive to assume that the Conservatives were hijacked by neoliberal radicalism 
throughout their time in office and, as this chapter will show, key neoliberal goals were 
undoubtedly marginalised as privatisation policy unravelled in practice. Nevertheless, 
without falling into an Enlightenment trap and believing, like Keynes (1964: 383), that "the 
world is ruled by little else" than the ideas of economists and political philosophers, the 
influence of neoliberalism on the initial development of privatisation policy during the 1970s 
should not be discounted (Atkinson and Savage, 1994). Key to this argument, of course, is 
that the Conservatives did not have much political and economic experience of privatisation 
at that time. Although a handful of small concerns, such as the Thomas Cook travel agency, 
had been sold by previous administrations, nothing approaching a sustained programme of 
divestiture had ever been attempted. 
Support within the Conservative Party for a sustained programme of privatisation began to 
materialise in the late 1960s (Conservative Research Department (CRD), 1968), although it 
was concentrated initially around a small group of politicians on the right of the Party. Keith 
Joseph in particular became obsessed with the `ratchet effect' of British politics - essentially, 
that the influence and power of the state was continuously increasing because new 
Conservative governments were unwilling to reverse nationalisations undertaken by 
previous Labour ones (Joseph, 1976). In 1968, a secret report of the Policy Group on 
Nationalised Industries, chaired by Nicholas Ridley, explicitly objected to public sector 
corporations and went on to suggest a policy strategy which amounted to the beginnings of 
a coherent privatisation programme: 
"... we have listed a number of small concerns which should be denationalised - £60 million worth - 
and these should be tackled at once. Steel, the airlines and road haulage represent £900 million worth of 
assets. We believe it is possible to sell them back... [but denationalisation] should be a continuing process of 
which our proposals are only the first stage" (CRD, 1968: iv and 20). 
Following Ridley's report, Conservative MP Rhodes Boyson edited a book, Goodbye to 
Nationalisation, which argued that public sector industries had been a political and social 
failure, and that there was a need to return them to a competitive framework (Boyson, 
1971). Suggestions were made regarding how this might be done (see Lewis, 1971), 
although they were not elaborated upon in any great detail and Foster (1992: 108) has 
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accused Goodbye to Nationalisation as being "less than penetrating in its arguments. " 
Nevertheless, Boyson's book can be regarded as important if only because it was one of the 
first public expositions of large-scale privatisation from a Conservative MP. 
The official Conservative Party position on denationalisation in the early 1970s was not 
swayed by right-wing fringe opinion. The 1970-74 Heath administration was committed to 
the welfare state consensus, and the 1970 Campaign Guide (Conservative Party, 1970), 
although emphasising the belief that political interference in the affairs of public 
corporations was deleterious, was unsympathetic to a sustained programme of privatisation. 
A noticeable shift in the Party's official stance did not occur until the election of Thatcher as 
leader in 1975. Shortly after becoming Conservative Party leader, Thatcher attended a 
policy seminar at the CRD in London. During the seminar, a researcher presented a paper 
which argued that the Party believed in, and should continue subscribing to, the welfare 
state consensus. However, before the researcher had finished, 
"... the new Party leader reached into her briefcase and took out a book. It was Friedrich von 
Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty. Interrupting our pragmatist, she held the book up for us all to see. 
'This', she said sternly, `is what we believe', and banged Hayek down on the table" (Ranelagh, 1991: ix. 
Italics added). 
Official Conservative Party literature published between 1975 and 1979 (see, for example, 
Conservative Party, 1976a, 1976b, 1979a; Fowler, 1977; Howe et al., 1977) began to 
emphasise key neoliberal ideas. Echoing Joseph's earlier concerns regarding the ratchet 
effect, the Conservative Right warned that the decades of welfare state consensus had 
resulted in governments making unacceptable infringements upon individual liberty, and that 
nationalisation was in large part responsible for this (Johnson, 1978). Official party 
statements restated the key themes of The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek, 1960): "[We] 
need to enlarge freedom of choice for the individual by reducing the power of the state" 
(Conservative Party, 1979a: 1); "Our purpose is to restore and defend individual freedom 
and individual responsibility" (Conservative Party, 1976b: 1). Johnson (1978) asserted, 
quoting Hayek (1944), that Britain was driving at speed along `the road to serfdom. ' 
Central to the case for privatisation was that it would apply the brakes: 
"We shall [restore individual freedom] by reducing the proportion of the nation's wealth consumed 
by the state [and] by taking the first steps towards making this country a nation of worker-owners" 
(Conservative Party, 1976b: 1) 
"The long term aim must be to reduce the preponderance of state ownership and to widen the 
base 
of ownership in our community. Ownership by the state is not the same as ownership by the people" 
(Howe 
et al., 1977: 47). 
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The Conservative Right also began to draw upon the work of Buchanan (1978) and 
Friedman (1962) to justify its support for privatisation. First, the nationalised industries 
were portrayed as being run for the benefit of politicians and bureaucrats rather than 
consumers (Veljanovski, 1987). For instance, as the Conservatives suspected in opposition 
and were to find when they took office in 1979, many of the profitable corporations were 
required to forego important capital investment programmes because their cash surpluses 
were siphoned off by government to help fulfil its macroeconomic objectives (Heald and 
Steel, 1981). Second, because some of the nationalised industries were monopolies, and 
none were subject to true market forces, it was argued that they were complacent, 
inefficient and offered poor standards of service (Conservative Party, 1974,1977). As such, 
emphasis was placed upon the need for the privatisation programme to foster a competitive 
free market and remove government involvement from industry altogether: 
"... Conservatives reject the idea that [for example] transport ought to be regarded primarily as a 
social service to which the taxpayer must be forced to contribute huge and continuing subsidies in order to 
secure social and political objectives selected by government... [T]he best way to ensure the public interest is 
to promote free competition between the providers and free choice between the users" (Conservative Party, 
1977: 364). 
That said, a confidential report leaked to The Economist in 1978 accepted as had Friedman 
that some industries, particularly the utilities, were natural monopolies and were likely to 
remain so (Veljanovski, 1987). 
Thus it can be argued that the Conservative Right approached the 1979 general election 
with limited practical experience of privatisation, but with an expectation derived from 
neoliberal ideology that it should deliver enhanced individual freedom by: a) promoting 
competition, rather than monopoly, in an industry's market to allow voluntary exchange 
between individuals, and b) genuinely reducing the powers of the state to manage an 
industry and the production/distribution of its goods and services. ' In addition, promoting 
competition and downsizing the state were expected to stimulate industrial efficiency, 
encourage risk-taking and refocus corporate activities on the interests of consumers. It is 
important to note, therefore, that although each of the three means of privatisation listed 
above - asset transfer, liberalisation and contracting out - can be executed separately, an 
1 It is important to recognise that the government will always retain a degree of control over any enterprise. 
Companies are subject to law, taxes, safety legislation and so on. Although pure neoliberal theory argues 
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effective combination of these might be necessary to achieve a genuine reduction in the 
power of the state over an industry. To illustrate, simply transferring the assets of a 
monopolist would do nothing to liberalise the market in which it operated, and could 
necessitate a continuing role for government as an industry regulator. 
Given Thatcher's "vehement... wish to roll back the borders of the public sector" (Foster, 
1992: 109) and the enthusiasm of the Conservative Right for privatisation, it is perhaps 
surprising that the Party's 1979 manifesto (Conservative Party, 1979b) was distinctly 
circumspect regarding the idea. Indeed, the word `privatisation' did not appear, and pledges 
were made only to sell shares in the National Freight Corporation (NFC), to relax bus- 
licensing controls and to reconsider the ownership of British Aerospace, British 
Shipbuilders and the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). The Queen's speech of 
1979 was equally vague, outlining only "proposals [to] reduce the extent of nationalised and 
state ownership and increase competition" (quoted in McLachlan, 1983: 21). 
Two key reasons seem to explain why the manifesto did not reflect the Conservative Right's 
enthusiasm for privatisation. First, the concept was at this stage still unpopular with the 
majority of the population (Heath et al., 1985). Opposition was also forthcoming from 
public sector industry, Conservative backbenchers and especially some quarters of the civil 
service, who regarded privatisation as dangerously radical (Foster, 1992). Thatcher, despite 
her often belligerent outward appearance, was politically cautious (Jenkins, 1995) and was 
determined not to lose the election before it even took place. 2 As Howe (1994: 254) 
recalled, Thatcher "had been fearful that a more extensive catalogue might frighten the 
floating voter. " Although the privatisation programme gained momentum throughout the 
1980s, Thatcher's political caution, as chapter four will show, was to resurface during 
debates over the BR sell-off. Second, the Conservatives had not actually formulated 
privatisation policy in any great detail during their time in opposition. Although the Party's 
right wing had embraced privatisation as a corollary of neoliberal theory, a blueprint 
regarding how it could actually be executed in practice - which companies could be sold and 
how, for example - had not been produced. Oliver Letwin, one of Thatcher's policy 
advisors, admitted in 1988 that although: 
that safety laws are generally superfluous - choice is said to protect the consumer and the worker 
(see 
Friedman, 1962; 1980) - the Conservatives never claimed that they accepted this line of thought. 
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"... we had a fundamental distrust in the state running things... we had no coherent policy. It was 
not the case that we knew that privatisation would bring in millions of new shareholders. It was not the case 
that we knew all these shareholders would benefit from premiums. It was not the case that we knew 
companies would do better in the private sector. Almost nothing that has happened since was known in 
advance" (quoted in Foster, 1992: 109). 
The combination of widespread opposition and the lack of a policy blueprint resulted in the 
privatisation programme developing slowly during Thatcher's first term in office. A 
dedicated Cabinet committee, E (DL) (Economic (Disposal)), was set up although Thatcher 
remained cautious. According to Ridley (1991: 83), the Prime Minister would not risk 
embarking upon a major privatisation programme because "she didn't want to stir up the 
lobbies in the public sector. She felt we could come to that in a few years' time. " As a 
result, the first industries to be privatised were the most convenient to dispose of - such as 
those which had only recently been nationalised - not necessarily the most strategically 
important. Shortly after the election, five per cent of British Petroleum (BP) was sold, 
which reduced the government's share to 46 per cent and thereby officially returned the 
company to the private sector (Letwin, 1988). Before the election in 1983, a further nine 
firms had been sold by asset transfer to the private sector (see table 2.1). The industrial 
privatisations of the early 1980s were complemented by the initiation of the `Right to Buy' 
scheme, which entitled sitting tenants to purchase their council houses at a discounted rate, 
and the contracting out of local authority services such as street cleaning and refuse 
collection (Bishop and Kay, 1988). Liberalisation of the long-distance coach industry also 
took place following the 1980 Transport Act (White, 1995). 
The early results of the privatisation process were encouraging from the viewpoint of the 
Conservative Right. The policy was promoted as having reduced or virtually eliminated the 
government's powers to control the divested companies. 3 As a result of their new-found 
`freedom', the companies had become more competitive and achieved major efficiency gains 
- the NFC, for example, increased its profitability sevenfold (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; 
Grimstone, 1990). Although in retrospect the 1979-83 programme of divestiture seems 
relatively unambitious, it was important to the policy's subsequent development. The effect 
of its perceived success was to convert many Conservative backbenchers, who had initially 
regarded privatisation with some scepticism, to the Right's ideological cause. The policy's 
2 This was also attested to by a number of her former Cabinet colleagues interviewed during the course of 
this thesis. Throughout the chapter, some references are made to respondents' comments. The means of 
their collection and analysis are detailed in the next chapter. 3 In reality, it was not always the case that the government forswore as much control as it might have done. 
Golden Shares, for example, were often retained to prevent `undesirable' (i. e. foreign) takeovers or 
to 
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radical image with civil servants and voters was also softened considerably (Foster, 1992). 
The Conservative Party's 1983 election manifesto confirmed that privatisation would be 
extended to embrace the utility industries (Conservative Party, 1983), and that the first such 
candidate for divestiture would be BT. 
Date Company sold Proceeds (£m)_ 
November 1979 BP 290 
June 1980 Fairey Engineering 22 
June 1980 Ferranti 54 
February 1981 British Aerospace 149 
November 1981 Cable & Wireless 224 
February 1982 Amersham International 63 
February 1982 National Freight Consortium 7 
February 1983 Associated British Ports 22 
March 1983 International Aeradio 60 
March 1983 British Rail Hotels 45 
Table 2.1. Companies privatised by asset transfer during the first Thatcher administration. 
Source: Bishop and Kay, 1988; Wright and Thompson, 1994. 
2.4 Privatising the network industries 
The utilities were significantly different in character to those industries previously divested. 
First, they were much bigger companies. At the time, for example, the BT sale represented 
the largest transfer of assets from the public to the private sector in world history 
(Veljanovski, 1987). Second, they traded as vertically integrated monopolies. As already 
noted, until the late 1970s it was assumed that almost all of the utilities' business 
constituted natural monopoly because competition was only feasible if second networks 
were constructed (Harrison, 1982). However, technological developments began to 
challenge this assumption, and it was realised that any number of different companies could 
in fact compete via the same pipes or wires to supply consumers with gas, electricity or 
telecommunications services. Thus, although the networks themselves remained natural 
monopolies, the rest of the utilities' activities were exposed as a collection of artificial 
monopolies. The Conservatives acknowledged this (Moore, 1983a), and indicated that, if 
re-elected, they would seek to break them: 
"... our aim is that BT should become a private sector company... [but] merely to replace state 
monopolies by private ones would be to waste a historic opportunity... we shall continue our programme to 
expose state-owned industries to competition" (Conservative Party, 1983: 292). 
restrict third parties' voting rights (see Graham and Prosser, 1994; Howe, 1994). Nevertheless, ministers 
could no longer control the management of the companies, or influence production/distribution matters. 
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Following the Conservatives' election victory, the minister then in charge of privatisation, 
John Moore, added that: 
"The long term success of the privatisation programme will stand or fall by the extent to which it 
maximises competition. If competition cannot be achieved, an historic opportunity will have been lost" 
(Moore, 1983b: 92). 
The simplest way to liberalise statutory monopolies is to remove legal barriers to market 
entry. The 1982 Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act and the 1983 Energy Act undertook this for 
the gas and electricity industries respectively and allowed competing energy suppliers to 
gain access to the nationalised distribution networks. However, as Veljanovski (1989) 
points out, and as Friedman (1962) had predicted (see section 2.2), competition failed to 
materialise because the Acts made no attempt to restrict the nationalised industries from 
engaging in anti-competitive practices. Both BG and the electricity industry manipulated 
their accounting procedures to make it economically unattractive for potential new suppliers 
to enter their markets. In the case of telecommunications, the government commissioned a 
report (Beesley, 1981) which concluded that BT should be forced to sell spare capacity on 
its network to potential competitors. However, reactions to this suggestion were mixed. 
Although generally favoured by users' groups, BT and the trades unions were hostile, with 
the Post Office Engineering Union noting that Beesley's work "was widely criticised as 
being rushed, and inadequate in its evidence and conclusions" (quoted in Harrison, 1982: 
17). In the event, the 1981 Telecommunications Act maintained BT's call monopoly but 
introduced some competition into `fringe' areas of its activities such as equipment supply. A 
promise was made to review this decision in 1989 (Foster, 1992). 
A chance for the government to conduct an early re-evaluation of this policy came with the 
decision to sell BT. The failure of previous legislation to affect the gas and electricity 
monopolies led Treasury ministers, in particular Nigel Lawson, to press for a different 
method of breaking BT's monopoly. One such method would have been to complement the 
removal of entry barriers with a strengthening of competition law to prevent BT from 
abusing its position. However, Lawson favoured a more radical alternative -a full-scale 
reorganisation of the telecommunications industry (Jenkins, 1995). A logical outcome of 
Lawson's idea would have been to split BT into a number of enterprises. One would have 
retained control of the network, and thus kept its natural monopoly status, whilst others 
would have competed amongst each other to provide telecommunications and related 
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services to the public. Academics such as Kay and Silbertson (1984: 15) sided with Lawson 
and urged the government to take its commitment to competition seriously. Aside from 
considerations of liberty, evidence had emerged to suggest that the key to improving 
industrial performance was not a simple change of ownership, as might have been 
concluded from the earlier divestitures, but competition. Thus, as Kay and Silbertson (1984: 
15) argued, it was imperative to break BT's monopoly because "the benefits of privatisation 
are likely to be small, or non-existent, in the absence of measures to create a more 
competitive environment within which the newly-privatised concerns will operate. " 
Although they acknowledged that the government would encounter resistance if it tinkered 
with the structure of BT, not least from vested interests such as management and the trades 
unions, Kay and Silbertson suggested that a competitive environment would be easier to 
create before privatisation than after. 
In the event, the government made only minor revisions to the telecommunications policy it 
had announced in 1981. BT was sold as a "virtual monopoly" guaranteed by statute for at 
least six years (Moore, 1985a: 94), and only one competitor, Mercury Communications, 
was allowed to enter the market. Mercury had been licensed to build its own long distance 
network in 1982, but from 1984 it was allowed access to BT's network in an attempt to 
generate some realistic competition (Veljanovski, 1989). 4 However, its disadvantage was 
huge. Although it was hoped that Mercury would be carrying around five per cent of total 
telecommunications traffic from the outset, it in fact took until 1991 to reach this figure, 
and even by 1996 around 10 per cent of residential and business customers were unable to 
access the Mercury network (Foster, 1992; Conservative Party, 1996). 
Why should the Conservatives, driven by a philosophy of "personal freedom, individuality, 
choice and opportunity" (Conservative Party, 1984: 1), choose to divest one of its largest 
industrial concerns as a virtual monopoly? Thatcher (1993: 67) suggests that a full-scale 
reorganisation of BT would have been delayed to an unacceptable degree by obstacles such 
as the lack of modern accounting and management systems. Thompson (1990) and Marsh 
(1991) suggest in addition that BT's management did not favour a break up and advised 
Thatcher that it would not be in the industry's interests. Thus the Conservatives concluded 
that, although overlooking competition, a monopoly sale was advantageous in that 
it could 
be achieved quickly and with relative ease: 
° The cost of this access was regulated by the Office of Telecommunications (see below) 
in order to ensure 
that BT could not discriminate against Mercury. 
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"... if it was a choice between having the ideal circumstances for privatisation, which might take 
years to achieve, and going for a choice within a politically determined timescale, the second was the 
preferable option" (Thatcher, 1993: 676). 
To a certain extent this version of events is plausible. Restructuring BT would, based on 
subsequent experience, have taken two or three years, and a lack of management co- 
operation would have created a host of difficulties for ministers during this period, not least 
in terms of public relations. Given that the privatisation of BT was breaking significant new 
ground, it might be argued that the government was wise not to create unnecessary 
obstacles for itself in a prominent policy area. 
However, whilst these considerations may have been influential, further evidence suggests 
that they were not decisive. It can forcefully be argued that the government's primary 
motivation for selling BT as a monopoly was financial (The Economist, 1995b). 5 During her 
first term in office Thatcher had learnt that not only could privatisation roll back the 
frontiers of the state and increase competition, but it could also produce a number of other 
benefits. Key among these was that its proceeds could be used to reduce the public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) (Mitchell, 1990). The Conservatives had committed 
themselves to reducing the PSBR in their 1979 election manifesto as part of a wider 
neoliberal policy agenda (Conservative Party, 1979) but, partly because of pledges to 
increase spending on defence and health, and partly because of rising unemployment, the 
government found itself unable to reduce public expenditure. Indeed, rather than falling, it 
actually rose from 40.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1978/79 to 43.5 per 
cent in 1982/83 (Veljanovski, 1987). 
Ministers had realised in 1980 that privatisation could be used to restore some order to 
public finances. Sales proceeds, combined with the transfer of the nationalised industries' 
investment requirements to the private sector, could offset reductions in public expenditure 
as a means of cutting public borrowing. As Jenkins (1995) has dryly remarked, selling 
public assets was politically much easier and more popular than cutting public expenditure. 
The then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe (1994: 254) has admitted that, in 
the early 1980s, "the sensible disposal of public sector assets had grown in urgency, not 
least as a short-term way of helping reduce the PSBR. " But whereas the early privatisations 
had impacted only modestly on public finances (see table 2.1), the potential contribution of 
5 In fact, Foster (1992) also believes that this was the most important reason why BT was privatised per se. 
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BT was huge - the company was valued at around £5.5 billion. BT's high market value was 
strongly connected to its significant market dominance, however, and had the Conservatives 
broken BT into a host of competing parts the sale price would have fallen and its 
contribution to the PSBR deficit would have been reduced (The Economist, 1995b; 
Veljanovski, 1989). 
Brittan (1984: 113) asserts that it is "ludicrous to suppose that major industrial decisions 
such as whether to denationalise the telephone system" were taken to massage public 
finances. Nevertheless, there is a strong case to be made for interpreting the monopoly sale 
of BT as a pragmatic solution to an economic problem. Given the expanding PSBR in 
1983/84, and the government's realisation that this could be tackled by privatisation, it 
seems likely that financial advantage is the most plausible explanation for competition being 
marginalised in the BT sell-off. It is ironic that the cash surpluses of privatisation - just as 
those of nationalisation beforehand - had come to make such a major contribution towards 
fulfilling the government's macroeconomic objectives. 
Following the sale of BT, government statements regarding competition in the utilities were 
contradictory. On the one hand, responding to charges similar to that presented above, 
ministers re-emphasised the importance of market liberalisation. John Moore noted that: 
"[Labour] argue that we are selling off assets because we desperately need the money. Nothing 
could be further from the truth... [O]pening up nationalised industry to competition is not about balancing 
the books. It is about choice" (Moore, 1985b: 1). 
On the other hand, it was admitted that BT faced practically no competition, and privatising 
BG and the water industry as monopolies was advocated. Revising earlier claims that the 
utilities' monopolies were in large part artificial (see section 2.4), Moore (1985a: 95) now 
suggested they were natural, and argued that it would be "wasteful or impractical to break 
them up. " Subsequent government policy developed adopting this latter view. BG was sold 
as a statutory monopoly in 1986 and, although some limited competition existed with the 
electricity industry (Adamson et al., 1991), any threat of competitive entry into the gas 
market, however unlikely, was removed. The water industry was restructured before 
privatisation, but little genuine competition resulted because a series of regional monopolies 
was created. Arguments advanced by opponents of liberalisation claimed that 6 
6 Although technically this provided scope for some direct competition around the `borders', and some 
indirect competition by way of `emulation' (see chapter six), the principal theoretical benefit of this 
restructuring was that it would ease the regulator's task by providing yardsticks for 
him to judge 
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contemporary technology, in both the water and gas industries, was insufficient to allow 
competing suppliers access to the domestic markets (Foster, 1992), although the validity of 
such claims is difficult to determine because the government did not extensively investigate 
the range of options available. ' 
It has already been noted that the simple transfer of a monopoly from the public to the 
private sector, aside from doing nothing to liberalise the market, necessitates an industry 
role for government as a regulator to prevent the monopolist from abusing its position. 
Section 2.2 pointed out that theorists such as Friedman (1962) do not object to 
governmental regulation of natural monopoly because they recognise that consumer 
protection measures are necessary where competition is impractical. However, the 
regulation of artificial monopolies - of which many of BT's activities were examples - 
exceeds that which is acceptable for most neoliberals because it results in unnecessary state 
activity. As Littlechild (1983: 7) points out, competition is believed "indisputably [to be] the 
most effective means - perhaps ultimately the only effective means - of protecting 
consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is... not a substitute for competition. " 
Nevertheless, in the absence of competition the Conservatives were forced to devise 
suitable regulation prior to the divestiture of the utilities, and a dedicated regulatory body 
was assigned to each utility. 8 The next section reviews the nature and scope of utility 
regulation and assesses the extent to which this enabled the state to maintain a continuing 
role in the companies' affairs. 
2.5 Regulation, surrogate competition and the continuing role of the state 
An all encompassing definition of regulation has eluded politicians and scholars alike, 
although Hancher and Moran (1989) suggest two uses of the term which predominate over 
all others. First, regulation theory is a political economy approach to the theorisation of 
capital accumulation, sometimes advanced from a neo-marxist perspective (Aglietta, 1979, 
Lipietz, 1993; Jessop, 1997). It integrates the patterns of production, consumption and 
exchange (the regime of accumulation) with the role of political and social relations (the 
mode of social regulation, or MSR) which serve to secure the integrity and cohesion of the 
comparative performance. However, as Foster (1992) argues, comparisons have proved difficult because the 
greatly varying characteristics of each company have resulted in considerable differences in costs and other 
measures of efficiency (although see Williams, 1992). 
7 One respondent, who was directly involved in selling both industries, claimed that competition in the 
domestic market would have been feasible in both industries. 
8 BT is regulated by the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel); BG by the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas); the 
water industry by the Office of Water Services (Ofwat); and the electricity suppliers by the 
Office of 
Electricity Regulation (Offer). 
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accumulation process (Tonts and Jones, 1996). Therefore the principal contribution of 
regulation theory is its conception, based on the integration of political, economic and social 
relations, of capitalist industrial society being founded on a regulatory system or form of 
governance which guarantees the reproduction of the regime of accumulation (Michalak, 
1994). 
Second, and of specific relevance here, statutory regulation describes a specific framework 
of legal and/or administrative rules determining acceptable courses of action to be followed 
by economic agents (Hancher and Moran, 1989). 9 Various ways exist of achieving such 
regulation, from the one extreme of flexibility or procedural formality, to the other of 
legislation enforceable through the courts (Foster, 1992). Foster (1992) notes that a useful 
distinction within statutory regulation is that between economic regulation, which is 
primarily concerned with monopoly and competition, and social regulation, which revolves 
around safety and environmental issues, notions of `fairness' and product quality. Both 
economic and quality of service regulation were used in combination to provide the utilities 
with a form of `surrogate' competition, that is to say the regulation was designed to 
replicate the effects of actual competition by forcing prices down and efficiency up (The 
Economist, 1995c). 
Unlike in the United States, where utilities have been in the private sector for a considerable 
time, the economic regulation of industry was long-neglected in Britain (the railways were 
regulated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries - see Parris, 1965 - but, following 
nationalisation, the practice was largely abandoned). Economic regulation in the US follows 
the `rate of return' model, which limits the profits a firm can make to an agreed rate of 
return on its employed capital. However, various weaknesses were identified with this type 
of regulation, not least that it often leads to over-capitalisation and regulatory capture (see, 
for example, Thompson, 1990), and this experience led the British government to seek an 
alternative. A report, The regulation of British Telecommunications' profitability 
(Littlechild, 1983), was commissioned to address the issue and suggested a novel price- 
capping mechanism, RPI minus `x'. This requires regulated firms to restrict their price 
increases to a fixed level below the rate of inflation for a given number of years. In this way, 
firms are incentivised to increase efficiency as they are allowed to retain any profits they 
9 The two interpretations of regulation - theory and statutory - are by no means separate and 
distinct. As 
noted by Leyshon (1992: 250), the form of "systematic equilibrium in operation at any one time will 
influence the drafting and administration of a system of legal rules and guidelines which are used to 
define 
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make within their price cap over the specified period. The difference between rate of return 
regulation, which revolves around profit, and RPI minus `x', which focuses on price, is 
fundamental. As Hillman and Braeutigam (1989: 37) point out: 
"A shift from profit to price level regulation effects a shift of risks and benefits between the firm 
and its consumers... [P]rofit level regulation assigns to consumers the risks of cost increases and the benefits 
of cost reductions, while price level regulation reassigns them both to the firm. " 
Littlechild suggested that only the monopoly elements of BT's business - for example, local 
calls, connection charges and rentals - should be subject to RPI minus `x', and that areas 
where the potential for competition existed - in particular, long-distance calls - should not. 
Although the logic of his position might have suggested the need for a range of individual 
price caps, one for each monopoly service, potential complexities led him to recommend a 
tariff `basket', within which BT's monopoly elements should be placed and whose average 
price level must not rise over RPI minus `x'. The tariff basket approach was adopted by the 
government. Interestingly, however, perhaps illustrating ministers' apprehension regarding 
the size of the competitive threat posed by Mercury, long-distance calls were included 
(Foster, 1992). 
RPI minus `x' was retained as the means of economic regulation for BG and the water 
industry. However, the formula was modified slightly to account for certain costs which 
were regarded as being subject to fluctuation beyond management control. These costs - 
North Sea gas in the case of BG and unpredictable government commitments to, for 
example, EU anti-pollution directives in the water industry - are passed directly on to 
consumers. The revised formula for the gas industry was RPI minus `x' plus `y' (where `y' 
was the cost of North Sea gas), whereas for the water industry it became RPI plus `k' 
(where `k' represented the sum required for new investment `y' less the efficiency gains `x') 
(Helm, 1987; Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). However, such modifications tend to 
compromise the fundamental difference between rate of return regulation and RPI minus `x' 
because they re-assign costs to the consumer. Because BG can pass on the cost of any 
North Sea gas contract to consumers, it need not concern itself with securing the best price 
for that gas. Likewise, the water industry is not forced to `shop around' among suppliers 
when it undertakes government-required enhancement schemes. Of course, it could be 
argued that the `y' and `k' factors were necessary regulatory characteristics in the gas and 
the range of permissible practices open to economic agents. " However, it is beyond the scope of the chapter 
to explore this connection (although see, for example, Leyshon, 1992). 
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water privatisations in order to introduce a degree of stability into the industries. Equally, 
however, they can be interpreted as further evidence of the government's desire to 
maximise sales revenues because the new factors removed considerable financial risks for 
potential investors. 
Social regulation has been imposed upon the utilities both through conditions in their 
licences and action by their respective regulators. BT, BG and the water industry are all 
required to satisfy certain safety requirements, in particular regarding the well-being of their 
workers, and fulfil environmental responsibilities where appropriate. The water industry, for 
example, is obliged to provide unpolluted water and the Director General of Ofgas is 
required to promote, as far as possible, the efficient use of energy (Foster, 1992). The 
utilities' licences also stipulate that a `fair' level of service should be provided for 
consumers. Such an obligation is not concerned with notions of social justice in the sense 
that utility prices should in some way seek to redistribute income (Oftel, 1986; Burns et al., 
1995). Instead, because monopolists are in a position to deprive consumers of their only 
means of obtaining a particular good, the utilities are generally required to provide universal 
service without discriminating their prices, terms or conditions. Finally, certain customer 
groups, such as the disabled or poor, have been protected. BT, for example, must provide 
various services for the blind at no extra cost, and has agreed to provide rebates on line 
rental for those with low bills. 
Explicit provisions to regulate service quality were not included in plans to privatise BT and 
BG. The government's initial lack of attention in this area is perhaps surprising given that 
deteriorating service quality is a potential side-effect of the RPI minus `x' method of 
economic regulation. As Foster (1992) observes, once an `x' value has been fixed, a firm 
must cut costs in order to maintain its profitability, and a simple way to achieve this is by 
lowering its output standards. Immediately after privatisation, BT stopped publishing 
performance data it had been required to disseminate as a public corporation, and public 
sentiment - in the absence of hard data - suggested a decline in service standards. An Oftel 
investigation confirmed this to be the case, and BT was required to accept some financial 
liability if it failed to provide certain services to a given standard (Rovizzi and Thompson, 
1992). Complaints about BG's service standards also increased following privatisation 
(Chapman, 1990) and, in the light of this experience, quality of service regulation including 
a financial liability scheme was formally established prior to the divestiture of the water 
industry (see table 2.2). 
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Service Performance level Payment if not achieved 
Appointments to visit customer (i) Specify morning or afternoon on £10 
relevant day 
(ii) Keep specified appointment £10 
Responding to written account 
queries 
Responding to requests to change 
payment methods or arrangements 
if it is not possible to meet the 
request 
Responding to written complaints: 
(a) No further action necessary 
(b) Further action 
Warning notices of a planned 
interruption to water supply 
Restoring supplies: 
(a) Planned interruptions 
(b) Unplanned interruptions (e. g. 
bursts) 
Installing a meter at customer's 
request 
Within 20 working days £10 
Within 10 working days £10 
(i) Substantive reply within 10 working £10 
days 
(ii) Holding reply within 10 working £10 
days, and substantive reply within 20 
At least 24 hours' notice to be given for £10 
interruptions lasting more than 4 hours 
By the time specified in a warning notice £10 
(i) Within 48 hours for strategic main £10, plus £10 for each 
additional 24 hours 
(ii) Within 24 hours in all other cases £10, plus £10 for each 
additional 24 hours 
Within 15 working days of payment £10 
Flooding from sewers No waste water to enter customer's Refund of year's sewage 
building charges (up to a 
maximum of £1,000) 
Table 2.2. Summary of quality of service regulation in the water industry (certain 
complexities are omitted here for the sake of clarity). Source: Gray and Ramanadham, 
1994. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to assess the efficacy of the above regulatory 
mechanisms and institutions in terms of their consumer protection outcomes (a thorough 
review can be found in Lowndes, 1997). Rather, emphasis here is placed upon the 
consequences of such regulation in terms of the state's continuing role in the utilities' 
affairs. Of course, as discussed in section 2.3, a key objective of privatisation initially 
identified by the Conservatives was to reduce the powers of the state to control an industry. 
Senker (1989: 179) has claimed that the utility privatisations represented a "triumph of 
ideology over economics, " implying the above objective was fulfilled, although it is difficult 
to see how he arrives at this conclusion. As Kay and Thompson (1986: 31) point out: 
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`Privatisation in the United Kingdom... increasingly [came] to emphasise the virtues of 
denationalisation over, and even at the expense of, the promotion of competition... The conflict between 
privatisation and liberalisation... is no longer a conflict but a rout. " 
In the absence of meaningful competition, the state could not withdraw in any simple sense 
from the privatised sectors. The introduction of regulatory mechanisms to act as surrogate 
competition represented continued statutory involvement in the affairs of the utilities despite 
a change of ownership. For example, quality of service regulation represented control over 
the production of goods and services, and universal service obligations amounted to a 
degree of control over their distribution. Thompson (1990) suggests that privatisation 
swapped a previously `close' form of intervention - nationalisation - for intervention `at a 
distance' - regulation. However, Thompson might be understating his case. According to 
Foster (1992: 124), the system of regulation adopted following privatisation was not at all 
distant; in fact, it was more systematic and penetrating than that which it superseded. 
Regulation under nationalisation was "rubbed smooth to achieve consensus, ... reflected 
mainly administrative and some political considerations, quickly ran into difficulties and 
ended by pleasing no-one. " Certainly, the constitutional relationship between government 
and its public corporations was such that effective regulation was difficult to enact. In a 
speech in 1981, Howe (quoted in Foster, 1992: 114) explained that the government was 
empowered only to issue instructions of a `general character, ' and that: 
"... any specific command like 'make sure the 8.15am from Victoria runs on time' would be legally 
unenforceable. The government's only real weapon is the threat to reduce or cut off external funds. This is 
far too drastic to be effective. It is like equipping traffic wardens with anti-tank guns but depriving them of 
the right to leave parking tickets. " 
Privatisation gave ministers the opportunity to address this constitutional loophole. The 
regulatory briefs of Oftel, Ofgas and Ofwat were very much moulded by objectives and 
guidance issued by central government acting in the light of previous experience (Jenkins, 
1995; Thompson, 1990), and regulators were given powers to address specific areas of 
poor utility performance. As has already been noted, these were used in the cases of BT and 
BG. 
Moreover, despite the technical independence of the regulators, the utilities were not 
protected from potential and actual governmental interference in their affairs. Because the 
government retained the right to change the regulators' briefs through legislation, ministers 
could overrule, say, an Oftel decision regarding the appropriate value for `x' 
in the RPI 
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minus `x' formula. As Veljanovski (1987) points out, this introduced a degree of 
uncertainty into the utilities' businesses, and gave the government potential influence over 
the companies' profitability, share prices, investment plans and so on. Evidence also 
indicates that government pressure was sometimes used to `inform' the regulators' day to 
day decisions. For example, following Ofwat's decision to force a price reduction in the 
South West, it was Conservative ministers and politicians who claimed credit for having 
brought this about (Jenkins, 1995). On a separate occasion, Nicholas Ridley (1991: 83), 
boasted revealingly that "the utilities which we have privatised... are more easily controlled 
when they are in the private sector. " 
At stake in the utility privatisations was the form of government intervention rather than its 
existence (Kay and Vickers, 1988; Thompson, 1990). Hancher and Moran (1989: 131) 
suggest that what began as an intent to withdraw from the intervention arena resulted in 
"not so much a change in the content of rules, or a departure from regulatory objectives, 
[but simply] an adjustment to the means of enforcement. " Letwin (1988) concurs, noting 
that the state retained powerful control over the network industries following their 
divestiture. The privatisation of the utilities throughout the 1980s was as much - if not more 
- of an exercise in the formulation of regulatory mechanisms and institutions as it was an 
attempt to promote competition and reduce state control over the utility industries. 
2.6 Utility privatisation reviewed - lessons for the 1990s 
This chapter has examined the development of utility privatisation policy throughout the 
1980s. It began by reviewing the key characteristics of neoliberalism and argued that, 
despite the tendency in recent literature to downplay the theory's role in privatisation policy 
development, its influence - at least initially - was considerable. It was suggested that the 
Conservative Right saw privatisation as a means of enhancing individual liberty, the 
fundamental concern of neoliberal theory, by: a) promoting competition, rather than 
monopoly, in an industry's market to allow voluntary exchange between individuals, and b) 
genuinely reducing the powers of the state to control an industry and the 
production/distribution of its goods and services. In addition, market liberalisation and state 
downsizing were expected to result in improved industrial efficiency, innovation and 
customer care. 
However, Gamble (1994) rightly points out that the 1980s did not see the unfolding of a 
New Right ideological masterplan. Key neoliberal goals were undoubtedly marginalised as 
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privatisation policy unravelled in practice, and this is evidenced by the privatisation of the 
network industries as regulated monopolies. When BT, BG and the water industry were 
divested, the Conservatives failed to meaningfully liberalise their markets and, as a result, 
were forced to create regulatory mechanisms and institutions to prevent the utilities from 
abusing their positions. Such regulation, it was contended, resulted in a significant and 
continuing role for the state in the utilities' affairs despite the transfer of ownership to the 
private sector. Evidence also showed that the utilities' performance, in the absence of 
competition, had not matched those of companies such as the NFC which had been sold 
into an already competitive market place. 
It was against this background that ministers considered the privatisation of the electricity 
industry. The Conservatives' 1987 election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1987) stressed 
the importance of freedom and individualism, and asserted that these could be achieved by 
checking state power. With specific reference to forthcoming privatisations, the manifesto 
noted that: 
"Competition forces the economy to respond to the needs of the consumer. It promotes efficiency, 
holds down costs, drives companies to innovate and ensures that customers get the best value for money" 
(Conservative Party, 1987: 30). 
Although this statement was a move away from John Moore's previous assertion that 
market liberalisation might not be practical or desirable in the case of the utilities (see 
section 2.4), previous experience suggested that a shift in policy would not be forthcoming - 
the rhetoric of competition had not prevented BT, BG and the water industry being sold as 
regulated monopolies. However, in a notable reorientation of policy, plans were unveiled in 
1988 to liberalise the electricity generating industry before divestiture at the turn of the 
decade (Veljanovski, 1989). 
The electricity industry can be divided into three components - generation, transmission (the 
network element) and supply. Prior to divestiture, the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) controlled generation and transmission, and 12 Area Boards supplied electricity to 
customers via their own local distribution systems discrete from the transmission network. 
Industry restructuring did not provide for much immediate competition among the Area 
Boards, with only the largest customers set to benefit from a choice of supplier, although 
plans to relax market entry in the future were advanced (see below). The principal 
achievement of the electricity divestiture was to remove the transmission component 
from 
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the CEGB's control (to become the National Grid) and to further split the CEGB into two 
generating companies (see figure 2.1). 10 Coupled with the removal of entry restrictions, this 
restructuring created a genuinely competitive generating industry. Because National Grid 
was separated from the CEGB, the potential for any one generator to deny others access to 
the network, as had happened following the 1983 Energy Act, was removed. By 1993,14 
licences had been issued to new generators (Littlechild, 1993). As a result, the need for 
surrogate competition was eliminated and, with the exception of anti-trust measures to 
prevent discriminatory practice from National Grid, the industry is now free from statutory 
economic and social regulation. The privatisation of the electricity generators therefore not 
only achieved a transfer of ownership, but also liberalised the market and reduced the 
degree of state control over the industry. 
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Figure 2.1. The structure of the privatised electricity industry in England and Wales. 
Source: Electricity Association, 1998. 
The electricity generating industry has not been the only utility market which has seen 
significant liberalisation in the 1990s. The `duopoly policy' in telecommunications, which 
had restricted entry beyond BT and Mercury, was ended in 1991. The gas supply market 
was liberalised in 1996, when a pilot scheme in south west England allowed all business and 
domestic customers to choose from a range of suppliers - competition has now been 
extended throughout the country (The Guardian, 1997a) - and the electricity supply 
industry was made fully competitive during 1998 (The Guardian, 1997b). Considerable 
10 The two generating companies were later to become three as financial difficulties arose over the nuclear 
generators (see Bowdery, 1994). It is also important to note that the industry description given here relates 
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efficiency gains and customer service improvements have resulted in all these industries 
following the introduction of competition (Lowndes, 1997; Offer, 1999; Ofgas, 1999). The 
liberalisation of the telecommunications and gas industry did not result from an enforced 
reorganisation of either BT or BG. Instead, network ownership has remained with the 
former utility monopolies. " Following the model employed when Mercury was connected 
to BT's network in 1984 (see section 2.4), Oftel and Ofgas have been charged with the 
additional responsibility of ensuring non-discriminatory access for potential competitors. In 
the electricity industry, the Area Boards (now termed Regional Electricity Companies 
(RECs)) have retained ownership of their local distribution networks and thus Offer has a 
similar task. Whilst this extra regulatory activity undoubtedly increased governmental 
influence over the utility industries, it is in fact consistent with neoliberal ideology because it 
essentially constitutes a kind of anti-trust law. Over time, and as actual competition 
increases, the aim is that the regulators can cease many activities inconsistent with the free 
market, in particular those designed to act as surrogate competition (although at the time of 
writing there is little evidence of this taking place). 
It is not clear why the Conservatives chose to re-emphasise the ideological values of 
competition and freedom when they came to privatise the electricity industry. After all, the 
reasons cited by Thompson (1990), Marsh (1991) and Thatcher (1993) as to why BT was 
privatised as a monopoly applied equally to the electricity industry in 1988: `modern' 
accounting and management systems did not exist in the sense that they were incapable of 
underpinning a restructured industry without revision; top-level management argued 
passionately against a break-up of the CEGB, and the plans ultimately led to the resignation 
of its chairman, Walter Marshall (Jenkins, 1995); and the sell-off plans were advanced with 
a similar amount of Parliamentary time remaining before a general election was required. 
Nevertheless, as Thatcher (1993: 684) recalls, she "again and again insisted that whatever 
structure [was created had to] provide genuine competition. " 
One possible explanation is backbench pressure. Some MPs who were initially sceptical of 
the privatisation programme had, over time, come to embrace it with a degree of ideological 
fervour seemingly absent from government circles. One backbencher noted that it was 
unacceptable to transfer a public monopoly from public into private hands, and that "what 
to England and Wales only. Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own, slightly different, industry 
organisation (see Electricity Association, 1998). 
11 BG has split into BGplc (network) and Centrica (supply), although they are still owned by the same 
holding company. 
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Conservative members want is competition" (Hansard, 1986a: Col. 6). A former Secretary 
of State interviewed during the course of this thesis did note that ministers were aware of 
such sentiment among the rank-and-file Parliamentary Party. A second possibility is the 
influence of Cecil Parkinson as Secretary of State for Energy. Parkinson's predecessor, 
Peter Walker, had presided over the BG sell-off and was known to favour another 
monopoly sale (Jenkins, 1995). However Parkinson, according to a respondent, had "very 
strong views" that the government should "never again `do a BT, "' and was convinced that 
the lack of competition and continuing government involvement in the telecommunications 
and gas markets was responsible for BT and BG's limited efficiency gains and poor 
customer service. Parkinson's appointment enhanced the credibility of Lawson's original 
case for competition (see section 2.4) and resulted in a forceful argument for market 
liberalisation being presented to the Cabinet. (Moreover, as will be further evidenced in 
chapter four, Parkinson seemed to enjoy considerable influence over Thatcher regarding 
privatisation policy. ) 
-2 
1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987188 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991192 1992/93 1993/94 
Year 
Figure 2.2. PSBR 1984/85 - 1993/94, showing the effect of privatisation revenue. Source: 
CSO Financial Statistics, 1992,1995. 
A third explanation relates to finance. Section 2.4 argued that the need to address a 
burgeoning PSBR resulted in BT being privatised as a monopoly in order to maximise sales 
proceeds. However by 1988, following several years of strong economic growth, the PSBR 
as a percentage of GDP had fallen considerably and the importance of privatisation revenue 
as a means of `balancing the books' had subsided (see figure 2.2). As Pliatzky (quoted in 
Mitchell, 1990: 24) observes, it was increasingly felt in the Treasury that "the objective of 
reducing public expenditure... [could] be achieved without bringing privatisation receipts 
into the reckoning. " Thus the Conservatives were accorded an opportunity to experiment 
with restructuring the CEGB notwithstanding the lower income the Treasury would receive 
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from the sale of a liberalised industry. There is a strong possibility that the financial climate, 
just as it did in previous utility divestitures, proved decisive in determining the method used 
to privatise the CEGB. In the light of previous experience, it seems unlikely that backbench 
pressure or the appointment of Cecil Parkinson would have resulted in a genuine move 
towards market liberalisation had the government still needed to maximise its revenue from 
the sale. 
Whatever the cause, this renewed commitment to neoliberal values continued in earnest 
throughout the mid 1990s. After the liberalisation of the telecommunications, gas and 
electricity supply industries, the next large network industry privatisation was that of British 
Rail. This was announced in 1992, at a time when the economy had relapsed into recession 
and the state of government finances had worsened considerably (see figure 2.2). 
Nevertheless, ministers announced their determination that BR should not be privatised as a 
monopoly like BT, BG and the water industry had been. Instead, they insisted that 
competition should be introduced into almost every aspect of railway operation, and that 
BR should accordingly be restructured along the lines of the electricity generating industry 
(Gibb et al., 1998). Chapter four documents the evolution of the policy which was designed 
to do this. However, because that and subsequent chapters draw heavily upon original 
empirical research, it is first necessary to review the methods of data collection and analysis 
employed during the production of this thesis. Chapter three therefore undertakes this task. 
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Chapter Three 
Researching rail privatisation 
3.1 Introduction 
As a preliminary to the empirical dimension of the study, this chapter reviews the methods 
employed to collect data in the `field'. It provides an account of how the programme of 
research presented in this thesis was designed, implemented and interpreted. Although it is 
usual, and largely unavoidable, to report on study designs retrospectively, such a practice is 
not without its problems and can be misleading if due care is not exercised by the 
researcher. As Cloke et al. (1995: 356) contend, retrospective accounts can: 
"... both result in a post hoc legitimation of the particular ensemble of concepts and practices which 
pertain at the time of writing, and present a view of the research process which suggests a logical, rational 
and well-ordered progression from original ideas to final `results'. In our experience, such descriptions are 
inaccurate and can be dishonest. " 
Partly in response to Cloke et al. 's concerns, and partly to assist in the general development 
of the research process, it was decided to keep a series of research notes throughout the 
course of the thesis to record comments and observations regarding methods used. In terms 
of this chapter, these notes proved extremely beneficial for recording the structure and 
detail of the research because they gave contemporaneous - as opposed to retrospective - 
accounts justifying decisions to pursue or abandon various initiatives. In a sense, therefore, 
this chapter represents a formally structured overview of the research notes. It attempts to 
present an honest and accurate account of the research process, highlighting where relevant 
the inevitability of flexibility and reflexivity (see May, 1997) within an overall framework 
designed to maintain logic, rationale and order. The chapter begins by identifying and 
justifying the principal methods chosen to collect the data, before reviewing issues arising in 
the preparation and execution of data collection, and describing the analysis process. 
3.2 Research aims and interviews 
As outlined in chapter one, the central aim of the study is to evaluate the extent to which the 
promotion of competition was an appropriate policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. 
It was noted that, in pursuit of this aim, the study draws heavily on interviews with key 
personnel involved in framing, executing and operating within the new railway policy. It 
was immediately recognised that undertaking research of this kind could give rise to 
methodological difficulties. Most obviously, the study would involve conducting interviews 
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with `elites'. Elites are regarded as the influential, the prominent and the well-informed 
people within organisations selected for interview because their expertise is relevant to the 
aims of the research (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). However, using elites as respondents 
can be problematic because they are usually busy people operating under considerable time 
constraints; they might have suspicions about the relevance of academic work; and they can 
be hard to reach - often researchers have to rely on sponsorship, recommendations and 
introductions to secure an interview appointment (Bird et al., 1983; Marshall and Rossman, 
1995; Shaw and Matthews, 1998). Despite such potential difficulties, it was felt that every 
effort should be made to pursue the study because, if successful, it would obtain high- 
quality data capable of making a valuable contribution to the understanding of a hitherto 
under-researched aspect of rail privatisation policy. In the event of insurmountable problems 
arising, the potential for a related study examining customers', rather than elites', 
perceptions of competition in the passenger rail industry was identified (see Bradshaw, 
1997a). Fortunately, however, progress with the intended research was sufficient to ensure 
that this `fall-back' option was not required. 
An early task in the research design process was to decide which of the principal interview 
strategies should be employed to obtain the required information. The most common is the 
questionnaire interview (Hughes, 1990). Questionnaire interviews, or surveys, have their 
origins in the epistemic assumptions of positivism (see Williams and May, 1996) and employ 
a methodology logically similar to that used by physical scientists to uncover social `truths' 
(May, 1997). Surveys are usually designed to test deductively the generalisability of 
hypotheses advanced by the researcher. ' They do this by asking a pre-determined set of 
questions to a representative sample of a given population. The researcher's social theory is 
then `proved' or `disproved' following a statistical analysis of results. 
Sarantakos (1993) identifies a number of advantages with surveys: they are cheap to 
administer (as Selltiz, quoted in Sarantakos (1993: 159), has pointed out, "questionnaires 
can be sent through the mail, interviewers cannot"); they provide quick results as many can 
be done at once; they are convenient for respondents to fill out at their leisure; they avoid 
the potential for bias caused by the presence/attitudes of the interviewer; and they provide 
for straightforward, quantitative, analysis by using closed-ended questions and answer 
categories. However, despite the many advantages of the survey technique, it was decided 
that questionnaires would not be a suitable research tool for this investigation. Because 
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surveys use closed-ended questions and answer categories, they are best suited to gathering 
`broad' information from a large number of respondents, perhaps several thousand 
(Lowndes, 1997; Mostyn, 1985). But this study needed precisely the opposite. It required 
`deep' information, comprising rich insights into the opinions and perceptions of 
respondents, and previous studies of this kind have suggested that a total of between 15- 
100 interviewees is appropriate to investigate relevant issues thoroughly (Bartram and 
Shobrook, 1998; Bird, 1982,1988; Grantham, 1998; Hoyle, 1993; Mostyn, 1985; Sidaway, 
1997). 
Schoenberger (1991) convincingly argues that an effective tool for obtaining `deep' 
information from elite respondents is the semi-structured interview. Described by Kahn and 
Connell (1957: 149) as "a conversation with a purpose, " a semi-structured interview allows 
the researcher to probe the respondents' opinions with open-ended questions. Such 
interviews are time consuming and can be difficult to analyse because they produce 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, data (Cook and Crang, 1995). Nevertheless, if executed 
competently in the correct research context, semi-structured interviews can produce 
valuable and revealing information. The use of semi-structured interviews allows the 
respondent's expertise to assert itself and, as a result, data regarding a particular 
phenomenon can unfold precisely as the respondent, and not the researcher, sees them 
(May, 1997). Moreover, it is possible to incorporate emerging issues into the study design 
as data collection progresses. Points raised by one respondent can be woven into 
subsequent interviews as additional questions to provide a potentially rich source of data 
which might have been overlooked in the original interview schedule. In contrast, the use of 
closed-ended questions and response categories in survey methods can wrongly presume 
that the researcher is able to anticipate all the possible answers before the research has been 
conducted. Data not falling into premeditated categories are therefore lost as provisions for 
their incorporation in the study cannot easily be made once the questionnaires have been 
despatched. 2 
The approach adopted by semi-structured interviews is inductive by nature and cannot, 
unlike the survey method, lend itself to formal hypothesis testing. As Strauss and Corbin 
(1990: 23) point out, "one does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, one begins 
' See Harvey (1969) or Haines-Young and Petch (1986) for discussions of inductive and deductive methods. 
2 Even though `any other information' sections are often included in questionnaires, respondents use them 
infrequently and, where opinions are expressed, they can be difficult to interpret. 
Moreover, the low 
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with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. " Schoenberger 
(1991: 181) concurs, noting that the use of semi-structured interviews provides fertile 
ground for the generation of hypotheses about respondents' behaviour. Although semi- 
structured interviews are widely accepted as a research tool in many areas of human 
geography (particularly those associated with `critical' methodologies - see, for example, 
Bartram and Shobrook, 1998; Herod, 1993; McDowell, 1992; Sidaway, 1997), they have, 
with a few notable exceptions (in particular Bird, 1982,1988; Hoyle, 1993,1995), been 
largely overlooked in transport-related aspects of the discipline. In part, this may be due to 
the fact that such techniques can still arouse suspicion in the minds of some social scientists, 
particularly those whose research is influenced by positivist assumptions. The inductive 
nature of semi-structured interviews, combined with the fact that they produce qualitative 
data, has led to charges that the method is in some way unscientific, and frequently 
questioned is the objectivity of qualitative techniques (Marshall and Rossman, 1995). 
Objectivity as a concept in scientific research can be divided into two components, reliability 
and validity (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 3 Reliability is the extent to which repetition of the same 
research procedures will yield the same results, whereas validity is the accuracy of that 
procedure - how closely the results conform to the `true' reality. 4 This distinction is clarified 
with a simple analogy: a thermometer which reads 82 degrees each time it is plunged into 
water boiling at sea-level gives a reliable, yet invalid, measurement. Crudely speaking, the 
more reliable and valid a piece of research, the greater its objectivity. However, as Kirk and 
Miller (1986) point out, the concept of validity is difficult to confirm. Even in the natural 
sciences, no experiment can be perfectly controlled and no measuring instrument can be 
perfectly calibrated. This "problem of validity" (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 21) is exacerbated in 
the social sciences because researchers are forced to contend with the vagaries of human 
nature. Schoenberger (1991) partially addresses the problem of validity by suggesting that 
semi-structured interviews are automatically valid by virtue of the fact that they allow a 
response rates render most findings statistically insignificant, a major shortcoming in terms of a 
quantitative-based research technique (see, for example, Bailey, 1997). 
3 Some qualitative researchers now argue that reliability and validity are not appropriate concepts by which 
to measure the objectivity of qualitative research because they are too moulded in the quantitative tradition 
(see, for example, Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Baxter and Eyles, 1997). Such developments serve to assert the 
value of semi-structured interviews as a technique in their own right rather than as an adjunct to more 
traditionally accepted quantitative methods. 
° The definition of reality will depend upon the epistemological convictions of the researcher. For example, 
the positivist `the truth is out there' view is absolutely at variance with the relativist approaches advanced by 
postmodernists. A full discussion of these issues is not the purpose of this chapter, but see May, 1997; 
McDowell, 1992; Schoenberger 1991,1992; Williams and May, 1996. 
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detailed exploration of respondents' circumstances. 5 Nevertheless, standard practice in 
social research has been to rely almost entirely upon techniques for assuring reliability as a 
means to the `truth'. Survey methods are ideal for ensuring consistent reliability because 
they completely standardise the design, administration and analysis of a study (McMiller and 
Wilson, 1984). Thus, as May (1997) points out, if all respondents are asked the same 
questions in the same manner, opinions expressed are believed to be `true' rather than a 
result of subjective factors such as how the questions were asked. Provided the wider 
circumstances under which the initial survey was carried out do not change, the results of a 
survey can in theory be replicated by repeating the questionnaire with a different 
representative sample of the same population. 
Demonstrating reliability in qualitative studies can be problematic. Although it is not an 
undisciplined technique, a semi-structured interview will not necessarily develop in the same 
way every time it is administered. To illustrate, questions may be asked in a different order 
according to the course of the conversation, the researcher will inevitably be involved in the 
dialogue, and the content of the interview could change in the light of data which have 
emerged from earlier discussions. As such, even if wider circumstances were to remain 
static, it may not be possible to replicate results if the interviews were carried out again. In 
response to such problems, some qualitative researchers have suggested a number of steps 
which those working within the tradition should take in order to assure others of the 
reliability of their techniques. Of these, the most notable is that the method employed must 
be explained in detail to allow the reader to judge whether it was adequate and appropriate 
(Marshall, 1990; Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 6 Marshall and Rossman (1995) additionally 
suggest that collected data must be kept in an organised and retrievable form so that they 
can be made available if the research findings are challenged. Interview data collected 
during the course of this thesis have been retained in both tape and transcript formats, and 
the remaining sections of this chapter detail the research methods employed for the study. 
3.3 Preparing interview schedules and identifying potential respondents 
Schoenberger (1991) makes the obvious, yet important, point that it is essential to be well 
prepared before fieldwork can commence. Diligent preparation serves to maximise the 
effectiveness of the fieldwork programme: interview questions are more likely to be relevant 
S Indeed, Plummer (1983: 102) suggests that, as a matter of course, "validity should come before 
reliability... There is no point in being precise about nothing. " 
6 Marshall (1990) in fact provides a full checklist of 20 points for qualitative researchers to consider when 
explicating their methods. 
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to the aims of the study; respondents are usually more forthcoming when the investigator 
understands the issues - and the specialist language peculiar to their industry - under 
discussion; and well-informed investigators are likely to make a better assessment of the 
data they collect. Preparations for the construction of interview schedules therefore began 
with a thorough review of industry-related data sources. Material was obtained from: 
academic journals; the Conservative Archive at the Bodleian Library, Oxford; Hansard 
debates, questions and answers; House of Commons Papers; publications from the 
Department of Transport, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), the Office of 
the Rail Regulator (ORR), the Stationery Office (formerly HMSO), the National Audit 
Office (NAO) and the various rail companies; broadsheet newspapers and dedicated trade 
journals such as Rail Privatisation News, Modern Railways, Rail and The Railway 
Magazine. A formal content analysis (see, for example, Bird et al., 1983) of these sources 
was unnecessary, although summaries were made of each document to be categorised for 
future reference. Specific works are cited throughout the text as and when they are referred 
to. 
Themes relevant to the aim and objectives of the research were identified from the industry- 
related literature (see appendices one and two), and it then became necessary to construct 
draft interview schedules capable of obtaining relevant information. From various studies 
employing semi-structured interviews to question elites (see, for example, Bird, 1982,1988; 
Hoyle, 1993,1994a, 1994b, 1995; Schoenberger, 1989; Sidaway, 1997), two contrasting 
approaches to schedule construction are evident. The first of these, advocated by Bird and 
Hoyle, is based upon proposition sets. This approach invites interviewees to respond to a 
pre-determined number of sets, each containing a general introductory statement, a 
proposition and supplementary questions (see table 3.1). The sets are shown to respondents 
in a given order, and the researcher remains passive throughout the interview, speaking only 
to introduce each new set. Hoyle (1993) reports great success with this method, noting that 
although respondents were encouraged to be brief, extended, yet coherent, answers were 
frequently given. 
In contrast, Schoenberger and Sidaway adopt a far less structured approach. Both authors 
prefer to base their interviews around a loose set of pre-determined questions. Unlike 
proposition sets, the questions are designed to facilitate as `normal' a conversation as 
possible, and actively encourage the interviewer to engage in proceedings. In this way, the 
potential exists for investigating emerging issues and for exploring particular themes in 
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detail according to the direction of the interview (Sidaway, 1997). Schoenberger (1991) in 
particular comments on the success of this method, noting that it is especially helpful in 
allowing the interviewer to address ambiguities or inconsistencies which may arise in 
respondents' accounts. 
Proposition set one 
Introductory statement 
The public and private sectors involved in waterfront redevelopment engage in competition, conflict and co- 
operation. 
Proposition 
The essential broad problem of waterfront redevelopment is how to link private sector dynamism with 
public sector non-monetary objectives. 
Supplementary questions 
Do you agree with this proposition, or do you see the essential problem in some other dimension? Please 
give your reasons. 
Table 3.1. An example of a proposition set addressing approaches to waterfront 
redevelopment in Canada. Source: Hoyle, 1995. 
Although both approaches seem successful in terms of engaging respondents, it was decided 
to reject proposition sets, principally because of their apparently inflexible nature. Not only 
does the proposition set approach preclude the possibility of a `normal' conversation, but it 
also cannot be adapted to include emerging information or address inconsistencies. In this 
sense, proposition sets have much in common with the standardised survey format, and the 
association is by no means coincidental. Writing at a time when qualitative methods were 
unfashionable in human geography, Bird et al. (1983) seemed concerned to alert readers as 
to the deductive properties of their method. They argued that the passive interviewing style, 
reliant upon pre-determined questions in a given order, was a means of ensuring reliability 
and permitted the testing of pre-formulated hypotheses. Indeed, Hoyle (1993) 
acknowledges that his proposition sets were designed with anticipated answers in mind. 
Although proposition sets were an undoubted methodological innovation, it was felt that 
their inflexibility could have detrimentally affected the quality of data obtained in this study. 
Thus the approach used by Schoenberger (1991) and Sidaway (1997) was adopted, and it 
was noted that care would be needed when explaining the methods used in order to assure 
the reader of the study's reliability. 
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It was decided that there would be three sections to the study. The first would focus on the 
evolution of rail privatisation policy, to establish how and why the promotion of 
competition became an important policy goal, whereas the second and third sections would 
focus on the outcomes of the policy in terms of competition for the market and competition 
in the market respectively. Separate interview schedules were constructed for each of the 
three sections. It was recognised that there would be some overlap in the information 
obtained by each interview schedule - for example, the existence or otherwise of on-rail 
competition would affect not only TOCs, but also franchise bidders because of the potential 
for market liberalisation to impact upon their revenue streams - but sufficient differences 
existed between each section of the study to warrant separate schedules. 
The schedules used for investigating competition for and in the market were each divided 
into four sections (see appendices one and two). The first section of each began with a 
statement outlining the aims and objectives of the research, to be read by the interviewer. 
The remaining sections of the schedule investigating competition for the market sought 
detailed responses regarding the preparation of franchise bids, the awarding of franchises 
and respondents' overall perceptions of the franchising process. The schedule relating to 
competition in the market asked for general opinions about on-rail competition, before 
turning to TOC-specific competition issues and potential future scenarios. 
The schedules used to investigate the evolution of rail privatisation policy were constructed 
slightly differently. Whereas the above schedules were designed to collect data relating to 
shared experiences - all franchise bidders were asked about competition for the market and 
all TOCs about competition within it - the aim here was to assemble a chronology of `facts' 
regarding events stretching over at least 18 years. Because of the protracted nature of rail 
privatisation policy evolution (see chapter four), it was felt unlikely that a sufficient number 
of key actors would have `shared' the entire policy evolution process (although two who 
did were located), and so the construction of one universal schedule was deemed 
unsuitable. 7 Thus, the approach ultimately adopted was to assemble a large `pool' of 
questions based upon relevant themes identified from the earlier literature searches, and then 
to select a different combination for each interview as appropriate (see appendix three). 
7 To illustrate, there would have been limited value in questioning a civil servant who worked at the 
Treasury from 1980 to 1985 about the internal workings of that Department in 1992. 
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Before finalising and piloting the interview schedules, potential respondents were selected 
and contacted. It seemed appropriate that the managing director/chief executive (MD/CE), 
or the member of senior management responsible for competition matters, of each of the 25 
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) would be needed to answer questions regarding on-rail 
competition. A similar executive, but with experience in the franchising process, would be 
needed from each of the franchise bidders. The studies cited involving elites do not indicate 
an ideal proportion of the study population which should be interviewed in order to ensure 
the representativeness of a qualitative data set. However, because the populations of both 
TOCs and franchise bidders were relatively small, it was felt that a near-census would 
probably be attainable. 
The names and addresses of each of the 25 TOC MD/CEs were obtained from the winter 
1996/97 edition of the Great Britain Passenger Railway Timetable (Railtrack, 1997). 
Letters were sent to the MDs explaining the nature, aims and objectives of the research 
project, and their co-operation (in the form of granting an interview with the most 
appropriate manager) was requested. Based upon experience of previous semi-structured 
interview work (Hoyle, 1995; Sidaway, 1997), it was suggested that the interviews would 
last between 30 minutes and one hour (most actually lasted around 45-50 minutes). The 
letters also stressed that any information obtained from the interview would remain strictly 
confidential. Initial response rates were disappointing (only 12 responded) but follow-up 
letters were sent after three weeks and, where no responses had been obtained after six 
weeks, telephone calls were made to enquire as to whether the letters had been received. 
Ultimately a highly satisfactory 23 TOCs agreed to participate, and meetings were arranged 
at the respondents' places of work. Seven of the 23 interviews with TOCs were with MDs, 
and the remainder were with commercial/business directors or corporate affairs managers. 
Although potential interviewees from TOCs were easy to identify, the same was not the 
case for those from franchise bidders because their identities had been declared 
commercially confidential by OPRAF. However, a list of 29 companies who were 
`shortlisted' in the franchising process was located (Cormack and Pigott, 1997). 
8 The list 
was comprised of both management-employee buy-out (MEBO) and corporate bids. MEBO 
teams were contacted via the relevant TOCs (in some cases the contact person was the 
The franchise bidding process consisted of numerous stages (see chapter five). OPRAF first invited 
potential bidders to pre-qualify. If successful, they would receive an Invitation to Tender 
(ITT) which 
entitled them to to bid for the right to run the franchise under offer. Shortlisting occurred after 
bids had 
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same as it had been for the interviews dealing with competition in the market and, where 
this was the case, a request for two interviews was included in one letter), whilst the 
addresses for other bidders were obtained from various sources. 15 shortlisted bidders 
ultimately participated in the study, four being MEBOs and 11 corporate. 9 
The proportion of shortlisted franchise bidders taking part in the study is clearly not as high 
as that noted above for the TOCs. Predominantly this was due to a relatively high number of 
refusals from potential respondents, although researcher error was also a factor; where 
questions regarding competition both in and for the market were being answered by the 
same individual(s), an overrun in the first part of the interview twice restricted the length of 
the second. As a result, few meaningful data were obtained regarding the bidding process 
on these occasions, but this error was corrected in subsequent interviews (see also section 
3.4). As already noted, the works cited above are silent regarding what proportion of a 
population should be interviewed in order to guarantee the representativeness of a 
qualitative data set, and some consideration had to be given to whether or not the amount 
of participants in this section of the study was sufficient. The issue was difficult to resolve. 
Because the purpose of semi-structured interviews is to generate, rather than test, 
hypotheses, the `correct' amount to be undertaken cannot be determined by a 
straightforward mechanism like sampling theory. On the one hand, Bird et al. (1983: 145) 
judiciously observe that "the limitation of refusals is essential when the population in 
question is not large and where there may be no opportunity for substitutes. " On the other 
hand, they point out that, if refusals do occur, it is important they do not remove all 
potential respondents of any given type from the investigation. For example, if all MEBOs 
had refused to co-operate in this study, an obvious gap would have been left in a study 
purporting to examine the franchising process from the perspective of all bidders. Ultimately 
it was decided to pursue the research because all types of shortlisted bidder - MEBOs and 
corporate bidders of varying sizes - were represented evenly and in sufficient numbers to 
generate a wide range of views regarding the issues under investigation. It is recognised, 
however, that many of the points raised in chapter five could to some extent have been 
explored more comprehensively had more franchise bidders, particularly MEBOs, 
participated in the study. 
been received; those excluded from the shortlist could take no further part in that particular franchise bid, 
whereas those included entered further negotiations with OPRAF before a franchise award was made. 
9 In two cases, respondents were able to answer on behalf of both their current employer and a 
Mebo in 
which they had previously been involved. 
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Problems were also encountered during attempts to identify and contact companies whose 
bids had failed to reach any of the shortlists. After various unsuccessful enquiries, it was 
decided to omit these companies from the study altogether. In essence, this was because it 
was realised that including non-shortlisted bidders in the study would probably effect only a 
minimal improvement in data quality. Many of the companies successful in being shortlisted 
for some bids had not progressed beyond the ITT stage with others, and thus the study was 
already canvassing views of some companies who failed to make the shortlists. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the study cannot claim to represent the views of 
those bidders who failed to make any of the shortlists during the franchising process. 
Potential policy maker interviewees were initially identified as the public sector `equivalents' 
to corporate MD/CEs - the Secretaries of State for Transport - over the period during 
which the Conservatives had been in power. These were identified in various editions of 
Whittaker's Almanac. Former ministers who were still alive were contacted either via the 
Houses of Parliament if they had remained in public service, or via Conservative Central 
Office if they had not. Six of these 11 potential respondents agreed to interviews, along with 
one former Minister of State for Public Transport who played a particularly crucial role in 
the development and implementation of rail privatisation policy. 
It was quickly decided that interviewing only politicians would not produce sufficient 
information for three reasons. First, data would not be forthcoming for periods when the 
Secretaries of State who declined to be interviewed were in office. Second, it was suspected 
(and later confirmed by respondents during interviews) that the Secretaries and Ministers of 
State would have only been involved in decisions at the very highest level, and would thus 
have been unaware of much of the detail involved in the policy making process. Third, the 
data produced could have been somewhat biased as, based upon their interview tactics on 
television, it was felt that the politicians might engage in post hoc rationalisation in order to 
reflect favourably upon their achievements in office. Because the aim of the exercise was to 
establish a `factual' chronology of rail privatisation policy development, it was important to 
ensure that, as far as possible, the data obtained were valid and not fabrications to suit 
respondents' own purposes. As such, it was decided to interview others who had been 
involved in rail privatisation policy formulation in different capacities to seek corroborative 
data. These fell into two categories, civil servants and individuals who were consulted by, or 
acted as advisors to, the government (the British Railways Board was included in this 
category). 
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Seven senior and mid-level civil servants from the Department of Transport were identified 
as potential respondents from the Civil Service Yearbook because of their particular 
involvement with rail privatisation policy development over a number of years. Permission 
to conduct the interviews was sought from the Department's Permanent Secretary, but the 
response obtained was rather negative. The Permanent Secretary noted that the policy of 
the Department under the new Labour administration was to press ahead with new policies 
rather than to revisit old ones, and that he therefore "did not see the scope" for interviews 
with the amount of individuals identified. An interview with only one civil servant was 
officially sanctioned by the Department of Transport. Although this respondent provided 
much valuable information, it was still felt that more corroborative data from civil servants 
were needed. 
At this point an ethical dilemma arose. How could further information be obtained from civil 
servants without undermining the view of the Permanent Secretary of the Department of 
Transport? This problem was partially resolved by the fact that some key officials 
responsible for formulating rail privatisation policy, albeit not always those originally 
identified from the Civil Service Yearbook, had left the Department of Transport and could 
be approached for interview. Moreover, it transpired that others had been involved 
exclusively with other Departments, particularly the Treasury. A total of nine new 
respondents was identified using a `snowballing' technique (May, 1997) which involved 
asking existing interviewees to name the pivotal figures with whom they dealt as policy was 
developed. All of these individuals were approached independently after obtaining their 
addresses from various sources, and seven agreed to be interviewed. 
Finally, four government advisors and consultants, identified both through industry-related 
literature and the above `snowballing' exercise, were interviewed. Despite the small number 
of respondents in this category, the information they provided was invaluable because two 
of them had been involved in the rail privatisation process as policy developed throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s and were able to provide corroborative `overviews' of 
developments during this time. It is recognised that the potential population for this 
category of respondent - indeed for most categories in the policy evolution section - was 
significantly larger than the 27 individuals actually approached, and it is accepted that a 
greater level of detail might have been obtained if more interviews were conducted. 
Nevertheless, the amount of interviews undertaken was probably sufficient for two reasons. 
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First, there were practical considerations to take into account. The total number of 
interviews, and the analysis associated with them, had already begun to exceed a realistic 
workload for a doctoral researcher constrained by limited financial and manpower 
resources. Second, and more importantly, the aims of this section of the study required only 
an investigation into how the decision to privatise BR in a vertically integrated manner came 
about. It was necessary to be selective when identifying potential respondents, and to 
concentrate on those involved in framing policy rather than those engaged in a less senior 
capacity. The amount of respondents interviewed was enough to ensure corroboration of 
each issue identified. 
3.4 Pilots and interviews 
Before formal data collection could commence, it was necessary to finalise and pilot the 
interview schedules, and this process consisted of three stages. First, a self-critique was 
undertaken. This involved thoroughly reviewing the interview schedules from `fresh' - i. e. 
after a vacation - in an effort to locate mistakes in the initial drafts. As Sarantakos (1993) 
points out, undertaking a self-critique can be important to test questions for, among other 
things, relevance, clarity and simplicity before any external scrutiny is sought. This exercise 
was extremely valuable for two reasons. First, it allowed the interview schedules to be 
brought up to date in the light of recent developments. To illustrate, Wales and West 
Passenger Trains' application to introduce through trains from Penzance to Manchester 
would rival Virgin's existing service between the origin/destination pair. For this reason the 
proposed service had industry-wide ramifications because it was widely viewed as the "first 
test of competition on [the] railways" (Batchelor, 1997: 10). A question soliciting views on 
this issue was framed and inserted into the TOCs' interview schedule accordingly. Second, 
several omissions were noted. Two of these were potentially serious: it was realised that 
although questions were framed to establish whether phenomena took place, there were few 
prompts asking why; and a question relating to the impact of on-rail competition was not 
included in the schedule for franchise bidders (see section 3.3). 
Second, a formal exercise of external scrutiny was undertaken. Academic colleagues within 
the University were approached for practical advice regarding interviewing techniques, and 
suggestions made complemented those already absorbed from the literature (see section 
3.3). In addition two transport professionals, both experienced in railway matters, were 
invited to critically review the interview schedules. The purpose of this was to establish the 
clarity and relevance of the questions from an industry point of view. Did the questions 
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make sense to those working within and around the railway industry? Moreover, given the 
potential sensitivity of the questions, how likely was it that they would even be answered by 
respondents? The reviewers suggested that the questions were sufficiently well framed to be 
understood by respondents, although both advised that franchise bidders and train operators 
would be unlikely to discuss openly their competitive strategies (such information is often 
viewed as commercially sensitive) unless they were absolutely assured of confidentiality. 
The interview schedules were amended to include an unambiguous confidentiality guarantee 
before the questions began (see also below). 
The final piloting stage was problematic owing to the small populations to be interviewed. 
Piloting in the sense of pre-testing - that is, trialling the interview schedules on a sample of 
respondents before the bulk of data collection took place - was not possible because it 
would have significantly reduced the amount of data obtainable during the fieldwork 
exercise. As such, it was decided that a system of `continuous' piloting should be adopted. 
This involved critically reflecting upon each interview conducted in order to identify, and 
therefore eliminate as far as possible, technical flaws as the fieldwork progressed. Cook and 
Crang (1995) suggest that early forays into the field are never as productive as later ones 
because interviewing technique improves with experience, and this research was no 
exception. It has already been noted that two interviews were mistimed and thus did not 
cover the franchise bidding process in sufficient detail. Additionally, however, when tapes of 
initial interviews were played back, it was apparent that, as a result of some early nerves, 
the format of the interview schedule was being observed too rigidly. Not only were 
important issues and inconsistencies being insufficiently probed when a deviation from the 
schedule would have been valuable, but all questions were being asked as written on the 
schedule even if the respondent had already (unwittingly) answered some of them. Had 
respondents perceived this to mean that their comments were being ignored, they might well 
have lost interest in proceedings and the validity of the interview could have been eroded. 
Fortunately, this and other problems were overcome with practice, and later transcripts 
demonstrate that a much more `natural' style of conversation between interviewer and 
respondent was being achieved. Nevertheless, tapes were monitored continuously in order 
to check consistency, and to extract emerging information which could be appended to 
subsequent interview schedules. 
Ensuring the relevance of questions and refining interview technique are clearly important 
considerations in a research project. However, throughout the fieldwork programme it was 
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necessary to be aware of, and be able to react to, various nuances of the interview situation 
which can also affect the validity of data gathered. Three of these are particularly 
significant: control, respondents' perceptions of the interviewer and ethical considerations. 
Issues surrounding the control of interviews have received considerable attention in the 
literature (see, for example, Kress and Fowler, 1979; Briggs, 1986). In fields such as 
anthropology, concern has centred around the potential for interviewers to exert excessive 
control over the respondent, in effect `leading the witness' and distorting the information 
obtained (Schoenberger, 1991). By contrast, the greater risk in research involving elites lies 
in the potential for the investigator to lose control. McDowell (1992: 213) argues that, from 
the outset, the researcher can be reduced to "the position of a supplicant, [because he or she 
is] requesting time and expertise from the powerful with little to offer in return. " 
Schoenberger (1991: 183) adds that this situation can be exacerbated during the interview 
itself because elites: 
"... are people accustomed to being in control and exerting authority over others. There is a risk 
that the respondent will impose his or her agenda on the interview, taking it in directions not directly 
relevant to the research or not worth lengthy elaboration. " 
Schoenberger (1991) continues to note that the aim should be to encourage a collaborative 
dialogue, where respondents can contribute to the shape of the discussion without 
controlling it. 
In general it was felt that Schoenberger's notion of a collaborative dialogue was achieved 
during most interviews, particularly the later ones. Some respondents appeared nervous, 
while others were forceful, but the style of interviewing could be adapted to the 
requirements of the situation. A combination of thorough preparation and alertness in the 
interview itself helped to minimise tangential discussions, and potential inconsistencies, with 
either the respondent's own account or those of others, were usually addressed. However, 
in one interview it quickly became apparent that the respondent was extremely keen to 
impose his own agenda on proceedings. It is unlikely that this was motivated by the 
`management ego' referred to by McDowell and Schoenberger; the interview was 
conducted shortly after a rail crash at Southall in 1997 in which seven people were killed, 
and the respondent was, understandably, preoccupied with the events which had occurred. 
The unfortunate timing of this interview meant that a sensitive approach was required to 
refocus the respondent's mind onto the topics which were supposed to be under discussion. 
The approach to this was very much improvised, but involved listening to the respondent's 
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comments - and sometimes, depending on the degree of conviction with which he spoke, 
exploring his concerns further - before reintroducing the issues at hand. The interview was 
certainly less successful than it could have been, although some of the main issues were 
covered in satisfactory detail. 
Respondents' perceptions of the interviewer can significantly affect the outcome of a 
fieldwork programme (Turner and Martin, 1984). Obvious differences in appearance or a 
clash of personalities between the respondent and the researcher could awaken prejudices in 
either party and result in poor data being produced if, for example, the respondent were to 
become deliberately unco-operative. It is clearly the responsibility of researchers to ensure 
that their own perceptions and prejudices do not compromise the integrity of an interview. 
Moreover, there are straightforward ways in which researchers can and should attempt to 
minimise the risk of being perceived inappropriately by respondents - being polite and 
dressing suitably are two obvious examples (Schoenberger, 1992). A suit and tie was worn 
to all interviews and every effort was made to identify, and adhere to, the social `rules' 
appropriate to each situation. It was felt that these attempts were largely successful, 
although some respondents were visibly surprised at being confronted with a young 
researcher. Two respondents in particular were noticeably unco-operative until they 
appeared satisfied that the interviewer was able to undertake his duties competently. 
In addition to age, certain other differences between respondent and researcher are 
impossible to conceal, particularly race and gender. Although all but one of the respondents 
in this study were white men (the other was a white woman), it would be over-simplistic to 
assume that issues of race and gender simply vanished because both parties to the interview 
were always the same colour and almost always the same sex (Herod, 1993). The issue of 
gender provides a useful illustration of this point. Based on an analysis of single and mixed 
sex group behaviour, Aries (1976) contended that men tend to be more aggressive and 
engage in more dramatisation and `tall' story telling in the company of other males than 
when women are present. Aries' (1976: 11) conclusion that "the interpersonal styles of men 
and women are different in... single sex and mixed group settings" has led Herod (1993: 
308) to argue that: 
"... whereas a male interviewee might adopt one type of behavior towards a female researcher, such 
as paternalism... he may also adopt different cultural norms of masculine behavior - perhaps one-upmanship 
in recounting events - in his encounter with a male interviewer. " 
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On the one hand, experiences in the field during this study might be interpreted as providing 
some evidence to support Herod's theory. On several occasions respondents seemed to 
adopt a spirit of male bonhomie -a `laddish' tone - and accentuated their arguments with 
profane language and/or referred to colleagues in a derogatory fashion. On the other hand, 
however, the majority of respondents expressed their thoughts in measured and considered 
language. Nevertheless, the different conversational styles of respondents were noted after 
interviews in order that they could be taken into account during analysis (see section 3.5). 
Finally, there are ethical considerations which can impact upon the information obtained 
from an interview situation. As Kimmel (1988) points out, it is important that all practical 
steps are taken to minimise potential harm to respondents which could arise from their 
participating in a research project. By far the most likely source of harm in an interview- 
based study of this kind is a failure to maintain the confidentiality promised to 
respondents. 1° Although it was noted in the introductory letters sent to potential 
interviewees that data obtained would be anonomised, most respondents sought to confirm 
their rights in this regard. Respondents did not generally want to impart commercially 
sensitive information, especially that which their colleagues/superiors may well have wanted 
to contain, if there was a chance that it could be attributed to them. Respondents were 
reassured that the research was guided by the ethical procedures adopted by the University 
of Plymouth, and were supplied with a written undertaking that every effort would be made 
to anonomise all direct quotations (see section 3.5). Moreover, respondents were assured 
that chapters in which they appeared would be sent to them for inspection and validation 
(see MacPherson and Williamson, 1992) before being included in the final draft of this 
thesis. Respondents were content to proceed on this basis, and all but one were happy for 
the interview to be tape recorded (detailed notes were taken in this instance). Although it 
was initially feared that the presence of a tape recorder might inhibit respondents, most 
were used to meetings being recorded and seemed to ignore the machine. Indeed, the 
presence of the tape recorder even seemed to stimulate a mischievous streak within some of 
the respondents. As one noted whilst the machine was being set up, "I have absolutely no 
problem with being indiscreet, but I cannot possibly be found out doing it. " Having 
reviewed the methods used to collect the data contained in this thesis, attention is now 
turned to the techniques employed to analyse them. 
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3.5 Data analysis 
Making sense of qualitative data has, by definition, to involve some kind of content analysis 
technique (Bird et al., 1983). Content analysis is the `diagnostic tool' of qualitative 
researchers, and its purpose is to: 
"... identify specific characteristics of communications systematically and objectively in order to 
convert the raw material [obtained during the study] into scientific data" (Mostyn, 1985: 117). 
Content analysis is a time consuming process (in this case lasting longer than the fieldwork 
itself), and executing it correctly is essential if the data are to be exploited effectively (Cook 
and Crang, 1995). Mostyn (1985) identifies two main types of content analysis relevant to 
this study, one quantitative, the other qualitative. " The quantitative approach involves 
placing data into categories and noting the frequency of responses assigned to each. In this 
way, it is possible to identify `major' or `minor' points, depending on the amount of times 
they were raised by different respondents, and the result is a quantifiable measurement of 
feeling regarding any given issue (Bird et al., 1983). In contrast, qualitative content analysis 
does not seek to generate numbers, but instead relies more upon the interpretations of the 
researcher to identify trends within the data. Emphasis is placed upon revealing the depth 
and context of the information collected (Cook and Crang, 1995; Miller and Crabtree, 
1992). 
At first sight, the former seems to offer notable advantages over the latter. Unlike 
qualitative content analysis, the quantitative approach can produce `at-a-glance' descriptive 
statistics. Moreover, it is systemised to guard against subjective interpretations. However, 
despite these advantages, it was decided that the quantitative technique was not suited to 
this study for three main reasons. First, the method of sampling employed was not 
consistent with frequency counting. Many of the data, particularly those concerned with 
policy evolution, had been collected to piece together a chronology rather than to identify 
collective trends (see section 3.3). Where, say, only three people had been interviewed 
about a particular topic, counting codes to determine relative importance would be rendered 
somewhat meaningless as the result would have no statistical significance. Second, the 
method of data collection was not compatible with quantitative analysis. The inductive 
nature of the approach adopted - not all respondents are asked the same questions in the 
10 Although others are not inconceivable. For example, as Shaw and Matthews (1998) argue, the failure of 
academics to publish research findings in appropriate outlets can result in any potential benefits arising 
from the study being lost to respondents. 
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same order - meant that frequency counts would have produced distorted results; some 
respondents may not have raised a particular point if they were not asked about it. Finally, 
and more generally, it was felt that the quantitative technique was not entirely consistent 
with the aims of qualitative research. It will be remembered that the purpose of qualitative 
investigation is to obtain deep data, comprising rich insights into respondents' opinions and 
perceptions. Reporting qualitative data solely by way of frequency counts would have 
stripped them of the depth which the semi-structured interviews had been designed to 
capture and, in this sense, would have defied the object of employing qualitative techniques 
in the first place (Mostyn, 1985). 
For these reasons, it was decided to adopt a more qualitative method of data analysis. It 
should be noted that such techniques also possess shortcomings, and it was important that 
these were understood before analysis began. Quantitative researchers often argue that the 
reliability of qualitative analysis is not guaranteed, that the method is too heavily based on 
interpretation and not adequately systemised. As Goode and Hatt (quoted in Mostyn, 1985: 
122) point out, "intuition is not enough to demonstrate the truth of ideas. " Certainly studies 
have shown that there can be a low level of comparability for qualitative research (May, 
1978) and May, himself a qualitative researcher, has acknowledged that qualitative analysts 
may on occasion be overly influenced by a `neat turn of phrase' or a few dramatic but 
untypical cases and could face difficulties defending themselves against charges of bias or 
inaccuracy. Thus it was necessary to ensure that the potential for researcher error was 
minimised, and this was done by initially by adopting techniques already discussed - 
retaining evidence (see section 3.2) and being self-critical (see section 3.4). However, 
Krippendorf (1980) has suggested that the ultimate test of good content analysis is a simple 
question: "Does [sic] the data obtained in the research provide a trustworthy basis for 
drawing inferences, making recommendations and supporting decisions? " In order to 
establish the answer to this question, respondents and industry actors who had not been 
involved in the study were contacted and asked for their opinions regarding the validity or 
otherwise of the completed chapters (see below). 
The analysis technique adopted closely resembles the `editing' method widely used in social 
scientific enquiry (Miller and Crabtree, 1992). This approach involves the researcher coding 
the data and organising them into themes before interpretation commences. The codes 
There are numerous different types of content analysis techniques depending on the particular aims of a 
research project. Bird et al. (1983) outline some examples. 
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employed arise purely as a result of the data and not, as in some analysis techniques (such as 
the `template' approach), from a pre-determined list; in other words, the views of the 
respondents, rather than the pre-conceptions of the researcher, prevail. The analysis 
undertaken in this thesis was informed by Cook and Crang (1995), May (1997), Miller and 
Crabtree (1992) and Strauss (1987), and the procedure consisted of three stages, transcript 
construction, coding and hypothesis formulation. Each is now discussed in turn. 
Transcripts were typed verbatim, and spaced to leave enough room for future annotations. 
At the same time, notes taken regarding the context of the interviews (see section 3.4) were 
appended to the transcripts. The notes contained a wide range of information, including 
contemporaneous thoughts and details concerning the dynamics of the interview situation 
and the interviewees themselves. The importance of these notes cannot be underestimated, 
and on several occasions they influenced the subsequent analysis. In one instance, where a 
respondent had used particularly colourful language throughout his interview, the analysis 
was able to take account of the fact that his actual views were likely to be less extreme than 
those he expressed. Individual answers within other interviews were also altered after 
reference was made to the research notes. For example, one respondent, when asked 
whether a company was serious about its pledge to study the feasibility of an electrification 
project, answered "of course. " What the tape did not reveal, however, was that the 
respondent had simultaneously mimicked his answer through his facial expression, and it 
was possible to record that the respondent actually meant "no. " Although it is undoubtedly 
possible to misread such occurrences in interview situations, and often difficult to deal with 
them objectively during data analysis (to illustrate - by how much do you `scale down' 
someone's opinion if they speak colourfully? ), the research notes at least captured some of 
the more subtle characteristics of the responses obtained in interviews and allowed an albeit 
subjective interpretation of them. 
Once the transcripts were complete, they were read in full to ensure a general level of 
familiarity with the data. Passages pertinent to the questions asked were highlighted, 
although care was taken not to automatically exclude the other data as they might have 
become relevant at a later stage in the analysis. Potential inconsistencies which remained 
were also identified and addressed as far as possible by referring to existing literature or 
other transcripts. In some cases, it was necessary to contact respondents again by telephone 
to clarify certain issues (this was particularly true in relation to the complexities of 
ORCATS-based competition - see chapter six). 
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The next step was to `code' the data. This process involved thoroughly re-reading the 
transcripts and annotating the highlighted passages according to their meaning and intent. 
Strauss (1987) argues it is important that these annotations should be kept general during 
the early stages of analysis, and that specific relations between the data should not yet be 
sought; the researcher should avoid reaching premature conclusions and manipulating 
subsequent data to support them. Thus, each relevant passage of text was given a code, 
often between one and three words, pertaining to what was being said (see table 3.2). In 
many cases, particularly where one aspect of a wider topic was being explored by the 
respondent, it was also necessary to assign sub-codes to the data. A list of all codes 
assigned, along with a record of where each one appeared, was taken on a separate sheet of 
paper in order that passages could be located in the future. Once coding was complete, 
transcript passages were categorised according to general themes relating to potential 
chapter headings ('Competition Between TOCs', `Future' and so on). Copies of the 
transcripts were `cut and pasted' electronically according to the themes into which they fell 
to produce `themed documents' ready for analysis. 
R: They tried, but I still think the MEBOs were playing a name with them. The raw 
privatisations in the 1980s were very much open to this abuse. The analogy is that 
Lud 
someone's council house is for sale but they actually want to buy it themselves. So you go 
and see it and they tell you all the faults. That's how it was in the 1980s. What happened r'[ 
in the 1990s - and London Transport I think started this with their privatisation - they put 
internal people in to stop them manipulating the cashflow to help the financing of the 
LI 
MEBO. They tried to filter the data so it was coming out sensitised for everybody. While 
lt. ( that has some advantages which improves the quality of the data of the third parties, at the 
"ý 
same time it is still giving the management a very strong hand to play because of the 
time... 
Table 3.2. An example of `coding' on a transcript. 
Although this stage of the analysis process is theoretically value-free, it would be dishonest 
to claim that this can entirely be the case given the extent to which qualitative researchers 
invariably become immersed in their data (Cook and Crang, 1995). It is almost impossible 
not to consider tentative conclusions and hypotheses as the coding process is being 
undertaken; potential relationships between the data present themselves continuously. In an 
attempt to guard against being unduly influenced by ideas which materialised at the coding 
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stage, tentative conclusions were recorded separately from the codes in the full knowledge 
that they were likely to change as the analysis progressed. A whole host of ideas generated 
during the coding process were discarded following formal hypothesis formulation. 12 
The hypothesis formulation stage first involved creating a series of `theoretical notes' 
(Strauss, 1987). These notes aimed simply to suggest trends which emerged after the data 
had been consistently revisited. For example, when analysing the extent to which the 
passenger rail market had been liberalised (see chapter six), the first stage was to identify 
each of the different methods of competition identified by respondents. The next task was to 
establish whether or not each took place, how and why. Each reading of the relevant 
themed document provided additional clues and/or refined ideas regarding answers to such 
questions, and reference was made to existing literature where this was relevant. 
Hypotheses, in the form of over-arching arguments to chapters, were formulated when the 
theoretical notes had been fmalised, and these were compared with the tentative hypotheses 
recorded during the coding process (see above). Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was found at this 
stage that many of the ideas generated during coding could not be supported by the 
evidence, and these were discarded accordingly. The importance of keeping tentative 
hypotheses separate from the coding process was thus vindicated as they could well have 
proved an inappropriate influence on the analysis process. The final set of theoretical notes, 
including hypotheses, was then appended to each of the themed documents in order to 
produce a set of `templates', around which the chapter drafts could be constructed (see 
table 3.3). 
When the analysis process was complete, the empirical chapters were drafted and checked 
for a final time against the templates to ensure that they accurately reflected the information 
contained in the transcripts. The chapter drafts were then sent to interviewees and industry 
actors who had not been involved in the study for validation. 13 The principal benefit of 
respondent validation exercises is that they can provide an invaluable means of ensuring the 
analysis in the study reflects accurately the `reality' which was researched (MacPherson and 
Williamson, 1992). Although few respondents returned the drafts of chapters five and six, 
12 For example, it was thought at one stage that OPRAF was held in contempt by franchise bidders because 
of its inability to expedite the franchising process. The reality turned out to be more subtle - OPRAF were 
disliked in the sense that it was seen as the `gatekeeper', although all bidders admired its practical 
franchising achievements (see chapter five). 
13 These actors were identified by respondents as being industry experts in fields relevant to this research. 
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OPRAF learnt valuable lessons from the sales of the first three franchises. To begin, they filled in all the 
information `holes'. Second, they standardised the documentation and that made it easier from both sides. 
Bidders were able to know what was required of them and OPRAF could streamline their activities and get 
things done quicker. The speed of the process was an important factor. OPRAF had been given instructions 
to finish the process by March (although they deny that was necessarily influenced by the general election: 
"if the election had been six months before when it was, we'd never have finished the process") and all 
parties were aware that the process had speeded up considerably. From taking almost a year to let the first 
three, the remaining 22 were let in around 18 months. When OPRAF first presented its timetable in late 
1995, the DoT was still riddled with sceptics: 
"After we'd produced the programme, and presented it to the Department as what we were going to 
do, there were smiles all round, everyone nudging each other as if to say `what's this bloke smoking? ' And 
when we started delivering it, they just went `oh! ' 
Most companies did not have a problem with the bidding timetable speeding up because they felt they had 
ample experience of the process and what was required of them by then: 
"I haven't really any argument that we were left short of time to do what we wnated to do, or our 
bids were compromised because we ran out of time... You either had to get your act together or forget it! " 
Only one bidder did not share this point of view, noting that the risks of making an error were increased: 
"I guess the problem towards the end was the very short time period, because you had less and less 
time to prepare your indicative bids and final bids... I think it increases the risk that you make the wrong 
decision and specify the wrong service improvement or the wrong rolling stock that you're going to buy, or 
put the wrong price in". 
Table 3.3. Example of a `template'. The theoretical notes surround the raw data (presented 
in quotation marks) which had formed the themed document. Some of the section shown 
has now been edited out of the final version of chapter five. 
an encouraging level of approval was obtained from those who did. 
14 Only limited 
alterations were made to the chapters' contents after a few mistakes and omissions were 
identified. These related to changes in regulatory policy which had occurred after the drafts 
had been completed, or minor misinterpretations of respondents' comments in some 
circumstances. 
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Respondents' reactions to chapter four were more varied, however. Although it was 
commented that the draft had "come out very well, " one interviewee was particularly 
critical, arguing that one part of section 4.5 - that which suggests the track authority model 
was not adopted as a result of considered analysis (see chapter four) - was "seriously 
misleading. " Data relating to this section were re-examined thoroughly in response to this 
assertion, and particular care was taken in doing this; although it was of course possible that 
the analysis was incorrect, it was also borne in mind that some respondents are wont to 
view validation exercises as opportunities to influence a research project's outcome, 
especially if it reflects badly upon them (MacPherson and Williamson, 1992). After a 
detailed re-evaluation of the data, which involved some supplementary interviewing, it was 
accepted that one aspect of section 4.5 was inaccurate and the text was changed 
accordingly. " Other aspects of the respondent's argument were rejected, however, as no 
corroborative evidence could be found to support them. This episode served to illustrate the 
difficulties involved in establishing a `factual' chronology from a variety of respondents 
whose viewpoints often conflict, and the remainder of the chapter was thoroughly reviewed 
in case of further errors (one was found with regard to the timing of Cecil Parkinson's 
tenure as Secretary of State for Transport). 
Finally, the style of data presentation adopted conforms to the standard currently adopted 
by qualitative authors (see, for example, Bartram and Shobrook, 1998; Schoenberger, 1989; 
Sidaway, 1997). Points raised are supported with verbatim quotes, although on occasion it 
was necessary to paraphrase the views of numerous respondents to protect anonymity 
and/or assist style. The sources of verbatim quotes are not revealed, and in some instances, 
where it was felt that respondents were easily identifiable, minor alterations to the wording 
of quotes have been made. Usually, this only involved changing the first person to the third 
person or vice versa, but all affected respondents were informed of this approach. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has described and evaluated the methods adopted in this thesis to collect 
primary data. In order to fulfil the aims of the study, it was recognised that interviews 
would have to be conducted with elites. Several potential difficulties exist with undertaking 
14 Four responses were obtained for chapter five and five for chapter six. Chapter seven was not forwarded 
to respondents as relatively little interview data was used in the chapter. Its contents were scrutinised by a 
leading railway journalist, however. 
15 The original draft overlooked the role of one key actor in selecting the track authority model of rail 
privatisation (see chapter four) and underestimated the amount of analysis which preceded the publication 
of the White Paper New Opportunities for the Railways. 
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research of this kind, but these were negotiated and it is felt that this enabled the collection 
of a high quality data set capable of making a valuable contribution to the understanding of 
rail privatisation policy. The key research tool employed was the semi-structured interview, 
recommended by Schoenberger (1991) as an effective means of obtaining `deep' 
information from respondents. This kind of interview is a standard research tool in many 
areas of human geography (see, for example, Bartram and Shobrook, 1998; Herod, 1993; 
McDowell, 1992; Sidaway, 1997) but, with a few notable exceptions (in particular Bird, 
1982,1988; Hoyle, 1993,1994,1995) has been largely overlooked in transport-related 
aspects of the discipline. It is recognised, therefore, that this technique may be unfamiliar to 
some transport geographers, but this chapter has been designed to explain the method in 
detail in an attempt to pre-empt any misgivings or confusion which may have arisen. The 
potential disadvantages associated with qualitative techniques have been noted, but it is felt 
that these have been adequately addressed. As a result, the key advantage of semi- 
structured interviewing, namely that it allows the thorough investigation of an issue from 
the perspective of the respondent rather than the researcher (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) has 
been exploited. 
Following detailed preparations, interviews were undertaken with policy makers and senior 
management representatives from both TOCs and franchise bidders. Policy makers and 
TOCs were well represented by the amount and nature of respondents interviewed, but 
there was concern that not enough franchise bidders were participating in the study to 
warrant continuing enquiries into the competitive tendering process. However, it was 
decided after consideration that a sufficient number and range of views could be obtained 
from shortlisted bidders, but it should be noted that the opinions of those who failed to 
reach final tendering stage on any occasion are not represented. Finally, data analysis was 
undertaken using a qualitative `editing' technique. Although the respondent validation 
exercise revealed some analytical errors, it is felt that the decision to adopt the editing 
technique was justified because it allowed the presentation of `deep, ' contextualised data, 
which would have been problematic to express in numbers. The results of the data 
collection and analysis techniques reviewed in this chapter are now presented throughout 
the remainder of the thesis. 
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Chapter Four 
Adopting the track authority model of rail privatisation 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter two examined the network industry sell-offs in the context of neoliberalism, the 
theoretical framework upon which the privatisation programme was based. It was suggested 
that throughout the 1980s, rather than promoting competition and reducing public sector 
involvement in the privatised sectors, the Conservatives marginalised the goal of market 
liberalisation and retained an influential role in the affairs of the utilities through the creation 
of regulatory mechanisms and institutions. The restructuring of the electricity generating 
industry in 1990 saw the first real attempt to secure a genuine move towards market 
liberalisation when divesting a utility. The CEGB was split into four companies -a common 
carrier (National Grid) and three, competing generating companies - and restrictions 
controlling market entry were abolished (Electricity Association, 1998). Actual competition 
within the industry is now considerable (Littlechild, 1993), and Offer does not impose 
`surrogate' competition measures. 
The government's proposals for rail privatisation were formally unveiled in the 1992 White 
Paper New Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a). As noted in 
chapter one, selling BR had been regarded by some as potentially troublesome because it 
differed from the other network industries in several important respects (Shaw, 2000). Most 
importantly BR, unlike the utilities, was heavily dependent upon public subsidy (some 
operational differences are discussed later). The Serpell Report (Serpell, 1983) concluded in 
1983 that in order to make BR profitable, 84 per cent of its route miles would have to be 
closed. Hostile public reaction to such a prospect confirmed to ministers that moves to cut 
back BR's network before (or after) privatisation would be politically unacceptable, and 
that at least some continuing financial support would be necessary to "sustain the... national 
network of services" at 1992 levels (Conservative party, 1992: 35). As such, ministers were 
forced to acknowledge that it would be impossible - and, indeed, undesirable - for the 
government to reduce significantly its influence over certain parts of the industry despite a 
transfer of ownership (Department of Transport, 1992a). Not only would the state's role 
continue through its financial contributions, but also by virtue of the fact that it could 
reasonably demand guaranteed levels of service in relation to subsidy where it was being 
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paid. In this sense, therefore, some compromise of the neoliberal policy goals outlined in 
chapter two would be inevitable in the rail sell-off. 
This situation notwithstanding, the promotion of industry-wide actual, rather than 
surrogate, competition was a fundamental objective of the government's rail privatisation 
plans. The Conservatives' 1992 election manifesto noted: 
"We believe the best way to produce profound and lasting improvements on the railways is to end 
BR's state monopoly... Companies have already said that they want to introduce new railway services as 
soon as the monopoly is ended. We will give them that chance" (Conservative Party, 1992: 35). 
New Opportunities for the Railways emphasised ministers' wish to reduce the role of the 
state in the railway industry in order to harness the "management skills, flair and 
entrepreneurial spirit" of the private sector (Department of Transport, 1992a: i; Welsby and 
Nicholls, 1999). A complete reorganisation of the railway industry was advocated, and the 
plans put forward in the White Paper - the so-called track authority model - essentially 
represented further experimentation with the method used to divest the electricity industry 
(Charlton et al., 1997; Helm, 1996; Mountford, 1996). A common carrier equivalent to the 
National Grid, Railtrack, was created, and as well as introducing competition to the 
maintenance and `support' aspects of BR's business, ministers also sought to liberalise 
passenger and freight train services. ' The following four chapters analyse the BR sell-off in 
the context of competition and regulation established in chapter two. Chapters five through 
seven assess the policy's outcome in terms of liberalising the passenger rail market, but the 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to describing its development and establishing how the 
track authority model of rail privatisation came to be selected by the government. This 
chapter therefore provides a background for subsequent analyses. 
Debates within and around the Conservative Party concerning the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the railway industry were protracted, some even pre-dating the election of 
the first Thatcher administration in 1979. Evidence suggests that the Department of 
Transport was attempting to sell parts of BR as early as 1980. However, despite rail 
privatisation having been considered by government for more than a decade, there is a 
strong case to be made that the privatisation and liberalisation strategy outlined in New 
Opportunities for the Railways was not, as some respondents suggested (see also House of 
Commons Papers, 1992a), the result of a coherent exercise in policy analysis. Indeed, the 
chapter shows that policymakers had not considered the intricacies of the track authority 
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model before the White Paper was published, and that ministers were unclear as to whether 
their plans were actually capable of achieving what was expected of them. It was not 
understood if adopting a neoliberal policy agenda - seeking to maximise competition and 
minimise the role of the state - would be as appropriate for the railways as it had apparently 
been for the CEGB. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate how and why this situation 
arose. 
The study of rail privatisation policy development is not new, and a number of academic 
accounts have examined the subject from various perspectives. 2 Gibb et al. (1996: 35) first 
advanced the argument that the process leading to BR's divestiture was extremely 
protracted. Zahariadis (1995,1996) explained the timing of the BR sale through a 
conceptual model which drew upon the interaction of three policy `streams', problems, 
solutions and politics. Both studies have made a useful contribution to the understanding of 
rail privatisation policy development, but the context of this thesis demands a new 
perspective in order to emphasise policy makers' evolving attitudes towards competition as 
plans to sell BR developed. Moreover, the arguments advanced in Gibb et al. and 
Zahariadis' work rely heavily upon secondary data sources. Although this is not to contest 
the validity of the studies, their exclusion of primary data might have compromised the 
`depth' of the empirical investigation undertaken in each. This chapter's original 
contribution to the understanding of rail privatisation policy development therefore relates 
both to content, with a focus upon policy makers' attitudes towards market liberalisation, 
and to method, with the incorporation of primary interview/parliamentary data to support its 
arguments. 
4.2 Government rail privatisation policy, 1979 - 1986 
Debate within the Conservative Party regarding the privatisation and liberalisation of BR 
can be traced back to the late 1960s. The CRD's Committee on Nationalised Industries, 
which identified the need to begin a sustained programme of privatisation (see chapter two), 
considered divesting BR's core activities but concluded that denationalisation would be 
inappropriate because "there would be no takers at the price which would be acceptable to 
us" (CRD, 1968: 15). Instead, the Committee suggested that emphasis should be placed on 
securing better public sector management. Following the election of Thatcher as Party 
I This thesis is of course primarily concerned with passenger train services. 
2 The two most comprehensive examples are mentioned here. Others are: European Research Centre, 1993; 
Harris and Godward, 1997; Jenkins, 1995; Shaw et al., 1998; Truelove, 1991; Turton, 1992; Williams, 
1992; Wolmar, 1996. 
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leader in 1975, support for the liberalisation of BR's market began to materialise among the 
Conservative Right. The Young Conservatives' (1976) Key Policy Statement called for the 
rail industry to be liberalised by allowing private operators onto the network to compete 
with BR, and the shadow transport spokesman, Norman Fowler, emphasised his support for 
market, rather than state, determination of transport provision (Fowler, 1977). 
Considering Thatcher's cautious outlook to privatisation in the early 1980s, plans to attract 
private sector capital into the railway industry materialised remarkably quickly. A likely 
reason why is because both the new Minister of State for Transport, Norman Fowler, and 
the British Railways Board (BRB) favoured private investment in BR's subsidiary industries 
(BRB, 1981; Modern Railways, 1980a, 1980b). 3 Proposals to achieve this were developed 
during 1980 and the result was the creation of a new holding company, British Rail 
Investments Ltd (BRIL), as a wholly owned subsidiary of the BRB. The assets of Sealink 
UK Ltd, British Transport Hotels, British Rail Hovercraft Ltd (Seaspeed) and British Rail 
Property Holdings were transferred to BRIL in order that private sector involvement could 
be administered separately from BR's core activities (Modern Railways, 1980c; 1981a). The 
BRB saw its new subsidiary as a means of expanding the total level of investment in the 
existing businesses on top of government grants: 
"... for BR, the benefit of privatisation is seen as being two-fold: in addition to receiving the 
proceeds of sales, BR will also face reduced calls on the finance available within its investment ceiling as 
the investment requirements of the subsidiaries in the holding company will be met in part from the private 
sector" (Modern Railways, 1980c: 386). 
The government's primary motivation for establishing BRIL was soon revealed to be 
different from BR's. When ministers realised that revenue from asset sales could be used in 
order to `massage' the PSBR (Brittan, 1984; Howe, 1981), they prioritised the divestiture 
of BR's subsidiaries in order to reduce the overall level of its subsidy and raise money for 
the Exchequer (Jenkins, 1995). As noted by a respondent: 
"... the [government] got to work on all public assets and simply stripped them. A 1970s merchant 
banker couldn't have done better. 'Get rid of your hotels, get rid of your hovercraft, get rid of your ships, we 
don't want all these engineering works, we don't want any of this catering, get rid of it. But most of all get 
rid of your property. And give us the money. "' 
3 Because there were too many cabinet ministers for the government legally to pay their salaries, Norman 
Fowler initially served as Minister (not Minister of State) for Transport outside the cabinet but in attendance 
at its meetings. In January 1981, following the removal of Norman St John-Stevas and Angus Maude, 
Fowler was accommodated as Secretary of State for Transport. 
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The 1981 Transport Act (House of Commons, 1981) provided for BR to dispose of its 
subsidiary businesses and these were sold throughout the 1980s (see table 4.1). 
The sale of BR's subsidiaries in the early 1980s was consistent with the development of 
privatisation policy in other industrial sectors at the time, as all the divested companies were 
relatively small and already operated in competitive markets. But having established the 
concept of privatisation in the rail industry, it seems that the Department of Transport was 
keen to set a precedent and be the first to sell the core activities of a network industry. As a 
result, attention was turned to the possibility of privatising parts of BR's rail operations. A 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) report on BR's Southern Region (SR) in 
1980 had concluded, among other things, that more investment was needed in order to 
improve rail services in the area (MMC, 1980). Increased government expenditure was 
ruled out because this would clash with the policy of reducing BR's overall subsidy (and the 
PSBR), but Fowler did ask BR to investigate operational and managerial independence for 
the SR in order to seek clearer accountability for the operation of services (Modern 
Railways, 1981b). The Department's semantic subtlety in fact concealed its objective of 
finding a way to divest the SR, perhaps opening up an alternative investment source: 
"... Norman Fowler... did a study of the Southern Region. He got his officials to study 
privatising the SR as an experiment. `Sell off the SR, ' [he said]. " 
Business Sold Date of Sale 
BR Hovercraft October 1981 
BR Hotels 1982 - 1984 
Superbreak Mini Holidays February 1983 
Slateford Laundry September 1983 
Sealink UK July 1984 
British Transport Advertising August 1987 
Doncaster Wagon Works October 1987 
Horwich Foundry August 1988 
Travellers' Fare December 1988 
British Rail Engineering Ltd April 1989 
Golden Rail May 1989 
Table 4.1. BR's subsidiary and peripheral business sales, 1981-1989 (excluding various 
property disposals). Source: Hansard (1995). 
In addition to the SR, the Department examined proposals for the privatisation of rail 
operations in Scotland and Wales (Hope, 1983). The favoured approach at this stage was to 
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auction franchises for vertically integrated, geographically discrete rail businesses broken 
from the rump of BR. In this sense, some provision had been made for competition for the 
rail market (as opposed to in it), although this was almost certainly by accident rather than 
by design. Early privatisation plans were crude and there is nothing to suggest that officials 
had submitted a blueprint capable of liberalising BR's core market; rather, the approach 
seems to have been to let the private sector formulate proposals of its own and present them 
to the Department (Abbott, 1984). 
Despite Fowler's enthusiasm for a rail sell-off, his plans were ultimately over-ridden by his 
Cabinet colleagues. Although numerous state-owned enterprises had been sold off by 1982, 
privatisation had not yet been extended to tackle the network industries and a BR sale was 
viewed as complicated and unworkable by many ministers. As already noted, the 
privatisation of BR would involve continuing subsidy payments: 
"... It got absolutely nowhere because no-one believed in it. They didn't think it was going to 
happen, it was crazy, and so on... Norman pushed it quite hard, but... at the end of the day he just didn't 
have any clout. " 
The most influential objector to rail privatisation was Margaret Thatcher, who sustained 
opposition to the idea throughout the early 1980s (Jenkins, 1995). In addition to the fact 
that "she was not convinced that privatising a loss-making industry was feasible, " Thatcher 
felt sure that `middle-England' held an inexplicable affection for its railways (a sentiment 
also expressed by Gibb et al., 1996) and that to tinker overtly with BR's core activities 
would precipitate a political disaster. The then Prime Minister's cautious approach to 
privatisation (see chapter two), although quickly evaporating with regard to other 
industries, remained acute in relation to the railways. When Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of 
State for Transport from 1983 to 1986, arranged a meeting with Thatcher specifically to 
obtain her support for rail privatisation, 
"... she told him never to mention the words again, and that was it. She said `railway privatisation 
will be the Waterloo of this government, I don't want to hear about it. Please never mention the railways to 
me again... Nick had a very shrewd political sense and I remember him saying `it's not worth a candle. As 
long as she's PM, there's no point in discussing railway privatisation. "' 
The divergence of opinion between the Department of Transport and Downing Street 
resulted in the abandonment of attempts to divest train services. Although the rhetoric of 
privatisation was kept alive by the Department of Transport - it recorded that it still 
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supported the idea - the responsibility for encouraging private sector train operation was 
passed to BR (Hansard, 1983a, 1983b, 1984). In reality, with the majority of the BRB 
opposed to core activity privatisation, it is scarcely credible to suppose that the Board 
would pursue this option enthusiastically. It therefore seems likely that the Department of 
Transport pursued this strategy because it allowed a policy compromise whereby Fowler 
and his successors could maintain a position in favour of privatisation safe in the knowledge 
that it was unlikely to occur. By the mid 1980s, however, the Department of Transport also 
appeared to lose interest in selling BR. Notwithstanding claims from Conservative 
backbenchers that parts of BR were "positively crying out for privatisation" (Hansard, 
1985: Cols 5-6), the Department stated that the government had no plans to privatise any 
part of the rail network (Hansard, 1986). That official position did not change publicly until 
1988. 
4.3 External proposals 
Despite the absence of a definitive government position on rail privatisation, the Department 
of Transport's initial enthusiasm aroused debate among interested observers regarding how 
BR might be sold. As in the case of BT, where divestiture plans had resulted in numerous 
analyses of potential methods of sale to promote competition (for example, Beesley, 1981; 
Kay and Silbertson, 1984; Veljanovski, 1989), suggestions regarding BR's future were 
advanced by academics (Beesley and Littlechild, 1983; Gylie, 1984; Starkie, 1984), think 
tanks (Adam Smith Institute (ASI), 1983; Gritten, 1988; Irvine, 1987,1988) and 
Conservative backbenchers (Hansard, 1988a, 1988b). Before this chapter moves on to 
discuss developments in government policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is necessary 
to review the key `external' contributions to the rail privatisation debate because they 
proposed concepts and methods which influenced policy makers' thoughts when they 
eventually came to privatise and liberalise the railway industry. 
Two suggestions were put forward in 1983, one by the ASI and the other by Beesley and 
Littlechild. Both elaborated upon the Department of Transport's original concept of 
regional separation as they advocated selling vertically integrated, geographically discrete 
cost centres. The ASI's (1983) Omega Report asserted that the government should aim for 
a free market in public transport run by private enterprise, and espoused charging road users 
in order to level the playing field between transport modes. Within this context, the future 
of the railways would have to "be [subject to] a commercial, rather than an emotional, 
assessment" (ASI, 1983: 27). The report called for the restructuring of BR's management 
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into cost centres to help identify financial and traffic records for each line. Once sufficient 
information had been collated regarding the commercial viability of individual cost centres, 
each could be auctioned, leasehold, to private bidders. Hopelessly uneconomic and 
underused lines would be closed and disposed of, although where "politicians [were] 
insistent on keeping lines open" (ASI, 1983: 31) the report suggested a degree of 
competition for the market could be created by offering franchises. Competition in the 
market was largely overlooked, although some restrictions to prevent one company buying 
up leases for adjacent lines were proposed in order to encourage competition between 
operators in `border' areas. 
Beesley and Littlechild (1983) emphasised the social, as well as the commercial, advantages 
rail privatisation could bring for consumers. Unlike the ASI, Beesley and Littlechild took 
seriously the social and political problems which would have accompanied the withdrawal 
of services. They suggested that once BR had been restructured (perhaps into the pre-1948 
regions), it would be sold on the condition that successor companies committed themselves 
to a minimum programme of rail output. Given that privatisation would, according to 
Beesley and Littlechild, make the successor companies much more efficient than BR, they 
could make better use of their equipment and a quite considerable passenger output could 
be insisted upon. The model included the potential for new operators to introduce services 
in competition with the successor companies although, like the ASI, Beesley and Littlechild 
effectively discounted any need for on-rail competition to develop. 
Debate in 1984 shifted towards the possibility of vertically separating BR before 
privatisation in a manner similar to that suggested by Nigel Lawson for BT in 1982 (see 
section 2.4). Vertical separation would have involved splitting BR into two successor 
companies, one assuming responsibility for infrastructure and the other operations. A key 
characteristic of this method is that it would expose BR's operations business as an 
artificial monopoly. Whereas the infrastructure would retain its natural monopoly 
characteristics, there would be, in theory at least, no reason why any number of operators 
should be prevented from operating different services on the same stretch of track (`on-rail' 
competition). 4 Gylie (1984) advocated vertical separation but argued that although the 
operations business should be privatised, the infrastructure should not. By retaining the 
4 In practice there can be numerous difficulties with introducing such an arrangement, and they are 
discussed in section 4.5 and chapter six. 
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`track authority' in the public sector, he suggested, the government would be able to make 
strategic decisions regarding investment in surface transport infrastructure: 
"... if road and rail [were] viewed simply as rights of way, the track, track bed, signalling and 
policing of the railway could be considered for investment in the same way as highways and the respective 
costs for both networks could be compared... The rail network would generally be considered as the 
equivalent of the trunk road network" (Gylie, 1984: 16). 
Moreover, the common funding and control of `highway track' and `railway track, ' 
combined with the sale of BR's maintenance operations would, according to Gylie, result in 
considerable efficiencies and cost savings. On the operations side, Gylie favoured 
disaggregating BR's services and selling them off bit by bit. Rather than seeking to promote 
competition, Gylie's plan was to create either an intricate, regional division of services, or a 
mainline network with supporting feeder services. The latter would be run commercially as 
far as possible, but with the potential for local authorities to contribute subsidy to 
uneconomic, yet necessary, routes. 
The first to advocate a significant liberalisation of BR's market was Starkie (1984). 
Following Kay and Silberston (1984) he argued that, although privatisation in and of itself 
would secure some consumer advantages, a divestiture which introduced on-rail 
competition would be more beneficial. Indeed, Starkie (1984: 16) dismissed the effect of 
competitive pressures from other modes of transport because BR was "still not as efficient 
as it might be" despite their existence. Thus, "... the issue... [was] what form of privatisation 
[would] increase competitive forces within the railway industry [? ]" (Starkie, 1984: 16). 
Starkie went on to suggest that although the government should retain control of the 
infrastructure, train sets should be vested in private sector companies who could compete 
over commercially attractive routes. In the case of socially necessary services, train 
operators could compete for a ring-fenced Public Service Obligation (PSO) grant to be 
awarded through a regime of competitive tendering. Starkie's model thus identified the 
potential for competition both in and for the market. 
By the late 1980s, considerable emphasis was being placed by Conservative 
parliamentarians and think tanks upon the importance of Starkie's notion of competition 
between operators on the same tracks. Two backbenchers, Keith Mans and Nicholas 
Bennett, suggested models through which on-rail competition could be achieved (Hansard, 
1988a, 1988b). Both espoused a track authority with slight modifications to Starkie's 
suggestion. The ASI contributed further proposals with Kenneth Irvine's The Right Lines 
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(1987) and Track to the Future (1988). Irvine's papers represented a shift of opinion for the 
ASI. Whereas The Omega Report had favoured a vertically integrated solution with minimal 
subsidy and limited competition, the ASI now championed a track authority supported by a 
grant to maximise competitive opportunities. Unlike Starkie, who advocated a nationalised 
infrastructure company, Irvine contended that trains should be able to compete with each 
other on privately-owned track. With this exception, Irvine generally concurred with 
Starkie's ideas and developed them further in certain cases. For example, with reference to 
competitive tendering for loss-making services, Irvine borrowed from Beesley and 
Littlechild (1983) and suggested that, in return for compensating revenue losses, a franchise 
must include quality of service stipulations in order to guarantee an acceptable level of 
service for consumers. 
Gritten (1988) returned the debate to vertical integration, although he placed a much 
greater emphasis on the desirability of, and the prospects for, market liberalisation than 
either the ASI (1983) or Beesley and Littlechild (1983). Gritten argued that BR should be 
broken into a perhaps a dozen discrete operating areas, and that such an approach would 
make commercial sense, provide efficiency and financial clarity. Competition would then 
occur not only in `border' areas, but also within the regions themselves as companies would 
be made to open their tracks to on-rail competitors. Ring-fenced grants for loss-making 
services were again proposed, although Gritten made no mention of competitive tendering 
for these operations. 
The suggested methods of privatisation reviewed here fall into two categories. First, 
building upon the Department of Transport's initial work, is the regional model. Beesley 
and Littlechild (1983), the ASI (1983) and Gritten (1988) espoused breaking BR up into 
vertically integrated, geographically discrete operations with or without opportunities for 
competition. Second is the track authority model. Advanced initially by Gylie, and 
developed by Starkie (1984), Irvine (1987,1988) and backbench MPs (Hansard, 1988a, 
1988b), this option involved the vertical separation of BR in order to allow either 
economies of scale from a state-owned combined track/highway company, or competition 
between different operators on the same tracks. Some competition for the market was also 
proposed. 
In common with other academic thought regarding utility privatisation (for example,. Kay 
and Silbertson, 1984; Veljanovski, 1989), none of the authors recommended that BR should 
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be sold as one company, although it is important to recognise that the ASI (1983), Beesley 
and Littlechild (1983) and Gylie (1984) appear to have suggested disaggregating BR for 
reasons unconnected with promoting competition. It seems likely that this was the case 
because their authors regarded BR as one of many transport modes already in competition 
with one another; in other words, they disagreed with Starkie's (1984) view that BR 
constituted a monopoly. 5 In each case a break-up was suggested principally on 
administrative grounds. Only after Starkie (1984) had suggested that competition with other 
transport modes had little effect on BR's performance did authors begin to assume that the 
company in essence behaved as a monopoly. Referring perhaps to ideological objections to 
monopolies (Friedman, 1962), and almost certainly to empirical experience of the 
disappointing performance after privatisation of BT and British Gas (see chapter two), the 
proposals began to advocate splitting BR up with a view to promoting competition. 
Of course, the existence of numerous academic arguments regarding the need to liberalise 
the markets of network industries had not prevented the government from selling BT, 
British Gas and the water industry as regulated monopolies. So long as it was politically 
convenient to forego market liberalisation, there is no reason to suggest that the above 
models would have influenced ministers to any practical extent. However, as the next 
sections point out, an announcement that BR would once again be considered for 
privatisation coincided with the publication of the electricity White Paper in 1988 (see 
chapter two). With the government becoming more interested in promoting competition, 
there was perhaps a more realistic expectation that restructuring BR to liberalise its market 
would become a policy commitment (see, for example, The Economist, 1991). It has 
already been noted that this option was ultimately pursued; the following section of this 
chapter reviews developments in advance of the publication of the White Paper, New 
Opportunities for the Railways. 
4.4 Rail privatisation and liberalisation: an idea whose time had come 
It is argued by Gibb et al. (1996: 40) that rail privatisation was firmly established on the 
political agenda by the late 1980s: "[i]t was no longer a case of whether the government 
would decide to privatise, but of when and how the railways could be privatised. " Paul 
Channon, Secretary of State for Transport from 1987 to 1989, was the first to "fly a kite" 
S Beesley and Littlechild (1983) and Gylie's (1984) opinion was shared by many in the railway industry and 
pressure groups such as Transport 2000 (1989) who argued that making rail operators compete with each 
other would distract their attention from the real issue which is competing with the private car. This point is 
discussed in more detail in chapters six and seven (see also Charlton et al., 1997). 
73 
regarding the sale of BR at the 1988 Conservative Party Conference (Webster, 1988). 
Channon was publicly circumspect in that he committed himself only to investigating 
whether privatisation might be a viable option in the future, but personally he was 
committed to the idea. Driven by developments occurring elsewhere in the transport field - 
such as the sale of British Airways and the deregulation and privatisation of the bus industry 
(see chapter one) - and at least partially by backbench pressure and his own commuting 
experience, Channon did not share Thatcher's view that the railways could not be sold: 
"... he became convinced that the government ought to grasp the nettle and do something about 
British Rail privatisation... It was something a Tory minister was bound to want to do, bound to want to 
look at, but he found it astonishing that it hadn't been looked at earlier in a big way... he was the first 
person to take a big step on it. " 
Why Thatcher changed her mind and allowed Channon to refer so overtly to rail 
privatisation remains unclear, even to Channon himself: 
"... He casually let it be known that he wanted to announce at the [1988] Party conference the fact 
that the government was going to privatise BR... He went to some meetings in September 1988 and asked 
permission to make this announcement at the Party conference. There were all sorts of wise people saying 
'oh, you can't do that, it's much too dangerous, the ground hasn't been prepared' and all that, and Mrs 
Thatcher was fairly luke warm. She said he could say something if he would submit the exact form of words 
to her before the Party conference. So about a week before the Party conference, he wrote to her with the 
paragraphs that he wanted to use in his speech about rail privatisation. To his astonishment, within 48 
hours he had them back with no comment. " 
Whatever Thatcher's reasoning, Channon announced shortly after the 1988 Conservative 
Party Conference that the Department of Transport was considering potential models for 
rail privatisation (Webster, 1988). In a speech at a Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) 
conference he listed them and outlined in general the pros and cons of each (see table 4.2) 
(Channon, 1988). Two of the sale options were lifted directly from the proposals outlined in 
section 4.3 above - the regional and track authority models - and three, `BR plc, ' 
sectorisation and a `hybrid' approach, were new. The BR plc option involved a direct 
transfer of BR from the public to the private sector in the same way that BT and British Gas 
had been sold some years before. The sectorisation model was an extension of BR's 
contemporaneous management structure. Until 1982, BR had been organised largely on a 
regional basis, with each region managing its own planning, marketing and operation of 
services, as well as maintaining its own infrastructure. For accounting purposes BR was 
reorganised in 1982 into five business sectors, each defined to be relatively homogenous in 
the type of traffic it operated. InterCity provided high speed services between major 
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conurbations; Network SouthEast served the London and south coast commuter market; 
Regional Railways operated the remaining, provincial passenger services; and freight and 
parcels handled the non-passenger trains that their names suggest. Although further 
reorganisation would have been necessary before privatisation, it was these businesses 
which the sectorisation model would have sold to the private sector. 6 Finally, the form of 
the hybrid model had not been determined by 1988 - instead, it was noted only that this 
"option would allow some of the better features of the other [proposals] to be incorporated, 
while avoiding some of the drawbacks" (Channon, 1988: 37). 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Regional Some competition, but largely indirect; 
Improved moral through local loyalty; 
Improved flexibility and efficiency 
Potential difficulties with network benefits; 
Problems with through trains between regions; 
Possible loss of economies of scale; 
Business 'mix' within each region requires 
division of management attention 
Track authority Promotes competition 
BR plc Continuity of style and structure; 
Minimal cost of privatisation 
Sectorisation Avoids problems of operational transparency 
On-rail competition limited by railway 
practicalities, eg economics, capacity; 
Track authority still a monopoly and difficult to 
regulate; 
Track authority remote from rail users; 
Investment decisions difficult 
Not even limited competition; 
Size of BR has engendered `diseconomies of 
complexity' ; 
Lack of operational transparency 
Difficulties with track ownership 
Hybrid Better features of other models can be 
incorporated while their drawbacks can be 
avoided 
Table 4.2. Advantages and disadvantages of possible rail privatisation models identified by 
the Department of Transport in 1988. The limited number and nature of points raised 
indicates that the proposals were still being considered at a general level. Source: Channon 
(1988). 
Despite the emphasis placed on the potential for market liberalisation in some of the 1988 
proposals (Redwood, 1988), speculation in the press and elsewhere implied that Channon 
did not share the enthusiasm of his right-wing colleagues for promoting competition. 
Channon's primary concern seems to have been to effect a relatively straightforward sale. 
Moreover, Channon was not convinced of the logic of promoting competition in a loss- 
6 The sector names listed here are the most recent to have been used by BR. The sectors were later 
reorganised under the Organising for Quality (OforQ) initiative (see chapter five) into fully vertically- 
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making industry, and it was initially reported that he was impressed by the sectorisation and 
`BR plc' models of divestiture (Leadbeater et al., 1989; Brown, 1989). Not only would 
these methods obviate the need for a complex restructuring exercise, but they were also 
approved by BR's management. A majority of the BRB was known to be "fanatical for a 
unitary solution, " but was prepared to accept sectorisation as a possible alternative (this 
position was also advanced by Transport 2000 (1989)). In fact, Channon was not 
particularly swayed by the feelings of the BRB and instead favoured Gritten's (1988) 
regional approach, at least in part because he had an emotional attachment to it: 
"... it would be in different regions again... That's the solution that he would have done - at least, 
when he left, that was the front runner. He was very keen to do that... he thought it would be nice, people 
would like to go back on the Great Western or whatever, and that was certainly the chief runner at that 
stage. " 
Gritten's original proposal had envisaged considerable scope for market liberalisation (see 
section 4.3), but Channon was less enthusiastic. He suggested that any competition arising 
from this model should be largely indirect, rather than `open access', and that greater 
passenger benefit would be derived from the improved loyalty, flexibility and efficiency 
which would result from the removal of a nationalised management structure (Channon, 
1988). 
Before significant progress on the regional model could be made, Channon was replaced as 
Secretary of State for Transport by Cecil Parkinson. Parkinson's success at introducing 
competition into the electricity industry led him to sympathise with David Starkie's view 
that a degree of rail competition was needed (although he did not favour Starkie's 
suggestion of how it should be secured). As it stood, Channon's regional model did not 
really encourage the development of competition (it could only have taken place along the 
territorial borders of different companies), but circumstances were to militate against 
Parkinson selecting an alternative. Upon arrival at the Department of Transport, Parkinson 
discovered that rail privatisation had been somewhat marginalised after the CPS conference 
in 1988. Officials had become lethargic, "looking at options, looking at more options and 
[saying] `let's have a look at some options, "' and the whole exercise was being examined 
"in a rather half-baked fashion. " A respondent recalls Parkinson reminding some civil 
servants that BR was an important industry, and that "the more important [industries] are, 
the more essential it is to get the government out. " 
integrated businesses and the sectorisation model would most likely have involved a similar restructuring 
exercise to remove some idiosyncracies from the mid-1980s structure. 
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More significantly, however, Parkinson became aware that Thatcher had again lost interest 
in selling BR after becoming alarmed at adverse public reaction to Channon's plans (Irvine, 
1987). He sent Thatcher a copy of his speech for the 1989 Conservative Party Conference 
but "got a message back saying she'd be grateful if he'd leave the subject alone and not say 
anything. " Press speculation began to suggest that the government was planning to shelve 
indefinitely its plans to sell BR (Stephens, 1989), and Parkinson felt it was necessary to 
emphasise that this was not the case: 
"... he got a message back saying she'd be grateful if he would leave the subject alone and not say 
anything. He actually went to see her in Blackpool and said 'look, if I don't say anything that will be seen as 
a retreat and... I don't think we should be seen to be backing off. ' So they agreed a form of words like 
`studies continue. "' 
Parkinson was forced to state after the conference that plans for selling BR "are not at the 
top of my list of priorities at the moment" (quoted in Stephens and Brown, 1989: 10), but 
he continued to pressure Thatcher into giving a firm commitment to privatise. He 
acknowledged that the government did not have a mandate to sell BR (a potential sale had 
not been mentioned in the 1987 election manifesto) but, drawing on his experience with 
electricity privatisation where "he had arrived at the beginning of a parliament with no 
plans" at all, 
"... he said that he would like to get it in the open so that we could start the discussions and we 
could develop our ideas. Then, by the time they came back after the next election, which was 1992... we 
could have [already] developed plans so we could crash straight into the business of getting on with it and 
reorganising [BR]. " 
Thatcher relented in autumn 1990 (although it is again uncertain as to why she changed her 
mind), and Parkinson was able to announce to Parliament that the government was now 
"determined to privatise British Rail" (Hansard, 1990, Col. 606). 
In 1990, a decade after Norman Fowler had first suggested privatising BR's core activities, 
the government had finally announced a firm intention to sell the railways. However, the 
various disagreements and delays throughout the 1980s had resulted in the Department of 
Transport undertaking little detailed work on the subject and, as Thatcher (1993: 676) 
herself notes, privatising BR at that point would still involve "large questions which needed 
careful thought and economic analysis. " One such question was that of competition. 
Notwithstanding the recent change in the Cabinet's attitude towards liberalising the markets 
of network industries, Parkinson had been unable to shift the Department of Transport's 
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policy beyond Channon's vision of a regional solution with no direct competition. Although 
improving government finances and backbench pressure had enabled Parkinson to press 
ahead with liberalising the CEGB, they had done little to alter the nature of rail privatisation 
policy. The bulk of Parkinson's efforts regarding rail privatisation had been devoted to 
persuading Thatcher of the need to sell BR, rather than exploring ways in which to liberalise 
its market. Not until Thatcher had agreed to a sale could Parkinson refocus his attention 
upon how to promote competition. 
A working group comprising ministers and officials from the Department of Transport, the 
Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry was established in the autumn of 1990 
to advance a final solution regarding the privatisation and liberalisation of BR. Parkinson 
left the Department of Transport before he could contribute in any meaningful way to the 
group's deliberations, and Thatcher was replaced as Prime Minister in December 1990 (the 
group was able to proceed without significant objections from Downing Street because her 
successor, John Major, was an enthusiastic advocate of rail privatisation). Parkinson's 
replacement, Malcolm Rifkind, shared an enthusiasm for market liberalisation, but 
concluded that Starkie's model of vertical separation was not necessary and that the 
simplest means of liberalising BR's market was to modify Channon's regional solution in 
two ways. First, he saw advantages in keeping the InterCity business intact. Not only would 
this allow a degree of continuity, but it would also provide scope for some competition 
between origin/destination pairs served by both InterCity and a regional company. Second, 
`open access' operators would in certain circumstances be allowed to operate services in 
competition with incumbents, as Gritten (1988) had originally proposed. 
In contrast, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry supported the track 
authority option. The Treasury in particular was convinced by Starkie's argument that BR 
behaved like a monopoly, especially in major commuter areas such as London, and was fully 
persuaded by the case for vertical separation. The outcome of the track authority option 
would be similar to the model of privatisation adopted for the bus industry in the sense that 
it would promote competition for the market, through the competitive tendering of train 
paths, and competition in the market on the tracks themselves (see chapter one). It is 
interesting to note, however, that Treasury officials' enthusiasm for vertical separation did 
not result from experience from the transport sector, but rather following their involvement 
with the break up of the CEGB. The sale of the CEGB had been a model neoliberal 
privatisation. Since restructuring, the electricity generating industry had seen genuine 
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competition emerge and efficiency increase, and the state had been able to significantly 
reduce its role in the industry's affairs (see chapter two). Although various technological 
factors had prevented competition being extended beyond the generating section of the 
industry, rail privatisation was seen as an opportunity to experiment further with vertical 
separation. As such, an analogy was drawn between the new electricity industry structure 
and the track authority model of rail privatisation: 
"... we were convinced that the model was to try and strip things down to the natural monopoly... 
accept that was a monopoly and regulate it, but everywhere else bring in competition. So when we 
approached BR, we said `where is the natural monopoly in BR? Let's strip it down, let's isolate that, let's 
try and break the rest of it up into units which can be open for competition in a variety of ways'... And 
that's the model we were convinced of, ourselves, as being right. " 
Treasury officials were even able to use the onset of recession to their advantage. Whereas 
in the past the government had not broken up utilities on the grounds that monopolies 
fetched a higher sale price, evidence from the electricity privatisation enabled the Treasury 
to argue that competition created by vertical separation would increase rail operators' 
efficiency and thus lower the future subsidy bill. 
In light of this disagreement, the working group's conclusions, outlined in a report in mid 
1991, were a compromise. A hybrid solution was recommended, which suggested that there 
should be a separation of infrastructure and operations throughout most of the UK, but that 
the London commuter area should remain vertically integrated. Although the Treasury 
thought that competition would be difficult to introduce in the vertically integrated area, this 
compromise was accepted because it was estimated, on reflection, that the amount of rail 
congestion around London would preclude the majority of competitive opportunities in any 
case. Treasury officials were aware that a degree of social regulation, in addition to the 
imposition of minimum service levels (see section 4.1), would probably be needed to protect 
commuters, but had made a strategic concession in a "desperate attempt to get agreement 
with a pretty damn recalcitrant DoT... [The Treasury] bought that for a quiet life to try and 
get the rest of it. " 
The conclusions of the working group were adopted in principle by Cabinet following the 
circulation of its report, and the Department of Transport and the Treasury were cleared to 
finalise policy detail in the run-up to the 1992 general election (the DTI had stepped back 
from proceedings by this stage). Although the need to secure a genuine move towards 
market liberalisation had now been agreed, the practicalities and implications peculiar to the 
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hybrid model had still to be analysed and legislation needed to be drafted. Key officials had 
hoped, like Parkinson in 1990, to undertake these tasks before the next general election, due 
no later than spring 1992, in order that the policy could be implemented quickly in the 1992 
- 1997 Parliament. As the next section shows, however, a definitive policy decision was not 
taken as soon as many both within - and outside - government would have liked. It is 
argued that, as a result, the policy advanced in New Opportunities for the Railways was not 
the result of a coherent exercise in policy analysis and ministers were unclear as to whether 
their plans would actually be capable of achieving what was expected of them. It was not 
understood by the government if adopting a neoliberal policy agenda - seeking to maximise 
competition and minimise the role of the state - would be as appropriate for the railways as 
it had apparently been for the CEGB. 
4.5 Adopting a model for rail privatisation 
4.5.1 The advent of franchising 
Although the conclusions of the working group were clear, it became apparent during 1991 
that Rifkind was not satisfied with them. The Secretary of State attached increasing 
importance to the sectorisation model, and became keen to re-evaluate its potential benefits 
(Atkins, 1992). Because this option had not been seriously considered since the CPS 
conference in 1988, few details regarding its potential implications had been prepared by 
officials. Rifkind decided to devote manpower to re-examining sectorisation and, as a result, 
the development of a rail privatisation Bill was temporarily halted. This new delay intensely 
frustrated the Treasury because it had wanted to forge ahead with drafting legislation as 
quickly as possible. Nonetheless, officials were able to use the extra time to subject their 
conception of a track authority to some further analysis and, as it turned out, this was 
beneficial because by this stage the literature had identified several shortcomings with the 
idea. 
Although there was an apparent analogy between the separation of generation and 
distribution activities in the electricity industry, and the creation of a track authority for the 
railways, it is in fact far from perfect (Adamson et al., 1991). Perhaps the most obvious 
difference is that railway tracks, unlike electricity wires, cannot function as passive conduits. 
Whereas electricity generated by competing companies can be supplied simultaneously to 
different customers using the same cables, it is clearly impossible to run two or more trains 
simultaneously along the same stretch of track. As a result, services between 
origin/destination pairs have to be run according to a series of dedicated train paths 
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monitored by a track authority. The Treasury had intended to auction available paths to 
whoever offered the highest bid (or required the lowest subsidy): 
"We had a view... that, if we had the time, one would have devised a rather more sophisticated 
structure of allocating railway slots, which was effectively a system of auctioning... [but] with some 
minimum requirements for grossly anti-competitive behaviour like running a train fractionally in front of 
another train and all that kind of stuff. " 
In this way, there would be both competition for the market, through the auctioning of 
paths, and competition in the market, between winning bidders' train services. It was 
believed that this would lower the overall subsidy bill, whilst at the same time make those in 
receipt of subsidy directly accountable for it. 
It quickly became apparent that such a scheme would be inoperable, at least in the short 
term. The heterogeneous nature of rail services - trains serve different markets by running at 
different speeds and frequencies - means that they are vastly interdependent. Any company 
bidding for rights to run, for example, a half-hourly stopping service between London 
Euston and Birmingham New Street would generate certain train-path requirements over a 
route shared with other operators. Running this service would thus affect the availability of 
paths for other operators wishing to offer a different type of service on the same, or 
different, routes. (Two stopping trains per hour could seriously constrain the opportunities 
to run fast services, for example. ) Conflicts arising in this way were resolved by BR through 
co-ordination in the timetabling process, but in practical terms it would be extremely 
difficult to replicate this through market mechanisms (Nash, 1990; Nash and Preston, 1993). 
Bids from different companies for potential services over the whole network would 
inevitably clash, and a first auction would become impossible - unsuccessful tenderers 
would therefore need to reconsider their need for paths in the knowledge that some were 
already allocated to a competitor. Not only would assembling a timetable in this manner be 
tortuous, but it would also introduce considerable financial uncertainty for bidders 
(Adamson et al., 1991). 
Moreover, even if paths could be efficiently allocated, day to day operational problems were 
identified in the form of externalities and the loss of network benefits. Externalities can be 
divided into two categories, `train to train' and `track to train' (Jones et al., 1993). The 
former occur as delays to one service, perhaps owing to locomotive breakdown, affect the 
running of others, whereas the latter arise as trains are delayed by a failure of the 
infrastructure. Both have a `snowballing' effect because of the interdependency of rail 
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services, and their resolution presents a host of complex problems. As Foster (1992) notes, 
each late train requires a consequential decision: shall following trains be delayed? Whose 
train? Who should then compensate whom for lost traffic? It became evident that, even with 
a logical (yet elaborate) accounting scheme, such problems would probably not be soluble 
without considerable goodwill from the multitude of operators. Of course, the existence of 
such goodwill in a `new' industry could not be guaranteed. 
Network benefits are advantages which accrue to passengers from the existence of a unified 
railway network (House of Commons Papers, 1993a). Tickets can be purchased from any 
one station on the network to any other; and tickets can be `inter-available' - that is to say, 
passengers can purchase one ticket and use it on any train between an origin/destination 
pair. As Jones et al. (1993) point out, the fragmentation of rail operations can result in 
problems with co-ordinating the sale of `through' tickets which involve numerous changes 
of operator, and/or the cessation of ticket inter-availability (see chapter six) if it is deemed 
anti-competitive. In cases of the latter, rail would lose its `turn up and go' facility because 
passengers would have to buy operator-specific (or `dedicated') tickets. A passenger 
wishing to travel from, say, Plymouth to Exeter St David's might purchase a ticket to use 
an infrequent Regional Railways train because it were cheaper, but in so doing he would 
forfeit his right to travel by more frequent InterCity services. 
Finally, arguments unconnected with trainpath auctioning were advanced in opposition to 
the track authority model. The Department of Transport had noted (Redwood, 1988) that 
effecting a track-train split could result in the track authority abusing its monopoly; that the 
track authority would be remote from rail users and responsibility for service shortcomings 
would be difficult to pin down; and that investment would be difficult to attract and co- 
ordinate (see also Helm and Thompson, 1991). 7 The combination of all the above factors 
led Adamson et al. (1991) to question whether the passenger train industry could be 
reorganised into a potentially competitive industry if it was vertically separated. Bradshaw 
(1991: 25) went further, suggesting that the track authority offended "every professional 
7 Further objections to the track authority concept were advanced by transport academics after the 
Treasury's deliberations had concluded. Among these - some of which are expanded upon 
later where 
relevant - were: the loss of cross-subsidisation opportunities for operators (Glaister and Travers, 1993); the 
incompatibility of franchising and open access operations (Charlton et al., 1997); an increase in transaction 
costs between operators and the track authority (Else, 1996); the difficulties of co-ordinating maintenance 
work and investment between train operators and the track authority (Dodgson, 1994); the 
(in)appropriateness of establishing a heavily contractual industry structure (Foster, 1994); and problems 
with creating train operators with no day to day control over a chief aspect of their operations, i. e. their 
infrastructure (Shires et al., 1994). 
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principle of railway operation" and was "likely to result in an outcome which will be 
expensive, unsuitable and unsafe. " 
The Treasury conceded that its plans for a system of train path auctioning would be 
unworkable given the limited time available to address the above issues. As an alternative, 
passenger rail franchising was suggested. Franchising had been employed by the government 
in selling other industries, especially local authority services (see chapter two), and was 
perceived by the Conservatives to be a generally successful method of privatisation (see also 
chapter seven). Rail franchising would combine groups of train paths, perhaps over a given 
area, to be offered to the private sector as one package. In this way, the retention of some 
competition for the market would be allowed through a tender for subsidy relating to the 
whole package of routes, and competition in the market would occur in border areas where 
operating territories overlapped. In addition, open access operations would be permitted, 
where a market for them existed, subject to operating constraints arising from franchise 
commitments. 
Franchising was seen by the Treasury as a "much cruder model" than the "sophisticated 
auctioning of... slots, " but it was a means of addressing the problems which would have 
arisen under a regime of train-path auctioning. By combining the path requirements of 
numerous services, the potential for reducing the number of operators on the network - and 
thus the complexity of inter-operator dealings - would be considerable: trains could be co- 
ordinated in a central timetable before franchises were let (with a degree of flexibility 
retained for private operators to re-arrange service patterns in the future); the majority of 
train to train externalities could be `internalised' because delays to any given service would 
principally affect other services run by the same operator; the resolution of track to train 
externalities would be simplified for the same reason; and attempts to secure network 
benefits would be somewhat more straightforward with a smaller number of operators 
working to a co-ordinated timetable. Once a framework to resolve these issues in the 
context of franchise operation had been established, it was suggested that open access 
services could be slotted in around existing services with relative ease. 
Franchising did not provide a complete solution to the train-path auctioning problems 
identified above - it only moderated them - and there was still no guarantee that they would 
be straightforward to resolve. Nevertheless, the Treasury had at least been working within 
the framework of the hybrid model suggested by the 1991 working group. In contrast, the 
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Department of Transport's position on rail privatisation, following Rifkind's decision to re- 
evaluate sectorisation, had fallen into disarray. Rifkind continued "agonising over whether 
InterCity should be vertically integrated or not, " and the remainder of 1991 was a "saga 
of... grief within the DoT. " So long as the Department of Transport failed to commit itself 
to a formal policy option, the government was unable to draft legislation. With hindsight, it 
is obvious that decisive action was required by Downing Street at some point during this 
period in order to restore a sense of direction to rail privatisation policy. What actually 
happened, however, was precisely the opposite. Rather than instructing the Department of 
Transport to accept the hybrid model, Major's policy unit began advancing solutions of its 
own based around the regional concept. Downing Street's action served only to confuse 
matters further, and there was "tremendous faffmg around... between the Department [of 
Transport], the Treasury and the cabinet secretariat who were trying to pull [rail 
privatisation policy] together - and not succeeding. " At least three models were now being 
considered - hybrid, sectorisation and regional - with none, other than the track authority 
element of the hybrid model, having received anything more than a cursory analysis. 
4.5.2 Framing the policy 
The government was obliged to call a general election by spring 1992, but at the beginning 
of that year there was still no consensus between Departments about rail privatisation. A 
White Paper on the subject had been promised for before the election but it was being 
delayed as ministers and officials continued to argue over the most appropriate industry 
structure (Financial Times, 1992a). As polling day neared, policy necessarily became 
considered in the context of an election campaign. One respondent pointed out that, "by the 
end of [1991] we'd lost a whole bloody year faffing around, most of it Rifkind's fault, and 
number 10 suddenly said `we've got to write an election manifesto. "' Thus: 
"... the deal was brokered not in the context of considered papers or great meetings; [it] was 
brokered by a guy... in the policy unit at Number 10 essentially - almost literally - walking around 
Whitehall with the bit for the manifesto. That was the way the final deal was done. " 
It is perhaps an overstatement to refer to the manifesto commitment as a `deal'. The only 
firm policy decision which appears to have been taken in terms of industry structure by 
April 1992 was that of ruling out Rifkind's sectorisation model (Tomkins, 1992a). The 
manifesto (Conservative Party, 1992: 35-36) promised a track authority ("one part of BR 
- will continue 
to be responsible for all track and infrastructure") and at the same time kept 
alive the possibility of regions ("our aim will be... to reflect regional and local identity... we 
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want to... recapture the spirit of the old regional companies"). The wording could have 
referred to the hybrid solution, where BR would maintain control of operations in the 
Network SouthEast territory; the universal track authority solution; or a vertically 
integrated regional solution, where the infrastructure would be divided among several track 
authorities coinciding with the territories of train operators. As a respondent, who had been 
observing developments from outside government circles, correctly guessed: 
"... minister X wanted something in about competition, minister Y wanted something in about 
regions and so on. So they just cobbled something together which appeared, in manifesto terms, to satisfy all 
this lot. And they went with that. " 
When John MacGregor was appointed as Secretary of State for Transport following the 
Conservatives' election victory in 1992, there was "not quite a blank sheet of paper as our 
election commitment, but very close to it. Just a few outlines about how [rail privatisation] 
might work. " Another respondent added that because of "Rifkind blowing [1991] out of the 
water and things being resolved in the context of drafting the manifesto, when they won the 
election we had nothing drafted at all. There was no base. " MacGregor's job was to resolve 
the debate over industry structure and present a Bill before Parliament as soon as possible. 
Although ministers were quoted as saying privatisation would be gradual and might take up 
to 10 years (Financial Times, 1992b), the real intention was always to complete the sale 
before the next general election. As a former minister pointed out, "you either did it or you 
didn't - and if you did it, you had to complete it. " 
Along with officials and ministerial colleagues, MacGregor undertook a "huge amount of 
work" in May and June 1992 to frame final proposals outlining how BR would be 
privatised. MacGregor was also convinced of the need to promote competition between 
train operators, and: 
"He spent the first two months [after the election] making up his own mind as to whether the 
framework - almost the blank sheet of paper in the manifesto - was the right framework or whether we 
should go differently. Horizontal and vertical integration was one crucial aspect of that. " 
MacGregor was further assisted by Sir Christopher Foster who had been appointed as a 
special advisor on rail privatisation. Foster was, like the Treasury, a proponent of the track 
authority model (despite having severely criticised it at the CPS conference some years 
before), and he outlined his views in his subsequent publication, The Economics of Rail 
Privatisation (Foster, 1994). Foster's arrival at the Department of Transport suited 
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Treasury ministers and officials because it increased the likelihood of them realising the 
option they had originally advocated. And so it was to be: although Foster recalls 
Departmental misgivings regarding the track authority model, a blueprint was "hammered 
out" and it was accepted as the government's official policy shortly thereafter. 
Former BR chairman Bob Reid identifies Foster's view as being the primary influence 
behind MacGregor's decision to adopt the track authority model. In 1995, he contended 
that the debate over how to privatise BR "was a dogmatic argument of three or four years 
ago. We lost [BR had, of course, supported a vertically integrated solution]. It means we 
now have a structure that is more complicated than necessary. Our view was subordinated 
to the view of one consultant who had never run anything" (The Guardian, 1995). But 
Reid's contention overlooks the influence of the Treasury, whose desire to maximise 
competition had seen it campaigning for vertical separation since 1990, and it is worth 
considering how far the Department of Transport could realistically have adopted anything 
other than the Treasury line. With Rifkind's sectorisation plans rejected in the manifesto and 
the vertically integrated half of the hybrid model still incomplete, the track authority 
proposal had at least been subjected to a relatively comprehensive policy analysis. 
Moreover, a new European Community directive, 91/440, which required member states to 
introduce split accounting into their railway industries, now further supported the case of 
those in favour of vertical separation (see Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1998). 8 MacGregor 
reviewed arguments for and against the various models of rail privatisation, but it seems that 
his hands were tied. Alternative models were insufficiently developed and, if the railways 
were to be in the private sector within the 1992-1997 Parliament, there was not enough 
time to analyse them further. The. track authority model was effectively MacGregor's only 
choice. The Treasury remains adamant that, notwithstanding Foster's preferences, the final 
decision to adopt the track authority model was taken principally as a result of its sustained 
campaigning in the face of continuing disarray within the Department of Transport. 
Although the recollections of various people differ, this view is corroborated by a former 
Transport minister: 
"Put it this way. MacGregor stood back and reviewed the options to familiarise himself with his 
brief at Transport. He just wanted to make sure that vertical separation would work. He may have said in 
8 EC 91/440 requires that member states' railways account for their infrastructure and operations businesses 
independently of one another. The idea is that trans-Europe freight and passenger movements will increase 
as one member state's rail operator could gain access to another's tracks following the simple calculation of 
a track access fee. Because the whole process is transparent, discriminating in favour of the incumbent 
operator becomes more difficult. However, it is important to emphasise that the directive only requires 
separate accounting - it does not require separate ownership of track and trains. 
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public, `we're doing another consultation', but in reality we all knew what the outcome would be... The 
Treasury won. "9 
Thus it is apparent that, despite the protracted evolution of rail privatisation policy, the 
decision to adopt the track authority model was not the result of a coherent policy analysis. 
Despite the existence of numerous models advanced by academics, think tanks, civil 
servants and politicians, the Department of Transport was unable to decide upon a suitable 
method of selling BR and agreement regarding how the railways would be privatised was 
for a long time not found within government. Vertical separation was favoured by the 
Treasury because it was seen as the most likely means of maximising competition and 
minimising the role of the state on the basis that it had been successfully applied to the 
CEGB when the electricity industry was privatised in 1991. The Treasury's assumption was 
that the model used to sell the CEGB could, with only a few minor changes, simply be 
transferred to the privatisation of BR. John MacGregor had little choice but to accept the 
Treasury's argument. 
In reality, of course, relatively little consideration had been given to whether or not the 
track authority model was an entirely suitable approach to privatising and liberalising the 
railway industry. Although a respondent argued that there had been "substantial analysis of 
many points, " this had necessarily been conducted at a general level. Despite the more 
obvious shortcomings in the Treasury's analogy between a track authority for BR and the 
National Grid for the electricity industry having been identified, and ministers satisfying 
themselves regarding essential considerations such as safety, the government still had little 
more than a framework; there was very minimal detail beyond it. To highlight a few key 
issues, little had been worked out regarding: the calculation and allocation of track access 
charges; the formation and vesting of successor rail companies; the specifications and 
administration of franchises; the precise functions and responsibilities of the regulators; the 
likelihood of privatising the structure within one Parliament or the probable cost of the 
exercise. Most importantly in terms of this thesis, the opportunities for, and appropriateness 
of, service competition and the potential impact of market liberalisation upon the 
relationship between the railways and the state had not been adequately examined. Ministers 
could not be sure that the track authority model would actually be capable of providing 
what was expected of it; although it was known that neoliberal values would be 
9 This passage is a joining together of quotes obtained in two separate interviews with the same respondent. 
The intent of each has been retained. 
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compromised by the state's continuing payment of subsidy (see section 4.1), policy makers 
could not be sure that the plans contained in New Opportunities for the Railways would be 
capable of promoting actual, rather than surrogate, competition. 
4.6 The new railway structure 
Having finally decided upon vertical separation, ministers were now faced with the task of 
formulating policy detail and producing a workable industry structure. This was essentially 
undertaken over a three year period between 1992 and 1995, beginning with the publication 
of New Opportunities for the Railways. The document noted that ministers wished to see "a 
reliable, efficient operation offering high quality services to users, " and confirmed the view 
that "the introduction of competition... and the ending of BR's monopoly in the operation of 
services will be instrumental in achieving this" (Department of Transport, 1992a: 1). The 
government's wish to liberate private sector management from state control in order to 
harness its "skills, flair and entrepreneurial spirit" was also emphasised (Department of 
Transport, 1992a: i; Welsby and Nicholls, 1999). The White Paper set out the government's 
commitment to establishing a track authority, Railtrack, and to splitting BR's passenger 
services up into franchises which would be awarded by competitive tendering. In addition, 
the document noted the intention to provide for private sector operators of passenger 
services to engage in on-rail competition with franchisees. This would mean that: 
"... companies wishing to provide new railway services... will have a right of access to the railway 
network... [At present], there is no choice of operator for the rail passenger... liberalising access to the 
network will [provide] the opportunity for new operators to run services. This will give... rail operators the 
stimulus of competition to provide better service quality and value for money" (Department of Transport, 
1992a: 13). 
Responsibility for negotiating, awarding and monitoring franchises would be transferred to a 
new Franchising Authority, whilst the rights of access for both franchised and non- 
franchised operators would be overseen by a new Rail Regulator. 
New Opportunities for the Railways attracted numerous hostile commentaries, not least 
because the plans appeared ill-considered and lacking in detail. Of course, a White Paper is 
not necessarily the place in which a thorough exposition of a new government policy is 
found. Nonetheless, New Opportunities for the Railways was seen by many as being 
exceptionally vague. The then Chairman of the Transport Select Committee, Robert Adley 
MP, argued that a Green Paper should have preceded the White in order to allow a fuller 
debate of its detail and likely implications before legislation was published (Hansard, 
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1993a). MacGregor did not deny that "in working through some of the proposals, it is clear 
that much work remains to be done" (Hansard, 1992a: Col. 974). Crucial aspects of the 
work to which MacGregor referred were not, in fact, completed when the Railways Bill was 
presented to the House of Commons in early 1993 (Nash, 1993). As later chapters will 
show, certain issues had proved complicated to resolve and, because of the need to proceed 
with rail privatisation as soon as possible, it was decided not to wait until the plans were 
fully formulated before drafting legislation. The solution was to produce a Bill which 
contained numerous enabling powers and to continue policymaking during, and after, its 
passage through Parliament. As one respondent who was involved in drafting the legislation 
admitted, "the Bill was a mess, and it had lots of enabling powers rather than specific 
proposals... [because] the thing wasn't properly prepared. " 
During the Bill's second reading, Liberal Democrat MP Nick Harvey mocked its vague 
content when he pointed out that: 
"the Bill comprises 132 clauses and 11 schedules and gives massive powers to the Secretary of 
State... It might have been preferable to have had a Bill of one clause which simply said `the Secretary of 
State can do what he likes, how he likes when he likes and where he likes. ' It would have had more or less 
the same effect" (Hansard, 1993b: 190). 
MacGregor, in contrast, argued that "the principles and the main structure of the Bill are 
entirely consistent with [those in] the White Paper" (Hansard, 1993b: 160). It is true that 
the offices of the Rail Regulator and Franchising Director were established, along with the 
concept of franchising and several technical details such as closure procedures. Beyond this, 
however, MacGregor's assertion is somewhat spurious. Although a deviation from the 
White Paper was unlikely because of the circumstances in which the policy had been 
decided, the Bill was not necessarily consistent with New Opportunities for the Railways in 
several crucial areas precisely because it was vague. To illustrate, no details were provided 
as to: the structure of the industry (the Bill noted merely that the Secretary of State could 
instruct the BRB to form a number of companies); the framework within which on-rail 
competition could develop (it was stated only that a facility owner might be instructed to 
allow more than one company access to its assets); or how it would be regulated (although 
some duties were assigned to the Regulator and the Franchising Director, the majority of 
their functions were to be prescribed by the Secretary of State at a future, unspecified, date) 
(House of Commons, 1993). 
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The majority of these details were finally forthcoming in 1994, and are summarised in 
Britain's Railways: A new Era (Department of Transport, 1994). Although the `new' 
railway appears complex in comparison with its predecessor, BR, the structure is in fact 
quite logical when viewed in the context of the electricity industry privatisation (or, indeed, 
any industry which is characterised by a substantial vertical division of labour). A brief 
overview of the new structure is presented here, although further details regarding the 
provision of passenger services are given as appropriate in chapters five and six. As 
indicated in the White Paper, BR was divided into two basic elements: infrastructure and 
operations. Control of the rail infrastructure passed to Railtrack, which became responsible 
for the safety, maintenance and renewal of the railway network, and now operates in seven 
zonal divisions10. Railtrack also co-ordinates train movements and, subject to the 
Regulator's approval, grants train operators access to the track. 
BR's operations business was divided into 91 separate companies which can be placed in six 
groups that reflect the nature of their activities (Department of Transport, 1994; 1996). 
These are: 
9 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) - 25 franchises to provide passenger rail services. 
The franchises were awarded to the private sector by competitive tender and, at the time 
of divestiture, the TOCs accounted for passenger services formerly operated by BR. In 
addition to the 25 TOCs, the Railways Act provided for the operation of non-franchised 
passenger services on an `open access' basis. These trains would run in addition to those 
operated by TOCs to stimulate further on-rail competition (see chapter six). 
" Freight - seven companies to operate freight trains. Five (Rail Express Systems, 
Loadhaul, Mainline, Transrail and Railfreight Distribution) were sold to a business 
consortium led by Wisconsin Central Transportation, now trading as English, Welsh and 
Scottish Railways (EWS). Red Star Parcels and Freightliner were sold to management 
buy-out teams (MBOs). Open access competition in the freight sector is also provided 
for the by the Railways Act. 
" Rolling Stock Companies (Roscos) - three businesses, Porterbrook Leasing, Eversholt 
Leasing (now Forward Trust Leasing) and Angel Trains Contracts, established to lease 
10 Railtrack does, however, lease most of its stations and light maintenance depots out to train operators. 
The company has retained direct management of only 14 stations throughout the network: London Charing 
Cross, London Euston, London King's Cross, London Liverpool Street, London Bridge, London 
Paddington, London Victoria, London Waterloo (excluding Waterloo International), Birmingham New 
Street, Edinburgh Waverly, Gatwick Airport, Glasgow Central, Leeds and Manchester Piccadilly. Railtrack 
was privatised by share issue in 1996. 
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rolling stock and locomotives to the TOCs. BR's railway vehicles were divided such 
that each Rosco owned a balanced portfolio at the time of divestiture. 
" British Rail Infrastructure Services (BRIS) - 20 companies concerned with the 
maintenance of track and signalling established initially on a regional basis. 
9 British Rail Maintenance Limited (BRML) - seven businesses to undertake the heavy 
overhaul of rolling stock and locomotives. 
9 Central - 27 companies to provide general support services to the industry such as 
telecommunications, consultancy and research. 
With the exception of TOCs, all businesses were sold outright to the private sector. A full 
list of all the rail businesses established, along with their sale details, is provided in appendix 
four. 11 
Companies within the new structure interact on a commercial, contractual basis, and the 
whole system is essentially financed through the TOCs. TOCs' payment of track access 
charges, rolling stock leases and other bills in turn enables Railtrack and the Roscos to let 
contracts for maintenance, renewal, support services and so on (see figure 4.1). Subsidy is 
paid to the TOCs to cover any shortfalls between their costs and revenue receipts, and the 
amounts payable were determined by competitive tender during the franchising process. All 
TOCs receive a declining level of subsidy - thus increasing their risk of financial loss - 
because their bids were predicated on a substantial growth in business over the coming 
years. If a franchisee goes bankrupt, the state reassumes control of the affected TOC(s) and 
initiates a new round of tendering. Subsidy cannot be paid to open access operators, as their 
services must be run on a commercial basis. 
Despite predictions that the government would save money through vertical integration (see 
section 4.4), the overall level of subsidy payable to the railway industry has increased 
dramatically as a result of the track authority model (Knowles, 1998). By splitting BR into 
92 companies, the government vastly increased the transaction costs within the industry 
because each new business needed to trade at a profit (see table 4.3 and Else, 1993). When 
the railway was still in public ownership, the net subsidy payable by the government was 
similar to that prior to reorganisation because the Treasury would administer and receive 
the profits made by all 92 companies (these have been estimated by White (1988) as 
11 The assets of European Passenger Services (which operated Eurostar) and Union Railways passed to 
central government prior to their divestiture. The two companies were combined as part of the Channel 
Tunnel Rail link (CTRL) deal. 
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amounting to around £880m). 12 When these companies were privatised, however, their 
profits passed to the private sector while the level of subsidy remained static. White (1998) 
has calculated that, even when sales revenues from Railtrack, the Roscos and other rail 
businesses are accounted for, privatising BR could incur a net cost to the state of as much 
as £2.2 billion (Harris and Godward (1997) suggest this cost might be as high as £5 billion). 
The potential for net gains depends heavily on declining subsidy payments to TOCs which 
were secured during the franchising process. The issue of subsidy in terms of this thesis is 
discussed further in chapters five and seven. 
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Figure 4.1. Company-group interactions in the new railway structure. Source: Charlton et 
al., 1997. 
Year Grants to passenger services (£m) 
1990/91 752 
1991/92 1022 
1992/93 1301 
1993/94 1092 
1994/95 2161(1281) 
1995/96 2074(1194) 
1996/97 2103 
Table 4.3. State support to the passenger rail industry in Great Britain, 1990/91 - 1996/97. 
An estimation of net state support paid whilst the restructured BR was still in public 
ownership is shown in brackets. Source: White, 1998. 
The creation of a number of companies within each group provided the potential for 
competition not only among train operators but, excepting the infrastructure, throughout 
12 The increase in BR's 1992/93 support can be explained in part by additional costs incurred by works 
associated with the channel tunnel. Two factors account for the difference between BR's 1993/94 support 
and that paid in following years: industry restructuring costs and the cessation of loans previously being 
made to BR (White, 1998). 
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the whole industry. In theory, a TOC can choose between competing Roscos; Railtrack can 
choose between competing track maintenance companies, and so on. Leaving passenger 
train operators aside (they are considered in chapters five and six), competition has often 
been slow to emerge throughout the industry. Partly this is because the government 
misjudged market conditions (for example, the relatively small rail freight business could not 
support seven discrete companies) and partly it is owing to the nature of contracts drawn up 
to formalise working arrangements between each of the individual businesses (Charlton et 
al., 1997). Most firms were sold with fixed term contracts which guaranteed them a market 
for a finite period (thereby raising their sale value above a nominal level). For example, 
whereas in theory TOCs could choose between three competing Roscos to negotiate rolling 
stock deals, in practice most leasing contracts were designed to match the length of the first 
franchise period (OPRAF, 1996a); TOCs are therefore bound by de facto monopolists. The 
same was initially true of Railtrack's relationship with the BRIS units, although some 
competition is now taking place for infrastructure maintenance contracts (SBC Warburg, 
1996; Modern Railways, 1998a). Of course, many would argue that the imposition of fixed 
term contracts was a necessary stabilising measure in a newly restructured industry, and that 
competition will emerge when current deals expire and are re-negotiated. This will to some 
extent be the case, although a marked trend of horizontal and vertical integration currently 
occurring within the industry could limit considerably the potential for market liberalisation 
in the future (see, for example, Charlton et al., 1997; Curwen, 1997; Simonian, 1996). 
The regulatory framework within which the industry operates was established in large part 
by the Regulator and the Franchising Director, following directions from the Secretary of 
State. At the simplest level, the Regulator is responsible for granting and monitoring 
licences to TOCs, approving access agreements between Railtrack and train operators, 
protecting consumers and promoting competition (Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR), 
1996). Constitutionally, the regulator is independent from government, although he was 
required to take account of guidance from the Secretary of State until January 1st, 1996. 
The Franchising Director was given the roles of transferring the TOCs from the public to 
the private sector as quickly as reasonably practicable, paying subsidies to (and, in some 
cases, collecting premiums from) TOCs, and undertaking consumer protection measures 
which complement those of the Regulator (OPRAF, 1994; 1996a). Unlike the Regulator, 
the Franchising Director does not enjoy constitutional independence from government, 
primarily because he administers subsidy on its behalf. As a result, he is obliged to follow 
Objectives, Instructions and Guidance given to him from time to time by the Secretary of 
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State. Whereas the roles of the Regulator and Franchising Director in relation to this thesis 
are discussed in more detail later, fuller analyses of the interaction between all the various 
actors in the new railway can be found elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, 
Bradshaw, 1997b; Curwen, 1997; Charlton et al., 1997; Department of Transport, 1994; 
Harris and Godward, 1997; OPRAF, 1996a). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the development of rail policy in the context of privatisation and 
market liberalisation established in chapter two. The track authority model of rail 
privatisation was employed to break what was perceived by the government as BR's 
monopoly of train service provision (see Starkie, 1984). It essentially represented further 
experimentation with the method used to privatise the electricity industry (Charlton et al., 
1997; Helm, 1996; Mountford, 1996) - which had promoted actual, rather than surrogate, 
competition - and was supported by the Treasury on that basis. A common carrier, 
Railtrack, was created and the remainder of BR's operations were split into 91 separate 
companies in order to maximise competitive opportunities (Gibb et al., 1998). However, 
this chapter has shown that, despite rail privatisation having been considered by government 
for more than a decade, the privatisation and liberalisation plans outlined in New 
Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a) were not the result of a 
coherent exercise in policy analysis. Despite a significant conceptual and empirical base for 
evaluating rail privatisation policy options - models advanced by think tanks, academics, 
politicians and civil servants were complemented by the practical experience of other 
network industry divestitures - the Department of Transport was unable to decide upon a 
suitable model for rail privatisation, and agreement regarding a method of selling BR could 
not be found within government. The track authority model was ultimately chosen by 
MacGregor not because it was best suited to the future needs of the railway industry, but 
because it was the only viable policy option - in the sense that others had not been 
sufficiently developed - given the time constraints in which he was forced to work. 
The wrangles among policy makers prevented sufficient ex ante analysis of the track 
authority model before it was announced in New Opportunities for the Railways and, as a 
result, the plans were ill-prepared and lacking in practical detail. John MacGregor defended 
the logic of the government's proposals to Parliament and the Transport Select Committee, 
but the chairman of Committee, Robert Adley, remained sceptical, noting that: 
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"... the Secretary of State, the Minister of State and Department [of Transport] officials have 
appeared before this committee and... it seems to me that none of them, quite frankly, have a clue about how 
all this is going to be worked out" (House of Commons Papers, 1992b: 52). 
Although it had been realised that the analogy between the separation of generation and 
distribution activities in the electricity industry and the creation of a track authority for the 
railways was far from perfect, policy makers had been unable to fully appraise the likelihood 
of vertical separation accomplishing what was expected of it in the case of BR. Key 
questions regarding all aspects of the track authority model had still to be resolved when the 
White Paper was published; of fundamental importance to this thesis is the fact that the 
opportunities for, and even appropriateness of, service competition and its potential impact 
upon the relationship between the railways and the state had not been investigated. 
Although it was known that neoliberal values would be compromised by the state's 
continuing payment of subsidy, policy makers could not be sure that the plans contained in 
New -Opportunities for the Railways would be capable of promoting actual, rather than 
surrogate, competition. Against this background, the following chapters now examine the 
detailed development and the outcome of this aspect of rail privatisation policy. The 
discussion investigates competition in the market in chapter six, but begins in chapter five 
by assessing competition for the market through the franchising process. 
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Chapter Five 
Competition for the passenger railway market 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter four argued that the industry structure advanced in the White Paper New 
Opportunities for the Railways was not adopted as the result of a coherent policy analysis, 
and that ministers and officials had been unable, by July 1992, to consider many of the 
intricacies associated with the model they had proposed. Importantly in terms of this thesis, 
the prospects for, and even appropriateness of, liberalising the passenger railway industry 
were unknown in 1992. This chapter focuses on the development and outcomes of the 
franchising policy adopted to promote competition for the passenger rail market. 
Since 1996, numerous authors have reviewed the franchising process in relation to both the 
level of competition it generated and the benefits (or otherwise) it bequeathed to rail users 
and taxpayers (Glover, 1997; Harris and Godward, 1997; Knowles, 1998; NAO, 1996; 
Powell, 1997; White, 1998). Whilst there is no consensus regarding the effects of 
franchising on the overall quality of privatised rail services, it is generally agreed that the 
process was successful in terms of generating competition for the passenger rail market. All 
25 TOCs were transferred to the private sector by April 1997, and the number of shortlisted 
bidders in each franchise round ensured the generation of "relatively intense" competition 
(Preston, 1997: 15; White, 1998). The NAO (1996: 25) confirmed that OPRAF had 
attracted and maintained a "good level of competition" in the early bidding rounds, and 
Knowles (1998) found that the franchising process became more competitive over time. 
Subsidy levels will be significantly lower than those claimed by BR at the time of letting, 
and a number of market-driven quality of service enhancements were also secured as a 
result of the tendering process (Knowles, 1998). 
It is not the purpose of this chapter simply to restate the conclusions of the above studies, 
but rather to develop an understanding, in the context of arguments already advanced in this 
thesis, of how franchising policy developed, why it became successful at generating 
competition and what impact it has had on the relationship between the rail industry and the 
state. Despite the intensity of competition ultimately generated for the passenger rail 
market, it was for a long time unclear as to whether the private sector would actually bid for 
the right to run TOCs. For a variety of reasons, some unquestionably the result of events 
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dicussed in chapter four, many potential bidders viewed rail privatisation as something of an 
uncertain proposition. Although some (notably Stagecoach and Virgin) had expressed an 
interest, others suggested that they were not persuaded of the government's case and would 
be unlikely to bid in competitive tendering rounds (House of Commons Papers, 1993a). 
Tomkins (1993) found that private sector interest in rail franchising was extremely low, 
with most TOCs attracting little or no corporate interest. Moreover, although the 
government argued that healthy competition would be assured by the presence of 
Management Employee buy-outs (MEBOs), a large majority - 91 per cent - of BR managers 
were opposed to the track authority method of privatisation, and almost three-quarters 
indicated that they did not see MEBOs as a primary means of privatising TOCs (Smithers, 
1993a). Financiers were also sceptical to the point that one, NatWest, refused to become 
involved with rail privatisation (Grantham, 1998), and Preston (1996) raised concerns about 
the risk of the entire franchising process being characterised by minimal competition and 
collusion among bidders. 
Against this background, sections 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter examine the development of 
passenger rail franchising policy. It is argued that the nature of the franchising policy finally 
adopted was heavily influenced by the government's need to convince the private sector of 
the viability of passenger rail franchising. Focus shifted from the ideological to the practical 
because senior policy makers harboured doubts as to whether they would be able to create a 
market for passenger rail franchises (House of Commons Papers, 1996). Certainly, the 
degree of competition which ultimately developed among franchise bidders was 
considerably in excess of that which officials had expected. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 review the 
extent to which the franchising market was ultimately contested and seek to ascertain, from 
a bidder's perspective, the principal reasons why this was so. Finally, the chapter concludes 
by considering the franchising process in terms of the extent to which it impacted upon the 
role of the state in the passenger railway industry. 
5.2 Passenger rail franchising: an uncertain proposition 
Several factors can be argued to have made passenger rail franchising appear unattractive to 
potential bidders. First, as noted in chapter two, the British economy had slumped into 
recession by 1992, and the viability of the whole rail privatisation exercise was being 
undermined by the prevailing economic conditions. While the fortunes of many industries 
are tied up with the overall performance of the economy, this is especially true of the 
railways (Nash and Preston, 1993). In previous recessions, fewer jobs in the major 
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conurbations had led to a decrease in the number of rail commuters, and the demand for 
leisure travel had fallen as people re-evaluated their expenditure priorities. Potential bidders 
were aware that the economic downturn of the early 1990s was having the same effect as 
the government was again being forced to increase BR's subsidy (Welsby and Nicholls, 
1999). In 1989/90, the final `boom' year of the late 1980s, the total government grant to 
BR had been £705 million, but by 1991/92 it had risen by over 40 per cent to £1035 million 
(Nash and Preston, 1993). Prospective franchisees were very much aware that subsidy 
following privatisation was unlikely to be so flexible, especially if it were determined by 
contract, and that they could be left in severe financial difficulties in a future recession. ' 
Moreover, concern about the viability of rail privatisation was heightened following the 
collapse of two private-sector initiatives in the early 1990s. Charterail, a private sector 
freight company, fell into receivership, and Stagecoach withdrew its Aberdeen-Edinburgh- 
London and Glasgow-London overnight services because of lack of demand (Dynes, 1992; 
White and Smithers, 1993). 
Second, the rail privatisation plans were facing hostility from interested parties both within, 
and outside of, the railway industry, and this had the effect of "talking the risks up and the 
value down. " As already noted, most BR managers disliked the track authority model and 
rejected the idea of MEBOs as a principal vehicle of rail privatisation (Smithers, 1993a). 
Although many of these managers were subsequently to modify their opinions (as section 
5.5 will show, MEBOs were submitted for most TOCs), their misgivings in 1993 did not 
serve to endorse the franchising proposition. The rail privatisation plans were also being 
criticised by journalists (NAO, 1998a), transport academics (Bradshaw, 1991; Dnes, 1993; 
Harman, 1993) and politicians of all major parties - including senior Conservative 
backbenchers (Hansard, 1993a) - but perhaps the most effective opposition campaign was 
being led by the Labour Party, which had committed itself to a "publicly owned, publicly 
accountable" railway (Labour Party, 1996). 2 Labour exploited the government's small 
' Conversely, of course, if the economy were to pick up after the franchises had been let, the government 
would have been burdened with a disproportionately high subsidy bill. 
2 This phrase is somewhat misleading. Labour did not expect rail privatisation to be completed by the time 
of the 1997 general election (Grantham, 1998) and, as such, resolved to keep what had not been sold in 
public ownership. It was not the case that an incoming Labour government would have repurchased 
companies where this involved significant capital expenditure: "Some people have argued that Labour could 
have halted the privatisation by simply seeking to repurchase parts of the rail network that have been sold 
off so cheaply. This is untrue. In the case of Railtrack, a promise to repurchase at anything less than the 
market price would be illegal under European law. A promise to repurchase at market price would... require 
considerable public resources, meaning that the taxpayer would be hit twice. It would also ensure that there 
would be insufficient resources left for investment. The challenge for an incoming Labour government is to 
deliver the improved railway network that we need whilst guaranteeing value and accountability for 
taxpayers' money" (Labour Party, 1996: 20). 
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majority and, although it was not absolutely certain that the Conservatives would lose the 
forthcoming general election, based the authority of their attacks on the probability of this 
happening. Opposition spokesmen made clear their contempt for rail privatisation 
(Hansard, 1992b), and promised that the operational environment for franchise holders 
would be considerably more demanding under a Labour administration than a Conservative 
one (Labour Party, 1996). As Michael Meacher, then Shadow Transport Secretary, told the 
Labour Party Conference: 
"If there are any investors thinking of buying into our rail system, I have a message for you. The 
railways depended on public subsidy last year to the tune of £1.8 billion. There can be no guarantee from 
any government that such a subsidy will continue indefinitely at that level... If you want to buy a pig in a 
poke in all those circumstances, it's up to you. But don't come crying to me when it all ends in tears" 
(quoted in Landale, 1995: 12). 
Third, there was no international precedent for the proposed model of rail privatisation from 
which prospective bidders could judge the likely implications of acquiring a franchise. 
Although other examples of rail privatisation existed around the world, Britain's plans were 
unique in their complexity (Shires et al., 1994b). Schemes in Japan, New Zealand and 
Argentina had all been undertaken on a vertically integrated basis, and whilst the Swedish 
approach had created a track authority, the post-privatisation industry structure remained 
relatively simple in comparison with that proposed in New Opportunities for the Railways. 
Although franchising was a major component of the Swedish proposals, little emphasis had 
been placed on the need for open access competition and, under interrogation by the 
Transport Select Committee, Department of Transport official Phillip Wood confirmed the 
the British proposals were "uniquely different from anybody else's" (House of Commons 
Papers, 1992c: 28). 
Finally, and not insignificantly, the effect of these factors was compounded by uncertainty 
surrounding the nature of the franchising proposition itself (Welsby, 1997). Because New 
Opportunities for the Railways had advanced little more than an industry framework, it was 
unclear at the outset as to precisely what the government was going to sell. MacGregor 
reported that the private sector had expressed some interest in taking on rail franchises, and 
that they wanted "to go into a great deal of detail... about what a franchise will comprise 
and so on" (House of Commons Papers, 1992d: 5). Accordingly, a consultation document, 
The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services, was published in October 1992 to describe 
how the franchising process would work (Department of Transport, 1992b), and 
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prospective bidders were asked to respond to questions regarding the proposals set by the 
Secretary of State. The document provided basic information about franchise 
administration, noting that successful bidders would be expected to provide a level of 
service at least comparable with that of BR (see chapter four), and that this would be 
subject to certain quality benchmarks (see chapter six). However, details of franchise 
specification were couched in very broad terms. No firm decisions had been taken on the 
size, length and depth of franchises and, in this sense, there was very little for prospective 
bidders to respond to. As Andrew Mackinley of the Transport Select Committee pointed 
out, 
"If you look at the franchising document, if I can use that term, I strain to find anything new in 
that, anything additionally revealing in substance to that which was in the White Paper... I cannot see any 
substance in terms of beef being put on the issue" (House of Commons Papers, 1992d: 9). 
The Committee's chairman, Robert Adley, agreed, noting that there was not "enough 
information for people to come forward with answers to the questions the Secretary of 
State is asking and on which the future of our railway depends" (House of Commons 
Papers, 1992b: 49). 
A possible reason for the vagueness of The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services was 
that the policy making process was badly managed at first. 3 Although the formulation of rail 
privatisation policy had become "one of the biggest tasks of project management that's ever 
been seen in government anywhere at all, " responsibility for organising the entire project 
was vested in policy analysts rather than project managers. The result was inefficiency, not 
just in relation to franchising, but in all aspects of policy development: 
"... [to begin] they staffed it with very bright people who were used to doing policy analysis, but 
weren't used to managing a project process... [For example] just very simple things like if you've got 
advisors on a project like this, your advisors have to be absolutely comprehensive in their understanding of 
what's going on, who is meant to be doing what, when, all these kinds of things. [One policymaker's] view 
was you may or may not have them all in for a meeting, you may or may not tell them all what had 
happened. It just didn't work, it's as simple as that. " 
This situation was ultimately resolved by the appointment of an experienced privatisation 
project co-ordinator, but in the meantime MacGregor was forced to defend the contents of 
the consultation document before the Transport Select Committee. He did this by stressing 
the importance of retaining flexibility in the process in order to gear "the system to the 
3 This argument is included with some reservation because only one respondent raised it (although he was 
directly involved with proceedings at the time). Nevertheless, it does offer a credible explanation for the fact 
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needs of the marketplace rather than sitting in Marsharn Street and deciding how you think 
it will run" (House of Commons Papers, 1992d: 10). He continued: 
"We will have a variety of different shapes and sizes of franchises. A variety of depth of franchises. 
Some operators will mainly want to do a marketing operation, perhaps not even employ the drivers. Others 
will want to employ depots, maintenance depots, for the period of the franchise and may well want to get 
involved with stations. " 
MacGregor's enthusiasm for flexibility appeared to exceed that which was originally 
intended in the consultation document, however. Despite its general paucity of detail, the 
document had implied that over-reliance on the wishes of the private sector might be 
impractical, especially if `cherry picking' left the government with a disaggregated residue 
of unsaleable services. Accordingly, The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services had noted 
that franchisees would assume responsibility for managing all aspects of train operation, and 
would be grouped in a way which made commercial and operational sense, had regard to 
markets being served and promoted competition. Notwithstanding these points, the majority 
feeling of the Transport Select Committee after MacGregor's appearance was that "the 
government do not really know what to do, " and ministers admitted that there were still 
huge areas of detail which needed filling in before the private sector could be convinced that 
rail franchising was an attractive opportunity (House of Commons Papers, 1992d: 22; 
Tomkins and Smith, 1992). The following sections review the process through which the 
basic franchise specifications of size, length and depth were established. 
5.3 Determining franchise specifications 
5.3.1 Franchise size 
As noted above, the main aims of The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services were to 
group services in a way that made operational and commercial sense, that had regard to 
markets being served, and that promoted competition. These last two aims reflected the 
agendas of Downing Street and the Treasury respectively. Although Major's preference for 
a regionally-based railway had lost out to the track authority model in summer 1992, "there 
were those, including the Prime Minister, who [remained] keen to develop regional 
identities in the railways, " and this idea could be realised through exerting an influence over 
the franchise boundaries. On the other hand, the Treasury, having been forced to abandon 
its idea of train-path auctioning (see chapter four), was keen to negotiate the next best thing 
by disaggregating BR into as many franchises as reasonably possible. A large number of 
that the advances in policy detail from New Opportunities for the Railways to The Franchising of Passenger 
Rail Services were slight with regard to franchise specifications. 
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franchises would maximise competition for the market by increasing the amount of 
competitive tenders, and in the market by boosting the amount of shared track miles (see 
chapter six). According to Grantham (1998), for example, the Treasury advanced the idea 
of splitting BR's South Western Division into as many as eight different companies (it was 
eventually franchised as two). 
Far more important to the Department of Transport, however, was to effect a split which 
made operational and commercial sense. Officials were aware that private sector confidence 
in rail privatisation was low, and realised that further delays in policy development would 
jeopardise the likelihood of their creating a market for TOCs. Protracted disputes might also 
have hampered the government's attempts to complete rail privatisation within one 
Parliament. Accordingly, the Department of Transport argued that, provided they were 
generally consistent with the policy outlined in New Opportunities for the Railways, 
solutions to arising complications should be determined by practicality: 
"We were driven by the practical necessity of getting the franchising programme launched... It had 
never been done before anywhere else in the world, and we were anxious to try and reduce uncertainties and 
risks wherever that was possible, but consistent with the policy... It [needed to be] a practical, sensible 
decision to make sure that we didn't waste any time. " 
The problem with both Downing Street and the Treasury's proposals was that they were 
driven by romanticism or ideology rather than practicality and, although each might have 
been feasible in the longer term, the Department of Transport could not risk approaching its 
task from a Utopian standpoint. Officials in Marsham Street recognised the need to establish 
pilot franchises in order that potential bidders could gain some idea of how the TOCs would 
function and what the costs associated with running them would be (Hansard, 1993a; 
House of Commons Papers, 1993a). As such, accommodating the whims of others, 
particularly those of the Treasury, was: "not at all, absolutely not at all [a factor]. We had 
an awful lot to do very quickly. We had to provide as good a track record as BR's 
accounting system would allow us to do for potential buyers. " 
Academics and transport consultants offered their conclusions regarding the optimum size 
for franchises. Most argued for splitting BR into a few, large operating businesses. Nash 
and Preston (1993) and Dodgson (1994) referred to evidence from the United States to 
show that dividing BR into 20 or more companies could result in at least some of them 
using rolling stock inefficiently. The Economic Research Centre (1993) reviewed literature 
which suggested the optimum size for a rail firm was around one third that of BR, especially 
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where economies of density were being maximised. ' Jones et al. (1993) also advocated 
large franchises because they limit the transactions costs associated with train to train 
externalities. Chapter four pointed out that train to train externalities occur where delays to 
one operator's train disrupt the service patterns of others, and therefore occur primarily 
along stretches of track shared by one or more franchisee. Franchising would, of course, 
provide only a partial solution to this problem, as it was unlikely to remove all instances of 
shared track miles around the network. Although Jones et al. (1993) did not doubt that 
externalities could be regulated by contracts between operators and the track authority, they 
did speculate that monitoring and enforcing such contracts would be costly and problematic, 
especially in congested areas where the effects of delays might be highly diffused. Thus, 
while fewer franchises would not eliminate shared track miles, they would reduce them and 
simplify the administration of associated externalities. 
Although these suggestions provided the Department of Transport with further policy 
options, there were practical difficulties associated with creating larger franchises. This 
would either have involved a significant - and therefore lengthy - restructuring of BR's 
passenger businesses, or reconstituted BR's business sectors, an option which had been 
ruled out by the election manifesto. Moreover, as Williams (1992) has pointed out, the 
significant turnovers which would have been associated with large franchises (up to £1 
billion) might have discouraged many potential bidders. Increasingly it became obvious to 
observers (Nash and Preston, 1993, Tomkins, 1992b) that the shape of the franchises would 
be largely based on BR's existing profit centres. After sectorisation in the mid 1980s (see 
chapter four), BR underwent a further restructuring exercise in 1992, Organising for 
Quality (0 for Q). The 0 for Q initiative separated each of BR's business sectors into a 
series of individual profit centres, each with its own management reporting to the relevant 
sectoral Director. A total of 19 were created, and these are listed in table 5.1. The profit 
centre approach to franchising offered four key advantages as far as the Department of 
Transport was concerned. First, and most obviously, BR had already designed its profit 
centres to make operational and commercial sense. Second, track records for the new 
franchises would be relatively straightforward to assemble. Third, the transition from 
sectorised to franchised management would be eased if a degree of continuity in senior 
personnel were maintained (Tomkins, 1992b, Grantham, 1998) and, finally, the profit centre 
4 Economies of scale with respect to density increase as a rail operator makes more intensive use of its fixed 
assets. Economies of density are also related to size: for a given fixed cost (the infrastructure), a rail 
operator will have lower unit costs (the services) the greater its output (although there are limits to this - 
see, for example, Dodgson, 1989). 
103 
approach promised to generate interest among potential bidders as some (Stagecoach in 
particular) had indicated that they wanted to acquire rail operations in this form (House of 
Commons Papers, 1992e). As a respondent pointed out: 
"We knew how BR organised itself [in 1993] and that seemed a sensible number of TOCs both in 
terms of the speed in which you could generate interest and complete the franchising programme within the 
Department. So we ruled out half a dozen, and we ruled out hundreds, and the existing structure seemed to 
present a practical and sensible way forward. " 
InterCity Network SouthEast Regional Railways 
Great Western South West Central 
West Coast South East North West 
East Coast South Central North East 
Midlands/Cross Country Thames and Chiltern South Wales and West 
Gatwick and Anglia Great Eastern ScotRail 
North 
Thameslink 
West Anglia Great Northern 
London, Tilbury, Southend 
Table 5.1. BR's profit centres. Source: Tomkins (1992b). 
MacGregor announced the first batch of franchises in February 1993 and a draft structure of 
25 TOCs three months later (Hansard, 1993c; 1993d). The franchises were indeed based 
around BR's profit centres, although some changes had been made to further localise the 
management of certain route groups following suggestions from potential bidders: in 
InterCity, Midlands/Cross Country and Gatwick and Anglia were both separated; in 
Network SouthEast, Island Line was removed from the South Western Division, and 
Thames and Chiltern were separated; and in Regional Railways, Merseyrail Electrics was 
split from North West, and the Cardiff Valley Lines were separated from South Wales and 
West. Some of the 25 TOCs have now undergone name changes and these are listed in table 
5.2. For the sake of clarity, TOCs' new names will be used throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show the final disaggregation of BR. Although it came about 
primarily for practical reasons, the final franchising map did offer Downing Street some 
regionally based franchises (Anglia, ScotRail) and the Treasury a considerable amount of 
competition. One respondent argued that "after all, 25 was not an inconsiderable number" 
of auctions to hold. The potential for competition in the market was also substantial as 56.4 
per cent of all rail journeys under the 0 for Q structure were undertaken by more than one 
company (ORR, 1994a). However, as chapter six will show, this scope for on-rail 
competition was largely theoretical as it was subsequently restricted by a number of 
regulatory and operational factors. 
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InterCity Network SouthEast Regional Railways 
Great Western Trains South West Trains Central Trains 
(First Great Western) 
InterCity West Coast South Eastern North West Regional Railways (First 
(Virgin Trains) (Connex South Eastern) North Western) 
InterCity East Coast Network South Central Regional Railways North East (Northern 
(GNER) (Connex South Central) Spirit) 
Midland Mainline Thames Trains South Wales and West 
(Wales & West) 
CrossCountry Chiltern Railways ScotRail 
(Virgin Trains) 
Gatwick Express Great Eastern Cardiff Railway Company 
(First Great Eastern) 
Anglia North London Railways (Silverlink) Merseyrail Electrics 
Thameslink 
West Anglia Great Northern 
LTS Rail 
Island Line 
Table 5.2. The 25 TOCs. Names outside brackets are those which TOCs were franchised 
under. The remainder are current and will be used during the remainder of this thesis. 
Source: OPRAF, 1998a. 
5.3.2 Franchise length 
The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services (Department of Transport, 1992b) noted that 
no decisions had been taken regarding franchise length by October 1992, and just as the 
Treasury and the Department of Transport had been at odds over the size of franchises, so 
they also fought over their length. The Treasury was again anxious to maximise 
competition, and therefore sought to minimise the interval between competitive tenders for 
each TOC. Treasury officials argued at first that franchises should be short, no longer than 
"three to five" years: 
"We were saying 'no, this is competition for the market. We want franchises which are long 
enough for people to make change and benefit from it, but we want the prospect of re-tendering. "' 
The Department of Transport, on the other hand, disagreed: 
"I always felt that we would have to go for longer franchises than the Treasury were initially trying 
to argue for, because I didn't think it was practical otherwise, we wouldn't get the bidders... There was a 
great debate about that. " 
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1ý 
Figure 5.1. Route plans of the former InterCity TOCs. After Shaw et al., 1998. 
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O Anglia 
© Cardiff Railway Company 
© Central Trains 
0 Merseyrail Electrics 
© First North Western 
0 Northern Spirit 
Q ScotRail 
0 Wales and West 
Former Regional Railways 
London 
Figure 5.2. Operating territories of the former Regional Railways TOCs. After Shaw et al., 
1998. 
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Figure 5.3. Operating territories of the former Network SouthEast TOCs. After Shaw et 
a!., 1998. 
The Department of Transport had once more recognised that, although the Treasury's 
stance might be appropriate in the longer term, it would not be practical in the initial 
franchising round. There were two main reasons why the franchise terms needed 
lengthening out to make them more attractive to potential bidders. First, there was the 
simple issue of branding. The Franchi. ýiýr. of' Passenger Ruihcov Services had suggested 
that franchisees would be able to trade under their own brand image. However, as the Bow 
Group, a right-wing think tank, pointed out, re-branding a railway takes a considerable 
amount of time. When Network SouthEast was relaunched in the late 1980s, for example, 
it took three years to fully establish its corporate identity (Campbell-Bannerman, 1993). 
Thus it was argued that short franchise contracts would negate any benefits which ºnight be 
5 associated with establishing a new corporate identity. 
Second, and more importantly, there were problems associated with investment (Jones ei 
of., 1993). Attracting, investment to the railway was central to the government's plans 
(BBC, 1996; House o/' Coninuun, c Papers, 1993x), but the Department cal' Transport argued 
The Bow Gmup's case was based on a Hain operating sector significantly larger than any of the TOCs 
which appeared as a result of the 1993 Railways Act. Ho ever, experience after privatisation has shown that. 
while some operators (e. g. GNER) haut rcbrandcd quickly, others (e. g. Virgin, Wales and West, Northern 
Spirit) may take up to three years. 
108 
that short franchises were unsuited to this. In part, this was because the timescales required 
for major investment in the railway industry are relatively lengthy. BR did not carry a surfeit 
of excess rolling stock and the introduction of new services or the replacement of life- 
expired stock would have required franchisees to procure refurbished or new-build carriages 
and locomotives. Depending on the size and specifications of the order, this could have 
taken up to three years, by which time the franchise might have expired. Moreover, many 
railway investments exhibit strong complementarities between infrastructure and rolling 
stock. Electric trains require third rail systems or overhead catenery, modern signalling 
systems require compatible train detection devices on or near the tracks and on rolling stock 
if they are to function properly and so on. Railtrack would have had little incentive to invest 
in an electrification scheme if it knew that the current franchisee might be replaced by a 
diesel traction enthusiast before the project was complete. 
The most significant investment-related problem from a franchisee's point of view was that 
of residual value risk. Railway assets are generally long-lived and highly specific. As such, 
investment in infrastructure under the franchisee's control (e. g. stations) is to all intents and 
purposes sunk and, although rolling stock can often be transferred to other areas of the 
network, the government could not guarantee that an active second hand market would 
have developed by the time the first generation of franchises ran out. Thus, with the residual 
value of assets highly uncertain, a franchisee would have sought to amortise them during the 
course of its contract, and Jones et al. (1993) argued that extremely high subsidies - or 
greatly inflated ticket prices - would have been required to encourage private sector bids in 
these circumstances. A solution to this problem in relation to infrastructure now exists 
through the Franchising Director's ability to designate `franchise assets' which an incoming 
franchisee must take on. With rolling stock, however, the answer was to establish a leasing 
market in order to ensure that residual value risk was assumed by a third party. The 
government had recognised in 1992 that, although some franchisees may wish to buy 
physical assets outright, leasing was likely to be the favoured option for most, and the 
creation of rolling stock leasing companies (Roscos) was announced in mid-1993 to 
accommodate this (Department of Transport, 1992b, 1993a; House of Commons Papers, 
1993c). 
In theory, the advent of Roscos lent weight to the Treasury's case for short operating 
contracts because franchisees, relieved of residual value risk, could replace rolling stock 
without making the capital investment themselves. Nevertheless, the Department of 
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Transport continued to press for longer franchises because it felt that bidders would submit 
tenders only if they were offered a degree of temporal security: 
"I certainly felt that franchises of 10 or more years would attract more interest... I had spent the 
summer of 1992 talking to potential bidders for the franchises. Of course, these conversations had nothing 
to draw upon in terms of experience anywhere else in the world or in the United Kingdom, and I do recall 
the initial reaction of the companies I spoke to... was that they would look for a longer period than three to 
five years in order to recover any investment that was made. " 
This was a view shared by the first Franchising Director, Roger Salmon, whose "answer to 
just about everything was to lengthen out the franchise terms. If you had longer franchises, 
it looked a more enticing process, and so on. " The Draft Objectives, Instructions and 
Guidance to the Franchising Director (House of Commons Papers, 1993a) signalled a 
partial victory for the Department of Transport in that the basic franchise term had been 
lengthened out to seven years, but that the Secretary of State's approval had to be sought if 
a longer contract was proposed. In private, however, the Department of Transport's case 
had more or less prevailed in full, as "where there was a good case for reinvestment in 
rolling stock" the Treasury had conceded "OK, we can see the case for a longer contract" 
of up to 15 years. 
5.3.3 Franchise depth 
Despite the White Paper being "seen as a clear victory for the track authority option, the 
opposite of vertical integration, " some potential bidders - and, as already noted, the majority 
of BR managers (Smithers, 1993a) - disagreed with the concept of vertical separation and 
began to stress the importance of infrastructure ownership to any franchising prospect. 
Their concerns revolved around the degree to which a franchisee would be dependent on a 
monopoly - Railtrack - under the track authority model, particularly with regard to cost 
control and managerial responsibility (House of Commons Papers, 1993a). Sea Containers 
argued that Railtrack's continued custody of the infrastructure would substantially reduce 
the prospects of being able to run a profitable business. Referring to his proposal to operate 
the southern region of BR, James Sherwood, president of Sea Containers, suggested that: 
"If we maintain the track and signalling ourselves... we could save £50 million a year over what 
British Rail is paying today. So if the idea is that British Rail [as Railtrack] are [sic] going to continue to 
run the track and the signalling, then there is no scope for us to achieve that £50 million of saving" (House 
of Commons Papers, 1992e: 196). 
Apprehension over the loss of managerial responsibility was heightened when Chris Green, 
director of InterCity, pointed out that vertical integration of his business under 0 for Q had 
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enabled it to make good progress towards delivering a high quality service. Brian Scott, 
Director of InterCity's Great Western Region, added that, as an operator, he could not 
contemplate forfeiting control over infrastructure because, if he did, he would no longer 
have charge of all the key components of his own business (see also Shires et al., 1994b): 
"As an experienced, professional railway business manager, I would not put my money into a train 
operating company... without having day to day command and control of operations, including signalling, 
track and signals maintenance [as it would be] an act of folly to buy into something with so little control of 
performance and, therefore, profit" (House of Commons Papers, 1993a: Iii). 
Given the struggle preceding the selection of the track authority model, it was unlikely that 
ministers would have been "prepared to junk it" even in the face of such criticism. Policy 
makers could afford to let debates over the size and length of franchises be guided by the 
views of potential bidders because they were not likely to compromise the fundamental aims 
of vertical separation. A significant number of competitive opportunities would still exist 
even if the Treasury's plans were rejected. But vertical integration was anathema to the 
concept of a track authority, and it might have been expected that any circumstances in 
which it would be permitted as an expedient would be minimal. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, a passage in The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services suggested that a 
franchisee might "take on a `vertically integrated' franchise covering the operation of track 
and signalling as well as trains" (Department of Transport, 1992a: 13). The Railways Bill, 
published in January 1993, also left the government's options open. 5 As one witness told the 
Transport Select Committee: 
"The Bill... bears no relation to the White Paper because technically it allows the government to 
dispose of BR in any way it sees fit. There is no mention of Railtrack within the Bill... As far as I can see... 
they can split it up into a hundred million parts, vertically integrated, laterally separated or whatever" 
(House of Commons Papers, 1993a: 708). 
The decision to allow a degree of vertical integration was not originally adopted as a result 
of the arguments advanced by prospective franchisees - in fact, it pre-empted them - but 
was agreed on the basis that there were likely to be exceptional circumstances around the 
network where vertical separation was neither logical nor desirable. In particular, ministers 
were aware that Island Line, the Isle of Wight's single track, eight-mile Ryde to Shanklin 
route, was so isolated and subsidy-dependent that it was unlikely to attract open access 
5 Chapter four noted that the Bill was essentially a piece of enabling legislation which gave Ministers the licence to 
create whatever they wished out of the BR monolith (see also Shaw et al., 1998). 
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operators and raise issues of anti-competitive practice (see chapter four). As policy 
developed, however, there is evidence to suggest that, as a result of pressure from potential 
bidders, the Department of Transport began to argue that vertical integration should be 
considered more favourably in relation to other self-contained TOCs such as LTS Rail. 
Again, agreement from the Treasury was obtained: 
"There was a theoretical possibility that in certain cases [a degree of vertical integration] might 
become necessary... That indication that vertical integration would be possible in certain circumstances was 
just to make sure that if there were any major problems in getting the franchises away, then some modest 
compromise within the idea of a single, unified track authority was possible. " 
The `modest compromise' to which the respondent referred would have resulted in 
Railtrack retaining ownership of the infrastructure, but then leasing it to the TOC for a 
period coterminous with the length of its franchise. In the event, only Island Line was 
franchised in this manner as had originally been envisaged; all TOCs on the British mainland 
were vertically separated, although they were to lease stations and light maintenance depots 
from Railtrack (see chapter four). 6 
5.3.4 Basic franchise specifications 
By mid-1993, almost a year after the publication of the White Paper, the government had 
finally decided upon the basic franchise specifications to complement the administration 
requirements it had outlined in The Franchising of Passenger Railways. There would be 25 
TOCs, each franchised for a period of between seven and 15 years, and all but Island Line 
would be vertically separated. 7 Franchisees would also be expected to provide a level of 
service which, at a minimum, roughly reflected that of BR immediately prior to 
privatisation. In attempting to resolve policy matters quickly, and to address the uncertainty 
surrounding the franchising proposition, the Department of Transport - with the approval of 
Downing Street and, more importantly, the Treasury - pursued a pragmatic line to define 
the basic characteristics of the TOCs. 
Yet a question remains as to how the Department of Transport was able to convince the 
Treasury of its plans. The period leading up to the publication of New Opportunities for the 
Railways had been dominated by the Treasury, and the ideologically-driven track authority 
model had prevailed in part because Marsharn Street had been unable to produce a viable 
6 As will become apparent later in this chapter, MacGregor's adoption of almost complete vertical 
separation did not discourage those who had opposed the idea from bidding for franchises. Brian Scott, for 
example, won the Great Western franchise as part of a Mebo in 1996, and then sold it to FirstGroup - at a 
personal profit of almost £3.8 million - in 1998 (Railway Gazette International, 1998). 
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alternative. However, in securing pragmatic solutions to franchise-related problems, officials 
in the Department of Transport had effectively reversed the prevailing hierarchy in rail 
privatisation policy formulation. Whereas the Department of Transport had previously been 
forced to accept the track authority model on the basis that it maximised competitive 
opportunities, so the Treasury became obliged to concede the impracticability of many of 
these opportunities as policy details were developed in 1993 and 1994: 
"You could sum up the whole process as follows: at the outset, [the Treasury] fought for - and won 
- the structure that was going to deliver the most competitive industry post-privatisation. [It] then spent the 
implementation years defining the exact trade-off between competition... and the practicalities of getting the 
businesses ready for sale... In lots of areas, [the Treasury] had to accept that greater competition would be 
introduced over time rather than immediately. " 
It would appear that the Department of Transport's previously unseen dominance arose as a 
result of the continuing recession. Since 1991, the Treasury had been struggling to contain 
public expenditure and was becoming vulnerable to charges that its ideas on rail 
privatisation would further extend the PSBR. Proponents of the track authority model had 
been protected from such charges before it was adopted because little was understood 
about the policy's likely implications. Following their experience with electricity 
privatisation, Treasury officials had argued strongly that vertical separation would benefit 
the taxpayer because of the myriad opportunities for competition, and thus cost reduction, it 
presented. Moreover, the contractual nature of the track authority model would ensure that 
subsidy would remain stable during future recessions (see section 5.2). These were 
compelling arguments, especially in an economic slowdown. But the Treasury was suddenly 
confronted with a financial `double whammy'. First, the higher transactional costs 
associated with the track authority model were by now starting to reveal themselves (see 
chapter four) and second, as the above sections have shown, the Department of Transport 
became aware from its discussions with prospective franchisees that implementing the 
Treasury's proposals would jeopardise its chances of creating a market for TOCs. Failure to 
let franchises would defeat the object of passenger rail privatisation, limit the potential for 
future subsidy reductions, and damage the flotation value of Railtrack and the Roscos upon 
which the government was heavily dependent, not least to curtail the net cost of rail 
privatisation to the state (see also Jenkins, 1995). As such, the Treasury was forced to 
concede that creating extremely short franchises and excessively disaggregating BR were no 
longer viable policy options: 
Reflecting its unique circumstances, Island Line was franchised for only five years. 
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"The Treasury's role in controlling public expenditure... became more dominant than competition 
and [rail] industry experts within the Treasury. Therefore, they were particularly susceptible to any 
arguments which protected the value of Railtrack for a public flotation and the ability to generate 
competition for franchises. So it was a question of the Department of Transport saying 'this is what you're 
going to have to do, this will maximise our chance of getting the whole thing away with reasonable returns 
and results'. Then the Treasury was more amenable [to the Department of Transport's position]. " 
By accepting the Department of Transport's re-orientation of the policy-making agenda 
away from ideology and towards practicality, the Treasury was forced to recognise the 
paradox that its own plans, which heavily emphasised market liberalisation, were likely to 
result in less competition than the Department of Transport's, which did not. 
Despite having won this battle, key officials in the Department of Transport and OPRAF 
remained sceptical as to whether they would be able to create a market for TOCs. Although 
the basic franchise specifications had now been decided upon, a vast amount of policy detail 
required filling in before the competitive tendering process could begin. TOCs' assets had to 
be assigned and incorporated, the contractual matrix through which the train operators 
would interact with other rail businesses needed to be assembled (see Grantham, 1998) and 
regulations governing the new industry had to be formulated. 8 The most significant 
regulation was the Public Service Requirement (PSR), the manifestation of the 
government's 1992 commitment to maintain the "current national network of services" 
(Conservative Party, 1992: 35). PSRs detail the minimum amount of trains each TOC must 
run in return for its subsidy (quality of service regulations are discussed in chapter six). 
They do not function explicitly as timetables, but instead set parameters, based largely on 
BR's service levels of 1992, within which TOCs must construct their timetables. The PSR 
for South West Trains, for example, stipulates that at least a two-hourly service must run 
between London Waterloo and Exeter St David's on weekdays and Saturdays, and that the 
last train to Exeter must leave at or after 18.30. 
The number of services stipulated in PSRs is generally less than that operated by BR, but 
operators are free to run more should they deem them commercially viable. Although the 
8 In addition, some broader policy issues were still to be resolved. As noted in chapter four, it was not 
envisaged in New Opportunities for the Railways that franchisees would have an exclusive right to operate 
services over any given stretch of track, but that other operators would be able to run competing trains on an 
open access basis. On rail competition forms the basis for chapter six and is discussed more fully therein. 
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to note here that many potential bidders found the prospect of open access 
incompatible with franchising because it would pose a serious threat to the viability of their businesses. This 
issue was not finally resolved until December 1994 and, at the very least, reinforced the conviction of some 
potential franchisees that the government did not fully understand the implications of its own rail 
privatisation policy (House of Commons Papers, 1993a). 
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government expected that this would happen - and thus that 1992 service levels would at 
least remain constant or increase (House of Commons Papers, 1993a) - its optimism was 
not shared by opponents of rail privatisation. Opposition spokesmen led a campaign to 
suggest that the policy would lead to service cuts which the Conservatives had ruled out, 
and the pressure group Save Our Railways launched a court action in an attempt to increase 
the number of services included in PSRs (Grantham, 1998). 9 Notwithstanding courtroom 
distractions, the production of PSRs was novel and complex, and some delay was perhaps 
inevitable because of the likelihood of errors. OPRAF admitted to producing an unworkable 
PSR for South West Trains where they experienced difficulties with train paths out of 
London Waterloo, and similar problems were encountered with LTS Rail (Grantham, 
1998). As a result, the PSRs - and, indeed, other sales documentation - were not completed 
by the time bidders were invited to tender for TOCs, a fact which led Grantham (1998: 132) 
to suggest that the franchising process "was being conducted with a paucity of detail. " 
Policy makers were aware that the franchising proposition had been characterised by a high 
degree of uncertainty since it was first unveiled in the White Paper. Not only was there a 
lack of international precedent, but the proposals had faced continued hostility from both 
within and outside the railway industry which had talked "the risk up and the value down. " 
Such was the perception of rail privatisation at the time that opposition frontbenchers 
genuinely believed the process would be significantly short of completion by the 1997 
general election (Grantham, 1998). Compounding these factors was the conduct of the 
government itself. Because of the way in which the track authority model had originally 
been adopted (see chapter four), policy makers had not been able to begin defining the 
nature of TOCs until after ministers had publicly committed themselves to vertical 
separation. Even though the Department of Transport had prioritised the need to complete 
the process quickly and make it more attractive to potential bidders, various complications 
had delayed the development of policy details. As a result, even when the competitive 
tendering process was imminent, key information was either missing or had only recently 
been provided, and critics of rail privatisation were able to portray rail privatisation in a very 
negative light (NAO, 1998a). 
I Save Our Railways argued that some of the PSRs suggested by OPRAF - in particular those 
for Gatwick 
Express, LTS Rail and InterCity East Coast were unlawful because they would not, as stipulated in the 
Franchising Director's Objectives, Instructions and Guidance, protect an amount of services similar to that 
operated by BR immediately prior to franchising. In response, the Secretary of State for Transport simply 
rewrote his guidance to the Franchising Director, thus re-legalising the offending PSRs. As events 
have 
transpired, some TOCs are now beginning to cut back services, particularly in rural areas (see chapter 
seven). 
115 
The only factor which appeared to be working in the government's favour was the 
economy. The recession which had beset the early 1990s was over by 1995, and ministers 
were assured that business confidence was generally higher than it had been in the recent 
past. As one respondent (rather prosaically) pointed out, had the economy still been in a 
slump when competitive tendering began, the latter would have been "an absolute fucking 
disaster. " The Department of Transport had ascertained that there were around 20 or 30 
companies interested in bidding for TOCs - despite MacGregor having earlier put the figure 
as high as 50 - but was unsure whether any would participate in the franchising process. 
Indeed, Tomkins (1993) had suggested that MacGregor was being disingenuous in that 
many of the companies included in his figure were organisations such as banks and venture 
capitalists who were unlikely to bid themselves. A respondent admitted: "no-one really 
knew. I could not put my hand on my heart and say `they will bid. "' Key personnel in the 
Department still feared that, despite their efforts to minimise the commercial uncertainties 
associated with passenger rail franchising, potential bidders would still consider the 
proposition too risky: 
"We were saying to people, `come buy these train companies. All you've got to do is, today - when 
there isn't a private sector train running on the network; when the company that we're asking you to buy 
has been run for the last 50 years as a sort of business sector part of BR, and a vertically integrated business 
sector at that; where difficult decisions are forced up the line [of companies within the new structure] and so 
on and so forth; all the problems of buying a subsidiary where there's no track record of the company 
operating - all you need to do is tell us how much money you're going to need over the next seven years to 
run that franchise. No break clauses saying 'if you think you've got it wrong in two years' time come back 
for more'. Tell us now how much money you need in 2002. So that's a really difficult proposition for 
franchisees to bid on... We weren't sure who the hell we were going to sell these franchises to. " 
Some within OPRAF were of a similar opinion: 
"T'he reality with OPRAF, and in particular OPRAF under Salmon, was that they badly lacked 
confidence for a long time that they were going to actually sell these things. Salmon's great worry was that 
no-one was going to come forward and bid for these things. " 
Roger Salmon himself subsequently admitted that, as late as May 1995, there had still been 
"very considerable uncertainty that we should ever sell any franchises. There was a 
widespread view that they were unsaleable" (House of Commons Papers, 1996: 13). 
With hindsight, it might be suggested that this situation might have been considerably 
different had the government been able to agree upon a suitable model for rail privatisation 
immediately following the circulation of the Redwood/Maude/Freeman working group 
report in January 1991. A significant amount of preparation could have been undertaken 
before the 1992 general election - legislation could have been drafted, analysis regarding the 
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break-up of BR could have been undertaken - and operational records for the new 
companies could have been built up from at least 1993 onwards. The government would 
have been able to present and defend its plans in the full knowledge of how they were 
intended to work, and with a reasonable expectation of what the policy's outcomes were 
likely to be. The success of passenger rail franchising would perhaps have been much more 
assured. As it was, despite the efforts of the Department of Transport to make franchising a 
more enticing prospect, policy makers could not be sure that the process would even create 
a market for TOCs, let alone generate real competition for it. As one respondent summed 
up, "it was a bold act [for us] to proceed without knowing precisely who would come to the 
table and negotiate. " Policy makers were understandably relieved, therefore, when bidders 
quickly began queueing to get to the table. 
5.4 Franchising the passenger railway 
5.4.1 The franchising process 
The Franchising Director explained the franchising proposition to the media in December 
1994, and outlined the bidding process through which companies would apply to acquire 
TOCs. The process would consist of five key stages (NAO, 1996). Interested parties would 
first be asked to pre-qualify, in order that OPRAF could check whether they had the 
financial backing and management competency to operate a franchise. Second, Invitations 
to Tender (ITTs) would be issued to those who had pre-qualified, inviting indicative bids. 
Third, a shortlist would be produced on the strength of the indicative bids and, fourth, a 
Preferred Bidder would be announced after final bids from shortlisted companies had been 
received. Finally, provided that contractual negotiations were successfully completed, the 
franchise would be awarded to the preferred bidder and private sector operation would 
commence. Although the bidding process may seem cumbersome, it was so designed in 
order to discourage all except bona fide bidders from submitting tenders. OPRAF were 
satisfied that, in general, the system achieved its aim in this regard (Grantham, 1998). 
Financial and trade interest in the Franchising Director's announcement was such that 
OPRAF considered it unnecessary to take out more than minimal paid advertising (NAO, 
1996). 246 potential bidders received pre-qualification documents for the first three 
franchises to be let, South West Trains, Great Western Trains and LTS Rail. 10 36 
10 The LTS Rail franchise was revoked after it had been awarded to the MBO team because of financial 
irregularities. OPRAF re-opened negotiations with the other shortlisted bidders, and the TOC was 
subsequently re-let in May 1996 on slightly more competitive terms than were contained in the original 
contract. See Grantham (1998) for a review of events. 
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organisations returned the documents to OPRAF by March 1995, and only six failed to 
progress to the ITT stage. 16 final bids were received from nine companies for the first 
three franchises (NAO, 1996). At first glance, it may seem that such a low `interest to bid' 
ratio (246 originally interested parties resulted in 16 bids giving a ratio of around 15: 1) 
demonstrated a lack of private sector interest in rail franchising, and that the bidding 
process was unlikely to attract more than minimal competition. This view is justified in part 
by previous experience as Kennedy (1995) had found that during the privatisation of the 
London bus companies, bidders behaved cautiously where uncertainty surrounding a sale 
was high. However, "such ratios are not uncommon in business for ITTs, " and academic 
analysis undertaken prior to the tendering process showed that shortlists of only three to 
five bidders per TOC - which OPRAF managed to secure - would lead to "relatively 
intense" competition (Preston, 1997: 15). In the event, the levels of subsidy negotiated by 
OPRAF for the first three TOCs were less than those claimed by BR in 1995/96, and the 
NAO (1996: 25 and 30) subsequently concluded that OPRAF had generated and sustained 
"a good level of competition" to secure "value for money" for the taxpayer. " 
The exact meaning of the expression `value for money' in rail privatisation terms had been a 
source of some contention since the announcement of franchising in New Opportunities for 
the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a). As stated previously (see sections 5.2 and 
5.4), all franchises were to be let subject to basic administrative requirements such as PSRs 
and some quality of service regulations. Assuming all bids met these stipulations, value for 
money could still be defined in a number of ways. Was it simply to mean the cheapest, `no 
frills' tender? Did it refer to major quality enhancements over and above those required by 
the regulations carried out on an efficient basis? Or did it imply some kind of compromise 
between these two extremes? In cases where substantial investment was needed - for 
example, where rolling stock was life-expired - the government recognised that the likely 
outcome of attempts simply to minimise subsidy would be a deterioration in the provision of 
rail services. 12 Ministers argued that this would be undesirable and, under interrogation by 
the Transport Select Committee (House of Commons Papers, 1993a), insisted that it was 
not their intention to make rail privatisation primarily a means of securing financial 
" The average annual claim for South West Trains was £49m (£54.7m in the first year declining to £40.9m 
in the last), compared to £63.5 million paid to BR in 1995/96 (OPRAF, 1996a). For Great Western the 
average claim was £40.1m (£53.2m in the first years and £38.2 in the last) compared to £47.3m paid to BR 
in 1995/96 (OPRAF, 1996b). After LTS had been re-tendered, its average claim was £18.1m (£27.6m in the 
first year and £12m in the last) compared to £31m paid to BR in 1995/96 (NAO, 1996; OPRAF, 1998a). 
12 Life-expired rolling stock is more likely to present maintenance problems (as is currently the case on, for 
example, the Gospel Oak to Barking Line (Rail, 1999a)) which impact upon a TOC's ability to maintain a 
prescribed minimum level of service. 
118 
advantages for the Treasury (although it will be recalled from section 5.3 that the 
government was depending upon revenue it would obtain from the flotation of Railtrack and 
the Roscos). On the other hand, the government did not wish for subsidy levels to impact 
excessively on the PSBR, and a compromise approach to defining value for money became 
inevitable. Some differences existed between policy makers, especially those in OPRAF and 
the Treasury, over how this compromise would be reached. OPRAF appears to have been 
unable to decide whether it should err on the side of subsidy minimisation or quality 
maximisation, but it was finally accepted that value for money would have to be determined 
individually for each franchise: 
"Salmon was constantly hankering for the view that value for money either meant cheapest or 
meant lots of new kit. He kind of veered between the two at various times. The Treasury was saying `no, 
value for money is a more holistic concept than that, and it depends on what one's asking for in the way of 
minimum service levels, it depends on whether there's a good case for reinvestment or not'. Once they'd 
decided what the proposition enshrined in the particular franchise contract was, then at that point they 
wanted it let on the best financial terms they could. But in determining what the investment proposition 
was, as it were, it had many more dimensions to it than 'my Christ, how can we flog this to minimse the 
subsidy bill? "' 
Some TOCs, especially those which had received major investment from BR (examples are 
Thames Trains, Chiltern Railways and GNER), could be let `as seen', whilst those at the 
opposite end of the scale (examples are LTS Rail and Virgin West Coast) might carry 
certain investment requirements or `recommendations'. OPRAF asked bidders to attach the 
highest priority to minimising subsidy according to each individual franchising proposition, 
and to include further quality of service enhancements only where they were self-financing 
or separately priced, in the form of `non-compliant' bids (NAO, 1996). 13 In an attempt to 
ensure that bidders included at least some original service innovations, it was also made 
clear that in cases where two or more bids had identified similar subsidy requirements, 
detailed attention would be paid to their qualitative aspects. 
5.4.2 Competition for the passenger rail market 
As noted in section 5.1, competition for the passenger rail market and its impacts upon 
subsidy and investment levels have already been documented by numerous authors (see, for 
example, Glover, 1997; Harris and Godward, 1997; Knowles, 1998; NAO, 1996; Powell, 
1997; White, 1998) and, as such, will only be reviewed here in brief. Table 5.3 shows the 
award and commencement dates, length and winner of each franchise. Shortlisted bidders 
13 A bid was compliant if it conformed to the requirements or recommendations stipulated by OPRAF. Non- 
compliant bids might suggest longer franchise terms or offer higher levels of investment, usually at a higher 
level of subsidy. As section 5.6 will show, OPRAF received many non-compliant bids at the beginning of 
the process, particularly from bidders who misunderstood its definition of value for money. 
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for all franchises are shown in table 5.4. The number of shortlisted bidders for each 
franchise is not in itself a good indicator of the degree of competition which took place at 
any one time in the bidding process because the shortlists remained roughly the same size 
regardless of the number and aggressiveness of indicative bids. The competitive pressure to 
minimise subsidy requirements during the franchising process is very apparent from table 
5.5. As Harris and Godward (1997) point out, total subsidy payable to the TOCs decreases 
from £1.8bn in 1997/98, the first full year of private sector operation, to £763m in 2003/04, 
the year in which the majority of franchises end. Subsidies continue to fall - or premiums 
continue to rise - for those TOCs whose franchises extend up to 15 years in length. Whereas 
only one TOC, Gatwick Express, was making premium payments to the Franchising 
Director in 1997/98, four of the 11 former Network SouthEast TOCs and five of the former 
InterCity TOCs will be doing so by the final year of their franchises, and a further TOC 
from each group will be receiving no subsidy (Knowles, 1998). 
Train Operating Company 
Franchise awarded / 
commenced 
Franchise holder Franchise 
length 
(years) 
South West Trains Dec 19,1995 / Feb 4,1996 Stagecoach Holdings 7 
First Great Western Dec 20,1995 / Feb 4,1996 Great Western Holdings 10 
LTS Rail May 9,1996* / May 26, Prism Rail 15 
1996* 
GNER Mar 29,1996 / Apr 28,1996 Sea Containers 7 
Gatwick Express Apr 3,1996 / Apr 28,1996 National Express Group 15 
Midland Mainline Apr 22,1996 / Apr 28,1996 National Express Group 10 
Connex South Central Apr 12,1996 / May 26,1996 CGEA 7 
Chiltern Railways Jun 26,1996 / Jul 21,1996 M40 Trains 7 
Connex South Eastern Aug 21,1996 / Oct 13,1996 CGEA 15 
Wales & West Sep 17,1996 / Oct 13,1996 Prism Rail 7'/z 
Cardiff Railway Company Sep 17,1996 / Oct 13,1996 Prism Rail 7'h 
Thames Trains Sep 19,1996 / Oct 13,1996 Victory Railways 7%z 
Island Line Sep 20,1996 / Oct 13,1996 Stagecoach Holdings 5 
Virgin CrossCountry Nov 29,1996 / Jan 5,1997 Virgin Rail Group 15 
First Great Eastern Dec 4,1996 / Jan 5,1997 First Group 7'/a 
Anglia Railways Dec 6,1996 / Jan 5,1997 GB Rail 7'/a 
West Anglia Great Northern Dec 6,1996 / Jan 5,1997 Prism Rail 7'/a 
Merseyrail Electrics Dec 20,1996 / Jan 19,1997 MTL Trust Holdings 7'/a 
First North Western Feb 5,1997 / Mar 2,1997 Great Western Holdings 71/a 
Silverlink Feb 7,1997 / Mar 2,1997 National Express Group 7'h 
Northern Spirit Feb 10,1997 / Mar 2,1997 MTL Trust Holdings 7 
Thameslink Feb 11,1997 / Mar 2,1997 Go-Ahead/VIA 7 
Central Trains Feb 17,1997 / Mar 2,1997 National Express Group 7 
Virgin West Coast Feb 19,1997 / Mar 9,1997 Virgin Rail Group 15 
ScotRail Feb 25,1997 / April 1,1997 National Express Group 7 
Table 5.3. Franchise award/commencement dates, holder and length. Source: Knowles, 
1998; OPRAF, 1998a. 
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Although the NAO (1996: 25) concluded that "a good level of competition" had been 
generated by OPRAF for the first three franchises, bids became very much more 
competitive immediately afterwards. Respondents who won TOCs shortly after South West 
Trains, First Great Western and LTS Rail had been let, noted: 
"We put in quite an aggressive bid... We did a lot of work on it and we came to a view that was 
supported but looked quite aggressive compared to South West Trains. SWT, in retrospect, was easy, and if 
we'd have won we'd all be millionaires by now... But potentially we could be seen as one of those ground- 
breakers. " 
"People applied very aggressive ratios to the costs and revenues... In the final lot of franchises... we 
lost by some substantial margin. We never really changed our risk profile throughout the whole process. We 
applied the same risk, slightly up or down depending on whether we liked the franchise or not, but 
essentially the same. We were very successful in the first half of the process, [but] in the final rounds we 
weren't very close at all to the winning subsidy. " 
The annual financial improvements needed by TOCs to compensate for declining subsidies 
or increasing premium payments are shown in figure 5.4 (figures 5.5 - 5.7 show this 
information by BR business sector). Although there is by no means a neat time/subsidy 
correlation, the important point to note is the significant increase in the financial 
improvements required before and after the first three franchises were let. GNER, the first 
InterCity-type operator to be franchised after First Great Western, needs to improve its 
financial performance by more than twice that of the latter. Other than Gatwick Express, no 
other former Inter-City franchise can afford to increase its revenue less than GNER. 
Similarly, Connex South Central must increase its annual revenues by more than three times 
the figure required of South West Trains and twice that of LTS Rail. Only Connex South 
Eastern has a less demanding financial task among the former Network SouthEast TOCs. A 
Regional Railways-style operator was not let in the first batch of franchises, but the 
minimum financial improvement required by a TOC in this group is 8.3 per cent per year, 
over six times that of South West Trains and over four times those of First Great Western 
and LTS Rail. All of the other companies in this group must improve their revenues by the 
same, or a higher, amount in order to remain profitable. 
The ambitious targets set by private sector operators mean that substantial increases in 
revenue are required in order for the TOCs to remain financially viable - indeed, for some 
TOCs, the overall financial improvement required exceeds their ticket revenue at the 
beginning of the franchise (Knowles, 1998) - and these increases must be achieved by better 
marketing and/or provision of services, more stringent revenue protection and cost 
reduction. InterCity-type TOCs are in a good position to expand their businesses because 
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they serve heavily used corridors between major destinations. Former Network SouthEast 
TOCs have an even greater growth potential because of their large amounts of spare off- 
peak capacity. Continuing economic growth in the city will also increase their revenue 
bases. On the other hand, the Network SouthEast-type TOCs could also be the hardest hit 
in a future recession precisely because of their dependence on commuter business (Knight, 
1998). Former Regional Railways TOCs, it can be argued, are the least well-placed to grow 
their passenger revenues significantly - despite the fact that they generally need the highest 
annual financial improvements. Not only are they heavily reliant upon peak-time commuting 
in their urban markets, but many serve rural or semi-rural areas with infrequent trains and 
limited growth potential (see Thornton, 1999a, regarding rural operators). All TOCs will be 
vulnerable to future economic downturns (see section 5.2), and have only limited scope to 
reduce operating costs because a large proportion of them are fixed by track access or 
rolling stock leasing charges. 14 The medium- and long-term financial viability of TOCs may 
impact significantly upon the outcome of future bidding rounds. If franchisees begin to lose 
money, subsidies for at least the next franchise period will have to rise significantly in order 
to ensure continued private sector interest in the passenger rail industry. Whilst all 
respondents believed that many TOCs would flourish, some were of the opinion that 
competition for the market in 1996/97 had been sufficiently aggressive to ensure that a 
number of TOCs would be unable to achieve their financial targets: 
"We suspect other bidders might [have been] slightly optimistic about how they'll restructure their 
companies - and that's bad enough - but then we look at some of the revenue assumptions underpinning 
some of these subsidy reductions, and we think some of [them] are very aggressive indeed. Something's got 
to give... we think others may have some difficulties towards the end. " 
"Everyone that I know in the industry says [that one TOC will be] impossible. Normally some 
people say 'oh yeah, this one isn't too bad, or `you never know'. It's a standard commuter franchise, with a 
few rural lines. There's no magic to it, and they're not going to do anything with the train service that's 
spectacular. And yet they've... well, we tried to do some rough sums on it and it's spectacular, the 
improvement they must get. Maybe they will. I hope they do... But if they achieve that, we'll have so much 
money flowing out of the coffers it'll be ridiculous. We'll all be heroes. So far, there's no indication that's 
going to happen. " 
Prospects for the future in terms of competition both for and in the passenger rail market 
are discussed further in chapter seven. 
In addition to securing subsidy minimisation, competition for the passenger rail market also 
manifested itself in terms of quality enhancements (Knowles, 1998). At first, although 
OPRAF had indicated that they would consider original bid enhancements where two or 
14 Track access and rolling stock leasing costs are in large part fixed and amount to over 70 per cent of a 
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more tenders were similarly priced, at least three companies submitted non-compliant 
tenders which sought to provide a greatly improved quality of service in exchange for a high 
level of subsidy. One respondent, who submitted such a tender for South West Trains, 
offered to resign from his post as a bidding consultant because he was "miles out" in terms 
of subsidy from the winning bid. A feeling of disillusionment grew among some bidders, 
with respondents lamenting OPRAF's apparent disinterest in non-compliant bids: 
"[We thought we] could offer to improve the service in some way, presumably there might be some 
trade off in terms of the level of subsidy the government would be prepared to put in. I never saw any 
evidence of that taking place. It was `who will give me the lowest subsidy or greatest level of premium for 
taking this franchise off our hands? ' ... It certainly took us a painful lesson or two to realise that was the 
case... We were surprised to realise that all that quality stuff was just put to one side. `Very nice, thankyou, 
but irrelevant. "' 
But the fact that some bidders held these opinions did not serve to undermine the 
importance of qualitative elements in the franchising process, especially in later bids. In a 
climate of intensifying competition, the difference between the subsidy profiles of different 
bidders was reducing considerably. Respondents perceived that low subsidy requirements in 
themselves became insufficient to guarantee winning franchises and, as a result, the 
inclusion of - or at least a willingness to negotiate -a host of "goodies" in compliant bids 
became de rigueur. 
"They [bidders] knew that we were explicit about the numbers, but we also said that we would look 
hard at the qualitative aspects of the deal. If we felt, in the round, that one bid might be slightly more 
expensive, but provided substantially better outputs, we may have chosen that. The bidders could not just 
have put in bids which were very low and offered nothing because they thought - and they would have been 
right - that we may have preferred another bid which provided more. " 
To many bidders, including "goodies" in tenders made business, as well as bidding, sense. 
Respondents took the view that certain improvement initiatives, including those which 
required major investment, were business-case driven in the sense that, by `speculating to 
accumulate', they would be able to improve their revenue predictions and thus secure a 
further reduction in the subsidy profile. More conservative bidders, who would only 
consider investment proposals if the franchise terms were extended beyond those which 
OPRAF was prepared to let, were now effectively eliminated from the process: 
"Someone would say, 'I know you're offering a seven year franchise, but I'd like a 10 year one'. I'd 
say, `great, wonderful, when we're offering one we'll give you a call. In the meantime, we'll deal with all 
the other people who are trying to buy what we're trying to sell. "' 
TOCs total costs (Modern Railways, 1995). 
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Table 5.6 outlines the key service quality enhancements which were secured by the 
Franchising Director during the competitive tendering process. All 25 franchisees made 
commitments to maintain service levels above those specified in the PSRs and/or provide 
more demanding improvements such as station or rolling stock upgrades. 22 franchises 
improved their targets for punctuality and/or reliability, and extra train services were 
secured in 18 TOCs (Knowles, 1998). 
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Notwithstanding the subsidy reductions and quality of service enhancements which resulted 
from the franchising process, some respondents maintained that the Franchising Director did 
little more than secure a `cheap' railway, and that the government overlooked an ideal 
opportunity to insist upon myriad service improvements not included under current 
franchising contracts. As will become apparent in chapter seven, this argument is powerful 
one, and may impact significantly upon future franchising rounds. At this stage, however, it 
is sufficient to note that the intensity and outcomes of the competition generated by the 
franchising process significantly exceeded anything policy makers originally expected given 
the uncertainty which surrounded rail privatisation before competitive tendering began. The 
state was able to withdraw from the passenger rail industry by both transferring assets and 
reducing subsidy. The next section of this chapter seeks to ascertain, from a bidder's 
perspective, the key reasons why this situation arose. 
5.5 Explaining competition for the market 
Speaking in front of the Committee of Public Accounts in October 1996, Roger Salmon 
suggested that "a good level of competition" (NAO, 1996: 25) had been generated for the 
first three TOCs for two reasons, both of which were related to OPRAF's handling of the 
franchising process. Salmon postulated, first, that his decision to prevent BR from tendering 
in the early stages of the process and, second, that OPRAF's helping bidders better 
understand the market, were instrumental in encouraging private sector interest in South 
West Trains, First Great Western and LTS Rail (House of Commons Papers, 1996). Whilst 
to a degree Salmon's arguments appear self-serving, evidence suggests that OPRAF's 
actions were indeed important to the success of the franchising process because they helped 
facilitate a market by removing at least some of the uncertainty which surrounded the 
market at the time. 
Although wishing to encourage privately-backed MEBO bids (Freeman, 1993), ministers 
consistently argued that the BRB should not be allowed to bid for the right to run TOCs 
(The Times, 1993). From an ideological point of view, the government's position was 
understandable given that the key aim of the 1993 Railways Act was to transfer the industry 
into the private sector. Letting BR bid for TOCs would have been the same as allowing the 
Post Office to buy BT. But the government's position had also been influenced by important 
practical considerations. First, allowing the BRB to submit tenders would probably have 
discouraged MEBO bids. Would-be franchisees in BR's employ were already facing the 
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dilemma of separating their responsibilities to the BRB from those to their bid partners, and 
allowing the Board to join the franchise competition would have created extreme conflicts 
of interest: 
"It was difficult enough as it was, having duties to BR and to the State in general as they were 
paying your salary. You know, you'd accumulated all this knowledge [of how to run a railway] and then 
suddenly you are supposed to give all that knowledge to OPRAF and their agents so that [they] can get the 
best price for the franchise. If you also had your bosses, essentially, competing against you, then the 
conflicts become even more impossible. " 
Second, the prospect of tenders being submitted by the BRB would almost certainly have 
discouraged externals from bidding because they viewed BR as having an unfair commercial 
advantage. 15 Not only might the BRB have cross-subsidised its bids from other sections of 
its business (Wintour, 1993), but it was also perceived as having an infinite financial backer 
in the government. As a result, the Board may not have been forced to make commercial 
assessments of risk and return, and the possibility of its submitting extraordinarily low bids 
could have distorted the entire franchising process. One respondent, a MEBO-turned- 
external bidder, argued in addition that the BRB's competitive position might have been 
strengthened by over-optimistic revenue projections made as a result of its approach to 
running the nationalised railway: "I mean, they always set impossible targets for the 
management which were regularly missed. If they'd actually believed those targets, then it 
would have been impossible to compete against them. " 
Despite these arguments, the Transport Select Committee remained concerned that 
excluding the Board from the franchising process could result in railway expertise being lost 
from the industry, and recommended that the BRB be allowed to participate (House of 
Commons Papers, 1993a). The House of Lords agreed and, in summer 1993, peers 
including former transport minister Lord Peyton passed an amendment which required that 
the Board be allowed to submit bids (Wintour, 1993). Reluctantly, after the Railways Bill 
had `ping-ponged' between the elected and unelected chambers, the government conceded 
that the BRB would be allowed to bid for TOCs, but that tenders would be invited subject 
to the discretion of the Franchising Director (House of Commons, 1993; The Times, 
1993). 16 Salmon announced in December 1994 that, in the interests of securing sufficient 
is Ford (1995) took issue with this point at a press conference in late 1995 during the following exchange 
between himself and Roger Salmon when he found out that BR would be unable to bid: "`Why not? ' I 
asked. 'Because private companies might be put off if they had to compete with BR' said Mr Salmon. `Oh, 
come on, everyone knows that BR is "deeply inefficient" (Major J. ) and "inadequate" (Major J. again) and 
the dynamic thrusting private sector companies will run rings around it. "' 
16 Perhaps realising that the Secretary of State would simply instruct the Franchising Director behind closed 
doors to block BR bids, opponents of this compromise noted that the government had missed the point of 
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competition for the TOCs, he would `provisionally' exclude the BRB from the initial 
franchising rounds (it was later confirmed that BR would not be allowed to bid in the first 
13 rounds) (Smithers, 1994b). His decision appears to have been an important factor in 
determining whether or not some bidders involved themselves in the early franchise 
competitions. A respondent noted that: 
"We clearly welcomed the fact that BR weren't able to bid because we felt BR would have a clear 
inside track. To put a bid together did require very significant effort, time resources and costs... If we felt we 
were bidding on an uneven playing field, then we would very seriously have reconsidered our position and I 
suspect, but of course this didn't happen so I don't know, but I suspect we may well have sat back a little bit 
to see what happened before we decided to go in or not. In other words, to see if BR were picking up five out 
of the first six, if you like. So we welcomed the secenario where BR weren't able to bid. " 
The BRB subsequently decided that it would not take part in any of the franchising rounds, 
even those it could legally have entered, after it became apparent that sufficient private 
sector interest had been generated in the process (Prynn, 1996a). 
Salmon's second assertion was that competition had been generated for the first three 
franchises because of OPRAF's commitment to helping bidders understand the market for 
which they were bidding. It has already been noted in section 5.4 that passenger rail 
franchising was being conducted "with a paucity of detail" (Grantham, 1998: 132) and, in a 
confidential report to Brian Mawhinney in September 1995, the Franchising Director 
pointed out that early submissions to OPRAF had been "of variable quality which reflected 
bidders' immature understanding of the businesses concerned" (Salmon, quoted in Harper, 
1995: 18). OPRAF responded to this problem pro-actively. In addition to providing a suite 
of basic information sources for bidders - long form reports from accountants, `data rooms' 
which detailed virtually all aspects of TOCs' operational environments and sales 
documentation - the Franchising Director made himself available to all interested parties and 
sent his staff to `troubleshoot' at corporate/MEBO board meetings. OPRAF's own systems 
were still very much in flux at this stage in the franchising process, but respondents 
acknowledged that OPRAF had made every effort to provide them with information as and 
when it became available. 
The provision of information to external bidders was a particularly important task in order 
to ensure the maintenance of a level playing field between MEBOs and those from outside 
the industry. One respondent, a member of a MEBO team, suggested that internal bidders 
the Lords' objections. Labour MPs had also foreseen that this tactic was a con (Webster and Prynn, 1993; 
Wintour, 1993). 
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probably had an inherent advantage over their competitors because of their `inside' 
knowledge of the rail industry. Significantly, many of BR's middle-managers, including 
those who subsequently assembled MEBO bids, were involved in the process of establishing 
TOCs, and liaised with the consultants writing long-form reports: "I remember long nights 
sat in Samuel Montagu's offices drafting ITTs which became a bit of a bench mark for the 
future. " To combat potential problems in this area, OPRAF enforced disclosure regulations 
to ensure that TOC managers passed on all relevant business information to external 
bidders. However, although respondents generally viewed these regulations as effective 
some, including those from MEBOs, acknowledged that there was a `grey area' which 
incumbent managers exploited to secrete ideas and business propositions they had 
formulated as a result of their familiarity with the industry: 
"Perhaps we had an inside track, sort of `here's an idea of what we'll do, what do you think? ' 
before it went to Sea Containers and so on... We knew stuff and said `well we're not going to talk about that 
unless we're asked'... But we had a bright idea and, you know, we'll put that one in the bottom drawer, save 
that one. The other management teams were doing the same, clearly, it was obvious. " 
That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of this `inside' information. 
MEBOs had no more access to financial performance data than external bidders because 
track records had only recently become available. In addition, externals bidding for more 
than one TOC accumulated the benefit of repeated exposure to the franchising process, 
something MEBO teams would clearly lack (although, as shown in table 5.4, some MEBOs 
were supported by experienced corporate bidders). Finally, it can be argued that any 
inherent advantage to MEBOs in terms of information was cancelled out by difficulties they 
experienced in raising bid-capital. '7 Because banks in the UK were suspicious of rail 
privatisation (see section 5.1), some MEBOs were forced to seek funding from foreign 
institutions or venture capitalists whose high rates of interest impacted significantly on the 
cost - and hence the competitiveness - of their bids. Moreover, many venture capitalists 
were conservative with regard to the rail industry's future growth prospects, and refused to 
back MEBOs if their bids were predicated on optimistic revenue predictions: 
"A key characteristic of franchising is of course that it removes the need for bidders to inject a significant 
amount of capital into a business. However, in order to ensure that a franchisee could not simply walk away 
from a TOC if their business plans were to go awry, the Franchising Director demanded that each successful 
bidder pay capitalisation and a performance bond. Capitalisation covers the high level of fares paid to TOCs 
in advance (especially annual season tickets), and performance bonds, which vary in value depending on the 
TOC (First Great Western's is around £14m), are only refundable once a franchise term has been completed 
(see OPRAF, 1996a). 
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"Whereas may of us believed that franchises ought to be capable of generating growth of five per 
cent a year compound, the financial institutions wouldn't accept that on the history of BR's performance in 
previous years. So the maximum which would have got in the plan was three per cent compound. " 
Corporate bidders, on the other hand, could take advantage of an established credit history, 
initiate a stock market flotation or even finance a bid from their own balance sheet to raise 
capital: 
"Those with a healthy balance sheet who were prepared to provide finance for a franchise bid won 
the franchises because the venture capitalists on which the management teams depended wouldn't match 
that optimism for revenue growth... We bid for [a TOC], for example. There was no way that in our bid 
there was a suggestion that subsidy could be removed altogether in the way that [the eventual winner] had 
done. " 
Although most external bidders were generally satisfied that OPRAF had sought to 
eliminate information asymmetries between themselves and MEBOs, it is clearly possible 
that their views were coloured at least in part by the above considerations. 
By excluding BR from the initial franchising rounds and helping bidders understand the 
market in which they were to become involved, OPRAF clearly removed some of the 
doubts about rail privatisation harboured by the private sector. However, even taken 
together, these two factors do not adequately explain why competition was generated for 
the South West Trains, First Great Western and LTS Rail franchises. Aside from the fact 
that OPRAF could only pass on information to bidders when it became available (and in 
some cases this was late into the tendering process), the Franchising Director could do little 
about the general level of uncertainty being sustained by media and political opposition to 
rail privatisation, and there was still no international precedent upon which bidders could 
draw to gain a better understanding of how the track authority model would work in 
practice. Two additional factors were found to augment the Franchising Director's account 
of why bidders became involved in the initial franchising rounds. 
First, there were bidders who had always supported the rail privatisation process, or who at 
least viewed it as an ideal means of adding further transport-related businesses to their 
portfolios, regardless of the uncertainty by which it was characterised. One bidder's interest 
stemmed from the fact that privatisation would give him, as an `enthusiast', the opportunity 
to run a railway, but others were more convinced that the proposals made commercial 
sense, especially in the medium to long-term. These latter bidders presumed that, given the 
increasing political, economic and environmental concerns about traffic congestion and 
pollution (see, for example, Hughes, 1993; Preston, 1980; Royal Commission on 
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Environmental Pollution, 1994; Whitelegg, 1992), rail was highly likely to be a growth 
industry in the future. Moreover, it was felt that any political risk associated with rail 
privatisation had been overstated because the Labour Party, if they were to form the next 
government, would be unlikely to renationalise the railways (see section 5.2). Indeed, 
perhaps ironically, one respondent noted that the prospects for a privately-owned railway 
were brighter under Labour than the Conservatives because the former were "more likely to 
be anti-car and that has to help train operators from a commercial point of view. " 
Second, at least two bidders realised that they could use the general level of uncertainty 
surrounding the proposition to their advantage in the early bidding rounds. These 
respondents reasoned that many of their potential competitors were likely to distance 
themselves from the franchising process initially in order to gauge the outcome before 
committing themselves. Thus, although conservative bidders would ensure that they did not 
waste resources should franchising prove a failure, their entrepreneurial counterparts would 
be more likely secure a TOC at good value in the face of limited competition. Drawing upon 
their experience from earlier bus privatisations where this pattern had prevailed (see also 
Knowles, 1989; Wolmar, 1998), the bidders noted: 
"With 25 franchises I suppose [being conservative at first] is a strategy you could justify, you don't 
need to be one of the first three. Our counter to that is our experience... has generally been that you get the 
best value at the beginning of a privatisation, you get the best value for the relatively unfancied franchises. 
If you have an auction process where there's 10 or 15 bidding, you tend to get more overpricing... than you 
would with [only] two or three. " 
"There are advantages in the information not being very clear at the outset because people are 
inherently cautious and risk averse, whereas I suppose we're a bit more entrepreneurial so these things can 
work to our advantage. Contrast that with what's going on now [outside of rail privatisation]. If we tender 
for an airport, we might find that we were info. memo. number 87... That points to like 100 interested 
parties. From our point of view, that's not a very good privatisation structure because we're not going to get 
value for our shareholders. [But] if there's only two or three serious bidders [we will]. " 
To their further advantage, early bidders were rewarded upon committing themselves to the 
process with the realisation that the limited information available to them in the early stages 
of the franchising process was not necessarily a handicap when it came to assembling a 
tender. Although "track records would have been nice, " the bidders became aware that 
other details could easily be estimated, especially at the non-binding, indicative bid stage of 
the process. For example, although the finalised PSRs were not available when ITTs were 
issued, it could be presumed that their contents would be similar to the draft documents 
which bidders had seen: 
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"I think it's always very easy [for people] to get diverted by relatively minute levels of 
information... The PSR did follow on by a few weeks, but anyone understanding the franchise and the terms 
of it knew within a minute proportion what level of service would be required. it really was, you know, 
whether the first departure in the morning had to be before 8.00 or 8.15, it was that sort of detail. So to be 
honest, I don't think that should have affected anyone's overall appraisal of the business. " 
Bidders who declined to submit tenders for any of the first three franchises realised in 
retrospect their mistake. One respondent opined (rather bitterly) that the initial bidders "got 
a better deal than they should have, " although he did acknowledge that "there is an 
argument [which says] they deserved it because they were the first people to bid. " 
The speed at which competition intensified after the first three TOCs had been let surprised 
some bidders who had expected others (and, in some cases, themselves) to remain cautious 
for much of the process: 
' We had expected [that] after these people had sat on the fence the first time that they would still 
be very cautious because of the uncertainty, the general election looming, all this sort of doom and gloom. 
This was a privatisation too far, all that business. [But] I don't think that happened. People did have the 
confidence to come in and come in big... We thought some of the outsiders might have been scared off as a 
lot of the banks were. " 
Salmon again suggested that his handling of the franchising process was at least in part 
responsible for the unexpected bullishness of the market (House of Commons Papers, 
1996). Respondents acknowledged that they were confident in the system established by the 
Franchising Director and had no reservations about re-entering later rounds following 
unsuccessful bids. Using its experience from the initial franchising rounds, OPRAF had been 
able to standardise almost all procedures and sales documentation, and the business of 
letting franchises was streamlined considerably as a result. In addition, OPRAF quickly 
established a reputation for integrity among bidders. Respondents commended OPRAF 
regarding the transparancy with which franchising was conducted, some noting that 
previous franchising rounds in which they had been involved, especially those in the bus 
industry, had been characterised by "suspicions and doubts, people with chips on their 
shoulder, people being aggrieved because they hadn't been rewarded in the way they 
thought they would and so on. " OPRAF sought to avoid this by publishing the terms of 
winning bids to provide a benchmark against which unsuccessful bidders could review their 
submissions. Moreover, the Franchising Director was also concerned to ensure that his staff 
were beyond indiscretion. Only one respondent suspected unprofessionalism on the part of 
OPRAF (although no evidence could be found to confirm this) and the Franchising 
Director's diligence was appreciated by bidders: 
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"I never felt that OPRAF people would give injudicious or indiscreet comments to people which 
was terribly tempting for them if you're letting one of these things [a franchise]. `Just push it up a bit 
more... ' You never got a sense of them doing that which gave people some confidence. " 
"My cousin worked for OPRAF... He was absolutely obsessive about not being anywhere near me 
for two years! He had nothing to do with my bid. Even when they had senior management meetings and 
mentioned [this particular TOC], he would excuse himself. It became one of the OPRAF jokes, but it's 
actually a great tribute to him and to OPRAF's integrity that they take these issues so seriously. " 
Although OPRAF's continuing management of the franchising process provided a 
foundation upon which the market for TOCs could be established, easily the most 
significant reason for the increase in competition seems to have been a straightforward and 
very sudden change in market sentiment. Salmon recognised this: 
"In each case the level of subsidy was ultimately set by competition and after people saw the first 
franchises sold, saw the reception of those sales on the stock market, saw that serious companies were 
interested saw the comment of the press, they became keener to bid and put in keener bids to me" (House of 
Commons Papers, 1996: 14). 
The pessimism with which the private sector had previously viewed passenger rail 
privatisation transformed quickly into virtually unfettered optimism. Respondents had seen 
that the contractual minefield of passenger rail franchising could be negotiated, and that 
TOCs could pass into private hands with relatively few problems. Most importantly, 
however, they had seen that money could be made from rail privatisation. The successful 
bidders, particularly Stagecoach, had taken over TOCs at a level of subsidy which, when 
combined with forecasts of even minimal revenue growth, would ensure "a very handsome 
profit" (The Times, 1995: 28). Stagecoach had made few commitments to invest in South 
West Trains, and the bus operator's reputation as an aggressive cost-cutter led city analysts 
to predict profits of up to £12 million per year by 1998 (The Times, 1995). 
The subsequent behaviour of Stagecoach Holdings was instrumental in alerting potential 
bidders to the benefits of rail franchising. At a presentation to the City after securing the 
South West Trains franchise, Stagecoach "did a very good job of informing their 
shareholders of the deal they had done. " Derek Scott, then Stagecoach's financial director, 
told Grantham (1998: 144) that: 
"As soon as we made a presentation to the City in December 1995 the genie was out of the box. 
[They said] `these guys have bought a £280m turnover business, they say they'll average a nine percent 
margin in seven years and they've bought it for a pound. " 
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In a volatile market unnerved by a sudden tumble on Wall Street (Pangalos, 1995), 
Stagecoach's share price rose by 17 per cent in the week after it had acquired South West 
Trains, and by a further seven per cent the following week. The Financial Times (1996) 
was later to comment that a key reason FirstBus's shares were performing poorly in relation 
to Stagecoach's was because the former had failed to obtain a controlling interest in any rail 
businesses (FirstBus did have a 24.5 per cent stake in Great Western Holdings). 
Stagecoach's bravado, along with what was perceived as an aggressive bid from Connex 
Rail for the South Central franchise soon afterwards, "had the effect of galvanising the 
market, and suddenly lots of other bidders realised this was a market they wanted to be in. " 
Although some bidders applied a consistent rate of return to their tenders throughout the 
process, others, especially those who had lost out in previous rounds, became much more 
aggressive as they attempted to win a franchise. A "must have" culture developed as bidders 
and investors grew increasingly confident of rail privatisation's financial allure: 
'The bus companies got on the bandwagon when they saw how well Stagecoach shares were doing, 
and National Express, and they thought `we must have a franchise! ' Firstbus got Great Eastern, MTL got 
North east and so on. So, good luck! " 
"Clearly other players came in, either desperate to win something because they had not yet won 
anything or to build a portfolio and time was running out. " 
"It's so easy to forget the circumstances. The early franchises had been quite a problem one way or 
another. They'd taken a hell of a long time to get away and the notion was around for a very long time that 
by the time of the general election it would be impossible to have let all these franchises. So I think people 
were... saying, 'oh yes, that's what's happening here and four have gone now [but] there's another 20 left'. 
Suddenly they discover that actually there are only another 10 left and half of those they didn't like the look 
of. So they really needed to win X, Y and Z. " 
As franchising progressed, one city analyst remarked that the competitive tendering process 
had become "a ridiculous pandemonium" (Nelson, 1997: 32). A respondent, who dealt with 
all bidders during the franchising round, suggested that this was so because ambition had 
blinded their judgement. Later tenders in particular, he argued, were characterised by 
hopeless short-termism in the sense that many bidders seemed to ignore potential future 
problems - such as the traditional link between the economy and railway performance or the 
potential impact of on-rail competition - in order to lower their subsidy requirements as far 
as possible. Thaler (1988), on the other hand, has contended that aggressive bidding of this 
kind results from corporate arrogance. The `hubris hypothesis' (Thaler, 1988) predicts that 
companies will attempt to buck the market on the misplaced assumption that they can 
estimate the true value of a franchise better than the market. This is irrational in the sense 
that all bidders have access to the same information, and the theory suggests that the 
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winning bid will overestimate the true value of its object and present its originator with an 
unprofitable or loss-making business - the `winner's curse' (Kennedy, 1995). It has already 
been noted that respondents believe some of their competitors to have been afflicted. 18 The 
intensification of competition for the market generally resulted in those bidders who applied 
consistent rates of return to all their tenders failing to secure any TOCs in the later 
franchising rounds. One of these was Stagecoach. Despite bidding for virtually all the 
TOCs, the Scottish bus operator won only one, the eight-mile Island Line, after its initial 
success with South West Trains. 
5.6 Competition for the market reviewed: the changing role of the state 
This chapter has reviewed the development and outcome of passenger rail franchising 
against the background of rail privatisation policy evolution established in chapter four. It 
has shown that, partly as a result of the circumstances in which the track authority model 
was adopted, the private sector viewed rail privatisation as something of an uncertain 
proposition before the TOCs were put on the market in 1995. As a result, the development 
of franchising policy was heavily influenced by the government's need to convince potential 
bidders that acquiring TOCs would make commercial sense. Although the Treasury initially 
sought to maximise competitive opportunities in the new railway structure, it relented after 
the Department of Transport realised that such a policy could jeopardise the viability of the 
franchising process. Franchising policy thus became something of a paradox, whereby the 
Department of Transport's proposals, based on practicality rather than ideology, were more 
likely to promote competition for TOCs than the Treasury's. Nonetheless, even though their 
position had prevailed, senior policy makers within the Department of Transport and 
OPRAF remained sceptical as to whether meaningful competition for TOCs would actually 
materialise. 
In the event, private sector interest in passenger rail franchising was remarkably buoyant. 
OPRAF's administrative competence, which removed at least some of the doubts 
surrounding rail privatisation and thus helped facilitate a market for TOCs, was at least 
partly responsible for this. More important, however, was the willingness of certain 
companies to take part in the initial franchising rounds and the sudden change in market 
sentiment that followed. A limited number of enthusiastic and entrepreneurial bidders were 
initially able to take advantage of the "doom and gloom" which surrounded rail privatisation 
to secure South West Trains, First Great Western and LTS Rail on favourable terms in the 
18 Perhaps predictably, no bidder admitted to having been afflicted themselves. 
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absence of fierce competition from rivals. Bidders not involved in these franchising rounds 
quickly became aware that the contractual minefield of acquiring a TOC could be 
successfully negotiated and, more importantly, that money could be made from rail 
privatisation. As one respondent observed, bidders "[suddenly] thought, `we must have a 
franchise! ". 
Before attention is turned to assessing rail privatisation in terms of its generating 
competition in the market, it is necessary in the context of this thesis to consider the impact 
of the franchising process upon the relationship between the railway industry and the state. 
It is argued here that the level of private sector interest in passenger rail franchising has 
altered this association in three key areas. First, because all 25 TOCs were let - the 
franchising equivalent of asset transfer - the state was able to shift much of the responsibility 
for the provision of rail services to private companies. In the same way that BT or British 
Gas own their means of production, franchisees now have albeit temporary control over the 
assets of the TOCs. It is true that the state has retained the right to stipulate minimum 
output standards in the form of PSRs but, as noted in chapter four, this compromise in 
neoliberal values was always inevitable in rail privatisation given the loss-making nature of 
most rail services. The outcome of rail privatisation was always going to be different from 
that of other network industries in this sense because the government clearly has a right to 
demand certain levels of service in respect of the financial support it provides to train 
operators (quality of service stipulations are discussed in chapter six). 
The level of financial support is the second area in which franchising has redefined the 
state's involvement with the rail industry. As a result of intense competition for TOCs, the 
subsidy required by franchisees will fall considerably below that which was required by BR 
at the time of letting. Whereas state support for TOCs was £2.1 billion in 1996/97, it should 
decline to £632 million by 2003/04, the year in which the majority of franchisees expire 
(OPRAF, 1998). Given that the track authority model significantly increased the overall 
level of subsidy required by the rail industry before privatisation (see chapter four), the 
figures should be interpreted with some caution. Even after sales revenues from Railtrack, 
the Roscos and other rail businesses are accounted for, the net costs of rail privatisation to 
the state could still be as high as £2.2 billion after 15 years (White, 1998). Net gains to the 
state, if there are to be any, depend upon the declining subsidy payments to TOCs which 
resulted from competition generated by the franchising process. 
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As this chapter has shown, the degree of competition generated for the market should result 
in subsidy falling considerably in comparison with that which was paid to BR at the point of 
privatisation (although it will remain above the amount received by BR prior to 
restructuring until at least 2001/02 (OPRAF, 1998)). White (1998) has calculated that, 
provided OPRAF support payments adhere to current forecasts, the savings which accrue 
will present a net gain to the state of some £240m by 2002/03. This will increase over time 
if overall subsidy payments reduce still further. Thus, the level of state involvement with the 
railway industry in terms of financial support will diminish from that which existed at the 
time of privatisation in this scenario. As noted in sections 5.4 and 5.5, some respondents 
suggested that the aggressive bids tendered by some franchisees are not sustainable, and 
that some TOCs, particularly those from the former Network SouthEast and Regional 
Railways business sectors let towards the end of the franchising process, could soon face 
financial difficulties. Should these TOCs go bankrupt, their franchises would (under current 
legislation) be re-let. Notwithstanding the hubris hypothesis, it is almost certain that the 
outcome would be financially less favourable to the state because potential bidders would be 
less likely to over-price a TOC given the increased private sector experience in operating 
rail businesses. Such subsidy rises could eliminate any net gains to the state or even, in the 
(admittedly) unlikely event that they were particularly significant, increase the amount of 
state involvement in the railways beyond that in 1996/97. Whilst it is certain that 
government contributions would be higher than at present had competition for the TOCs 
been less aggressive, the franchising process has not, as yet, diminished the financial role of 
the state in the passenger rail industry. The likelihood of this being achieved in the future is 
considered in more detail in chapter seven. 
Finally, franchising competition produced an unexpected role for the market in terms of 
investment planning within the rail industry. Section 5.5 noted that the `value for money' 
criterion on which franchises were let determined that the state would identify where 
significant investment (for example, replacement rolling stock) around the network was 
required, and that the market, through competitive tendering, would determine only the cost 
of that investment to the Treasury. However, as franchising progressed, and as competition 
between bidders became more intense, market forces began to both identify and pay for 
investment opportunities in the privatised railway to the extent that all 25 franchises were let 
on terms more favourable to rail users than the government had initially envisaged. Bidders 
improved - or at least signalled to OPRAF a willingness to improve - the qualitative aspects 
of their bids because they perceived that aggressive subsidy reduction would not in itself be 
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sufficient to secure a TOC. The nature and amount of improvements secured in this way 
clearly represents a degree of market, rather than state, determination of post-privatisation 
investment requirements. Although the state did not reduce its role in rail investment 
planning in an absolute sense, the degree of competition for franchises did result in the 
market increasing its relative involvement in this area. Having reviewed the evolution and 
outcome of the policy adopted to promote competition for the passenger rail market, this 
thesis now turns its attention to the development of competition within it. 
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Chapter Six 
Competition in the passenger railway market 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter five reviewed the development and outcomes of the franchising policy adopted to 
privatise the passenger rail industry. It was suggested that, despite the misgivings of senior 
policy makers, the level of competition for the market generated by the franchising process 
was high. The government's influence over the TOCs has diminished in the sense that 
ownership of the latter has been transferred to the private sector, although state financial 
support to the rail industry is currently higher than it was before denationalisation. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which competition had materialised in 
the passenger rail market by early 1998.1 The chapter seeks to identify the opportunities for 
on-rail competition which existed at that time, to assess whether these were being exploited 
and to discuss their impact upon the relationship between the passenger rail industry and the 
state. 
It will be remembered that the promotion of on-rail competition was a primary objective of 
the track authority model of rail privatisation. The 1992 Conservative Party manifesto 
stated that: 
"We believe that the best way to produce profound and lasting improvements on the railways is to 
end BR's state monopoly... A significant number of companies have already said that they want to introduce 
new railway services as soon as the monopoly is ended. We will give them that chance" (Conservative 
Party, 1992: 35). 
This was reiterated in New Opportunities for the Railways: 
"The Government proposes to provide a right of access to the rail network for the private sector 
operators of passenger services... [Because of this] new operators will be allowed to provide services giving 
customers a choice stimulating improved services and value" (Department of Transport, 1992a: 4). 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first (in section 6.2) reviews debates 
surrounding the appropriateness of on-rail competition, and begins by demonstrating that 
many potential opportunities for competition between passenger operators exist within the 
new industry structure. However, as noted in chapter five, and as will become clearer 
below, the plans advanced in the White Paper provoked concerns from observers regarding 
the compatibility of on-rail competition with the franchising process (House of Commons 
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Papers, 1993a; Gibb et al., 1998). Although it was immediately clear to many that the 
pursuit of on-rail competition might jeopardise the entire rail privatisation exercise, it is 
suggested that, for various reasons, the government was initially reluctant to compromise its 
commitment to this form of market liberalisation. Indeed, it did not formally do so until 
ministers accepted that some competition would have to be `moderated' in the 1993 
publication Gaining Access to the Railway Network (Department of Transport, 1993b). 
The principal argument of this chapter is developed in sections 6.3 and 6.4. The policies 
ultimately adopted by the government to moderate competition between TOCs are 
examined, and each is assessed in detail according to the extent to which the passenger rail 
market had been liberalised by early 1998. It is argued that, although certain types of 
competition were permitted and were clearly taking place, most significant competitive 
opportunities were being restricted by regulation and/or operational factors such as network 
capacity and rolling stock availability. As a result, much of the passenger rail market was 
still characterised by monopoly, and the industry was based on a comprehensive array of 
regulatory mechanisms designed to promote a form of surrogate competition comparable to 
that which governs the utilities discussed in chapter two. 
6.2 On-rail competition and the formulation of competition policy 
After encountering significant difficulties in adopting the track authority model (see chapter 
four), the government's priority following the publication of New Opportunities for the 
Railways was to make it work. The promotion of competition between train operators was 
therefore an important policy objective and the Treasury in particular, having sacrificed its 
original plan of train-path auctioning, was keen to ensure that the passenger railway market 
was liberalised as far as possible (see chapters four and five). In Parliament and in front of 
the Transport Select Committee, MacGregor and his Minister of State, Roger Freeman, 
delivered a number of speeches in support of the proposals. MacGregor claimed "it is 
important... that we carry forward our thinking" because publicly owned transportation 
systems "could not hold a candle to the market and competition as the best ways of 
determining what the travelling public... want" (Hansard, 1992b: Cols 1161-1162). The 
track authority option would be "a great deal better than what we have at the moment, a 
monolithic system with no competition in it" (House of Commons Papers, 1992d: 21) and, 
Interviews in the field were completed by this time, almost four years after BR was initially restructured 
(see chapter one). Prospects for the future will be discussed in chapter seven. 
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Freeman noted, open access competition would "start in April 1994, " following the 
reorganisation of BR (Hansard, 1993e: Cols 411-412w). 
The industry structure envisaged in New Opportunities for the Railways provided for at 
least three different types of on-rail competition - competitive new entry, competition along 
shared route miles and competition along duplicated routes - and these could occur both 
between TOCs and non-franchised operators and between TOCs themselves. In addition, 
the potential for some indirect competition - by emulation - also existed. Each of these types 
of competition can in turn be characterised by price, where operators would seek to 
undercut each others' fares, or by quality of service, where an operator might seek to offer 
a quicker, more convenient or more comfortable journey than its competitors. A 
combination of both these elements would also be possible (and highly likely). 
Competitive new entry rests upon the theory of contestable markets (Baumol, 1982). The 
theory maintains that incumbents will be incentivised to produce efficiently because of the 
threat of new market entry from potential competitors. The open access regime allows for 
the initiation of new services either to compete with those already provided by incumbent 
TOCs, or to link destination pairs currently unconnected by direct trains on a scheduled or 
charter basis (Swift, 1997a). These services can be provided in either of two ways: a TOC 
can expand its operations into the `patch' of a counterpart, or a non-franchised company 
can enter the market specifically to provide them (Department of Transport, 1994). 
Regardless of who works non-franchised services, they are not eligible for subsidy and must 
be run on a commercial basis. Thus, if a TOC initiates new services of this kind, it must do 
so in addition to the conditions of its original franchise. On the other hand, a non-franchised 
operator is not constrained by a PSR and, as such, may choose to operate only one service a 
day on one route if this is considered to be the most profitable option. 
In order for Baumol's theory to hold, the market to which it applies must be perfectly 
contestable, i. e. incumbents and potential new entrants must be symmetrically placed, there 
must be an absence of sunk costs and `hit and run' entry must be possible. 2 In a thorough 
2 As noted by Shires et al. (1994a), symmetrical placing means that the incumbent and potential new 
entrants are subject to the same regulations, possess similar market knowledge, have access to the same 
technology and so on. A sunk cost is any asset which cannot be used for the production of other goods, or 
whose value cannot be recouped on the second hand market. The separation of infrastructure and 
operations, and the establishment of Roscos, has removed many sunk costs from the industry, but a 
remaining example might be certain staff training costs (e. g. drivers). Finally, `hit and run' entry is the 
ability to penetrate a market briefly and exploit a profit opportunity without the prior knowledge of the 
incumbent. 
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analysis, Shires et al. (1994a) conclude that the passenger rail market is not perfectly 
contestable, principally because long lead times in timetable planning make `hit and run' 
entry difficult (although they do note that some competitive threats could exist in certain 
markets, such as the provision of first class accommodation. In contrast, of course, the open 
access regime proposed by the Conservatives (Department of Transport, 1992a) assumes by 
its very nature that many more competitive opportunities exist, such as those for heavily 
used flows between destination pairs serviced by only one TOC. In this case, another 
operator - either a different TOC expanding the extent of its operations, or a non-franchised 
company - could initiate new, open access services along that route to compete with the 
incumbent. The contestability of the passenger rail market is discussed in terms of this thesis 
in section 6.3.1. 
Competition on the passenger railway network is not solely dependent upon opportunities 
for new entry. Despite considerations of market liberalisation being absent when the 
franchise boundaries were decided (see chapter five), there is considerable overlap in the 
operating territories of some TOCs. Competition along shared route miles can therefore 
occur where two or more TOCs operate along the same stretch of track (ORR, 1994b). The 
potential for this type of competition was considerable because, as noted in chapter five, 
more than half of all rail journeys (56.4 per cent) in 1994 could be made with more than one 
operator (ORR, 1994a). Good examples of this are London to Gatwick Airport (Connex 
South Central, Gatwick Express and Thameslink), London Euston to Birmingham (Virgin 
Trains and Silverlink), and Penzance to Exeter (Virgin Trains, Great Western and Wales 
and West). 
Likewise, competition along duplicated routes can also occur without competitive new 
entry. This kind of competition arises when each route is worked by a different TOC (ORR, 
1994a) and can exist in two scenarios. The first is between the origin/destination points of 
the duplicated routes, and examples are London to Glasgow (Virgin Trains via Preston, and 
Great North Eastern Railway (GNER) via York) and London to Exeter (Great Western via 
Westbury and South West Trains via Salisbury - see figure 6.1). The second scenario is 
between stations along duplicated routes and their origin/destination points (hereinafter 
competition `along route corridors'). As a respondent pointed out, 
"If you look at the geography of railway lines emanating out of London, up as far as Milton 
Keynes, Northampton, Bedford, Huntingdon and Peterborough, then there's not more than 10 miles quite 
often [between] these particular services. If you live in one of the villages [between these lines] you can go 
either way. " 
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To illustrate, a customer living in Dunstable can either `turn left out of his drive' to use a 
Silverlink service from Leighton Buzzard to London, or `turn right out of his drive' to use a 
Thameslink service from Luton to London (see figure 6.2). In this example, the TOCs might 
focus their efforts on shifting an imaginary line which exists between their two routes; 
Silverlink would want to move the line as far to the right as possible, thus capturing 
Thameslink's customers, whilst Thameslink would seek to do precisely the opposite. 
Although this kind of competition can result in additional revenue generation, it was 
indicated that it is not always as significant as it might seem because of the relatively small 
populations situated between the larger towns served by the train. Moreover, because of the 
distance people in these `hinterland' areas must travel to reach a station, they are 
significantly less likely to consider using the train for non-commuter journeys (Lowndes, 
1997). 
Great Western Reading Paddington 
LONDON 
Waterloo 
Basingstoke 
-Salisbury 
South West Trains 
EXETER Honiton 
Not to scale 
Figure 6.1. Duplicated routes between London and Exeter. 
Finally, competition by emulation does not require franchises to be in direct competition 
with each other (although they can be). This kind of competition, also known as `yardstick' 
competition (Foster, 1992) and `comparative' competition (Williams, 1992), rests on the 
assumption that companies are keen to be - and be perceived by others as being - leaders in 
their field. The concept is not new in the railway industry. As noted by Waghorn (1905: 26), 
in 1876 the Midland Railway Company "adopted the practice of conveying third class 
passengers by all trains... [and] whether other companies approved or not, they were all 
compelled... to place themselves on an equality with the Midland Company. " An example of 
how competition by emulation could occur between TOCs was given by a respondent: 
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"If Richard Branson and James Sherwood are together at a function, and Branson's sounding off 
about how much money he's spending on tilting trains and how wonderful his staff are, you can bet your 
bottom dollar Sherwood doesn't want to be put in the shade by Branson... There's going to be the pride, the 
competition of standards. So a report in the FT that says `the standard of service on GNER's restaurant car 
is much better than on Virgin Trains" will count for a lot. " 
Figure 6.2. Competition along route corridors. 
As noted in chapter two, competition by emulation was initially regarded as a potentially 
useful regulatory tool when the water industry was privatised because it was thought 
capable of providing yardsticks from which comparative performance could be judged. 
However, it was quickly discovered that comparisons were difficult because of the greatly 
varying characteristics of each water company - considerable differences existed in costs 
and other measures of efficiency or service quality (Foster, 1992). Perhaps fearing similar 
difficulties within the railway industry, policy makers did not view competition by emulation 
as a regulatory aid. Instead, it was principally seen as a means of complementing on-track 
competition to generate additional innovation among TOCs: 
"We believed that by allowing many different private sector companies to run the railways - 25 
franchises - different ideas about innovation, about service delivery, about pricing, about marketing, about 
management, about the type of rolling stock, would emerge. And you'd have not one idea, a monolithic 
idea, British Rail's idea, but you'd have many ideas about how to compete. " 
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The scope for competition by emulation has been formally recognised by the industry and 
those around it through such events as the Railway Innovation Awards, which honour 
innovations made by TOCs regardless of whether they compete directly with each other 
(Modern Railways, 1998d). 
Although these different types of competition were theoretically possible within the 
reorganised passenger railway industry, policy makers had, by the summer of 1992, paid 
comparatively little attention to devising means through which they could be administered. 
Complex issues such as compensation regimes and ticket interavailability were still to be 
resolved and, perhaps most importantly, the extent to which competition could be 
introduced into a loss-making industry needed thoroughly evaluating. Because ministers 
wanted to privatise BR in one parliament (see chapter four), it was especially important that 
this aspect - along with all others - of rail privatisation policy be completed quickly and 
efficiently. However, as already noted in chapter five, when work finally began on 
formulating policy details, progress was initially hampered by a degree of confusion among 
key actors. Competition policy was not exempt from such confusion. Published evidence 
hints at a degree of misunderstanding between Ministers and officials. Ministers' statements 
to the Transport Select Committee regarding market liberalisation in autumn 1992 were at 
variance with those of senior civil servants (see, for example, House of Commons Papers, 
1992c, 1992d), and it is unlikely this was deliberate as "there was obviously no overt 
dichotomy between officials and ministers because that has to be unthinkable. " 
Perhaps as a direct consequence of the above, the government was initially reluctant to 
compromise its commitment to on-rail competition despite concerns raised in relation to its 
appropriateness in the passenger rail industry (House of Commons Papers, 1992c; 1992e; 
1992f). Regarding competitive new entry, commentators suggested that the concept of open 
access competition could be incompatible with the franchising process to such an extent that 
it might jeopardise the entire rail privatisation exercise (Gibb et al., 1998). Although in 1992 
no decisions had been taken regarding the specifications of individual franchises 
(Department of Transport, 1992b), it was regarded as probable - and of course turned out 
to be the case - that most TOCs would be allocated a varied portfolio of routes, some highly 
lucrative, others less so. A franchisee would therefore need to earn enough profit on its 
remunerative lines, given its level of subsidy, to ensure an adequate financial return on its 
whole operation. Meanwhile, non-franchised operators running on lucrative trainpaths 
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would not have the same obligation to maintain uneconomic services and would thus be 
able to undercut franchisees. The prospect of revenue dilution on high-earning routes would 
drastically reduce or even eliminate a franchisee's profitability (Foster, 1994; Shaw et al., 
1998) and, without being able to plan their businesses to any reasonable degree of certainty, 
potential franchisees would either require extremely high subsidies or refrain from bidding 
altogether. The Transport Select Committee acquired evidence from potential franchisees 
indicating that open access would create difficulties for franchise bidders in predicting costs 
and revenues from service operation (House of Commons Papers, 1993a) and Sea 
Containers Ltd noted that "it is not clear to us why anyone should bother with a franchise if 
the [potentially more lucrative] alternative of open access is available" (House of Commons 
Papers, 1992e: 194). 
Despite these concerns, the Department of Transport's document The Franchising of 
Passenger Rail Services, published in October of 1992, noted that although franchisees 
would have an exclusive claim on grant awarded in respect of their contract, they could "not 
[expect] an exclusive right to run all the services on any particular route" (Department of 
Transport, 1992b: 15). Suggestions which challenged this assertion were countered (House 
of Commons Papers, 1992d), the views of the BRB were overlooked (see below) and the 
government's attitude was increasingly viewed as dogmatic. The government's failure to 
rule out open access competition added to the general level of uncertainty surrounding 
passenger rail franchising (see chapter five), and questions were asked as to whether 
ministers were pursuing ideology at the expense of improving railway services (House of 
Commons Papers, 1992g). James Sherwood, a prospective franchisee, felt "the problem 
[was] that no-one [had] looked yet at the private sector and said `how is he going to make a 
profit from this business? "' (House of Commons Papers, 1992e: 196). 
As late as November 1992, Freeman insisted that the Transport Committee was "mistaken 
to suggest that the government has concluded that franchising and open access are 
incompatible" (House of Commons Papers, 1992a: 304), but the government's official 
position changed soon afterwards. It seems probable that ministers were forced to abandon 
plans for universal open access to the network after receiving written responses from 
potential franchisees to The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services (House of Commons 
Papers, 1993a). Contradicting his earlier stance, Freeman indicated in December 1992 that 
the government was now ready to allow some operators exclusivity in order to expedite the 
franchising process (Tomkins, 1992c). It was officially recognised the following month that 
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open access competition "just wasn't [going to be] practicable, " and MacGregor accepted 
that "the prospect of unlimited competition was a major deterrent to prospective franchise 
holders" (Smithers, 1993b: 3). Gaining Access to the Railway Network: the Government's 
Proposals, published by the Department of Transport in February 1993, stated accordingly 
that the government now acknowledged that there was a: 
"... potential tension between liberalising access for private sector operators and successfully 
franchising British Rail's existing passenger services. This means that to the extent that it is necessary to 
ensure the success of the first generation of franchises, on-track competition between operators of passenger 
services may have to be moderated for a limited and specified period" (Department of Transport, 1993b: 7). 
Whatever form competition policy was to take, its outcome was likely to involve a 
significant reduction in the potential for competitive new entry into the passenger rail 
market. 
Coinciding with the debate about competitive new entry, questions were also being raised 
regarding the potential role and scope of price competition along shared and separate route 
miles. Chapter four identified how these kinds of competition - which, of course, could arise 
in the absence of open access operators - might create difficulties regarding the 
establishment of (for example) inter-operator compensation regimes and the maintenance of 
network benefits. Although the concept of franchising had partially addressed these 
problems by reducing the number of operators using the network, potentially serious 
difficulties remained. In particular, concerns revolved around the assertion that competition 
along shared and separate route miles would erode ticket interavailability (House of 
Commons Papers, 1992e, 1993a). Under a system of interavailability, customers can use 
one ticket to travel between an origin/destination pair on trains operated by any TOC. 
Although many different ticket types may exist (Open return, Day return, Saver return and 
so on), and certain restrictions may be attached (for example, it may not be possible to 
travel before 09.30 on a Saver ticket), each operator accepts all tickets, applies the same 
restrictions and, crucially, charges the same price for them (revenue is subsequently divided 
among the operators according to passenger miles travelled on each); price competition 
cannot therefore be permitted under a system of total interavailability. This is in contrast to 
a fully liberalised market, where each TOC can set dedicated fares at varying prices and 
with different restrictions, for use only on its own services. Operators can voluntarily agree 
to issue and accept each other's tickets, but they are not compelled to do so. If 
interavailability ceases to function, rail loses its ability to provide customers with a `turn up 
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and go' service which was widely believed to account for a significant proportion of its 
business (Curwen, 1997). 
New Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a: 19-20) had noted 
that although the government was concerned to ensure that "customers continue to enjoy 
the advantages they get from a national rail system... in the arrangements made for... 
ticketing, " it would be "for the train operators to make arrangements to accept each other's 
tickets. " During its investigations into the future of the railways, the Transport Select 
Committee found consistent hostility towards this position (House of Commons Papers, 
1993a). As BRB chairman John Welsby pointed out, it was unlikely that voluntary 
interavailability would feature in a liberalised regime because where more than one operator 
ran services between an origin/destination pair they would have no incentive to accept each 
other's tickets: 
"... as a private sector operator... the last thing I may actually wish to have is your tickets on my 
train or vice versa. [I] would advise the Secretary of State very strongly... that in the interests of the 
customer there has got to be interavailability of tickets" (House of Commons Papers, 1993a: lxxx). 
Welsby's view was corroborated by evidence from the deregulated bus industry, where only 
25 per cent of operators accepted each other's tickets (see chapter seven), and the 
experience of Stagecoach, the only company to have recent experience of running a private 
passenger train service (see chapter five). The Scottish-based transport operator argued that 
the government should compel private operators to accept each others' tickets. Its 
overnight services had been disadvantaged by a lack of interavailability, and the company 
argued that, if necessary, TOCs should have a revenue allocation system forced upon them 
3 (House of Commons Papers, 1992e). 
As with its stance on competitive new entry, the government was initially sceptical of 
measures which would curtail the prospects for market liberalisation in the new railway 
industry. By late 1992, again following the receipt of responses to The Franchising of 
Passenger Rail Services (Department of Transport, 1992b), ministers had been forced to 
concede that the regulatory authorities should at least have the power to insist on 
interavailability. The Draft Objectives for the Franchising Director (quoted in House of 
Commons Papers, 1993a: para 16) noted that the policy of the government was that ticket 
interavailability should be considered where "the benefits clearly outweigh the benefits of 
I The lack of ticket interavailability was one factor which contributed towards the subsequent removal of the 
Stagecoach Rail overnight service. 
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competition or service diversity. " Thus, with competitive new entry already to be restricted, 
an interavailability requirement would, depending on its scope, remove some or all of the 
remaining potential for price competition between private train operators on the passenger 
network. 
It is of course possible to contend, contrary to the argument presented here, that the 
government delayed its decision to moderate competition until early 1993 simply because it 
wanted to canvass and consider the views of a wide variety of interested parties before 
subscribing to a definitive course of action. Indeed, one respondent suggested that this was 
the case, and that he consistently sought to: 
"... listen to as much advice as possible, for example the consultative committees, for example 
clearly the professional advice of British Rail, and the advice of some of the lobby groups and pressure 
groups who took an interest in British Rail... It was, I hope, a listening and improving process. " 
But ministers had heard the views of most interested parties by the early autumn of 1992 
through both the Transport Select Committee's hearings and media reports. Moreover, 
some respondents indicated that the government was being somewhat dogmatic in its 
defence of on-rail competition. It was argued that the government "did not listen to the 
industry, or to people who were not totally committed to their method of privatising the 
railway. " With regard to the views of British Rail: 
"... they just weren't listening. Right from the beginning... they felt... that BR was in `anti' mode. 
They switched off and weren't really listening to what BR had to say. It was... very short sighted on their 
part. BR was not trying to wreck it. They were almost paranoid about the fact that BR was trying to wreck 
it. s4 
Particularly within the Treasury, which remained the principal exponent of the track 
authority model, policy makers were fixated by the potential advantages of on-rail 
competition to the extent that they neglected to consider its potential drawbacks: 
"... at some points in the early stages [key actors were] being theoretical and what was 
becoming 
very evident [elsewhere], ... that we were 
heading for competition for the market rather than in the market, 
didn't dawn on them. " 
5 
° Many respondents within government maintained that the BRB was anti-privatisation and 
behaved in a 
negative manner towards the process. However, evidence would 
indicate that although the Board disagreed 
with the track authority model, it did not oppose the concept of divestiture per se. 
Nor did it fight the 
government's plans in a pro-active way: "there's no question, if they'd 
[the BRB] wanted to wreck it, they 
could have, quite easily. " 
5 One respondent argued that he "certainly did not believe, [and his] colleagues certainly 
did not believe, 
that on-track, head to head competition was going to happen... We realised that 
it was much more 
152 
Thus, the period between July and December 1992 had effectively been wasted, and when 
Ministers finally accepted the need to restrict competition in late 1992, they did not know 
how it would be done. Whilst giving evidence to the Transport Select Committee, 
MacGregor suggested that restricting competition might be the remit of the Franchising 
Director or the Rail Regulator, but no details were provided as to how or when regulation 
might be forthcoming (House of Commons Papers, 1993a). After firing a number of 
questions regarding details which caused MacGregor to stumble, Committee member 
Andrew MacKinlay suggested to the Secretary of State that "you do not know, do you sir? " 
(House of Commons Papers, 1993a: 744). MacGregor acknowledged that the issue needed 
further consideration: "I think it is important to stress that... there is still, at this stage, quite 
a lot of detailed information... to be filled out" (House of Commons Papers, 1993a: 728). 6 
This task of `filling out' was ultimately devolved to the Offices of the Rail Regulator and the 
Franchising Director, and each adopted regulatory regimes which, between them, sought to 
`moderate' on-track competition (Charlton et al., 1997). Competitive new entry would be 
restricted by the regulator's policy of `Controlled Competition In Contestable Markets' 
(CCICM) (ORR, 1994c), and price competition along shared route miles would be limited 
by the Franchising Director's `Compulsory Interavailability' (CI) requirement (OPRAF, 
1996). Perhaps in an attempt to secure at least some market liberalisation, no administrative 
restrictions were placed on competition along duplicated routes or competition by 
emulation; however, what had become very clear by early 1993 was that the outcome of rail 
privatisation policy, at least in terms of on-track competition, would be substantially 
different to that which had been envisaged in New Opportunities for the Railways. Indeed, 
in February 1993 the Labour Party's transport spokesman, John Prescott, scoffed (rather 
presciently, as it turned out) that: 
"if the proposals will not lead to competition in the provision of services... instead of the public 
monopoly about which the government are so concerned, we shall have what the Secretary of State called 
`exclusive service' - in other words, a private monopoly. We shall be replacing a public monopoly with a 
private one" (Hansard, 1993b: 176-177). 
The following sections of this chapter examine CCICM and CI, and assess each in detail 
according to the extent to which the passenger rail market had been liberalised by early 
1998. As noted in section 6.1, it is argued that, although certain types of competition were 
complicated than that... " However, this response contradicts those of his colleagues and, more importantly, 
his own comments some years previously in documentary sources. 
6 One respondent from the Department of Transport, when asked if policy makers had any idea at this stage 
how competition would be moderated, answered simply: "no". 
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permitted and were clearly taking place, most significant competitive opportunities were still 
being restricted by regulation and/or operational restrictions. 
6.3 The scope for competition in the passenger rail market 
6.3.1 Controlled Competition In Contestable Markets and competitive new entry 
CCICM was implemented by the ORR following a period of consultation with interested 
parties. The Regulator's paper, Competition for railway passenger services: a consultation 
document (ORR, 1994b), stressed the need for policy both to moderate open access 
competition in the short term, but to retain a degree of flexibility in the longer term should 
market liberalisation become appropriate in the future. The paper suggested four policy 
options, three of which, `negotiated charges', `equalised access charges' and `access deficit 
charges' were financial mechanisms based upon different means of charging operators for 
access to the rail network (see appendix five). The mechanistic approaches were ultimately 
regarded as unsuitable by the ORR either (a) because they were not capable of moderating 
competition at all, and therefore did not address the problem at hand, and/or (b) because 
they created barriers to entry, some artificial, which would have been difficult to surmount 
in the future (ORR, 1994b; 1994c). CCICM was the fourth option suggested. In contrast to 
the mechanistic approaches, CCICM was predominantly administrative in nature, and was 
perceived as being the most likely to achieve the ORR's stated policy goals of providing 
sufficient immediate moderation of competition and long-term flexibility. 
CCICM achieves the ORR's goals by operating in two stages. Stage one accords TOCs 
"effective exclusivity" (OPRAF, 1996: 65) until late 1999, whilst stage two imposes fewer 
restrictions to competitive open access entry and will last from late 1999 until at least 2002 
(ORR, 1998a). Possible outcomes and implications of stage two of CCICM are considered 
in chapter seven. Stage one of CCICM works by defining TOCs' markets as a series of 
`point-to-point flows', and by protecting these flows from competitive open access entry 
subject to certain restrictions (ORR, 1994c). Point-to-point flows comprise services 
operated by a TOC between any two destinations on its network. For example, a Great 
Western service from Plymouth to London Paddington will serve a number of point to point 
flows - Plymouth to Exeter St David's, Exeter St David's to Taunton, Taunton to London 
Paddington and so on - not just Plymouth to London Paddington. For stage one of CCICM, 
TOCs identify all point to point flows within their network and nominate those on which 
they require protection. The Regulator protects nominated flows by controlling Railtrack's 
ability to sell access rights to other operators. 
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CCICM thus restricts competitive new entry by making virtually all of the passenger rail 
market incontestable. It places incumbents and potential new entrants asymmetrically, 
thereby preventing hit and run entry - crudely, the regulations mean that incumbents are 
allowed to operate trains whereas potential new entrants are not. In practice, the policy has 
been largely effective, resulting in only "very limited opportunities for train operators to 
introduce new services" (ORR, 1998a: 1) although this, as the Regulator points out, "is not 
surprising [as it is] the natural consequence of granting effective exclusivity" to TOCs in 
stage one of CCICM (ORR, 1998a: i). The "very limited opportunities" to which the 
Regulator refers arise where TOCs have joined existing access rights together to create a 
new direct service between an origin/destination pair already served by another operator 
(ORR, 1997). CCICM did not envisage this scenario would arise, and it was regarded as 
something of a `grey area' by TOCs until Wales and West Passenger Trains sought 
regulatory approval to combine two of its paths between Manchester and Penzance 
(Batchelor, 1997). A respondent pointed out that, in Wales and West's judgement, 
"... it was absolutely necessary for the industry to establish how the rules of this particular game 
were going to be played. And it had better be done early, because they've got a seven and a half year 
franchise and every day ticks away and it's getting very costly for them not to have taken action that day... 
Therefore it was desperately important that they understood [whether] there was a market which was not 
being fulfilled. " 
The affected operator, Virgin Trains, initially suggested that the proposal would breach the 
principles of CCICM because it was "purely a poaching exercise. " The Regulator ruled in 
Wales and West's favour, but Virgin, rather than pursuing its initial grievance, accepted the 
Regulator's decision: 
"It was quite interesting what Virgin's final reaction to that was, [because] although they had 
initially opposed it, when the Regulator announced his decision they welcomed it because CrossCountry, 
with its rather complex access rights, may have considerable opportunities to do the same sort of thing. " 
Following the Regulator's decision, respondents confirmed that other TOCs were 
examining opportunities for combining access rights to introduce competitive new services. 
In particular, this was the case where TOCs had a number of `dormant' access rights which, 
although included in the franchising process, were not being used when contracts were let: 
"One of the nice things about the... franchises we have got is that there were actually track access 
agreements in place that weren't being exercised... It is easy for us to reactivate those access agreements at 
no extra cost, and [combine them with others] without fear of anyone else calling foul and saying `oh you 
can't do it because you're poaching... our business. " 
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However, the number of TOCs with potentially lucrative dormant access rights is low and, 
by early 1998, this kind of competition was not in evidence elsewhere around the network. 
Whereas CCICM prevents most competitive new entry, it does not forbid the initiation of 
what are termed `non-competitive' open access services (ORR, 1994c). As such, there are 
two types of flow which TOCs generally cannot nominate for protection - non-material 
flows, and flows where the TOC does not serve both the origin and destination points. A 
flow is non-material if it represents less than 0.2 per cent of a TOC's total farebox revenue. 
New entry on such flows is obviously unlikely but, if it were to take place, could not 
significantly affect the incumbent's total income and is therefore deemed uncompetitive. 
Where TOCs do not serve both the origin and destination points of a flow - for example, 
Virgin Trains does not serve Aberystwyth to London - they cannot nominate that flow 
because such action might prevent an open access operator (say, Central Trains) from 
developing a new, direct service along it. A new `niche' service such as this would benefit 
passengers in mid-Wales and compete with Virgin in the sense that it provide an alternative 
for those customers travelling from mid-Wales to London, who would otherwise have had 
to change onto a Virgin Trains service at Wolverhampton. However, Central's service 
would not run in direct competition with Virgin's operations beyond Wolverhampton 
because it would not be able to pick up passengers on Virgin's protected flows to London. 
An interesting quirk of CCICM is that it seems to have stimulated a degree of competition 
among operators for the right to provide potentially lucrative niche services - in other 
words, competition for non-competitive new entry. This kind of competition was 
particularly evident during the franchising process, with a number of bids including plans for 
niche service provision (notable examples are North Western Trains' Rochdale, Blackpool 
and Newton-le-Willows to London trains and Connex South Central's Rugby to Gatwick 
Airport services). Post-franchising opportunities for non-competitive entry still exist (such 
as Central Trains' operations into Manchester and Stansted airports), and one respondent 
suggested that there remains some degree of competition between TOCs to identify them: 
"I don't think there's any doubt that if we didn't go to [a destination], somebody else would... It's 
obviously important to get in on these routes which we think have got an opportunity as soon as possible. " 
Other TOCs shared this view, with one noting that "there's enough niches neglected... 
[which] need to be filled. " 
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6.3.2 Compulsory Interavailability and competition along shared route miles 
Although CCICM protects TOCs from the threat of competitive new entry, it does nothing 
to address competition along shared route miles which could have resulted had TOCs 
introduced an unrestricted range of dedicated tickets at the expense of interavailable ones. 
As noted in section 6.2, the policy of Compulsory Interavailability (CI) was formulated by 
the Franchising Director to deal with this issue. CI ensures the continued interavailability of 
virtually all ticket types on all but one flow on the network. As will become evident, some 
price competition is permitted by CI, although relatively little had actually materialised by 
early 1998. CI works in two stages. First, it identifies a `lead operator' for each 
interavailable flow served by more than one TOC (as with CCICM, CI defines point to 
point journeys as flows). The lead operator is usually the TOC with the greatest commercial 
interest over any given flow. Second, the lead operator is required to create fares for the 
flow, which other TOCs (secondary operators) running trains along it must honour. In this 
way, a customer can buy one ticket and use it to travel on "the trains of different passenger 
operators which run in parallel on the same flow" (OPRAF, 1996: 185). Revenue is 
`pooled' and divided among operators by Operational Research Computer Allocation of 
Tickets to Services (ORCATS), a computerised allocation system, according to passenger 
miles travelled (see section 6.3.3). 
The Franchising Director considers that "the benefits of inter-availability will be outweighed 
by the potential benefits of price competition" (OPRAF, 1996: 186) only on the London to 
Gatwick Airport line, and competition on this stretch of railway has developed quickly. 
Although it is by no means cut-throat, differential pricing is evident and all three companies 
have engaged in ambitious advertising campaigns to promote their rival services 7 As one 
respondent pointed out: 
"You [can] go to Victoria station now and see how much [another operator] is investing in 
competing with us down what is considered to be a lucrative piece of railway. You'll see if you walk around 
the station there's a lot of effort being concentrated on what's perceived to be a lucrative corridor. " 
Elsewhere, CI ensures the interavailability of most tickets. Lead operators are permitted to 
offer dedicated fares for only four ticket types: first class, temporary, special and certain 
kinds of advance purchase. Each of these fares can be sold for use solely on a lead 
' Standard single fares are £9.50 on Gatwick Express and Thameslink's trains, and £8.20 on Connex South 
Central's - although there are actually more than 35 different fares in existence between London and 
Gatwick Airport. 
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operator's services and, as such, the associated revenue bypasses the ORCATS system and 
goes directly to the relevant TOC. Secondary operators are given more freedom. In addition 
to the above, they are in fact allowed to set dedicated fares for all of their other ticket types. 
These fares co-exist with their interavailable counterparts to provide opportunities for price 
competition notwithstanding the CI regulations. Revenue generated in this way also avoids 
ORCATS. Although all these opportunities for price competition might appear significant, it 
is shown below that, predominantly for operational reasons, they were often somewhat 
limited in practice. 
First class facilities along shared route miles were usually provided by `long distance' 
operators - especially former InterCity TOCs - and it was generally the case that only one 
operator offered this standard of accommodation over flows to which CI applied. There 
were, of course, exceptions - for example, first class was provided between Penzance and 
Bristol by Great Western and Virgin Trains; between London Paddington and Worcester by 
Great Western and Thames Trains; and between London King's Cross and Peterborough by 
GNER and West Anglia Great Northern (WAGN) (Railtrack, 1998). In addition, 
Thameslink offered dedicated first class travel cards and a season ticket (Thameslink, 1997), 
but other instances of competition for the first class market between operators were rare 
despite the apparent logic of discounting tickets to fill currently under-used capacity 
(Modern Railways, 1998e). 
Temporary fares were used by TOCs predominantly to facilitate short-term promotions 
such as such as Midland Main Line's `Chatsworth Day Out' offer (Midland Main Line, 
1997a). In order to qualify for exemption from CI, temporary fares created by TOCs must 
not exceed 12 weeks' (17 weeks if the TOC is not a lead operator) duration (OPRAF, 
1996). Although they resulted in pockets of price competition between TOCs, the effects of 
temporary fares were transient and, therefore, limited in nature. Indeed, this type of fare was 
designed specifically to prevent operators from gaining a sustainable competitive advantage 
over other TOCs (OPRAF, 1996). 
Special fares are an obscure collection of ticket types bunched together at the time of 
privatisation "because they could not be included in the compulsory interavailability 
regulations in any other way. " Special fares are unique in the way that they are retailed; 
predominantly, they are created for localised user groups in order to account for discounts 
negotiated with TOCs (OPRAF, 1996). An example would be the Bournemouth Rail Travel 
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Association, where members can purchase discounted tickets for travel with South West 
Trains from Bournemouth station. Although the potential for this kind of competition 
existed at stations served by more than one operator, a respondent confirmed that no special 
fares had been created by any operator since privatisation. 
Dedicated, advance purchase fares provide more scope for competition than those 
mentioned above and generally fall into two categories, season tickets and `Apex'-style 
tickets. Season tickets, as the name implies, entitle the holder to use services over a given 
flow or flows for a specified period of time, usually between one week and one year from 
the date of purchase. The tickets are primarily sold to commuters in and around the major 
conurbations, although they are also available on other routes. Price competition for the 
season ticket market was certainly evident, and perhaps the most widely known example 
was WAGN's Peterborough to London ticket (WAGN, 1997). In early 1998, an 
interavailable annual season ticket from Peterborough to King's Cross cost £4,600, whereas 
WAGN's dedicated alternative was priced at £3,556. The scope for further price 
competition for season tickets along shared route miles was restricted to the relatively small 
number of commuter stations served by more than one operator. 8 In addition, 
considerations of train loading were critical. Dedicated season tickets could work well from 
distant or semi-distant commuter nodes such as Peterborough because the amount of 
customers carried by each train during rush hours was `manageable' from a TOC's point of 
view - in other words, it was possible to check customers' tickets after they had boarded the 
train. In contrast, trains serving more centrally located commuter stations - particularly in 
the south east - frequently ran in excess of their load factor requirements (OPRAF, 1998b) 
and revenue protection would have been fraught with difficulty. 9 As noted by a respondent, 
"In a suburban railway like this, you can't do that [sell dedicated tickets]. I mean, we carry 80,000 
people into London every morning and take them home again at night. You just can't tag people like that. I 
think in the long term we might have smart cards and all sorts of things, and you might be able to have real 
person-specific journeys... But at the moment you can't do that. " 
Apex-style tickets are principally aimed at the leisure market and offer a discounted rate of 
travel for customers making journeys of around 100 miles or more provided certain 
8 Aside from Gatwick Airport, the principal examples are Bedford, Colchester, Croydon, Luton, Milton 
Keynes, Peterborough, Reading, Slough, Sutton and Watford. Dedicated standard class season tickets are 
available from Peterborough (WAGN), Bedford and Luton (Thameslink) and from Southend (LTS Rail). 
9 Load factor requirements pertain to the amount of people south eastern commuter TOCs are supposed to 
carry on a train at any given time. The requirements form one strand of the `surrogate' competition 
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conditions are met (this usually involves specifying dates and times of travel: see, for 
example, ATOC, 1998; Central Trains, 1997; GNER, 1997; Midland Main Line, 1997b; 
Virgin Rail Group, 1997). As with season tickets, it was possible to identify some instances 
of Apex competition between operators along shared route miles (see Bradshaw, 1997). 10 
Indeed, one respondent pointed out that Apex-style fares were a useful means of poaching 
business from another TOC: 
"If people are travelling by rail anyway then they're fair game. They're easier to attract than a new 
person who has their company BMW. If somebody's already travelling by rail, I'd like them to travel with 
us... Being brutally honest... it's quite fun to grow your market where another operator has to pay. " 
There is no doubt that the range and number of Apex-style tickets has increased 
considerably since privatisation. " Nevertheless, there was little prospect of an explosion in 
Apex competition between operators. Apex fares are usually available only over longer 
distances, because requiring passengers to book days in advance for short journeys (say, 
Plymouth to Newton Abbot) is wholly impractical in operational terms. Thus, the journeys 
to which Apex tickets could sensibly be applied were frequently, though by no means 
exclusively, offered by only one operator. For example, Virgin's Value Fares (Virgin Rail 
Group, 1997) relate to discounted tickets between London and many destinations along the 
West Coast Main Line (WCML) such as Stafford, Crewe, Preston and Carlisle, and direct 
travel between London and any of these destinations was only possible with Virgin Trains. 
When reviewing the extent of Apex-style competition, one respondent pointed out that: 
"It's actually quite difficult [for a lead operator to compete on price] given the almost-total 
operation of interavailability... You could probably quote a hundred examples of it around the network, but 
a hundred examples in relation to the millions of flows that exist isn't enormous. " 
Finally, TOCs are permitted to offer dedicated fares for all their ticket types which pertain 
to flows on which they are a secondary operator. This was regarded by a prominent industry 
regulator as the primary opportunity for price competition, and was "generally considered 
to be more significant than `special' or `Apex' tickets. " However, aside from the fact that 
secondary operators' dedicated tickets do not represent true competition - they are 
something of a one-sided bargain as the lead operator cannot respond - there were still two 
operational factors which prevented some operators from competing along their secondary 
measures imposed upon TOCs by the Regulator and the Franchising Director, and these are discussed in 
section 6.4. 
10 London to Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Leeds and Manchester; the South West to 
Manchester; Portsmouth to Manchester and Birmingham to Cardiff being principal examples. 
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flows. First, irregular service patterns were a problem. Although many flows existed where 
secondary TOCs offered a frequent alternative to the lead operator's services (such as 
Silverlink's London Euston to Birmingham New Street trains), there were also instances 
where the opposite was the case (for example the North Wales Line). Some secondary 
operators could not address this issue because of the limited availability of rolling stock and 
trainpaths, especially during busy periods: 
"Nobody that I know of has any peak rolling stock capacity spare. Not everybody's peak coincides 
with everybody else's peak, although there is a certain commonality. But I think you'll find that, with a 
trivial number of exceptions, everybody's rolling stock is fully utilised in the peak. " 
"There are some constraints in terms of... track capacity. Full stop. There are only so many trains 
you can run safely down one line... There will be some places where the simple constraints of capacity will 
mean competition has some limits. " 
Second, the bureaucracy involved in establishing dedicated fares on heavily loss-making 
lines - initiating TOCs have to create new flows and recalculate ORCATS revenue 
allocations over pre-existing ones (see footnote 12 below) - outweighed the economic 
advantages secondary operators felt would have accrued, and some TOCs were dissuaded 
from the exercise for this reason. As such, only seven operators had introduced dedicated, 
walk-on fares by early 1998 (see table 6.1). 
Operator Route 
First Great Eastern Ipswich to all Great Eastern Stations and London Liverpool Street 
First North Western Manchester and Blackpool to London Euston 
Midland Mainline Bedford to London first class 
ScotRail Sleepers to London 
Silverlink Birmingham New Street to Silverlink stations and London Euston 
Thameslink Bedford and stations to Luton first class travelcard. 
WAGN Peterborough to London King's Cross and other selected WAGN 
stations (including travelcard) 
Table 6.1. Availability of dedicated, walk-on fares from secondary operators. 
6.3.3 Competition for interavailable revenue 
In addition to the opportunities for price competition discussed above, it was also possible 
to identify a kind of quality of service competition promoted by CI which is related to the 
ORCATS mechanism used to allocate interavailable revenue between TOCs. For each 
interavailable fare, ORCATS shares the total amount of revenue among the relevant TOCs 
according to the number of passenger miles travelled on each of their services in respect of 
that fare. ORCATS calculates passenger miles by taking into account factors such as 
Apex-style fares on the railway were both invented, and promoted, by BR. 
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timetabling and speed of journey, and by making assumptions about passenger behaviour 
based on historical survey evidence (KPMG, 1996). 
A simple example illustrates this concept. Two operators, `A' and B', run services 
throughout the day between two sizeable towns. Operator A's trains are non-stop, depart 
on the hour and complete the journey in 30 minutes. Operator B's trains, on the other hand, 
call at all intermediate stations, depart at 10 minutes past the hour and have a journey time 
of 45 minutes. In this example, ORCATS will assume that, because passengers generally 
prefer a superior service, more people will use operator A's trains - perhaps eight out of 
every 10 - and the revenue will be divided between the two TOCs accordingly. ORCATS' 
obvious shortcoming is that it cannot provide an entirely accurate record of passenger 
movements because its calculations are based on assumptions derived from one historical 
survey rather than continuous flowcounts. Thus, it is perfectly possible for the relative 
loading of operators' trains to change whilst the ORCATS allocations remain static. 12 
Operators were aware of this situation but, according to respondents, generally accepted the 
ORCATS allocations in lieu of a more technologically advanced alternative: 
"It's not an exact science, there's a few hundred thousand pounds slopping around in the system - 
which all sounds very unprofessional - but, if you're not careful, you end up having to sell [dedicated] 
tickets which restrict people's freedom. " 
Competition for interavailable revenue occurred when TOCs introduced additional services, 
or re-timetabled existing services, between an origin and destination pair because such 
action caused a reapportionment of ORCATS revenue between operators. There were 
difficulties in identifying genuine examples of this kind of competition - for example, re- 
timetabling might have been imposed on an operator by external forces such as long-term 
engineering or the actions of another TOC on a different route - but in general it could be 
categorised as either generative service provision or ORCATS raiding. 
13 
A generative service is regarded as one which materially improves the overall level of 
service for passengers (ORR, 1998a). Referring back to the above example, a generative 
service might result if operator A introduced a new, fast train between the two towns at 
12 When an operator introduces a dedicated ticket, he is required to compensate the other operator(s) on the 
affected flow because it is highly probable that passenger behaviour will change. If this change is likely to 
be large, the lead operator may conduct a new survey to replace the existing one (this happened on flows 
between Peterborough and London and Ipswich and London). In other cases, recourse to a survey may not 
be necessary, and the initiating operator can seek agreement from the others on the basis of an estimate. 
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07.30 to provide a half-hourly, instead of an hourly, service during the morning peak. The 
generative service would (in theory) reap a double `reward' for operator A: first, the 
apportionment of existing interavailable revenue would shift marginally in its favour because 
ORCATS would assume that some people who took the 07.10 stopper would now take the 
07.30 fast; second, the overall improvement in journey opportunities should encourage 
more commuters to take the train, and increase the interavailable revenue pool for that flow. 
Thus, operator A should receive a larger proportion of income from an expanded revenue 
pool. 
On the other hand, ORCATS raiding is a mischievous and cynical tactic rarely motivated by 
a desire to improve the level of service. Although ORCATS raiding was recently outlawed 
by industry regulations, operators could still attempt it by manipulating their train times to 
increase the share of interavailable revenue beyond that to which they were actually entitled. 
An ORCATS raid would occur if operator B retimed its 07.10 stopping train to form a new, 
fast service to depart five minutes before operator A's 07: 00 train. Because operator B's 
new train would reach its destination ahead of operator A's, ORCATS would now assume 
that most people would patronise the new service as opposed to the pre-existing one. In 
reality, of course, this may not necessarily be the case - perhaps a connecting bus does not 
arrive until 06.56 - but the likely result would be that the 06.55 would run nearly-empty and 
earn operator Ba disproportionately large share of the interavailable revenue at operator 
A's expense. Such an abstractive technique would not generally increase rail business 
because it leads to unnecessary service bunching at the expense of a more practical regular 
interval timetable (Jones et al., 1993; ORR, 1998a). 
It was clear in early 1998 that both generative service provision and ORCATS raiding took 
place. However, attempting to gauge the extent of each was problematic because their 
precise definitions were open to subjective interpretation. As a respondent explained, the 
distinction between a generative, new service and an ORCATS raid is easily blurred: 
"The economics of railways fundamentally are such that [even] a good, creative new service, 
[which] generates some new business, is going to abstract [from another incumbent]. It's probably going to 
abstract more than it generates. So when is a good, innovative service not an ORCATS raid? ... You have to 
make judgements" 
13 Some additional complexities, providing more opportunities for ORCATS-based competition, have 
recently emerged within the industry, but these are likely to impact on future developments and, as such, are 
highlighted in chapter seven. 
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In order to allow a degree of analytical consistency, respondents were asked to consider 
competition for interavailable revenue in terms of the ORR's (1997: 18) position on the 
subject. This states that "where the demand of passengers to travel between two points is 
evenly spread over a given period, " generative new rail services will ensure that "the overall 
pattern of rail services should be similarly spread over that period. " Essentially, then, 
generative services were defined narrowly as those which promoted a regular interval 
timetable, whereas ORCATS raids were those which resulted in unnecessary service 
bunching. '4 
It was not expected that respondents would necessarily admit to ORCATS raiding 
themselves, but it was anticipated that they would accuse others of the practice where they 
felt it was taking place. Following the above definition, respondents suggested that some 
ORCATS raiding was evident in the period immediately following privatisation (see also 
Rail Privatisation News, 1997). It was pointed out that, in some ways, this was 
unsurprising: 
"With the almost total operation of interavailability... [the new structure] encourages people to play 
the system which is in place - by that I mean the ORCATS system... A lot of opportunities [for competition] 
may well... be very related to what ORCATS will reward them [operators] with. "'S 
In some cases, opportunities to ORCATS raid were `inherited' by the TOCs as a 
consequence of the franchising process, and one respondent admitted that they provided a 
welcome source of additional revenue: 
"... we have inherited a situation at [one terminus]. We run three trains a day out of [there]. I think 
it's fair to say that we don't really carry many people on those services, but it gives us a slice of the large 
revenue that is available... For our 21 carriages in each direction we get a very large slice of revenue, 
thankyou very much, which doesn't in any way equate to the number of people that we actually carry. " 
However, although ORCATS was initially seen to offer TOCs financial advantages, it was 
suggested that raids were quickly reducing in number. Not only was this a function of the 
regulations, but also it was because ORCATS raids were increasingly found to be poor 
business practice as their effects would probably be short-term and possibly even counter 
productive: 
"We are talking about a network and, to some extent, if you go and raid somebody else's business, 
sooner or later somebody's going to turn round and do it to you. " 
14 Even so, interviewees' responses could not be corroborated satisfactorily with reference to timetables. For 
example, where services beginning in entirely different areas converge, could it beclassed as an ORCATS 
raid if one arrives minutes before the other? Liaison with the ORR was necessary, and analytical judgements 
are to a certain extent subjective. 
15 This passage is a joining together of two short quotes, although the intent of each has been retained. 
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"I just think it's a no-brainer, you know. I'll do it this time and then 15 other guys will do it to me. 
It's just nonsense. I'm not interested in wasting... the limited amount of resources and energy that my 
business has got in robbing another company. " 
Numerous respondents believed that the decrease in ORCATS raids was symptomatic of a 
wider trend of industry maturity developing amongst TOCs, whereby the corporate culture 
had begun to embrace the virtues of long-term planning rather than short term gain. In 
particular, 
"... there's a natural, well I would suggest natural, human behavioural thing which says `having 
restructured an industry which has created separate entities who are all needing to be the best, [and] to have 
a vision about how they can be the best, inevitably there's a natural emotive pressure on TOCs to do better 
than other TOCs'. To some extent, that will cause some reaction in terms of 'let's attack another TOC and 
see how we can take their business away'. I think there'll be an element of that. [However], there's a re- 
maturing process that the industry is going through. It's probably going through it faster than many people 
would have perhaps dared to think possible... That maturing process... that's coming about quite quickly. " 
Thus, whereas "one or two companies started taking the odd swipe at each other... there's 
comparatively little of that [now]. " The issue of industry maturity, and its potential effect on 
competition, is considered in more detail in chapter seven. 
Instances of competition for interavailable revenue were therefore based more around the 
provision of generative new services. One respondent, who had seen his own revenue 
decline over a flow following the extension of a service by another TOC, argued that this 
was very much the case. He pointed out that the other operator's services produced an 
enhanced timetable following a major investment programme: 
"We'd seen a very large reduction, it was around £400,000... It was quite easy to see the swathe of 
cash that had been removed... Now, one could say `is that an ORCATS raid? ' But it's a consequence of 
investing... and I can't cry about new [investment] on the railway. " 
However, although generative service provision was growing in popularity, it had not 
developed as widely as some, particularly those in the ORR, wanted to see. One respondent 
lamented that there was still "limited case law" regarding competition for interavailable 
revenue. ' 6 
6.3.4 Unregulated competitive opportunites 
Section 6.2 noted that, although competitive new entry and price competition along shared 
route miles were restricted by regulation, competition along shared route miles was not. 
16 The ORR deals with all applications to run new services. 
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Likewise, no regulatory measures were deployed against competition by emulation. Aside 
from the fact that it is practically impossible to legislate against the latter, the most likely 
reason for leaving these kinds of competition unregulated was because it allowed the 
government to claim that they had successfully liberalised at least some of the passenger 
railway market. As a respondent pointed out, this ensured "a couple of bits of it, sort of 
feather in the cap... [so they could say] `look, we told you so. "' 
The potential for competition along duplicated route miles was, in theory at least, 
substantial. Despite the network rationalisation which has taken place over the past 50 years 
(BRB, 1962; Henshaw, 1991), it was possible to identify more than 80 instances on the 
passenger railway where competition between origin/destination pairs could have taken 
place (see appendix six). In practice, however, the opportunities for such competition were 
considerably more limited than this figure might suggest, and this was the case for three 
main reasons. First, some significant potential for competition was passed up when the 
geography of TOCs was being determined. As noted in chapter five, delays in policy 
formulation at ministerial level left officials with little time to design the franchise map, and 
TOCs were based upon BR's profit centres as the latter provided the quickest and easiest 
division of passenger services. A respondent confirmed that, because of timescale pressure, 
the promotion of on-rail competition was "not at all, absolutely not at all" a consideration of 
officials when they created the TOCs. As a result, at least 40 duplicated lines were allocated 
to one company when they could technically have been split between two (see appendix 
six). A notable example was London to Cambridge where the two routes, one from 
Liverpool Street and the other from King's Cross, were both served by WAGN. 
Second, some franchises operating along duplicated routes were sold to the same owner 
(Knowles, 1998). Several examples of this were evident, especially in the Connex 
SouthCentral/Connex South Eastern operating areas. One respondent pointed out that, even 
though the potential existed for him to introduce a new, competitive service, there would be 
little point because his colleagues elsewhere in the group were already planning something 
similar: "we would see any plans to go to [a destination] as being better dealt with by [our 
sister company] rather than ourselves. " Third, many of the remaining duplicated routes 
either served relatively insignificant markets and/or offered journeys which were not 
realistically comparable, and were therefore neglected as candidates for competitive 
marketing by TOCs for these reasons. An example is Liverpool to Chester, operated by 
Merseyrail Electrics and First North Western. The Merseyrail Electrics service departs 
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every half hour throughout the day and takes 38 minutes, whereas First North Western 
Trains depart every hour or two hours (depending on the time of day), do not run before 
8am and after 7.30pm, and take almost twice as long. A respondent rubbished the possibility 
of competition existing or being likely to exist on this route. 
Despite the substantial number of theoretical opportunities for competition along duplicated 
route miles, there were in practice only a small number of meaningful examples scattered 
around the network (see also Adamson et al., 1991), in particular: London - Birmingham, 
London - Bristol, London - Leeds, London - Exeter, London - Southend and London - 
Glasgow. Price and quality of service competition was evident on all these corridors, 
especially between London and Birmingham where in excess of 100 fares were being 
offered for the journey (BBC, 1996). Perhaps more significant on a network-wide basis 
were opportunities for competition along route corridors. This kind of competition was 
found to be possible in numerous places, but respondents indicated that it was taken most 
seriously by TOCs along six commuter corridors between London and the northern Home 
Counties (South West Trains and Thames Trains, Thames Trains and Chiltern Railways, 
Chiltern Railways and Silverlink, Silverlink and Thameslink, Thameslink and WAGN and 
Great Eastern and LTS Rail). It was argued that these instances were "not to be 
underestimated as real, de facto competition, " and one company had amended its timetables 
to take account of "the fact that [another operator] is there... [In part] it's to improve our 
competitive position vis a vis the other operator. " 
The final area where competition between operators was possible in the new railway 
industry was competition by emulation. Although discounted as meaningless by some 
commentators (see, for example, The Economist, 1991), there was evidence to suggest that 
competitive opportunities opening up in this area were taken seriously by TOCs, and did 
influence managerial decisions to a considerable extent: 
"There certainly will be - and you can see it now - quite a lot of competition by emulation... There's 
a lot of watching over the fence going on in the industry, and everyone's keen to make use of other people's 
good ideas. " 
Competition by emulation did not seem to greatly influence the pricing policies of most 
TOCs. It was not the case, for example, that GNER would be particularly concerned that 
their average fare per passenger mile was slightly different to Great Western's. There was 
some indication that each operator was keen to be perceived as well-managed, both 
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financially and operationally, but the principal effect of competition by emulation was to 
provide a yardstick by which TOCs can measure their service standards relative to those of 
other operators: 
"We're keen to be seen as innovators within the industry, and your measures of that are other 
TOCs. So we're very much in competition to be seen delivering a better service... than any of the other 
operators. Competition by emulation, that's where it is at the moment. We're in competition in terms of 
column inches and city profile. " 
"We see competition regarding service as very straightforward. We aim to provide the best 
customer service that anybody will be able to experience on a railway train in this country. Now on that 
basis... the competition, if there is such a thing in that field, has got a lot to live up to. " 
As a result, innovations in excess of those secured during the franchising process (see 
chapter five) had been initiated by TOCs eager to be perceived as market leaders in service 
quality. Examples from around the network, introduced by various TOCs, were: continuing 
improvements to dedicated phone enquiry/booking services, complimentary refreshments 
for all passengers, a `family carriage' provided for parents with young children, improved 
train cleanliness and revised catering arrangements. 
Of particular importance to TOCs, especially former InterCity ones, were the opinions of 
business travellers. Business people were regarded as the most widely travelled type of 
customer, and therefore the most likely to compare the relative service standards of each 
operator. As a respondent pointed out: 
"On this railway, you are talking about your customers being at the top end of the market. They are 
people who get around. I should imagine if you surveyed our customers and said `when did you go on this 
line or that other line? ' that it wouldn't be very long ago, and that they would be perfectly ready to make 
comparisons between us and [the others]. They know what's out there. " 
Innovations aimed at business travellers since privatisation include first class lounges, 
inclusive first class tickets (car parking, journey, food/drink and onward travel for one 
price), dedicated business coaches in standard class, frequent travellers' clubs and 
negotiated discounts with car rental companies. 
6.3.5 Summary - the extent of on-rail competition 
The previous four sections assessed CCICM and CI in terms of the extent to which the 
passenger railway had been liberalised by early 1998. It was suggested that: competitive 
new entry was possible where TOCs joined existing access rights together or introduced 
`non-competitive' new services; competition along shared route miles could take place 
between London and Gatwick Airport; lead operators could offer dedicated first class, 
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temporary, special and dedicated advance purchase fares, whilst other operators could sell 
TOC-specific tickets of all types; a kind of service competition was possible along shared 
route miles as a result of the ORCATS revenue allocation system; and competition could 
also occur unregulated along duplicated route miles and by emulation. 
There was therefore scope for competition in the new railway structure in early 1998, and 
TOCs were beginning to exploit some of the competitive opportunities presented to them. 
But such market liberalisation must be viewed in relation to both that which would have 
been possible in the absence of CCICM and CI, and the operational restrictions which 
prevented competition from developing where the regulations would have allowed it. 
CCICM made virtually all of the passenger railway market incontestable by placing 
incumbents and potential new entrants asymmetrically. Without it, allowing for some 
operational constraints such as capacity constraints and the availability of rolling stock, '7 
every line in Britain would have been subject to the threat of competitive new entry 
(admittedly this would have been slight on uneconomic lines). As things stood in early 1998, 
there were only "very limited opportunities for train operators to introduce new services" 
anywhere on the passenger railway network (ORR, 1998a: 1). CI limited price competition 
for the majority of fares on all but the London to Gatwick Airport line. In the absence of CI, 
competition such as that developing there would have been feasible along all shared route 
miles. Instead, lead operators were permitted to compete using only four ticket types and, 
as this analysis has shown, various operating factors frequently limited opportunities for 
market liberalisation even in these circumstances. To a limited extent, the same was true for 
secondary operators despite their freedom to compete with all ticket types. Although the 
ORCATS allocation system associated with CI did encourage a kind of service competition 
for interavailable revenue, this was generally marginal and had not developed widely. 
Opportunities for competition along duplicated route miles, a potentially significant form of 
market liberalisation, had failed to materialise on all but a handful of corridors. Despite 
being unregulated, various factors - such as a failure to allocate duplicated route miles 
among adjacent, potentially competing TOCs - had curtailed its development. Only 
competition by emulation, unrestricted by regulatory and operational factors, was 
acknowledged by a wide range of TOCs as a competitive force which existed around the 
industry as a whole. However, the presence of this indirect form of competition, combined 
17 It is likely these would have been overcome much quicker in the absence of CCICM because Railtrack 
and TOCs would have been incentivised to invest sooner. 
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with the limited examples of direct competition noted above, were not sufficient to move 
the Regulator from his view that: 
"The new railway structure is built on different forms of monopoly in the supply of railway 
services... The supply of passenger train services is based on 25 territorial franchises with full protection 
from competition... [Glenerally, passengers... have limited choice in respect of the particular train services 
they wish to use" (Swift, 1997x: 8). 
Although the Conservatives' initial intention was to meaningfully liberalise the passenger 
rail market, ministers were ultimately forced to adopt regulatory measures designed to 
prevent the competition they had originally wanted to promote (Charlton et al., 1997); all 
the direct forms of on-rail competition identified in section 6.2 were heavily constrained. 
Against this background, one respondent suggested that restructuring the railway industry 
to promote direct, on-rail competition was a "complete and utter waste of time". Although 
this view may be challenged as circumstances change in the future (see chapter seven), in 
early 1998 there was a strong sense in which 25 regional monopolies had, with relatively 
few exceptions, replaced BR's national one (Shaw et al., 1998). 
6.4 Surrogate competition and the continuing role of the state 
The creation of a new generation of privatised monopolies has obvious regulatory 
implications. As already discussed in chapters four and five, there was always likely to be a 
degree of regulation in the privatised passenger railway industry. Minimum service levels, in 
the form of PSRs, were necessary to ensure that operators ran an acceptable number of 
trains in respect of subsidy being paid. In addition, further safeguards were perhaps 
inevitable in the London area because the prospects for on-rail competition developing 
along its congested lines were recognised as slim. These regulations were most likely to 
apply to TOCs by way of fares' control and through quality of service stipulations. New 
Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a) made clear that the 
government would stipulate `broad' regulatory objectives, and that the Franchising Director 
would translate these into specific minimum standards by which private train operators 
would be contractually bound. Beyond these, the general tenor of the White Paper 
suggested that ministers saw market forces, rather than government intervention, as the 
principal stimulant of service improvements. However, in the subsequent absence of 
competition, it would appear that the regulation ultimately adopted to govern the passenger 
rail market is more extensive than the government initially envisaged. Indeed, in early 1998, 
it impacted upon the production and distribution of railway services to the extent that John 
Welsby, then Chairman and Chief Executive of the BRB, believed that the TOCs "finished 
up with fewer managerial degrees of freedom than were previously enjoyed by BR under 
state ownership" (Welsby, 1997: 5). 
Chapter two noted that the regulation established to control BT, BG and the water industry 
represented a form of surrogate competition in that it sought to mimic the effects of actual 
competition by keeping prices down and efficiency up (The Economist, 1995c). Surrogate 
competition consists of economic and social regulation (see chapter two) and, as was the 
case with the above utilities, both components were imposed upon the passenger rail 
industry. The need for economic regulation was not discussed in any detail by New 
Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a), and nothing was added 
in The Franchising of Passenger Rail Services (Department of Transport, 1992b). In 1993, 
the Transport Select Committee concluded that RPI minus `x' style regulation should be 
imposed upon all franchised services (House of Commons Papers, 1993a), but the 
government maintained that the market should determine the level of fares TOCs could 
charge in all areas except those where they enjoyed significant market power, such as 
London (House of Commons Papers, 1993c). 
The government's final decision on ticket price regulation was not forthcoming until after 
the adoption of CCICM and the principle of Cl, and it is likely that fares policy was 
influenced at least in part by the outcome of the ORR and OPRAF's deliberations. Although 
the precise extent to which the passenger rail market would be liberalised was still 
unknown, it was clear that there would be significantly less scope for competition than the 
government had initially planned. Given the fact that a key argument underpinning the track 
authority model is that competition from other modes of transport does not impact 
sufficiently upon rail performance (see chapter four), the case for market determination of 
fares had been weakened considerably. Media speculation regarding the level of fares after 
privatisation was also becoming intense (Shaw et al., 1998), and reports predicting ticket 
price increases of between 50 and 130 per cent were helping to make the rail sell-off the 
most unpopular privatisation ever undertaken in Britain (The Guardian, 1993; The 
Economist, 1996b). The combination of these factors led to the announcement on May 16, 
1995 of a policy to regulate fares - as the Transport Select Committee had originally 
recommended - across the entire network. 
The government's decision to adopt fares regulation represented a notable reversal of a ten- 
year-old policy of increasing BR's ticket prices above the rate of inflation. Whilst BR was 
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state-owned, ministers had sought to shift the burden of BR's operating loss progressively 
from the taxpayer to the passenger. It was claimed in 1993 that this policy would continue 
after privatisation (House of Commons Papers, 1993c), but the adoption of comprehensive 
fares regulation clearly limited the extent to which this would be the case (indeed, the policy 
was described by one commentator as "a multi-billion pound sweetener to get passenger 
backing for privatisation" (Barrie, 1995: 1)). Details of the regulation are found in literature 
released jointly by the Department of Transport and the Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising (1996). As in previous divestitures, TOCs' fares are regulated by the RPI minus 
`x' formula. `X' presently stands at one (having previously been at zero), where it will 
remain for four years. The government also created a tariff basket and only included certain 
fares within it, namely: unrestricted standard class return fares (which permit outward and 
return travel on any train), some single fares for short journeys, `saver' fares (which, subject 
to certain conditions, offer a discounted rate for most journeys over 50 miles) and certain 
standard class season ticket fares including all weekly tickets. Some Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTEs) are entitled to set fares in their commuter markets and, as such, these 
will remain unregulated by the Franchising Director. In London, Cardiff, Edinburgh and 
Greater Manchester, the Franchising Director himself takes a comprehensive approach to 
regulating commuter fares. A performance incentive applies whereby a TOC's failure to 
meet agreed punctuality and reliability standards can result in the price cap being adjusted to 
RPI minus three for certain tickets. Although the RPI minus one formula is not as stringent 
as it is in other utility industries (for example, the formula used to regulate BT is now RPI 
minus 7.5 (Office of Telecommunications, 1997)), it is still regarded by the former Rail 
Regulator as "radical, almost socialist, planning by a Conservative `free market' 
government" (Swift, 1997c: 7). 
In terms of social regulation, New Opportunities for the Railways noted that minimum 
levels of service (in the form of PSRs) would be required, and certain quality of service 
standards - such as punctuality and reliability - would be expected of all operators 
(Department of Transport, 1992a). It has already been suggested that the imposition of 
PSRs was inevitable inasmuch as the government clearly has a right to expect certain level 
of output in respect of the subsidy it pays. But in the market-orientated context of the White 
Paper as a whole, it was not entirely clear how far ministers intended quality standards to be 
enforced specifically by regulation (see, for example, House of Commons Papers, 1993a). 
As noted above, the government committed itself only to setting `broad' objectives, leaving 
the Franchising Director free to determine detailed regulation for TOCs "as appropriate" 
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(Department of Transport, 1992a: 7. Italics added). In this sense, the White Paper might be 
interpreted as advocating the maintenance of quality standards through a combination of 
regulation and market forces depending on the operating characteristics unique to each 
TOC. Thus with the exception of PSR obligations, contestable lines might have been subject 
only to minimal social regulation, whereas routes on which the threat of competition was 
remote would have had more exacting requirements imposed upon them. 
As it turned out, the only piece of social regulation to vary substantially between TOCs was 
the PSR, each one being written according to the social, operational and market conditions 
particular to the services operated by the TOC it governed (see chapter five). The remaining 
safeguards were based upon BR's National Conditions of Carriage (NCC) (BRB, 1996), 
and were applied more or less equally to all operators to reflect the high number of 
incontestable lines across the network. 18 TOCs were required, as BR had been since the 
introduction of the Citizen's Charter, to produce a `user-friendly' summary of the NCC in 
the form of a `Passenger's Charter. ' The charters had to set out TOCs' commitments as 
regards operating punctual and reliable trains, as well as: ensuring acceptable train 
capacities, providing information on services, fares and facilities, meeting the needs of 
disabled travellers, and disseminating information in advance of delays and non-emergency 
engineering works. In all cases, TOCs' charters had to contain provisions at least as 
favourable as those offered by BR. (Some operators had elected to offer certain 
improvements over the standards aspired to by BR, and a comparison in table 6.2 of BR and 
Wales and West Passenger Railway's charters demonstrates this. ) TOCs' performance in 
each area of their charters is monitored by OPRAF through customer satisfaction surveys 
and formal incentive regimes (OPRAF, 1997). 19 Finally, TOCs are obliged to participate in 
ticketing and other schemes organised by the Association of Train Operating Companies 
(ATOC) in order to secure the additional provision of network-wide products. Examples of 
such products are the National Rail Enquiries Service (NRES) and discount railcard 
schemes. 
The imposition of economic and social regulation upon TOCs represents continuing 
statutory involvement in the passenger rail industry, just as it did in the utility privatisations 
18 Although those operators providing services into the major conurbations are subject to some additional 
stipulations in certain circumstances. 
19 Interestingly, the customer satisfaction surveys did not allow simple comparisons between operators 
because they were not standardised. In this sense, an opportunity for stimulating a degree of yardstick 
competition was being lost; OPRAF has recognised this and is now seeking to impose uniform standards on 
TOCs' surveys. 
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of the 1980s. Despite a change of ownership, the absence of competition meant that the 
state could not withdraw from the affairs of the rail companies in any simple sense. At stake 
again was the form of government intervention rather than its existence (Thompson, 1990). 
As noted in chapter two, Foster (1992), when discussing the utility sell-offs, argued that the 
regulation adopted after privatisation was more systematic and penetrating than anything 
which had existed under nationalisation. Ministers addressed the constitutional loophole 
which had enabled them only to issue nationalised industries with instructions of a `general 
character', and constructed regimes which conferred specific and detailed powers upon 
regulators to tackle areas of poor performance. Furthermore, the independence from 
government of the utility regulators has been called into question as evidence indicates that 
ministers sometimes used pressure to `inform' the day to day decisions of regulatory 
authorities (Jenkins, 1995). 
Criteria 4-7 .,:... ,,,.,... wäleS&weSt Improvement ? 
BR (Regional) 
Punctuality 90% of long distance trains to 90% of long distance trains Yes 
arrive within 10 minutes of schedule. to arrive within 10 minutes 
of schedule. To improve to 
92% by 1998. 
Reliability 99% of services to run 99% of services to run. To Yes 
improve to 99.5% by 1998. 
Compensation 20% of price paid for journey 20% of price paid for Yes 
(one-off journeys) refunded if delayed for>l hour. journey refunded if delayed 
for >1 hour. Increases to 50% 
refund for delays >2 hours. 
Compensation 5% discount on monthly or longer 5% discount for monthly season Yes 
(season tickets) season tickets if punctuality <87% tickets if punctuality <87% or 
or reliability <98% for preeceding reliability <98% for proceeding year. 
year. 10% discount if both punctuality 10% discount if both punctuality 
and reliability below those thresholds. and reliability below these thresholds. 
For annual season tickets, above 
discounts rise to 7% and 14% 
respectively. 
Ticket Office Maximum five minutes peak. Maximum five minutes peak. No 
queueing Maximum three minutes off-peak. Maximum three minutes off-peak. 
Information Timetables at all stations. Timetables at all stations. Yes 
Notice of engineering work PA or freephone or information 
at affected stations. boards at all stations by 1999. 
Notice in advance if advertised, 7 days' notice of engineering 
on-board catering is cancelled. work at affected stations. 
Advance notice of cancellation of 
advertised, on-board catering service. 
Disabled 48 hours' notice for assistance 24 hours' notice for assistance Yes 
Travellers at staffed stations. at staffed stations. 
Table 6.2. A comparison of key commitments in the passenger's charters of BR and Wales 
and West Passenger Trains Ltd. Sources: BRB, 1992; Wales and West Passenger Trains, 
1997. 
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The economic and social regulation imposed upon the passenger railway shares these 
characteristics. The requirements are more stringent than those which governed BR in the 
sense that TOCs, like the utilities, can now be formally punished for failing to meet 
prescribed standards (see BRB, 1992,1996; OPRAF, 1996; 1997). Whereas any specific 
command to BR like "`make sure the 8.15am from Victoria runs on time' would have been 
legally unenforceable" (Howe, quoted in Foster, 1992: 114), the Franchising Director fines 
operators whose trains are delayed, too short or cancelled, and penalties imposed on TOCs 
for their failure to meet NRES performance targets has confirmed the Regulator's equal 
willingness to enforce quality standards (OPRAF, 1997; ORR, 1997b). 
Neither the Rail Regulator nor the Franchising Director are protected from potential and 
actual ministerial interference in their affairs. Although the Regulator is officially 
independent from government (see chapter four), he was obliged to take into account 
guidance issued to him by the Secretary of State until January 1st, 1996 (House of 
Commons, 1993). It was under such guidance that CCICM, detailed earlier in this chapter, 
was formulated. Even now, however, ministers still reserve the right to change his brief 
informally, through `moral suasion', or formally through legislation in the same way they do 
with the utility regulators (Veljanovski, 1987). In 1997, for example, the Regulator signed a 
`concordat' setting out a framework for co-operation and communication between his office 
and the government, and this was followed by a request from the Deputy Prime Minister, 
John Prescott, for the Regulator to review his laissez faire position on regulating the 
Roscos (ORR, 1997c, ORR, 1998b). Press speculation has also suggested that Prescott 
refused to renew John Swift's contract in 1998 because the latter had not pursued a 
significantly interventionist approach to regulating the railway industry (Prynn, 1999). 
The Franchising Director does not operate with the same constitutional independence as the 
Regulator because he is required to function according to the OIG issued to him by the 
Secretary of State (OPRAF, 1997). In this sense, he is even more susceptible to the whim of 
government. On a macro level, the Labour administration has amended and rewritten the 
OIG (although this was in part to update OPRAF's duties), whilst on a micro level the 
Conservatives, particularly Brian Mawhinney, pursued policies against the better judgement 
of Roger Salmon (Grantham, 1998). The most significant example of this was the RPI 
minus `x' regulation outlined above which, according to a respondent, was regarded by 
Mawhinney as one of his more notable achievements as Secretary of State for Transport. 
One policy maker noted that he found past experience with utility regulation highly 
instructive when he came to construct and implement the regimes which would govern the 
passenger rail industry. Certainly it would appear that, as with the privatisations of BT, BG 
and the water industry, the government had again secured "not so much a change in the 
content of rules, or a departure from regulatory objectives, [but simply] an adjustment to 
the means of enforcement" (Hancher and Moran, 1989: 131). Of course, it was always 
likely that fares controls and quality of service regulation would be imposed in areas such as 
the London commuter market where the potential for competition developing was slim. 
Given the market-orientated thrust of New Opportunities for the Railways, it is unlikely that 
the government originally intended to maintain such an extensive role for the state in the 
affairs of the whole passenger rail industry. Nevertheless, having failed meaningfully to 
liberalise the passenger rail market, ministers were forced to create a regulatory system 
which was capable of exerting significant control over TOCs once they had been transferred 
to the private sector. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed rail privatisation policy in terms of the extent to which the 
passenger rail market had been liberalised by early 1998, four years after BR was 
reorganised prior to its divestiture. After three major utility sell-offs where the conflict 
between privatisation and liberalisation was "no longer a conflict... but a rout" (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986: 31) and regulation was required to act as surrogate competition, senior 
Conservatives became dissatisfied with the outcome of network industry disposal policy. 
The liberalisation of the CEGB's market emerged as a key aim of the electricity industry 
privatisation, and major structural reform was undertaken in order to achieve this. This 
notable reorientation of policy resulted in the creation of genuine competition among 
electricity generators and eradicated the need for economic and social regulation 
(Littlechild, 1993). The policy adopted to privatise BR essentially represented further 
experimentation with that used to divest the electricity industry (Gibb et al., 1998). 
Clearly, the passenger rail industry was (and remains) different in character to the electricity 
industry in several respects. Perhaps most importantly, BR was heavily dependent upon 
public subsidy, and ministers had acknowledged that they would continue to provide train 
operators with financial support in order to secure the provision of loss-making, socially 
necessary services following privatisation. In this sense, a degree of statutory involvement in 
the privatised rail industry was inevitable so long as it received government subsidy. 
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Nevertheless, ministers strongly advocated the promotion of actual, rather than surrogate, 
competition as the best means of securing service enhancements (Department of Transport, 
1992a). Crucially, however, rail privatisation policy was not adopted by ministers as a result 
of a coherent analysis of its potential outcomes, and limited consideration had been given to 
many key issues when New Opportunities for the Railways was published. It was not 
entirely understood whether vertical separation would be appropriate for the loss-making 
rail industry and, fundamentally in terms of this thesis, policy makers had not properly 
considered whether promoting competition in the passenger rail market was a viable 
proposition. 
This chapter has shown that, in the short term at least, it was at best only partially so. By 
early 1998, the outcome of the policy used to privatise the passenger rail industry differed 
considerably from the government's original intention. Despite BR's undergoing a complex 
restructuring exercise designed to promote on-rail competition, it can be argued that BR's 
monopoly has, with relatively few exceptions, been reconstituted in the private sector. 
Although some competition was clearly possible, the number of competitive opportunites 
available was notably fewer than ministers had initially envisaged. As a result, a host of 
regulatory mechanisms, comparable with those imposed on BT, BG and the water industry, 
were required to enforce a regime of surrogate competition capable of governing the 
behaviour of TOCs. Chapter two suggested that the privatisation of the utilities throughout 
the 1980s was as much - if not more - of an exercise in the formulation of regulatory 
mechanisms and institutions as it was an attempt to promote competition and reduce state 
control over the industries. This trend has indubitably continued in the passenger rail 
industry. 
A regulatory `domino effect' developed in four stages. First, as noted above, ministers' 
concerns regarding the consequences of mass service withdrawals resulted in continuing 
subsidy and PSRs. Second, the threat posed to the completion of the franchising process by 
on-rail competition - both from open access operations and the erosion of ticket 
interavailability - prompted regulation to prevent the very competition ministers had 
originally wanted to promote (Charlton et al., 1997). The regimes which were formulated to 
undertake this task, CCICM and CI, are manifestations of ministers' realisation that on-rail 
competition could not be, at least in the short term, an entirely realisable outcome of rail 
privatisation policy. Vertical separation was efficacious when the electricity companies were 
privatised because the industry was profitable. Difficulties were almost certain to be 
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encountered with the track authority model of rail privatisation because competition 
between train operators could threaten the viability of many services; private sector 
companies would simply not compete with each other for the right to lose money. The fact 
that this point was overlooked perhaps gives a further indication of just how little policy 
makers understood the likely implications of vertically separating the railway industry when 
New Opportunities for the Railways was published. Third, economic regulation was made 
necessary by the re-emergence of monopoly and, finally, this was complemented by social 
regulation in the form of quality of service stipulations designed to provide a `surrogate' 
competition regime with comparable objectives to those imposed on the utility industries in 
the 1980s. Whether or not the relationship between competition and regulation in the 
passenger rail industry will change in years to come remains uncertain. A discussion of this 
issue is contained in the following, and concluding, chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and prospects for the future 
7.1 Introduction 
As noted in chapter one, the central aim of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which the 
promotion of competition was an appropriate policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. 
In pursuit of this aim, the study set out to critically evaluate the evolution, outcome and 
future prospects of the policy adopted to liberalise BR's market, and to closely examine the 
translation of neoliberal political philosophy into practical policy measures. As such, there 
are three key objectives. These are: (a) to establish why and how the liberalisation of the 
passenger train market became an important goal of rail privatisation policy; (b) to assess 
the outcome of rail privatisation policy in terms of the extent to which the passenger rail 
market has been liberalised; and (c) to review the future prospects for competition 
developing between passenger train operators. The preceding analysis has so far addressed 
the first and second of these objectives. This chapter will examine and discuss the third 
objective and present overall conclusions in relation to the central aim of the study. 
However, for the purposes of clarity, this chapter will first summarise the key findings of the 
study so far. 
7.2 Expectations and outcomes of the `free' market approach 
7.2.1 Expectations 
This study began by examining how and why the liberalisation of the passenger train market 
became an important goal of rail privatisation policy. Chapter one noted that the 
privatisation of BR followed the sales of numerous British transport concerns, including 
those of Sealink, British Airways, the British Airports Authority and the National and 
Scottish Bus Companies. Given the nature of BR's business, it is perhaps logical to assume 
that the method adopted to sell off the railways was directly related to those employed in 
previous transport divestitures, particularly the bus industry. However, it was suggested in 
chapters one and four that BR was viewed primarily as a network industry by key policy 
makers, and that the track authority model used to sell it can be seen as further 
experimentation with the method used to sell the CEGB. 
Chapter two therefore examined the divestiture of the network industries in order to 
establish a background against which the evolution of rail privatisation policy could be 
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examined. It outlined the key assumptions of neoliberalism, the ideology on which the 
economic strategy of the New Right was based, and explored the interaction between the 
abstract ideals of political philosophy and privatisation policy in practice. It was suggested 
that the Conservative Right, the original protagonists of the policy, saw privatisation as a 
means of enhancing individual liberty, the fundamental concern of neoliberal theory, by: a) 
promoting competition, rather than monopoly, to allow voluntary exchange between 
individuals; and b) reducing the powers of the state to control an industry and the 
production/distribution of its goods and services. In addition, market liberalisation and state 
downsizing were expected to result in improved industrial efficiency, innovation and 
customer care. 
Nevertheless, as Gamble (1994) points out, the 1980s did not see the successful unfolding 
of a New Right ideological masterplan. Key neoliberal goals were undoubtedly marginalised 
as privatisation policy unravelled in practice, and this is evidenced by the sale of network 
industries as regulated monopolies. When BT, BG and the water industry were divested, the 
Conservatives failed to meaningfully liberalise their markets and, as a result, were forced to 
create regulatory mechanisms and institutions designed to create regimes of `surrogate' 
competition to prevent the utilities from abusing their market positions (see chapter two). It 
was contended that such regulation represented a significant and continuing role for the 
state in the affairs of the utilities despite a transfer of ownership to the private sector 
(indeed, Ridley (1991: 83) revealingly boasted that "the utilities which we have privatised... 
are more easily controlled when they are in the private sector"). Evidence also showed that 
the utilities' performance, in the absence of competition, had not matched that of companies 
such as the NFC which had been sold into an already competitive market place. 
It was in this context that ministers considered the privatisation of the electricity industry. 
The Conservatives' 1987 election manifesto (Conservative Party, 1987) re-emphasised the 
importance of the key neoliberal values of individualism and freedom, and asserted that a 
key means of promoting them would be to introduce competition into the markets of state- 
owned industries prior to their divestitures. The Conservatives had espoused competition in 
theory but eschewed it in practice throughout the network industry privatisation 
programme, and there was therefore no reason to assume that a genuine move towards 
market liberalisation would take place before the electricity industry was sold. Nevertheless, 
for various reasons, including an improving economy and ministerial dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the privatised utilities (see chapter two), a notable reorientation of policy 
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was announced which advanced plans to liberalise the electricity generating industry prior 
its divestiture in 1991 (Veljanovski, 1989). The results of the CEGB sale were encouraging 
for the government - competition increased, the role of the state decreased and the 
performance of the electricity generating industry improved significantly (Littlechild, 1993; 
Lowndes, 1997; Offer, 1999) - and the Conservatives' renewed commitment to neoliberal 
values was extended within the industrial sector throughout the early and mid 1990s. 
Competition was introduced into the telecommunications and gas industries, and electricity 
supply was also liberalised. 
The next large network industry privatisation was that of BR. The government's 
commitment to selling the railways was announced in the 1992 White Paper New 
Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 1992a), at a time when the 
economy had relapsed into recession and the state of government finances had worsened 
considerably. Nevertheless, encouraged by developments in the electricity industry, 
ministers made clear their intention that BR should not be privatised as a monopoly. They 
insisted that competition should be introduced into all aspects of railway operation in order 
to reduce the role of the state in the railway industry and harness the "management skills, 
flair and entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector" (Department of Transport, 1992a: i; 
Welsby and Nicholls, 1999) to improve services for customers. The need for intra-industry 
competition was questioned by many, including rail industry chairmen and pressure groups 
such as Transport 2000, in that BR already faced competition from other modes of 
transport (Shaw et al., 1998). In some contrast, however, the White Paper seemed to agree 
with Starkie (1984: 16), who had suggested that disaggregating BR was essential because 
the competitive effect from other transport modes was not sufficient as the railway was "still 
not as efficient as it might be. " 
Numerous methods of rail privatisation were proposed by academics, think tanks, MPs and 
officials, but the model ultimately adopted was the `track authority' initially suggested by 
Gylie (1984) and Starkie (1984). The Treasury was particularly supportive of the track 
authority model because it appeared to be analogous with the method used to sell the 
CEGB; i. e., it was known to be capable of promoting competition and reducing the role of 
the state in network industries. Various technological factors had prevented competition 
from being extended beyond the generating section of the electricity industry, but Treasury 
officials considered that rail privatisation would allow further experimentation with the 
concept of vertical separation. A final policy decision was not taken without some debate in 
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government, although opposition to the Treasury's plans was rather ineffective. The 
Department of Transport had been considering rail privatisation since 1980s and had 
favoured various models at different times. Successive Secretaries of State for Transport 
disliked the track authority model but seemed unable to offer an alternative. Even after the 
Department had forced a compromise from the Treasury following a 1991 joint working 
paper (see chapter four), it could not commit itself to the deal it had brokered because 
Malcolm Rilkind, then Secretary of State for Transport, was not persuaded by the report's 
conclusions. A period of stalemate, which hampered policy development, ensued before the 
impending 1992 general election forced policy makers to resolve their differences hastily. 
Although the government stated that rail privatisation might take up to 10 years (Financial 
Times, 1992b), the real intention was to complete it before the next general election, due by 
1997 at the latest. Thus, as a respondent noted, 
"... the deal was brokered not in the context of considered papers or great meeting; [it] was brokered 
by a guy... in the policy unit at Number 10 essentially - almost literally - walking around Whitehall with the 
bit for the manifesto. That was the way the final deal was done. " 
A new Secretary of State for Transport, John MacGregor, was charged with the 
responsibility for enacting rail privatisation and he conducted a brief policy review 
immediately after the election. Although MacGregor ostensibly set out to select the most 
appropriate from a range of policies (despite the pre-election push, the manifesto was still 
somewhat vague), it seems likely that he knew in advance that the track authority model 
was effectively the only option as others had either been ruled out in earlier cabinet 
discussions or were insufficiently developed with no time to examine them further. As one 
respondent pointed out, 
"Put it this way. MacGregor stood back and reviewed the options to familiarise himself with his 
brief at Transport. He just wanted to make sure that vertical separation would work. He may have said in 
public, `we're doing another consultation, ' but in reality we all knew what the outcome would be... The 
Treasury won. " 
The policy of rail privatisation advanced in New Opportunities of the Railways was not the 
result of a coherent exercise in policy analysis. Although the track authority model was the 
best understood of the policy options available to MacGregor, the superiority attached to it 
was distinctly relative. Because of the pre-election delay in adopting a definitive policy 
option, civil servants had been prevented from undertaking a detailed assessment of the 
potential outcomes of vertical separation as applied to the rail industry. The Treasury had by 
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now identified that its analogy between the separation of generation and distribution 
activities in the electricity industry and the creation of a track authority for the railways was 
not perfect, and had accordingly suggested a number of refinements. It had also been 
accepted that there were differences between the electricity and rail industries, notably in 
that the latter lost money and, if service levels were to be maintained (a political 
imperative), there would be a continuing role for the state in terms of both subsidy provision 
and service requirements in respect of that subsidy. Beyond this, however, the government's 
understanding of the track authority model of rail privatisation was limited. Although the 
Treasury's assumption was that the model used to sell the CEGB could, with only a few 
minor changes, be transferred to the privatisation of BR and achieve similar results, policy 
makers could not be sure that this would be the case. When New Opportunities for the 
Railways was published, key areas of policy were still to be devised; crucially in terms of 
this thesis, the opportunities for, and even appropriateness of, service competition and its 
potential impact upon the relationship between the railways and the state had not been 
investigated. It was not known whether vertical separation would promote actual, rather 
than surrogate, competition. 
7.2.2 Outcomes 
It was against this background that the thesis turned to assess the outcome of rail 
privatisation policy in terms of the extent to which the passenger rail market has been 
liberalised. Chapter five reviewed the policy of franchising adopted to promote competition 
for the market. It was shown that, at least partly as a result of the muddled circumstances in 
which the track authority model was adopted by ministers, the private sector viewed rail 
privatisation as something of an uncertain proposition. In an attempt to ensure that 
meaningful competition for the market would be realised, the development of franchising 
policy was heavily influenced by the government's need to convince potential bidders that 
acquiring TOCs would make commercial sense. The Treasury had initially sought to 
maximise competition by making franchises short (to minimise the amount of time between 
tendering rounds) and numerous (to maximise the number of tenders in any given round). 
The Department of Transport, which had begun to enter into dialogue with potential 
bidders, quickly realised that such a policy could in fact threaten the viability of the 
franchising process by deterring bidders from submitting tenders (see chapter five). The 
Treasury was forced to accept the Department of Transport's analysis when it recognised 
the financial implications of an unsuccessful franchising process, and the policy of 
franchising became characterised by something of a paradox; the Department of Transport's 
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proposals, based on practicality rather than ideology, were more likely to promote 
competition than the Treasury's, whose motivation had been the other way around. 
Nonetheless, even though their position had prevailed, senior policy makers within the 
Department of Transport and OPRAF remained sceptical as to whether meaningful 
competition for TOCs would actually materialise. 
In the event, private sector interest in passenger rail franchising was remarkably buoyant. 
OPRAF's administrative competence, which removed at least some of the doubts 
surrounding rail privatisation and thus helped facilitate a market for TOCs, was at least 
partly responsible for this. More important, however, was the willingness of certain 
companies to take part in the initial franchising rounds and the sudden change in market 
sentiment that followed. A small number of enthusiastic bidders was able to take advantage 
of the uncertainty surrounding rail privatisation to secure South West Trains, First Great 
Western and LTS Rail on favourable terms in the absence of much competition from rivals. 
Bidders not involved in these initial tenders quickly realised that money could be made out 
of rail privatisation and, as a respondent recalled, "[suddenly] thought, `we must have a 
franchise! "' 
The high degree of competition for the market generated by the franchising process affected 
the relationship between the passenger railway industry and the state in three key areas. 
First, the letting of all 25 franchises meant that the state was able to shift the provision of 
rail services to private companies. Ministers retained the right to stipulate minimum output 
standards in the form of PSRs (and also surrogate competition measures - see below) but, 
as noted above, this compromise of neoliberal values was inevitable given the loss-making 
nature of many rail services. The outcome of rail privatisation was always going to be 
different from that of other network industry sales because the state clearly has a right to 
demand certain levels of service in respect of the subsidy it provides. 
The level of financial support is the second area in which franchising has redefined the 
state's involvement with the passenger railway industry. As explained in chapter four, the 
amount of subsidy payable to the rail industry has significantly increased since privatisation 
as a direct result of vertical separation. By splitting BR into 92 separate companies, the 
government vastly increased the transaction costs within the industry because each new 
business needed to trade at a profit. White (1998) has calculated that, even when sales 
revenues from Railtrack, the Roscos and other rail businesses are accounted for, privatising 
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BR could incur a net cost to the state of as much as £2.2 billion. Net gains to the state, if 
there are to be any, depend upon the declining subsidy/increasing premium payments 
to/from TOCs which resulted from competition generated by the franchising process. 
Provided these payments adhere to current forecasts, the savings which accrue will result in 
a net gain to the state of around £240 million by 2002/03, and this will increase over time if 
subsidy/premium payments reduce/increase further. Thus, the level of state involvement in 
the passenger railway industry in terms of financial support will decrease from that which 
existed at the time of privatisation in this scenario. However, as pointed out in chapter five, 
there is some doubt as to whether this will be the case (see also section 7.3.1). 
Finally, franchising competition resulted in an unexpected role for the market in terms of 
investment planning within the rail industry. Although the government had originally 
envisaged that significant investment around the network would take place only where it 
signalled a willingness to fund it, market forces led franchise bidders into identifying several 
further investment programmes on a commercial basis. Bidders improved - or at least 
signalled to OPRAF a willingness to improve - the qualitative aspects of their bids because 
they perceived that aggressive subsidy reduction would not in itself be sufficient to secure a 
TOC. All 25 franchises were ultimately let on terms more favourable to rail users than the 
government had originally envisaged (although see section 7.3.1 below). The nature and 
amount of improvements secured in this way clearly represents a degree of market, rather 
than state, determination of investment requirements in the privatised railway. Although the 
state did not reduce its role absolutely, the degree of competition for franchises did result in 
the market increasing its relative involvement in this area. 
The extent to which competition had materialised in the passenger rail market by early 1998 
was reviewed in chapter six. Although, as noted above, the government had accepted that a 
degree of statutory involvement in this market was inevitable so long as it was financially 
supported, ministers strongly advocated the promotion of actual, rather than surrogate, 
competition as the best means of securing service enhancements (Department of Transport, 
1992a). The chapter showed that, despite the claims of many commentators that franchising 
and `open access' competition were incompatible owing to the need of train operators to 
cross-subsidise their businesses, the government - particularly the Treasury - was reluctant 
to concede that this was the case. Ministers' failure to rule out open access competition at 
an early stage added to the general level of uncertainty surrounding rail privatisation (see 
above), and questions were asked as to whether ministers were pursuing ideology at the 
expense of improving railway services (House of Commons Papers, 1992g). 
In early 1993, MacGregor was forced to announce that certain restrictions to the proposed 
open access regime would have to be introduced as "the prospect of unlimited competition 
was [going to be] a major deterrent to prospective franchise holders" (Smithers, 1993b: 3), 
and it became apparent that the outcome of rail privatisation in terms of on-rail competition 
would be significantly different to that which the government had originally intended. It was 
argued in chapter six that, despite BR's undergoing a complex restructuring exercise 
designed to promote on-rail competition, its monopoly has, with relatively few exceptions, 
been reconstituted in the private sector. Although some competition was clearly possible 
and taking place, the number of competitive opportunities available was severely 
constrained by regulations - CCICM and CI - which had been designed to prevent the very 
competition ministers had originally wanted to promote (Charlton et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, operational factors such as rolling stock availability and/or network capacity 
were militating against market liberalisation. As a result, a host of regulatory mechanisms, 
comparable with those imposed upon BT, British Gas and the water industry, were required 
to enforce a regime of surrogate competition capable of governing the behaviour of TOCs. 
It was suggested in chapter two that the privatisation of the utilities during the 1980s was as 
much, if not more, an exercise in the formulation of regulatory mechanisms and institutions 
as it was an attempt to promote competition and reduce state control over the industries. 
This trend has indubitably continued in the passenger rail industry. Vertical separation was 
efficacious when the electricity companies were privatised because the industry was 
profitable, but difficulties were almost certain to be encountered with the track authority 
model of rail privatisation because on-rail competition could threaten the financial viability 
of many TOCs. The fact that this point was overlooked perhaps gives a further indication of 
just how little policy makers understood the likely implications of the track authority model 
of rail privatisation when New Opportunities for the Railways (Department of Transport, 
1992a) was published. 
Against this background, it is possible to draw two key conclusions in relation to the central 
aim of the study, which is to assess the extent to which the promotion of competition was 
an appropriate policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. First, competition for the 
market would appear to be a workable and successful policy option whereas competition in 
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the market is less so; and second, the success of franchising seems to have occurred despite 
the muddled circumstances in which the track authority model was adopted whereas the 
failure of open access would seem to reflect them. In the context of the uncertainty which 
characterised the rail privatisation exercise, OPRAF's achievements, in the words of one 
respondent, "were quite exceptional. " Had Roger Salmon and his successor, John O'Brien, 
failed, the franchising process might have been left uncompleted, the TOCs may have been 
let at significantly higher subsidy levels and private sector-driven investment in the railway 
could have been lower. As things stand, the government managed to transfer the assets of 
all 25 train operators to the private sector and, provided that TOCs meet their subsidy 
reduction targets, the amount of competition generated in the franchising process should 
reduce the amount of operating subsidy to a level below that given to BR before its 
restructuring in 1994. Furthermore, the quality of services provided to passengers should 
improve by more than the government had originally intended. 
On the other hand, competition in the market had not, by early 1998, materialised to 
anything like the degree which the government had originally hoped. It seems that an initial 
failure to understand key intricacies of the railway industry resulted in ministers being 
unduly optimistic about the prospects for open access competition developing quickly 
around the network. The government's decision to promote on-rail competition is all the 
more surprising given that competition for the market is often introduced as a substitute for 
competition in the market where the latter is not possible because an industry loses money 
(Foster, 1992). In the past, policy makers had selected one instead or the other, rather than 
both simultaneously, and ministers would no doubt have been aware of this given that the 
Conservatives introduced competitive tendering regimes throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s in many areas of the public sector (Gibb et al., 1996; Pirie, 1988). The lack of on-rail 
competition in the new railway industry might be regarded as a major disappointment in 
policy making terms given that the raison d'etre of the track authority model was to 
promote it. It should be remembered that vertically separating BR was directly responsible 
for the inflated transaction costs, and thus subsidies, now incurred by the railway industry. 
The government's attempt to introduce competition in the market has been considerably 
less effective than its efforts to promote franchising (indeed, the success of the latter is 
being relied upon to recapture the costs of the former). In light of this, it might be argued 
that restructuring BR to promote an open access regime was unnecessarily complex and 
expensive. A different method of rail privatisation, such as sectorisation or the regional 
model, would have been compatible with franchising (see chapter four) and might have 
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achieved similar levels of on-rail competition at a significantly reduced cost. The 
government's attempts to promote on-track competition expose practical limitations of 
neoliberal theory and illustrate ministers' apparent failure to acknowledge some of the 
difficulties involved in translating philosophy into policy. 
Although these conclusions may appear logical, however, they can at this stage only be 
tentative. Whilst in some respects they confirm the speculative analyses of others such as 
Preston (1997) (who suggested that there would be a healthy level of competition for the 
market) and Shires et al. (1994) (who argued that promoting competition in the market 
would be problematic), they are provisional in the sense that the policy to which they relate 
was implemented only a short time ago. Although New Opportunities for the Railways was 
published in July 1992, and BR was restructured in April 1994, most TOCs have been in 
private hands for only two years and the new industry structure is still, to a certain extent, 
`bedding in'. To illustrate, although much on-rail competition is currently prevented by 
CCICM and CI, these regulations are soon to be relaxed (OPRAF, 1999; ORR, 1998a) to 
provide new opportunities for market liberalisation. It is therefore the case that further 
conclusions arising from this study need to be informed at least in part by a discussion about 
the prospects for rail competition in the foreseeable future. ' It is acknowledged that such 
conclusions will be unavoidably speculative; however, recent events have revealed a number 
of trends which shed some light on possible policy outcomes. These are examined in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
7.3 Future prospects: competition for the market 
Speaking in late 1997 and early 1998, when interviews for this thesis were undertaken, 
respondents were confident that their involvement in passenger rail franchising would be 
long-term. Passenger numbers were increasing throughout the industry and, because many 
TOCs were still in their first year of private operation, their subsidies had not yet begun to 
decline (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 1999; Hope, 
1997). Although there had been some suggestion that certain bidders would face a tough 2 
I That is, until the current generation of seven-year franchises expire in 2003/04. Attempting to foretell 
developments beyond this point is of limited value because of the potential for circumstances to become 
rather unpredictable in the longer-term. 
2 It should be noted that published passenger journey figures do not allow a direct comparison of trends 
before and after privatisation. Passenger journeys are estimated from ticket sales, and the post-privatisation 
figures include an element of double counting; a journey involving more than one operator is now scored 
against each operator, whereas for BR a through-ticketed journey was counted only once, irrespective of any 
changes made (DETR, 1999). Nevertheless, as will be shown below, it is generally agreed that passenger 
numbers are rising as significant real-terms revenue increases have also been recorded by TOCs. 
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task offsetting their future subsidy reductions (see chapter five), respondents were keen to 
stress that they saw no reasons to dissuade or preclude them from bidding in future 
franchise rounds. 3 Indeed, several franchisees have elected not to wait until 2003/04 to 
expand their TOC portfolios, staging successful takeover bids within the last year 
(FirstGroup, Laing and Go-Ahead have bought out Great Western Holdings, M40 Trains 
and Victory Railway Holdings respectively; Stagecoach has purchased a 49 per cent share in 
Virgin Trains, and FirstGroup is currently seeking further acquisitions (Morgan, 1998a; 
Rail, 1999b)). In addition to this internal optimism, media reports suggested that 
unsuccessful bidders and other companies outside the rail industry had maintained an 
interest in procuring TOCs in the future (Prynn, 1996). The combination of these factors 
would suggest that, in early 1998 at least, key industry actors and observers shared the 
opinion that TOCs would continue to perform well throughout their franchise periods. If 
this were so, demand for franchises at the next bidding round would be likely to remain high 
and the future success of franchising would be guaranteed through the continued private 
sector operation of passenger train services, perhaps at further-reducing levels of subsidy 
and with increased private investment. 
Since 1997, the aggregate number of passenger journeys made on the British passenger 
railway network has continued to grow (see figure 7.1). Furthermore, this growth has been 
accompanied by a significant increase in farebox revenues, from £2,355 million in 1994/95 
to £2,845 million in 1997/98 (see figure 7.2). 4 Such trends have led some commentators 
(see, for example, Rail, 1999c) to express a considerable degree of optimism about the 
future financial viability of TOCs. Although such optimism is encouraging, there is a case to 
be made suggesting that, at least in part, it is somewhat misplaced. Despite the aggregate 
growth in passenger numbers and associated revenues, the financial performance of certain 
TOCs is worsening as the amount of subsidy they receive decreases. Moreover, it can be 
argued that the prospects for growth of the order required by most TOCs continuing 
throughout their franchise periods is slim. Should certain TOCs become unprofitable, or 
even loss-making, before the next tendering round begins, the success of franchising in the 
future would not be assured. Demand for TOCs is likely to be low if potential bidders, given 
3 Concerns were raised about franchise length (in particular that seven years was too short given the long 
investment lead/recovery times) although no-one seemed to believe that this would impact on bidders' 
willingness to submit future tenders. Similarly, since imparting their views on long-term involvement, some 
respondents have sold their companies to rivals or partners who mounted takeover bids. Whilst it could be 
argued that this demonstrates only a short-term commitment to the industry, many of these vendors have 
retained employment in the railways and could, of course, bid in their own right again in the future. 
4 In 1997/98 prices. 
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their industry experience (or industry-watching experience), come to regard them as 
commercially unattractive; the government would be forced to let such franchises at more 
generous terms in order to secure continued private sector operation of train services, and 
this would result in higher subsidy levels and, presumably, a reduced amount of 
commercially-driven investment. 
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Figure 7.1. Passenger rail journeys, 1986/87 - 1997-98. Source: DETR, 1999. Figures for 
the whole 1998/99 are not yet available, although early indications are that passenger 
numbers are still rising. 
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Figure 7.2. Passenger rail revenues, 1986/87 - 1997/98. Source: DETR, 1999. Figures for 
the whole of 1998/99 are not yet available, although early indications are that passenger 
revenues are still rising. 
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It will be remembered that all TOCs need to attract more passengers in order to grow their 
revenue base and offset declining subsidy levels. Scope for cost-cutting does exist - 
operators have, for example, restructured their workforces and begun to renegotiate certain 
contracts - but most costs are fixed. Some TOCs, particularly South West Trains, First 
Great Western and LTS Rail (the first three to have been let) require only a small annual 
financial improvement of between 1.3 and two per cent. On the other hand, many operators 
need to secure more ambitious improvements of at least five per cent per annum, with some 
of the former Regional Railways TOCs needing up to 12 per cent (see figure 5.4). Although 
the above growth figures suggest that almost all TOCs should be achieving, or coming close 
to achieving, their targets, this is not in fact the case. Significantly, the DETR's figures are 
aggregates and do not therefore take into account variations in performance between 
different operators. 
It was predicted in chapter five that the former InterCity TOCs are in a good position to 
expand their businesses, whilst Regional Railways operators could be particularly vulnerable 
in the future. Former Network SouthEast TOCs, although arguably having the greatest 
growth potential, could also be the hardest hit in a future recession because of their 
dependence on commuter business. The initial financial results of TOCs since privatisation 
generally support these predictions (see table 7.1). Operators of InterCity-type services are 
performing particularly well, with First Great Western, GNER, Virgin Trains and Gatwick 
Express all announcing significant pre-tax profits for 1997/98 (Knight, 1999). Conversely, 
almost all former Regional Railways operators are beginning to encounter financial 
difficulties. Although the TOCs are witnessing passenger growth, this is at too low a level 
to offset the large reductions in subsidy they are facing (see, for example, Prism Rail plc, 
1998). MTL Trust Holdings, which owns Northern Spirit and Merseyrail Electrics, 
managed to increase the profitability of its rail operations in 1998/99, but is now faced with 
very large cuts in subsidy and industry feeling is that these operations will move into loss 
this year. Indeed, MTL has been forced to postpone plans to sell its rail businesses - despite 
trying to offload them - because it has been unable to find a buyer (Transit, 1998; Morgan, 
1998b). With regard to other operators, Prism Rail has announced that its substantial fall in 
profits in the first half of 1998/99 was due to its Wales and West and Cardiff Railway 
companies incurring losses, whilst First Group has publicly written off any chance of making 
money from its First North Western business (Wolmar, 1999a). Anglia is currently the 
exception. The company, whose operations are a combination of Regional and InterCity- 
type services, has remained in the black, although its pre-tax profits have fallen by 44 per 
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cent this year following a £9.3 million reduction in subsidy (see chapter five). Tellingly, 
former Regional Railways TOCs are beginning to argue that some of their services should 
be cut as it will be impossible to maintain them in the face of falling subsidies: 
`7he rail industry is lobbying the government to allow it to cut `unused' rural services in, it claims, 
a desperate attempt to avert financial disaster because subsidies are falling by almost £lbn. Measures were 
put in place at privatisation to protect such services, but rail companies say they are now unsustainable" 
(Thornton and Clement, 1999: 14. Inverted commas added. ) 
Company 1996/97 1997/98 
Gatwick Express 1.3 3.54 
First Great Western 14.28 27.783 
GNER -0.374 15.221 
Midland Mainline 1.546 4.77 
Virgin Cross Country 7.3 3.296 
Virgin West Coast 20.4 21.193 
Chiltern Railways 0.957 2.013 
Connex South Central -7.774 -2.8 
Connex South Eastern -16.794 
First Great Eastern 8.7 
Island Line -0.168 
LTS Rail 0.927 
Silverlink 1.852 
South West Trains 6.632 
Thames Trains/Thameslink' 5.7 7.9 
WAGN -3.655 14.0 
Anglia 6.6 2.915 
Cardiff Railway Company -2.427 
Central Trains -6.482 0.7 
First North Western 11.095 -0.785 
Merseyrail Electrics 1.098 
Northern Spirit -2.201 
ScotRail -3.975 -3.057 
Wales and West -0.168 -4.0 
Table 7.1. TOCs' operating profits/losses, 1996/97 - 1997/98. Sources: Leathley and 
Nelson, 1999; Knight, 1998. Figures for 1996/97 represent only part of the year for some 
TOCs and cannot be compared meaningfully with those from 1997/98. However, incipient 
trends of profit and loss are apparent (operating profit/loss figures are shown to avoid 
potential distortions from exceptional costs in the first year figures). 
Note: 1. Go-Ahead Group combined results for both companies. 
The fortunes of former NSE operators have been mixed. South West Trains and LTS Rail, 
with relatively generous levels of support, have both increased their profitability since 
privatisation. Thames Trains and Chiltern Railways have performed well although, as a 
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respondent pointed out, this was partially expected given that both networks underwent 
total route modernisation shortly before they were sold. WAGN, also the recipient of a new 
train fleet, has reported a healthy profit in the last financial year (Leathley and Nelson, 
1999). At the other end of the spectrum, Island Line has yet to make a profit, and both 
Connex South Central and Connex South Eastern have remained in the red despite both 
franchises requiring relatively modest annual financial improvements (four per cent for 
South Central, 3.4 per cent for South Eastern (Glover, 1997)). Total replacement of slam- 
door stock is planned for Connex South Eastern and this, combined with line speed 
improvements being investigated by Railtrack, might assist the operator in the same way 
that modernisation transformed the fortunes of Thames and Chiltern. There are no major 
stock replacement schemes planned for Connex South Central and Island Line, however. 
Thus, in terms of financial viability, something of a two-tier railway seems to be developing 
with, on the one hand, a group of financially successful TOCs trading profitably and, on the 
other hand, a number of TOCs who are either already losing money or are expected to 
move into loss this year. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that this trend will 
continue in the future. The figures presented above refer to only the first (part) year or two 
years of private operation. Those TOCs currently experiencing significant growth could 
witness a slowdown or even a contraction, especially if, for example, overcrowding began 
to deter customers from using their services. Conversely, many operators - including almost 
all former Regional Railways TOCs - are currently receiving new and/or refurbished rolling 
stock which will enable them to enhance both their standards and levels of service to attract 
more customers on to the railways. That said, there are two key factors which suggest that 
significant levels of growth will not be sustained by most operators over the coming years. 
First, network capacity constraints will prevent certain operators from running more trains, 
especially along busy routes at the busiest times of day (such trains are generally the most 
lucrative). The former InterCity TOCs will be less affected by capacity constraints over the 
length of their franchises because most have already negotiated access rights with Railtrack 
which allow for frequency improvements despite current infrastructural constraints. Virgin 
Trains will benefit from the complete rebuilding of the West Coast Main Line (WCML) 
which is set to create a substantial number of additional trainpaths, but others, such as First 
Great Western, Midland Mainline and Anglia, guaranteed extra services as part of their 
franchise agreements when capacity was still available. The remaining TOCs will be more 
seriously affected. Chiltern Railways has recently been forced to cut around three per cent 
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of its services into Marylebone because it was running more trains than the infrastructure 
could cope with despite the recent modernisation of the route (Thornton, 1999b). Capacity 
constraints will also prevent major expansion by both Connex businesses, Silverlink, 
Thameslink, Thames Trains and WAGN because of congestion in and around their 
respective London termini (although WAGN is introducing a quarter-hourly Stansted 
Skytrain service shortly) (Knight, 1998). The Regional TOCs will also face difficulties in 
increasing service frequencies around major centres such as Birmingham and Leeds - partly 
as a result of increased InterCity-type services - although there is considerable scope to 
introduce new inter-urban services between smaller population centres such as Portsmouth 
and Penzance and these may prove particularly lucrative if timetabled and marketed sensibly 
(see section 7.3.2) (Modern Railways, 1999a). 
Railtrack acknowledges that congestion is a barrier to growth in the railway industry. Its 
Network Management Statement (Railtrack, 1999) identifies 30 `bottlenecks' around the 
network which are currently running at, or near, capacity. Although work to alleviate 
congestion is underway at 11 of these, solutions to most congestion problems will not be 
implemented before the current generation of seven-year franchises expire. If growth 
continues at current levels, franchisees with longer contracts could also face capacity 
problems after 2008; Railtrack has forecast a further 30 per cent growth in passenger 
numbers over the next ten years, but admits that "even this level of growth, although 
unprecedented this century, is at the lower end of the range that our customers [i. e. the 
TOCs] aspire to achieve" (quoted in Rail, 1999c: 22). Railtrack has been accused by many 
of being risk-averse and has faced considerable pressure from the Rail Regulator who 
suggested that the company has behaved like a public sector utility. Nevertheless, it may be 
that Railtrack's relatively conservative forecast reflects future trading conditions more 
accurately than that of its customers given the second key factor which could impact upon 
all operators' passenger growth, namely a general economic slowdown (Prynn, 1996b). 
Chapter five noted that while the fortunes of many industries are tied up with the overall 
performance of the economy, this is especially true of the railways (Nash and Preston, 
1993). The onset of a recession reduces not only the amount of rail commuters, but also 
impacts adversely on the demand for leisure travel as potential customers re-evaluate their 
expenditure priorities. Economists appear unable to decide on the likelihood of an economic 
downturn occurring in the near future. At the time of the 1999 budget, many experts 
believed that the Chancellor's expectations for growth were far too optimistic and that the 
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economy would stagnate over the next couple of years (Kaletsky, 1999). More recently, 
economists' opinions have changed and it is now believed that prospects are somewhat 
brighter (Murray, 1999). Nevertheless, the typically cyclical nature of the British economy - 
particularly over the past two decades - would suggest that an economic slowdown will 
occur before too long (it remains to be seen whether politicians' talk about eradicating the 
`boom/bust' cycle is credible) and the analysis will proceed on this basis. 
Optimists have argued that the effects of a future recession on the railway industry would 
not be as adverse as those of previous economic slowdowns. Wolmar (1999b), for example, 
suggests that a good proportion of the growth which has taken place since privatisation has 
been structural and will not, therefore, be eroded by a future economic downturn. He 
further predicts that modal switch will continue as motorists, aggravated by road congestion 
and real-terms increases in driving costs, become increasingly disillusioned with car travel. 
Wolmar (1999c) argues that the recent growth in passenger numbers is greater than in 
previous economic booms, and also that the fares regulation introduced at the time of 
privatisation is now assisting rail's competitive position vis a vis the private car. Whereas 
BR could have choked off excess demand through large fare increases, the privatised TOCs 
are required to peg the price of at least some tickets to the rate of inflation (see chapter six). 
But it is nonetheless questionable whether optimistic predictions such as Wolmar's will be 
proven correct. For a start, although the recent growth in passenger numbers has been 
impressive, it is unclear how far it can be attributed to the effects of privatisation because 
the `revival' of the railway industry began around 18 months before its divestiture (DETR, 
1999). Fares regulation, whilst protecting four key ticket types, does not control popular 
SuperSaver and Apex leisure tickets and some operators, particularly Virgin, have increased 
the cost of these fares significantly in relation to regulated ones. Furthermore, TOCs' 
performance since 1996/97 has been patchy. Whereas certain operators, such as GNER and 
Midland Mainline, have invested heavily in service improvements and transformed their 
approach to customer care, others have been criticised for allowing standards to decline 
(Knight and Harris, 1999). Punctuality and reliability, the key indicators used to measure 
operators' performance, are on average no better now than they were under BR (DETR, 
1999). Customer complaints to Rail Users' Consultative Committees have risen to record 
levels, doubling since the last full year of BR operation (Bray, 1999), 5 whilst media 
Whilst it is true that customers have been more encouraged to seek compensation following privatisation 
than before, such a large increase hardly signifies high levels of customer satisfaction. 
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reporting of railway issues has frequently been negative. In combination, these factors can 
hardly have done much to encourage large numbers of new long-term customers on to the 
railway system. The recent growth of rail passenger numbers has also taken place against a 
background of a seemingly inexorable rise in car ownership, and recent figures suggest that 
the amount of car journeys made on Britain's roads could still almost double over the next 
25 years (DETR, 1998a). People do not buy cars to leave them sitting on the drive - despite 
the potential threat of traffic congestion - and will be less likely to take the train in times of 
recession because rail travel would represent unnecessary expenditure when a private 
vehicle is already being paid for (trains are still considerably more expensive to use than cars 
despite rail fares regulation and recent increases in fuel duty (Leathley, 1999)). 6 
It can therefore still be argued that much of the current increase in patronage is a result of 
general economic expansion rather than structural growth attributable to the effects of rail 
privatisation or road congestion; if this is the case, experience suggests that passenger 
numbers will start to fall as the economy begins to make the transition from `boom' to 
`bust'. But even if the bulk of the current growth is structural, and a recession causes 
passenger numbers only to level off rather than decline, many TOCs could still find 
themselves in financial difficulties in the future. Subsidies will continue to shrink after the 
economy slows down, and passenger numbers at the point when recession starts may not be 
sufficient to offset the reduced government support TOCs will receive in subsequent years. 
Certain operators, particularly those who have relatively generous subsidies and/or have 
experienced greater than expected growth before recession, could well be unaffected but it 
is unlikely that others will be in such a happy position. 
This section has painted a somewhat gloomy picture of the financial outlook for some train 
operators. Despite the encouraging level of aggregate growth experienced since 1994/95, it 
has suggested that this is unlikely to continue in the coming years. In terms of the prospects 
for competition in the 2003/04 franchising round, declining or stagnating passenger numbers 
will almost certainly have an adverse impact. Certain TOCs will of course remain attractive 
to potential bidders, especially those which currently enjoy relatively generous subsidy 
profiles and any which, notwithstanding the capacity and economic problems outlined 
above, achieve high levels of growth throughout their franchise periods. Such TOCs will 
6 particularly where more than one person are making a journey together. Although some innovative 
ticketing has been introduced (for example Midland Mainline's Foursight), the cost of taking the train 
hugely exceeds that of using the car. Five people travelling from Plymouth to Taunton and back pay a 
combined fare of £92.50 by rail, compared with around £18 by road. 
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probably be let at terms more favourable to the government than their current contracts. On 
the other hand, many TOCs will almost certainly appear less enticing, and may well have to 
be let by government with a more generous level of financial support than that paid when 
the franchises expire (see also Powell, 1997). The key question is whether the relative 
benefits secured when letting the more attractive TOCs will be enough to offset the relative 
disbenefits incurred when letting those with less appeal. There is of course a chance that this 
will happen; moreover, the premiums paid by Virgin Trains, Midland Mainline, Gatwick 
Express and First Great Western (all of whom have 10 or 15 year contracts) will help 
stabilise the overall level of subsidy paid to the industry after 2003/04. However, should a 
number of TOCs move into a loss-making position by the end of their franchise periods, the 
government may find itself having to increase, rather than continuing to decrease, the 
amount of financial support it pays. Although this is not to suggest that the government 
would be unable to find buyers for loss-making TOCs after 2003/04, ministers may have to 
accept that there will be less competition and, as a result, it will cost more to secure a 
similar level of privatised passenger services after the next franchising round. Any net gain 
which the state might have expected rail privatisation to deliver in the early 2000s will most 
likely be delayed. 
7.4 Future prospects: competition in the market 
Although there is little on-rail competition at present, the relaxation of several regulatory 
and operational restrictions over the coming five years will present a number of new 
opportunities for market liberalisation. Significantly, the Regulator and Franchising Director 
are to moderate the requirements of CCICM and CI to permit more competition between 
TOCs. The relaxation of CI involves OPRAF allowing lead operators to create dedicated 
fares on a permanent basis (at present only secondary operators are permitted to do this - 
see chapter six). At first glance, such a step would seem rather drastic as it might be 
considered tantamount to abolishing CI altogether; why have a compulsory inter-availability 
requirement if all operators can create their own dedicated fares? In practice, however, this 
amendment to CI will have little affect on the current trading environment. In order to 
create a new fare, operators must apply to, and obtain permission from, OPRAF. According 
to his OIG, the Franchising Director will still be required to view inter-availability as a key 
priority and a respondent from OPRAF suggested that, although he expects many 
applications, few will be sanctioned. Any additional competition for interavailable revenue 
will be limited to ORCATS raids (see below) and that which is currently permitted by CI. 
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The relaxation of CCICM is more noteworthy. Chapter six noted that stage one of CCICM 
restricts competitive new entry by making virtually all of the passenger rail market 
incontestable. Because it places incumbents and potential new entrants asymmetrically, 
CCICM currently prevents `hit and run' entry - crudely, the regulations mean that 
incumbents are allowed to operate trains whereas potential new entrants are not. Stage two 
of CCICM will begin in September of this year and will last until at least 2002 (ORR, 
1998a). 7 Following the changes, CCICM will continue to be administered on a point-to- 
point flow basis (see chapter six), although now only 80 per cent - as opposed to 100 per 
cent at present - of the farebox revenue will be protected on nominated flows. To illustrate, 
if First Great Western's Plymouth to London Paddington service raises £10 million per year, 
an open access rival could introduce new services on that route to compete for up to £2 
million of that revenue. 8 Flows not nominated for protection will, as under stage one, be 
open to full competition, although it is again expected that these flows will be found on 
uneconomic lines along which there is no real prospect of new services being initiated. 
As with changes to fares under CI, permission from the Regulator is needed before new 
services can be introduced under stage two of CCICM. Unlike the Franchising Director, the 
Regulator is not subject to OIG from the Secretary of State and, unless TOCs seek to run 
primarily abstractive trains (i. e. ORCATS raids), new services should be sanctioned because 
the ORR has stated that it wishes to encourage competition (ORR, 1997a). The potential 
impact of stage two, despite the capacity constraints outlined in section 7.3.1, could 
therefore be fairly significant. With the exception of West Coast flows, which have received 
ongoing protection from competition in light of Virgin's investment undertakings on the 
route, some InterCity- and many inter-urban- flows will be liberalised to present a 
considerable number of opportunities for new inter-peak and weekend services. Stage two 
of CCICM will introduce a degree of contestability to a large number of key routes around 
the network. 9 
7 It is not known whether the Regulator will further relax CCICM after 2002, but any change will be 
incremental in nature (ORR, 1994c) and it is safe to assume here that the regulations will remain relatively 
constant until 2004. 
8 In certain circumstances, especially where two or more operators share a flow and none earn over 80 per 
cent of the revenue from that flow, open access services will not be allowed as it is deemed that some 
competition already exists (although this is of course severely limited by CI - see chapter six). An example 
is the Thameslink/Midland Mainline flow between Bedford and London. 
9 Takeovers (see section 7.3.1) could impact upon the amount of on-rail competition which develops if a 
TOC is bought out by its neighbour. This has not happened to date and, unless OPRAF and the ORR change 
their current policies, is unlikely to before 2003/04 because both regulatory bodies are reluctant to jeopardise 
the potential for competition between adjacent TOCs. 
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Complementing these regulatory changes is the fact that many TOCs have ordered new 
rolling stock. With the notable exception of former Network SouthEast TOCs, the bulk of 
whose train movements are in peak hours, operators have had little spare off-peak rolling 
stock since privatisation because BR was unable to maintain train sets made redundant 
during the last recession (Knight, 1998). A hiatus of orders for new trains during the 
railways' lengthy divestiture served to compound this problem (Rail, 1998). Since 1996/97, 
however, many TOCs have placed substantial orders for new train sets both as part of, and 
in addition to, their franchise commitments. Many of these are now being delivered and the 
introduction of new trains will leave TOCs and/or Roscos (depending on the lease 
agreement) with spare sets which franchisees can use to bolster their existing services or 
compete with other operators. Either way, rolling stock will increasingly become available 
for TOCs to provide additional train services around the network where capacity constraints 
allow. 
Although it is established that additional competitive opportunities will exist from this 
September, it still remains to be seen whether TOCs will choose to exploit them. 
Respondents were divided on this issue, but it appears that some TOCs intend to run 
competitive new services whilst others will refrain from doing so to concentrate on 
consolidating their current operations. Some of this latter group of franchisees were of the 
opinion that, whilst competition is usually to be encouraged, it is not yet appropriate 
specifically between TOCs for reasons outlined in chapter six - i. e. it cannot work 
effectively whilst the industry runs at a significant loss. Besides, one respondent argued, 
TOCs already face demanding surrogate competition, not only in the form of RPI minus `x' 
and quality of service regulations, but also because the financial effects of declining 
subsidies/increasing premiums substantially reduce operators' overall incomes (see also 
Shaw, 1999). It was thought that more time was needed before properly informed decisions 
about open access could be made. 
Other respondents were more opposed to on-rail competition in principle. Echoing the 
arguments advanced by former BR chairmen and pressure groups such as Transport 2000 
when the track authority model was first being considered by the Conservatives (see chapter 
four), the respondents argued that on-rail competition is unnecessary as TOCs already face 
competition with other transport modes, notably the private car: 
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"Of course, on-rail competition misses the point which is that rail has a pathetically small market 
share in most markets and that the competition is not out there wanting to use different trains, it's on the 
roads and that's where we have to work hard and compete. " 
`7he idea of competition between rail companies is a bit of a distraction if you're trying to 
encourage more people to use trains generally... It potentially dissipates the effort if the rail operators are 
competing against themselves when they should actually be competing against other forms of transport. " 
It was further suggested that on-rail competition forces TOCs to concentrate on increasing 
their share of the existing market rather than seeking its overall growth, and that this would 
be to the detriment of the passenger rail industry. One respondent noted that market 
research conducted by his company had revealed that some rail users were already finding 
rail travel more complex following the demise of BR. The respondent suggested that 
increasing on-rail competition would make matters worse since the complexities facing 
customers would multiply. It may of course be the case that rail users would come to accept 
additional complications which arise from on-rail competition in the same way that utility 
customers now grapple with the liberalised telecommunications, gas and electricity markets. 
It was nevertheless suggested that TOCs should focus in future on co-operation, rather than 
competition, in their efforts to provide a `seamless' alternative to the car: 
"Far more important [than competition] is co-operation between operators. We can stand or fall on 
the extent to which the railway operates as a single, seamless product for the public... It's imperative that 
operators work together... There's far more scope for that than there is for competition. " 
Instead of deploying rolling stock to compete with another company's services, TOCs 
might seek to enhance their own levels of service provision on key routes; rather than 
omitting competitors' trains from their timetables, TOCs might include them and so on. 
Examples of co-operative working have already begun to develop around the network. First 
Great Western and Thames Trains have recently combined access rights to provide a new 
through service between Bristol and Oxford, and several TOCs now take part in joint 
marketing schemes, particularly those initiated by extra-industry groups such as the Devon 
and Cornwall Rail Partnership (Pinder, 1998). Some respondents felt that inter-TOC co- 
operation would increase as the industry's outlook had matured after the initial uncertainty 
created by privatisation. Chapter six noted that whereas TOCs initially sought to attack each 
other in an attempt to satisfy the egos of newly-liberated management teams, operators had 
now begun to eschew the superficial attractions of short-term gain in favour of a long-term 
growth strategy. Evidence cited by respondents in early 1998 to support this thesis was the 
declining popularity of ORCATS raiding. A significant increase in co-operation between 
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TOCs would impact considerably on the amount of on-rail competition which develops 
around the network in the future. If co-operation is viewed by TOCs as a desirable 
substitute for competition, enabling them to effectively offset declining subsidies/increased 
premiums, then it would become a kind of self-regulation working in addition to CCICM 
and CI to restrict market liberalisation. The ORR (1997a) has acknowledged that extensive 
co-operation could negate the effects of relaxing CCICM, noting that whilst the Regulator 
will encourage operators to compete, he cannot force them to do so. 
Despite these predictions of growing inter-TOC co-operation, other respondents felt instead 
that more on-rail competition would take place after September. There were two reasons 
for this point of view. First, in contrast to the opinions cited above, it was argued that 
existing co-operation around the network was exceptional and belied an immaturity which 
had persisted throughout much of the industry; indeed, it was predicted that rivalry between 
many TOCs would remain strong in the foreseeable future. One respondent implied that this 
was because although co-operation is easy to advocate, it is difficult to achieve when 
sharply reducing subsidies/increasing premiums "require desperate actions. " He argued that 
laudable long-term aims - and the logic of seeking market growth rather than maintaining 
market share which underpins them (see above) - might therefore fall victim to short- 
termism as some TOCs attempt to make a `quick buck': 
"There's little in the way, unfortunately, of co-operation... I think that's an element that's been 
wasted in the rail industry. There's far more options to co-operate with each other and compete against what 
is the real competitor, which is the car, [but] I don't think there is a maturity in the industry... There's really 
not been the co-operation, the maturity which one would expect, to fight the real competition which is the 
car. " 
"For the last 6-9 months I've been working very closely with colleagues to say `we must co- 
operate, ' but I'm getting nowhere fast. People are concerned that I will grow my market share and have a 
vested interest in promoting co-operation. They think I'll pinch some of [their] business... Yes, if my share 
goes up somebody has to decline in market share, but if the overall growth is so big why should any of us be 
concerned? " 
Just as there is evidence of co-operation between TOCs, so there are examples of short- 
termist competition, all of which are ORCATS raids. One TOC, which has returned an 
operating loss in both trading years since privatisation, has identified and implemented a 
novel ORCATS raiding technique at another operator's expense. 1° In another instance, 
Wales and West, the former Regional Railways operator, has cut rural services to free up 
10 This involved identifying a loophole in CI which enabled the creation of new dedicated flows on inter- 
available routes between alternative London termini. Whereas the previous flow specified only London BR 
as the final destination (in this case including two termini), the new flow referred to London Victoria only 
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rolling stock to run along the West of England main line (Wales and West has not ordered 
any new train sets). Although the company maintains that it is responding to patterns of 
demand - an ostensibly valid claim, given that its branch lines are patronised so thinly - 
industry insiders have suggested that Wales and West is engineering an elaborate ORCATS 
raid in an attempt to address its worsening financial performance. The ORR's decision to 
ensure that new services introduced under CCICM stage two are primarily generative rather 
than abstractive appears particularly prescient in light of this experience. 
Second, other respondents were of the view that, far from being destructive or superfluous, 
an increased level of on-rail competition would contribute positively to the future success of 
the rail industry. Much as the Conservatives argued in New Opportunities for the Railways, 
it was suggested that on-rail competition would secure market growth rather than 
encourage fights over market share because it would provide a spur for TOCs to provide 
better services for customers. Respondents referred in particular to the competition between 
WAGN and GNER on the Peterborough to London route which, despite the arguments 
advanced in opposition to on-rail competition, was viewed as a success. WAGN's services 
have benefited not only customers - by providing a real choice of operator - but also both 
TOCs; whereas WAGN has increased its share of both the existing rail- and overall- 
markets between Peterborough and London (WAGN, 1999), GNER has been able to use its 
resultant increase in capacity to attract additional longer-distance customers and 
accommodate further growth from northern cities such as York and Newcastle. Although 
WAGN's actions were made possible through CI rather than CCICM, respondents were 
hopeful that similar conditions might be created on other routes with the introduction of 
new open access services. 
Numerous operators have publicly expressed an interest in introducing new services from 
September 1999. GB Railways announced plans to run across London from Ipswich to 
Northampton and Romsey, as well as to introduce a `Hampshire Pullman' service in direct 
competition with South West Trains between Southampton and Waterloo (Ford, 1999a); 
Virgin will significantly expand its network after 2002, but in the meantime is considering 
extending its Dorset Scot service from Perth to Inverness (Holley, 1999); and WAGN is 
planning to initiate services from London to Doncaster (Modern Railways, 1999b). Several 
respondents also implied that they would also be seeking to exploit the relaxation of 
and resulted in the manipulative operator being able to introduce its own dedicated fares to undercut the 
interavailable ones. 
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CCICM. At least one non-franchised company is known to be seeking to introduce new 
services in the near future (Local Transport Today, 1999), and Railtrack is keen to 
encourage operators to take advantage of open access because it will enable the company to 
increase its revenue base (Morgan and Halstead, 1998). 
It is apparent from this section that a number of new opportunities for on-rail competition 
will arise following the introduction of CCICM stage two. Whilst some operators argued 
that priority should be given to increased co-operation rather than competition, it is likely 
that several TOCs will begin to introduce new services over the next few years. Some of 
these services may not be competitive in that they will provide links between destinations 
without impacting upon other operators (as they had to under CCICM stage one). Most will 
have an element of abstraction, however, and the ORR's task will be to ensure that a new 
entrant's primary motivation is to generate additional revenue rather than plunder that 
which currently exists. It should be noted that the introduction of competitive new services 
does not mean that all TOCs will necessarily cease to co-operate. Whilst it may not be the 
case that operators will choose to collaborate with counterparts with whom they are in 
direct competition, many opportunities for co-operation will still exist and be exploited. 
Examples might be the pooling of rolling stock to create new services or the improvement 
of connectional arrangements to reduce overall journey times. 
7.4.1 The sustainability of on-rail competition 
Whether or not the services introduced under CCICM stage two will prove financially 
viable is far from assured. Although the Peterborough to London example cited earlier has 
clearly been a success, recent events indicate that it may also prove exceptional. First North 
Western has been forced to withdraw two long-distance services it introduced to compete 
with Virgin's Blackpool/Manchester-London Euston trains because of poor loading. The 
Manchester-London service was particularly under-patronised, attracting only 253 
passengers per week despite an available capacity of 5,040 (Thornton, 1999b). Although it 
might be argued that First North Western's trains would have moved into profit in the 
future after becoming more established, this is unlikely owing to their relative infrequency. 
particularly with regard to the Manchester-London services, customers travelling with First 
North Western had to choose from two services per day, whereas Virgin's could select 
from 21. Whilst presented in a different context, Wolmar's (1999d) argument that it is 
difficult to build patronage with an infrequent service is equally applicable here. Moreover, 
the lack of ticket interavailability on the route exacerbated the infrequency problem because, 
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unless they bought another ticket, customers were unable to take a Virgin train if they 
missed their First North Western service. Some open access services introduced under stage 
two of CCICM could also be heavily disadvantaged by these, or similar, factors. Even if 
they are required to adhere to CI, new entrants are almost certain to introduce - and 
encourage customers to use - their own dedicated tickets and, so long as they are allowed 
to compete for only 20 per cent of a flow's total revenue, their services will be infrequent 
relative to those of the incumbent. 
Furthermore, any new on-rail competition which does take place will do so against the 
background of the impediments to growth outlined in section 7.3.1. Generative new 
services will need to attract a large amount of long-term, structural growth against the 
historic trend of short-term, economically-related growth if they are to survive. There will 
be some which accomplish this, particularly those designed to exploit potentially lucrative 
market niches (see chapter six). An example to date is Connex's Rugby to Gatwick service, 
which has built up a market from nothing to over 100,000 journeys per month (Knight, 
1998) because it greatly simplifies the journey from the south Midlands to the airport and 
encourages modal switch for this reason. But such niches may be limited in number and, as 
a result, potential new entrants could be forced to increase the abstractive element of new 
service proposals in an attempt to guarantee their financial success. The Regulator will be 
aware of this and no doubt seek to discourage such a trend, but in reality he will be faced 
with a dilemma. Despite the ORR's policy being geared towards preventing abstraction, its 
over-riding objective remains the promotion of competition. These two goals will become 
increasingly incompatible once most lucrative niches have been filled and/or current growth 
levels stagnate. The Regulator might be forced to scale down his aversion to abstraction if 
he wants to continue encouraging new services, because few will materialise if he refuses 
applications with an abstractive element larger than he is currently prepared to accept. On 
the other hand, however, sanctioning overtly abstractive new services could, as outlined in 
chapter six, result in the financial viability of incumbents being seriously affected, 
particularly if they are already in difficulty because passenger numbers have failed to grow 
as predicted in their franchise bid. This will in turn affect the amount of competition for the 
market generated by the next franchising round. Although successful new entrants might 
increase the value of their own businesses - and thus attract a high level of interest from 
bidders - badly affected incumbents would have to be re-let at far higher levels of subsidy. 
The government has recently appointed a new Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor, who is 
understood to be significantly less pro-market than his predecessor (Shaw, 1999). If this 
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proves to be the case, the ORR may begin to lose its present enthusiasm for on-rail 
competition, and choose to resolve the above dilemma by simply refusing to sanction most 
applications for competitive new services. 
Perhaps the most likely outcome of CCICM stage two is that, after niches have been filled, 
TOCs will adopt a `defensive' rather than an `attacking' attitude to introducing new 
services. In essence, this would involve incumbents identifying lines within their own 
networks which they think will be vulnerable to attack from new entrants, and then 
`protecting' them by filling spare capacity with extra trains of their own. This scenario 
would in practice be consistent with that predicted by the theory of contestable markets (see 
chapter six). Although hit and run entry would still not be entirely feasible because of 
timetabling lead times, it would be the threat of competition, rather than competition itself, 
which forced incumbents to improve their quality and levels of service. Such an outcome 
has numerous advantages. It allows incumbent TOCs to expand in their own markets with 
which they are already familiar; it minimises the cost of expansion because access rights 
already exist (although an overall increase in train movements of more than six per cent will 
incur additional charges) and there is less need for extensive driver training; there will be 
none of the potential for ticketing and timetable confusion identified above because all new 
services will be provided by the same operator; and TOCs, in the absence of direct rivalry, 
could be more inclined to collaborate with each other. In combination, these factors could 
be more effective than direct competition in increasing the amount of structural growth 
TOCs are able to attract, thereby assisting many of them in their efforts to offset declining 
subsidies. Recent evidence indicates that TOCs are becoming aware of this as South West 
Trains has successfully fought off a threat by GB Rail to operate along the Southampton- 
London Waterloo corridor (see above) by introducing additional services of its own 
(Modern Railways, 1999c). 
One final point to make with regard to the future prospects for on-rail competition is the 
likely impact of the above developments on the relationship between the passenger rail 
industry and the state. It will be recalled from chapter six that TOCs are currently subject to 
surrogate competition in the form of RPI minus `x' and various quality of service 
regulations specified in the Passengers' Charters and elsewhere. Although in theory an 
increase in the amount of competition between operators should result in a decrease in the 
need for regulation, this is unlikely to happen in practice, at least over the coming five years. 
Apart from the fact that the regime originally proposed by the Conservatives - different 
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routes being subject to different degrees of regulation depending on the level of competition 
they supported - would be complicated in the extreme to implement successfully, the 
Labour administration elected in 1997 is less sympathetic than the Major administration to 
neoliberal ideals and has indicated accordingly its intention to strengthen, rather than 
relinquish, its control over the passenger railway industry (DETR, 1998b; Knight and 
Harris, 1999; Shaw et al., 1998; see also Jenkins, 1999). It is therefore extremely 
improbable that, even if passenger growth exceeded all expectations, capacity constraints 
were all resolved and on-rail competition became viable across much of the network, the 
regulations currently governing the performance of the TOCs would be relaxed. 
7.5 Promoting railway competition: an appropriate policy goal? 
7.5.1 Competition for the market 
Whilst the above analyses add a new perspective to the tentative conclusions outlined in 
section 7.2, they in fact do little to detract from the validity of the original statements. In 
terms of competition for the market, it was suggested that the success of the 1996/97 
franchising round would not be repeated in 2003/04. High levels of passenger growth, upon 
which many of the TOCs depend, are probably not sustainable and it would appear that 
bidders generally overvalued the market in 1996/97. Such a mistake is unlikely to be 
repeated. That said, an increase in subsidy bills need not - and, indeed, should not - 
undermine the case for passenger rail franchising. Competitive tendering will still offer 
numerous advantages. First, franchising will continue to facilitate competition for a market 
which, despite the impact of CCICM stage two, will retain a significant element of 
monopoly. More importantly, however, franchising will provide the government with a 
mechanism for the continued protection of both passengers' and taxpayers' interests 
(Wadsworth, 1995). If one operator's performance is poor, another can be sought after a 
contractually-specified time period. 
Thirdly, franchising will also enable the government to redraw the boundaries of TOCs 
should the need arise. It is possible that the 25 franchises designed in 1994/95 will not be 
appropriate in 2003/04 for a variety of reasons such as the completion of major 
infrastructural improvements or the identification of new opportunities to realise economies 
of scale. It was pointed out in chapter five that an optimal division of BR's operations 
would have involved the creation of fewer TOCs, and the recent round of takeovers and 
subsequent management rationalisations suggest that certain franchise boundaries might be 
re-drawn before the 2003/04 tendering round. The issue of redrawing franchise boundaries 
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has recently been discussed by Whitehouse (1998), although it is likely that the Franchising 
Director was aware there would be a need to reconsider the operating territories of some 
TOCs before letting them again in the future. As a respondent from OPRAF pointed out in 
1997, 
"One of the criticisms I've heard levelled against us [OPRAF] recently is 'what on earth do we 
think we're doing having lots of franchises finishing at the same time? ' It wasn't an accident, we did it on 
purpose, and the reason we did it on purpose is that at the time we let these franchises we believed that the 
format of each of these businesses was right. In seven years' time they may be different. We wanted to give 
ourselves the opportunity to reconfigure some of these franchises if we thought there was a better way of 
getting more benefits to the passengers. It might not happen, but then again it might... So we've given 
ourselves the option of making sure those franchises finish at the same time so we can take the benefits of 
any reconfiguring if we want to. " 
Although reducing the number of franchises will obviously result in fewer competitive 
tenders, the amount of competition generated for each could be greater than if the current 
25 are retained because potential bidders would be encouraged if improved business 
prospects were associated with each. 
Fourthly, franchising will give ministers scope to alter rail policy in accordance with future 
changes to the government's wider transport and/or environmental objectives. A key 
criticism of the Conservatives' attitude towards rail privatisation is that, although some 
major investment was secured, emphasis was placed on securing a `cheap' rather than a 
quality railway. " From an environmental perspective, the latter would have been more 
desirable because of its heightened potential to play a central role in effecting large and 
sustainable modal shift from road to rail. The sale of BR provided a real opportunity for the 
government to influence people's travel habits because through franchising ministers could 
have secured ambitious output targets at a competitive price from the private sector. Of 
course, such a policy would probably have been unacceptable to the Conservatives because 
it would have meant significantly increasing the level of financial support to, and thus the 
influence of the state over, the railway industry. The new Labour administration is less 
preoccupied with neoliberal ideals than were the Conservatives (see section 7.3.2) and train 
operators could benefit from a public-private investment partnership in the future. However, 
although the government has recently announced a tentative move in this direction in the 
form of the £130 million Rail Passenger Partnership Fund (RPPF) (Rail, 1999d), it is 
beginning to look as though Labour will also prove as reluctant as the Conservatives to 
commit significant amounts of new public funding to improve railway services. Industry 
insiders have become aware that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, is 
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applying increasing pressure on transport ministers to justify the level of subsidy currently 
given to the rail operators. 
Ironically, it could be that neoliberal policies hold the key to providing an environmentally 
sustainable transport policy. Numerous authors have argued that a key reason for rail's 
decline relative to the continued ascendancy of the private car is that the two transport 
modes do not compete on a level playing field (ASI, 1983; Campbell-Bannerman, 1993; 
Bradshaw, 1997; Hibbs, 1998; Martin and Michaelis, 1992). Although this has been the case 
for many decades (see, for example, Shaw et al., 1998), the problem was exacerbated in the 
1980s by an ideological paradox in Conservative transport policy. The Thatcher 
administrations sought to promote individual freedom by encouraging car use, but this was 
achieved and maintained through what amounted to huge subsidies - i. e. state intervention - 
for motorists. Whilst petrol and road taxes covered the cost of road building and 
maintenance, they failed to take adequate account of costs incurred by externalities such as 
congestion, pollution, threats to safety and so on (see, for example, Bradshaw, 1997; 
Department of Transport, 1996). Thus the true cost of motoring remained significantly 
higher than that which road users actually paid. At the same time the Conservatives sought 
to ensure that a progressively higher proportion of BR's costs were being met by its users 
rather than by state subsidy (see chapter six) and, in combination, these factors hugely 
distorted the transport market to the benefit of road and the detriment of rail. 
Recent real-terms increases in fuel duty and rail fares regulation (both of which were 
initiated by the Conservatives) have begun to address this imbalance - the relative cost of 
motoring is now starting to rise (Leathley, 1999) - but the market distortion remains 
immense and is likely to do so for some time. Charging motorists the true cost of using the 
road would be inflationary and, to say the least, politically difficult and it is conceivable that 
the current policy on fuel duty will be modified should it begin to prove politically 
inconvenient. This would be unfortunate, because the long-term effect of `levelling the 
playing field' between road and rail would almost certainly be significantly increased 
patronage for train operators. As Martin and Michaelis (quoted in Hughes, 1993: 76) point 
out, "if car users had to pay the full external cost, in a system which recovered the full costs 
of the congestion and nuisance effects of car use, they would be far more likely to take the 
train. " The rail industry's increased revenue expectations would enable Railtrack to embark 
upon a far more ambitious investment programme, the train operators to order more new 
11 That is to say, `cheap' in the context of the increased transaction costs associated with vertical separation. 
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trains and provide more frequent services and the government to diminish its influence over 
the rail industry at least in terms of subsidy payable. Competition both for and in the 
passenger rail market would then become much more viable. 
7.5.2 Competition in the market 
Whereas franchising was and remains advantageous despite anticipated setbacks, the case 
for competition in the market is less convincing. As things currently stand, on-rail 
competition is severely limited around the network, although section 7.3.2 predicts that 
more will arise following the implementation of CCICM stage two. Nevertheless, in judging 
whether or not it was an appropriate policy, the key question must be: will the amount of 
on-rail competition which develops in the future be sufficient to justify the Conservatives' 
method of rail privatisation and the restructuring costs/opportunity costs associated with it? 
Answers to this question will inevitably be speculative and also subjective, as much can 
depend upon differing interpretations of `appropriateness'. One respondent pursued an 
ideologically dogmatic line, arguing that establishing an environment in which on-rail 
competition can take place was justifiable despite its cost and practical outcome. The 
respondent's views were based on the assumption that all competition is good and, 
therefore, that some competition is better than none. Another suggested that on-rail 
competition could only be judged appropriate if it benefited all passengers equally, but this 
is problematic in the sense that universal advantage is unlikely to be the result of any 
government policy. Perhaps most reasonably, it was suggested that appropriateness in this 
sense should be defined as a utilitarian concept to reflect the generalised circumstances in 
which government policies are frequently devised - will the promotion of on-rail 
competition result in service improvements for most passengers whilst at the same time 
produce a cheaper and more efficient railway for the majority of both passengers and 
taxpayers? 12 
Whilst it would seem that on-rail competition has led to service innovations on certain lines, 
most improvements since privatisation have had little to do with direct inter-TOC rivalry; 
Railtrack's station regeneration programme, rolling stock refurbishment schemes and 
increases in train frequencies were all enacted during stage one of CCICM. It is true that 
competition along shared route miles and competition by emulation will have stimulated 
12 There are of course problems with this concept, notably the fact that it ignores the circumstances of the 
disadvantaged minority. However, because all rail users are protected by PSRs and other regulations, it is 
assumed that no passengers will receive a level of service significantly worse than that in evidence before 
privatisation. 
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some innovations, but these kinds of competitive pressure are not exclusive to the track 
authority model and would have existed in a regional or sectoral rail industry too. 
Moreover, although CCICM stage two will result in the introduction of competitive new 
services around the network, they will in the main be off-peak and/or operate on less busy 
routes. Combined with the possibility that the new Regulator may refuse to sanction many 
applications to run them, the impact of competitive new services on the majority of 
customers may be limited. If, alternatively, the new services are defensive in nature, 
introduced in response to the threat of competition, they could bring major benefits to large 
numbers of rail users. Again, however, it is important to note that a similar outcome could 
have been achieved by any other method of rail privatisation, at a considerably reduced cost, 
through stipulating higher PSRs (or equivalent) at the time of divestiture. In neoliberal 
terms, although this would have meant more government involvement in terms of quality of 
service regulations, such intervention would have been offset by the relative reduction in 
restructuring costs and subsidy payments. Finally, and in relation to subsidy, potential 
taxpayer benefits are of course contingent upon the overall subsidy bill falling continuously 
until the state realises a net gain from rail privatisation. It has been argued here that this is 
unlikely to occur at least in the foreseeable future. 
Despite these factors, it would be wrong to conclude that the promotion of on-rail 
competition per se is inappropriate. On a line by line basis, it has the potential to stimulate 
new demand and improve operational efficiency - the introduction of Connex's Rugby- 
Gatwick Airport service is a good example. On the other hand, it is not the case that the 
small amount of competition generated between TOCs is, or will be, sufficient to justify 
adopting a restructuring policy designed first and foremost to liberalise the entire network. 
The track authority model, despite the promotion of on-rail competition being its raison 
d'etre, has resulted in minimal direct rivalry at a cost which significantly outweighs that of 
running BR as a vertically integrated whole. Perhaps a more sensible approach to rail 
privatisation would have been to pursue a more simplistic method of divestiture and then 
evaluate the prospects for on-rail competition on a line by line basis as and when 
applications arose. This would have been perfectly possible in any of the methods of rail 
privatisation outlined in this thesis (it had also, of course, been done in 1992 when 
Stagecoach introduced its Scotland to London services to compete against BR (see chapter 
five)) and still allowed the introduction of franchising. 
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Evidence presented in this thesis would support the argument that the Conservatives were 
mistaken to view BR's passenger services as monopolies. BR already faced competition 
from other transport modes, a point of course stressed repeatedly by critics of the track 
authority model before, during and after the time of privatisation (see section 7.3.2 and 
chapter four). Given the distortion which currently characterises the transport market (see 
above), it is crucial that a railway provides safe, fast, efficient, punctual and reliable trains in 
order to maximise its competitive position relative to road transport. Despite major 
productivity and efficiency gains in the 1980s and early 1990s, BR was arguably not 
achieving this at the time of its divestiture and it is becoming clear that the "management 
skills, flair and entrepreneurial spirit" (Department of Transport, 1992a) of the private 
sector has hardly improved the situation. As noted in section 7.3.1, standards of punctuality 
and reliability are on average no better than they were under BR; in addition, many trains 
remain dirty, overcrowding is increasingly commonplace and rural services, especially in the 
South West of England and South Wales, are being cut back to PSR levels (OPRAF, 1998c, 
1998d, 1999a, 1999b; Ford, 1999b; Thornton, 1999b). On-rail competition was supposed 
to help prevent such problems, but in reality it could - and probably will - have the opposite 
effect. As TOCs spend time and effort devising new services to take advantage of CCICM 
stage two, they devote less energy to addressing the fundamental deficiencies which pervade 
their day-to-day operations. As Railtrack encourages more trains onto its network, 
punctuality and reliability suffer further as pinch points develop more quickly than the 
company can (or is prepared to) invest to alleviate them. Promoting competition on the 
current network is to encourage expansion at a time when the industry needs consolidation. 
So long as all TOCs are unable routinely to deliver fast, efficient, punctual and reliable 
trains, it could be suggested that on-rail competition is an unnecessary distraction to the rail 
industry and a largely inappropriate policy goal. If the money spent on trying to liberalise 
BR's market had instead been invested in improving the quality of its network, the train 
operators of today - nationalised or privatised - might have found themselves far better 
equipped to provide a high quality service capable of attracting high levels of long-term 
structural growth. 
Chapter four showed that the track authority model of rail privatisation was pushed by the 
Treasury because it wanted competition and made the erroneous assumption that vertical 
separation would liberalise BR's market as effectively as it had the CEGB's. Little 
consideration had been given to how appropriate competition would be in the railway 
industry, but the circumstances in which the policy was adopted precluded detailed 
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discussion of the matter. Had the Conservatives not chosen to formulate rail privatisation 
policy in the context of drafting their 1992 election manifesto, their analysis might have led 
them to compare BR's market with those of companies other than the network industries, 
especially ones in which competition has been far less beneficial than free-marketeers would 
generally expect. Ministers might, for instance, have considered the experience of the bus 
industry - where the Conservatives also sought to introduce competition for and in the 
market (see chapter one) - since it was privatised in 1985. Although the markets of BR and 
the NBC were by no means identical, they shared key characteristics such as their relative 
insignificance in terms of the transport market as a whole and their dependence on public 
subsidy to support loss-making yet socially necessary services. The chief architect of bus 
privatisation, Nicholas Ridley, envisaged that, as a result of his policy, the NBC would be 
replaced by numerous small operators in each town competing with each other to grow the 
bus market and improve the overall level of service to passengers. The outcome was 
somewhat different to that which Joseph had in mind, however. As Wolmar (1998) makes 
clear, the bus market was not sufficiently robust to support competition from within. Far 
from increasing, patronage continued to decline (passenger numbers had been falling 
steadily for decades), services became unnecessarily bunched along busy corridors whereas 
rural routes were in contrast relatively neglected, small operators went bust or sold out to 
larger firms and the industry is now dominated by three major players, Stagecoach, 
FirstGroup and Arriva (see also Knowles and Hall, 1992; Lowndes, 1997; Simpson, 1996; 
White, 1995). 
Wolmar (1998) suggests that bus privatisation policy (and especially the attempts made by 
the MMC to support it) was flawed because it under-emphasised the competitive threat 
posed by other modes of transport. Whereas in reality the bus companies' share of the 
overall transport market was generally too small to be contestable, the regulatory authorities 
"insisted that competition between the bus companies was the only yardstick against which 
to measure the competitiveness of the market... The only recognised form of competition 
against the bus were other buses" (Wolmar, 1998: 171-172). Despite Ridley's efforts, the 
bus industry is now characterised by very little intra-modal competition, as the NBC's 
successor companies recognise the futility of `bus wars' and for the most part respect and 
avoid each other's territories (Wolmar, 1998). Attempting to introduce competition into the 
bus market was thus a largely superfluous exercise, often creating instability and uncertainty 
rather than service improvements and market growth. The fact that BR's share of the 
overall transport market was small, and in addition that it required an annual subsidy of 
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around £1 billion, should have alerted the Conservatives to the likelihood of on-track 
competition having a similar impact in the rail market. Had bus and rail privatisation been 
considered as part of a wider neoliberal transport strategy, creating a level playing field 
between road and rail, liberalising the NBC and BR's markets might have been a more 
feasible proposition. But such a radical policy approach was always unlikely. There are, of 
course, both practical and political limitations to the application of theories of political 
economy. 
Whatever the inappropriateness of the track authority model of rail privatisation, the Blair 
administration has had to review its future policy options carefully. Renationalisation was 
not an option as it would have involved considerable wasted expenditure. Under European 
law, the businesses sold outright could only be bought back at their current market values 
and these are significantly higher than they were at privatisation. Furthermore, the level of 
investment needed in the rail industry outstrips that which any UK government would be 
prepared to undertake. It could be argued that successive administrations, both Labour and 
Conservative, have viewed the railways as a low priority and starved BR of investment 
capital, and there is no reason to suppose this would change. One benefit of privatisation is 
that it frees industry from public sector financial constraints, so the rail companies are able 
to raise their own investment capital from the financial markets. The government has also 
had to ensure that any changes it does implement will not significantly alter the structure of 
the railway. Despite the expense and complexity of the current regime, further restructuring 
will only create more uncertainty within the industry. As Chris Green, former InterCity 
director and now chief executive at Virgin Trains, has pointed out, various reorganisations 
over the past two decades have forced British railway managers to concentrate too much on 
implementing new industry structures - perhaps at the expense of actually running the 
railway (Shaw, 1999). 
Labour's `third way' approach, suggesting that the answer lies in tougher state guidance 
rather than either nationalisation or free-marketeering, seems sensible in theory and is being 
welcomed by many in the industry, including some respondents. A Strategic Rail Authority 
(SRA) has been established to assume all of the Franchising Director's and some of the 
Regulator's duties, as well as to provide decisive leadership for the myriad railway 
companies. The SRA is currently operating in shadow form as primary legislation is needed 
before it can formally begin its task, although policy details are currently being formulated in 
anticipation of a start in spring 2000. It is hoped that the strategic vision the government is 
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promising will contribute significantly to the future success of the railway, but it will only do 
so if ministers learn from the experience of the original privatisation and carefully think out 
their strategy first. In the short-term, the SRA needs to concentrate on developing tougher 
standards of performance. Passenger's charters currently allow TOCs to run trains up to 10 
minutes late and claim they are on time. Moreover, operators can `stretch' their timetables if 
they think that certain trains will be delayed, and this has resulted in advertised journey 
times between certain stations increasing beyond those of 100 years ago (Leake and 
Macaskill, 1998). The list of shortcomings in TOC regulation is considerable and will 
occupy the minds of SRA staff for some time to come. In the longer term, it is suggested 
that rail policy be formulated with reference to the wider context of the transport market as 
a whole. Although not addressed in this thesis, it would also seem sensible that 
environmental and social objectives play a key role in determining both the SRA's and the 
Regulator's agenda. The effective regulation of Railtrack, the only true monopoly left in the 
industry, will be crucial in ensuring sufficient investment in the infrastructure is forthcoming 
to support these wider objectives. 
In terms of market liberalisation, the most appropriate course of action might be to continue 
with franchising, but to abandon CCICM stage two, at least for the time being. Competition 
in the market might, at some future stage, become viable in more areas across the network 
and could then be re-introduced on a case by case basis. What is certain, however, is that 
future research into railway competition will be essential in helping the regulatory 
authorities take decisions on the matter. It was noted in chapter one that this study did not 
set out to undertake an exhaustive analysis of railway competition in terms of its impact 
upon service output. Such research is now required with some urgency. Even if CCICM 
stage two is dropped, pockets of on-rail competition will remain around the network as 
described in chapter six. The effect of each or all of these can be measured to ascertain in 
detail their costs and benefits line by line. What are the implications of on-rail competition 
along different types of corridors? How does it affect the quality and frequency of services 
along those corridors, and does it impact detrimentally on services in other areas? What 
effect could on-rail competition have on local or regional socio-economic development? 
Finally, what is the perception of rail users towards on-rail competition? Do customers want 
a choice of trains between destinations or, as a respondent suggested (see section 7.3.2), 
will this give rise to unnecessary confusion and detract from rail's appeal to potential 
customers (see also Bradshaw, 1997a)? The method of rail privatisation adopted by the 
Conservatives to liberalise BR's market has been only partially successful. Whilst 
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franchising has much to commend it, on-rail competition is not an appropriate policy goal at 
present. Ministers wanted to introduce on-rail competition because they thought it would 
bring benefits to rail passengers and taxpayers alike, but they failed to research the potential 
implications of the track authority model in sufficient detail before its implementation. It is 
the responsibility of the new government to ensure a similar mistake is not repeated in the 
future. 
This thesis has examined the policy adopted to promote competition in the British passenger 
railway industry. Its central aim was to assess the extent to which the promotion of 
competition between passenger train operators was an appropriate policy goal. In pursuit of 
this aim, the thesis critically evaluated the evolution, outcome and future prospects of rail 
liberalisation policy and closely examined the translation of neoliberal political philosophy 
into practical policy measures. The study's original investigation, which used qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis to draw upon the experiences of key personnel 
involved in framing, executing and operating within the policy, augmented secondary data 
to provide an in-depth level of analysis not previously available within the literature. The 
main findings were that, despite the sale of BR having been considered by the government 
for more than a decade, the privatisation and liberalisation strategy advanced by the 1992 
White Paper, New Opportunities for the Railways, was not the result of a coherent policy 
analysis. The opportunities for, and even appropriateness of, a neoliberal agenda to promote 
competition between train operators were not sufficiently well understood by government 
when the proposals were adopted. Competition for the market, nevertheless, would appear 
to be a workable and successful policy option, with the scope to offer long-term benefits to 
the rail industry should future governments choose to seek them. Competition in the 
market, on the other hand, is far less appropriate and continued emphasis on this aspect of 
rail policy could damage the industry's prospects in the coming years. The success of 
franchising seems to have occurred despite the muddled circumstances in which the 
Conservatives formulated rail privatisation policy, whereas the general failure of `on-rail' 
competition seems to reflect them. 
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Appendix one 
Schedule used to interview franchise bidders 
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Section A: Interviews with franchise bidders 
The central aim of this research project is to evaluate whether or not the promotion of 
competition was a viable policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. This series of 
interviews is designed to examine bidders' perceptions and attitudes towards the 
competitive tendering process used to award TOC franchises. I would like to record the 
interview for logistical reasons, although confidentiality is of course guaranteed. 
Questions will focus on: the competitiveness of the bidding process; the openness or 
otherwise of the tendering process; clarity of OPRAF's criteria for awarding franchises; 
consistency with these criteria of winning franchise bids; the independence (from 
government) of the process; the speed at which franchising was conducted and whether this 
affected the outcome; overall benefits/shortcomings with the system, for both your company 
and the consumer; what you would like to see altered next time around. 
The interview will comprise a limited number of open-ended questions, to which you will be 
invited to respond in as much depth as you feel necessary to make your points. It will last 
between 45 minutes and one hour. 
Section B: Preparing to bid 
I should first like to discuss your attitudes regarding the bid submission process in relation 
to your decision to tender for a franchise(s). 
1. Was the bidding process logical and clearly explained by OPRAF? Why/why not? 
- Were sufficient instructions provided as to exactly what you should submit 
etc? 
- Did these instructions change over time? 
2. How far do you feel sufficient information was available as to the nature of the business 
on offer? 
- Did (for example) the lack of PSRs until late in the bidding process, or the 
possibility of a change in government, affect your understanding of what you 
were bidding for? 
3. What are your thoughts about OPRAF preventing bids from BR for the first 14 
franchises? 
- Why? Would you still have submitted bids had BR been involved in the process? 
4. Several Mebo teams submitted bids with some financial security provided by the BRB. Is 
there therefore a difference between a Mebo bid and one from the Board? 
- What and why? 
Section C: Awarding franchises 
5. How well did OPRAF outline the criteria on which they would award franchises? 
- What did you perceive these criteria to be? 
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6. In what order of preference do you think OPRAF held these criteria? 
- Did your interpretation of this order of preference remain constant or did it 
change with time? 
- Presumably your interpretation, whether static or dynamic, influenced your 
bidding strategy? How? 
7. Is it feasible that other bidders would have interpreted OPRAF's preferences in a similar 
manner to you? 
- What, therefore, do you see as the consequences of these interpretations? 
Key issues to prod: levels of investment, franchise length (and the relationship 
between these two). 
8. Do you believe the allocation of franchises was influenced by factors other than bid 
quality? 
- Government interference, opposition policy etc? 
Section D: Prospect and retrospect 
Bearing in mind our discussion so far, I would like to ask you a few questions about your 
overall perceptions of the process 
9. What comments do you have regarding the pace at which the franchising process was 
conducted? 
- How did this affect the outcome? 
10. How far do you think the franchising process was coherent? Why? 
- Was this related to the speed at which it was conducted? 
11. Roger Salmon, whilst giving evidence to the CPA in 1996, said that "most of our 
unsuccessful bidders come back again; they have a lot of confidence in the system. " What is 
your reaction to that statement? 
- Prod for an answer relating to all bidders as well as their own company 
12. How effective was the franchising process as a mechanism of generating competition 
between bidders? Why? 
13. Did the level of competitiveness between bidders change as the process evolved? 
- Is there an identifiable pattern in terms of the bids' competitiveness? Why? 
- Are some successful bidders therefore going to have a harder task than others to 
operate profitably? 
14. When framing your bid, did you bear in mind the threat of on-rail competition? 
- Did you alter your bid because of it? 
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15. Has the franchising process benefited the consumer? 
- Both in terms of improvements over and above what BR were already going 
to do and than a different method of sale? 
16. Has the franchising process benefited the industry? 
- Is it a key component to the future success of the industry? 
- Is it appropriate? 
17. When the current generation of franchises expire, should they be re-tendered or dealt 
with in a different manner? 
- Sold outright? Kept in public ownership? 
- What is your long-term strategy? Will you be bidding again? 
I8. Keeping in mind all we have discussed, and presuming that TOCs will be re-franchised, 
what, if anything, would you like to see changed in the next round of franchising? 
I have now finished my questions. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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Schedule used to interview TOC managers 
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Section A: Interviews with key Train Operating Companies' personnel 
The central aim of this research project is to evaluate whether or not the promotion of 
competition was a viable policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. This interview is 
designed to examine the attitudes, perceptions and experiences of TOCs' management in 
this area. I would like to record the interview for logistical reasons, although confidentiality 
is of course guaranteed. 
I should like to discuss competition in the market, where TOCs provide a number of 
competing on-rail services. Questions will focus on: the extent to which competition exists 
between TOCs; the future prospects for on-rail competition; the appropriateness of 
competition in the passenger train service industry; the extent to which competition 
influences your business and whether this has changed since privatisation. 
The interview will comprise a limited number of open-ended questions, to which you will be 
invited to respond in as much depth as you feel necessary to make your points. It will last 
between 45 minutes and one hour. 
Section B: General introduction 
1. What would you say were the key objectives of the Conservative government in framing 
the 1993 Railways Act? 
- Both in terms of what they wanted to achieve and the methods used? 
2. The Rail Regulator believes that, because of the current territorial geography of TOCs, 
there are `many opportunities for [TOCs] to compete, both on price and service quality'. 
What are your thoughts about that statement? 
- What form does competition take? 
- What factors limit/promote it? Only regulation, or operator (un)willingness 
too? 
- Any more than under the BR sectors? Was it worth restructuring for 
competition, then? 
3. What are the prospects for competition developing between operators in the future? 
- What form will this take? 
- What factors will limit/promote it? 
Section C: TOC-specific questions 
4. Who or what do you regard as your main competitor? Why? 
- Has this changed since privatisation? 
5. Do you compete with other TOCs? 
- If so, which ones and how? 
- ORCATS? 
6. Have you introduced new train services which compete with other operators? 
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- What about other initiatives? 
- How many of these are 'carry-ons'from what BR was already planning? 
- ORCATS? 
7. Do you work in co-operation with other TOCs you could in fact compete with? 
- How and why? Bear in mind size of market, fragility, what would happen if 
you did get into aggressive competition? 
8. To what extent does the prospect/threat of on-rail competition impact upon your business 
plan? 
- At the time of bidding? For the future? 
- Positive/negative/no effect? Why? 
9. Bearing in mind our discussion so far, do you think (lack of) competition between 
operators has benefited the consumer? 
- Has privatisation enabled TOCs to become more competitive with other modes of 
transport than BR was? 
- Has this benefited the rail user? Wales and West/Virgin example? 
10. What are your opinions regarding the regulatory framework within which you operate? 
- Controlled competition in contestable markets? 
- Other regulation from OPRAF/ORR. Is it flexible? Is it effective? From whose 
point of view? Why? 
Section D: The future 
11. Do you think the current restrictions to open access competition should be relaxed in 
1999? Why/why not? 
- What about a further relaxation in 2002? Pace of change? 
12. How will you, as a company, react to this change? 
13. Who do you see being the operators being most likely to benefit from a relaxation of 
CCICM? Why? 
- Who will open access operators be? TOCs or new entrants? 
13. How far do you think that competition between TOCs is a key component to the future 
success of the industry? 
- What other components? Co-operation? 
- Is competition appropriate? 
14. Will competition between operators benefit the consumer? 
- Was it worth restructuring for competition, then? 
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15. I contend that competition between operators is to all intents and purposes absent and is 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. How far do you agree with this statement? 
I have now finished my questions. Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Appendix three 
Example of schedule used to interview policy makers 
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Section A: Interviews with key policvmakers/advisors 
The central aim of this research project is to evaluate whether or not the promotion of 
competition was a viable policy goal in the privatisation of British Rail. This series of 
interviews is designed to broaden understanding of rail privatisation policy formulation by 
investigating the roles and recollections of key actors involved in the process. I would like 
to record the interview for logistical reasons, although confidentiality is of course 
guaranteed. 
Questions will focus on: your/your Department's role in the policy making process; the 
relative balance of power between different groups of decision makers (e. g. Ministers, civil 
servants, advisors, different Departments) during policy formulation; the relative importance 
of market liberalisation as an influencing factor in policy evolution; the mechanisms used to 
promote, and the difficulties recognised with using, competition as an organising principle 
for the passenger train service industry. 
The interview will comprise a limited number of open-ended questions, to which you will be 
invited to respond in as much depth as you feel necessary to make your points. It will last 
between 45 minutes and one hour. 
1. When did you first become aware of the government's plans to sell BR? 
2. When did the Treasury become involved, and in what capacity? 
(Other respondents have hinted at a very influential role for the Treasury. Probe in 
particular the Freeman/Maude/Redwood Working Party. ) 
3. Would it be fair to say that a key objective in the White Paper was to promote 
competition in the passenger railway industry? 
- Clarify where. Between TOCs and between bidders? 
- How strenuously was this pursued within government, and by whom 
particularly? 
(Note that others have said it came from the Treasury. ) 
4. Was competition between TOCs seen as viable? 
- By who? What was the Treasury's opinion on this? 
5. What was the Treasury's working relationship with other Departments like? 
- was the policy making exercise coherent? 
(Point out accusations of `dominance' and that the process was a shambles. ) 
6. When was it realised, and who realised, that competition in the market was not 
compatible with competition for the market? 
- Was ideology being pushed at the expense of practicality? 
7. What was the Treasury's influence on CCICM? 
- Did you agree with it? Why/why not? 
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- Did you suggest an alternative? Why did you agree to it? 
- Isn't it the case that you could get more money (or pay out less in subsidy) 
for monopolies? 
8. What about the Treasury's involvement with the structure and sale of franchises? 
- How independent was the Franchising Director in deciding what criteria he 
would award them by? How did the Treasury interpret `value for money' in 
this sense? 
- How long did the Treasury want them to be? 
- Did the Treasury support the long-term commitment to franchises? 
(Mention accusations of `breathing down the neck of the FD'. ) 
9. How would you like to see competition, both for and in the market, develop in the 
passenger railway industry? 
10. In retrospect, was the method used the correct one from the Treasury's perspective? 
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Appendix four 
BR Businesses franchised/sold/closed. 
Sources: Curwen, 1997; Department of Transport, 1996; Modern Railways 1996,1997, 
1998a, 1998b. 
227 
Company and group (now trading as) Date sold Owner 
TOC 
South West Trains 19/12/95 Stagecoach Holdings 
Great Western (First Great Western) 20/12/95 FirstGroup 
LTS Rail 08/05/96 Prism Rail 
interCity East Coast (GNER) 29/03/96 Sea Containers 
Gatwick Express 03/04/96 National Express Group 
Network SouthCentral (Convex South Central) 12/04/96 CGEA 
Midland Main Line 22/04/96 National Express Group 
Chiltern Railways 25/06/96 M40 Trains 
South Eastern (Convex South Eastern) 21/08/96 CGEA 
South Wales and West (Wales and West) 17/09/96 Prism Rail 
Cardiff Railways 17/09/96 Prism Rail 
Island Line 13/10/96 Stagecoach Holdings 
Thames Trains 19/10/96 Go-Ahead 
CrossCountry Trains (Virgin Trains) 28/11/96 Virgin Rail Group 
Great Eastern 03/12/96 FirstGroup 
West Anglia Great Northern 05/12/96 Prism Rail 
Anglia Railways 05/12/96 GB Railways 
Merseyrail Elearics 20/12/96 MTL Trustholdings 
North West Regional Railways (Fast North Western) 04/02/97 FirstGroup 
North London Railways (Silverlink) 07/02/97 National Express Group 
Regional Railways North East (Northern Spirit) 10/02/97 MTL Trustholdings 
Thameslink 11/02/97 GoVia 
Central Trains 17/02/97 National Express Group 
IntetCity West Coast (Virgin Trains) 09/02/97 Virgin Rail Group 
ScotRail Railways 25/02/97 National Express Group 
Freight 
Red Star Parcels 05/09/95 Rald (MBO 
Rail Express Systems 09/12/95 EWS 
Mainline Fright 24/02/96 EWS 
Loadhaul 24/02/96 EWS 
Transrail Freight 24/02196 EWS 
Freightliner 25/05/96 MCB (MBO)' 
Railfreight Distribution 13/03/97 EWS 
Rosco 
Porterbrook LeasingW 08/01/96 MEBO 
Angel Train Contracts' 16/01/96 Nomura/Babcock et al 
Eversholt Leasing (Forward Trust Rail)" 02/02/96 Candover Partners/MBO 
GoCo 
Railtrack 20/05/96 Stock market flotation 
Union Railways" 31/05/96 London & Continental 
Railways 
European Passenger Services 31/05/96 London & Continental 
Railways 
BRIS 
DCU Birmingham (Owen Williams Railways) 25/07/95 Owen Williams 
IDG Glasgow 18/08/95 Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick 
Mainline Swindon (Scott Wilson Mainline) 18/08/95 Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick 
Civil Engineering Design Group (CEDG York) 15/09/95 British Steel 
BPE Mechanical & Electrical Engineering Consultancy (BPE 15/09/95 James Scott (AMEC) 
Engineering) 
CEDAC (W S Atkins Rail (CEDAC)) 15/12/95 WS Atkins Consultants 
Powertrack Engineering (W S Atkins Power Track) 15/12/95 WS Atkins Consultants 
Scotland Track Renewals 08/02/96 Relayfast (MBO) 
Scotland Infrastructure Maintenance (Fast Engineering) 14/02/96 First Engineering (MBO) 
Central Track Renewals (Centrac) 29/02/96 Tarmac 
Eastern Track Renewals 15/03/96 Fastline Track Renewals 
(MBO) 
Western Infrastructure Maintenance (Amey Railways) 25/03/96 Amey/MBO 
South East Infrastructure Maintenance 02/04/96 Balfour Beatty/MBO 
Eastern Infrastructure maintenance 02/04/96 Balfour Beatty 
Southern Track Renewals 02/0496 Balfour Beatty 
South West Infrastructure Maintenance (SWIMCO) 18/04/96 AMEC 
Central Infrastructure Maintenance (GT Railway Maintenance) 19/04/96 GEC AlsthomlTarmac 
Northern Track Renewals 23/05/96 Fastline Group (MEBO) 
Northern Inftstructure Maintenance (Jarvis Facilities) 18/06/96 Jarvis 
Western Track Renewals 23/07/96 Relayfast (MBO) 
BRML 
Swindon Electronic Service Centre (ABB Daimler-Benz 13/(4/95 ABB Customer Support 
Transportation) Services 
Chart beacon Level 5 Depot (ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation) 05/06/95 ABB Customer Support 
Services 
Doncaster BRML Depot (ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation) 05/06/95 ABB Customer Support 
Services 
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IlFord Level 5 Depot (ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation) 05/06/95 ABB Customer Support 
Services 
Springbum BRML Depot (Railcare) 06/06/95 Babcock/Siemens 
Wolverton BRML Depot 06/06/95 Babcock/Siemens 
Eastleigh BRML Depot 07/06/95 Wessex Traincare (MBO) 
Central 
Meldon Quarry 04/03/94 ECC Construction Materials 
Special Trains Unit 31/01/95 Flying Scotsman Railways 
Baileyfield Switches and Crossings Works 07/07/95 VAE-Baileyfield 
Ditton Timber Treatment Works 01/09/95 The Phoenix Timber Group 
OBS Services Ltd 03/10/95 European Rail Catering 
(MBO) 
Quality & Safety Service 10/11/95 Ingleby (805) Ltd (MBO) 
Railway Occupational Health 30/11/95 Occupational Health Care 
Signalling Control (UK) 01/12/95 BTR (Westinghouse Signals) 
BR Telecommunications (Racal BRT) 21/12/95 Racal Electronics 
Interlogic Control Engineering 04/01/96 ABB Daimler-Benz 
Transportation 
Castleton Works (British Steel Track Products) 14/03/96 British Steel 
The Engineering Link 18/03/96 Chief Policy Ltd 
Interfleet Technology 22/03/96 Bromco 909 (MBO) 
College of Railway Technology 29/03/96 Advicepart (MBO) 
Network Train Engineering Services 01/04/96 WS Atkins (Consultants) 
BR Projects 26/06/96 Addspice Ltd (MBO) 
Scientifics 09/12/96 Atesta Group 
British Rail Research 20/12/96 AEA Technology 
Nationwide Fire Services 06/01/97 Serco 
BR Business Systems 03/02/97 Sema 
National Railway Supplies (including Collector's Comer) 03/02/97 MEBO/Unipart 
Rail Operational Research 04/02/97 BR Projects Ltd (MBO) 
Opal Engineering 13/02/97 WS Atkins (Consultants) 
Railtest 14/02/97 Serco 
Railpart UK 06/03/97 Unipart 
BRIL Not yet sold 
Businesses closed 
Crewe Timber Works 25/03/94 
Newton Heath Concrete Works 25/03/94 
Crofton Track Works, Wakefield 25/03/94 
Architecture & Design 31/03/94 
Haulmark 30/09/94 
Brighton Fabrication Works 25/11/94 
Shettlestone Fabrication Works 23/12/94 
Taunton Concrete Works 02/02/95 
The Grove Management School 16/02/95 
Materials Technology, Derby 31/03/95 
Materials Engineering Group 31/12/95 
Railnews 30/10/96 
First procurement 31/12/96 
British Railways Savings Co 31/03/97 
i Sale includes the promise of a subsidy totalling £75 million and a five year track access agreement with 
Railtrack 
Ownership finally transferred to EWS on 22-11-97 after an EU enquiry. 
Sold on to Stagecoach for £825 million. 
Sold on to Royal Bank of Scotland for £395 million. 
" Sold on to Forward Trust for £726.5 million. 
" Union Railways and European Passenger Services were both given to London and Continental Railways 
after their winning bid to build the CTRL. 
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Appendix five 
Summary of mechanistic approaches to access charging assessed by the Rail Regulator in 
1994. Source: ORR, 1994b 
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Negotiated Charges required Railtrack to estimate its total future revenue requirement, and 
then deduct anticipated income from (among other things) access charges expected to be 
paid from non-franchised operators. TOCs would, between them, meet the remaining 
`control cost'. Meanwhile, Railtrack would have an incentive to encourage non-franchised 
operators onto the network - who would pay a negotiated charge - in order to increase its 
revenue above the control cost. This approach to charging was seen as a means "both of 
maximising the use of the network and of maximising financial contributions towards it - 
both highly desirable objectives" (ORR, 1994a: 11). However, aside from the fact that 
negotiations between Railtrack and non-franchised operators might fail to capture the full 
amount of their potential contribution, or even discourage open access entry to the 
network, a major shortcoming of the negotiated charges regime was that it made no attempt 
to moderate competition. If non-franchised operators did abound, then the problems of 
escalating subsidy bills and/or absence of bids for franchises would have occurred. 
Equalised Access Charges envisaged that all operators, whether a TOC or non-franchised, 
would pay the same price per unit of operation for access to a particular route. The `unit of 
operation' might comprise train miles, vehicle miles or passenger revenues. Analysis 
undertaken by the ORR for a typical InterCity TOC showed that using train miles as the unit 
of operation created an almost complete barrier to entry, whilst using vehicle miles created 
virtually no barrier at all and would have exposed the incumbent's income in a manner 
similar to the negotiated charges regime. The use of passenger revenues would have been 
equally problematic. Because Railtrack's costs represent at least 40 per cent of all passenger 
revenues, train operators would have had an incentive to cease operating services which 
earned, on average, a margin of less than 40 per cent over direct operating costs. Such a 
scenario would have required detailed timetable specifications (in considerable excess of 
those included in PSRs) to prevent this happening, thus, as the Regulator pointed out, 
entrenching inflexibility instead of removing it. 
Access Deficit Charges represented a different approach to the above models. The charges 
would contain some of the risks a TOC might face from competition by requiring new 
entrants to compensate incumbents for their reduced capacity to cross-subsidise services. 
This type of charge was first considered in the railway industry in 1991, when the Virgin 
Group expressed a desire to run services from London to Edinburgh in competition with 
British Rail (House of Commons Papers, 1992d). However, the calculation of an access 
deficit charge would have raised problems of practicality because of the extreme difficulty in 
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Appendix six 
Duplicated route miles on the British passenger rail network. 
Source: Railtrack, 1998 
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Route Competition ? Operator(s) 
Barking/Upminster - No LTS Rail 
Benfleet/Southend 
Birmingham - Edinburgh No Virgin Trains 
Birmingham - Leamington Spa Yes Central Trains, Virgin Trains, 
Wales and West 
Birmingham - Stafford Yes Virgin Trains, Central Trains 
Birmingham - Smethwick No Central Trains (Centro) 
Birmingham - Worcester Yes Central Trains, Wales and West 
Cardiff - Cheltenham/Birmingham Yes Wales and West, Virgin Trains 
Cardiff - Radyr No Valley Lines 
Clapham Junction - Staines No South West Trains 
Didcot - Worcester Yes Thames Trains, Great Western 
Edinburgh - Perth Yes Virgin Trains, ScotRail 
Gatwick - Barnham No Connex South Central 
Glasgow - Carlisle Yes Virgin Trains, ScotRail 
Glasgow - Edinburgh Yes ScotRail/Virgin Trains 
Glasgow - Motherwell Yes ScotRail (SPT)/Virgin Trains 
Glasgow - Dalmuir No ScotRail (SPT) 
Glasgow - Newton No ScotRail (SPT) 
Glasgow - Springbum No ScotRail (SPT) 
Leeds - Bradford Yes North Western Trains, Regional 
Railways North East 
Liverpool - Chester/Ellesmere Port Yes Merseyrail Electrics, North Western 
Trains 
Liverpool - Hunts Cross Yes Merseyrail Electrics, Central Trains 
Liverpool - Manchester Yes North Western Trains, Regional 
Railways North East, Central 
Trains 
Liverpool - Preston No North Western Trains 
Liverpool - Wigan No North Western Trains 
London - Beckenham Junction No Connex South Central/Eastern 
London - Birmingham Yes Virgin Trains/Silverlink, Chiltern 
Railways 
London - Clapham Yes Connex South Central/Eastern, 
South West Trains 
London - Croydon Yes Thameslink, Connex South Central, 
Connex South Eastern 
London - Epsom Yes South West Trains, Thameslink 
London - Exeter Yes Great Western, South West Trains 
London - Glasgow Yes Virgin Trains, GNER 
London - Havant/Portsmouth Yes Connex South Central, South West 
Trains 
London - Herne Hill Yes Thameslink, Connex South Eastern 
London - Reading Yes Great Western, Thames Trains, 
Virgin Trains, South West Trains 
London - Leeds/Wakefield Yes GNER, Midland Main Line 
London - Southend Yes LTS Rail, Great Eastern 
London - Stevenage Yes GNER, WAGN 
London - Streatham Yes Thameslink, Connex South Central 
London - Sutton 
Yes Thameslink, Connex South Central 
London - Wimbledon Yes Connex South Central, South West 
Trains 
London - Ashford No Connex South Central/Eastern 
London - Aylesbury No Chiltern Railways 
London - Bromley 
No Connex South Eastern 
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London - Broxbourne No WAGN 
London - Cambridge No WAGN 
London - Canterbury No Connex South Eastern 
London - Catford No Connex South Eastern 
London - Charlton No Connex South Eastern 
London - Dartford No Connex South Eastern 
London - Dover No Connex South Eastern 
London - Finsbury Park No WAGN 
London - Horsham No Connex South Central 
London - Lewisham No Connex South Eastern 
London - Maidstone No Connex South Eastern 
London - Margate/Ramsgate No Connex South Eastern 
London - Minster No Connex South Eastern 
London - Orpington No Connex South Eastern 
London - Peckham/Denmark Hill No Connex South Central/Eastern 
London - Penge No Connex South Central/Eastern 
London - Rochester/Chatham No Connex South Eastern 
London - Sevenoaks No Connex South Eastern 
London - Twickenham No South West Trains 
Loughborough - Chesterfield Yes Central Trains, Midland Mainline 
Manchester - Bristol Yes Wales and West, Virgin Trains 
Manchester - Chester No North Western Trains 
Manchester - Leeds No Regional Railways North East 
Manchester - Sheffield Yes North Western Trains, Regional 
Railways North East, Central 
Trains 
Manchester - Stafford/Birmingham No Virgin Trains 
Manchester - Rochdale No Regional Railways North East 
Manchester - Wigan No North Western Trains 
Milton Keynes - Rugby Yes Virgin Trains, Silverlink 
Norwich - Great Yarmouth No Anglia 
Preston - Blackpool Yes North Western Trains, Regional 
Railways North East, Virgin Trains 
Surbiton - Guildford No South West Trains 
Wakefield - Castleford No Regional Railways North East 
Wakefield - Sheffield Yes Midland Mainline, Regional 
Railways North East 
Wimbledon - Effingham Junction No South West Trains 
York - Leeds Yes Virgin Trains, Regional Railways North East 
York - Sheffield Yes Virgin Trains, Regional Railways North East 
York - Selby No Regional Railways North East 
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Regulation and continuing 
monopoly on Britain's railways 
Clive Charlton, Richard Gibb and Jon Shaw 
Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK 
One of the key objectives of rail privatization was to dismantle British Rail's (BR's) 
monopoly and introduce a competitive spirit into the industry. In order to achieve this, BR 
was fragmented into 92 separate companies. This restructuring is now complete and, at the 
time of writing, slightly more than two-thirds of these new companies have been divested. 
Despite this, the government is taking regulatory steps to prevent the competition it wanted to 
promote and there are signs that a private monopoly has already begun to rise from the 
ashes of the public one. This paper explores the government's apparently paradoxical regula- 
tory stance and questions the necessity of such a major restructuring exercise within the 
railway industry. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Keywords: railways, privatization, competition, regulation, de-regulation 
Introduction 
In 1992, the Government published its White Paper 
New Opportunities for the Railways (Department of 
Transport, 1992) with a view to radically restructuring 
British Rail (BR) in preparation for privatization. A 
principal objective of the White Paper was to improve 
the quality of railway services through the promotion 
of competition. In order to facilitate this, BR was 
fragmented to form a complex new industry structure 
comprising 92 separate companies (Department of 
Transport, 1996). However, despite having adopted a 
fiercely pro-competitive stance throughout the formula- 
tion of its rail privatization policy, the government is 
now taking regulatory steps to try and prevent competi- 
tion. Through this policy of regulation, one of the 
principal objectives of the rail privatization exercise 
appears to have been lost, as most customers are still 
dealing with a monopoly service provider just as in the 
days of BR. 
It is a central contention of the present paper that 
meaningful competition has not, and will not, 
materialize in the railway industry whilst the govern- 
ment continues to encourage an extensive regulatory 
regime. It is also suggested that, as such, the complex 
restructuring exercise undertaken to end BR's 
monopoly was probably unnecessary. This paper will 
therefore examine the initial thinking behind competi- 
tion in the railway industry, the methodology used to 
try and promote it, and the subsequent regulation 
imposed to ensure its prevention. Evidence presented 
in the last section of this paper suggests that BR's 
public monopoly, rather than being replaced by a 
myriad of competing companies, has begun to 
re-emerge both spatially and structurally in private 
hands. 
Why competition? 
Achieving the theoretical benefits of competition in a 
free market-increased efficiency, greater choice and 
so on-is a stated goal of the Conservative Party's 
privatization policy (Conservative Party, 1992). The 
government suggests it has returned much of Britain's 
formerly nationalized industry to the free market 
(Conservative Party, 1992), but this assertion would be 
contested by many in that utilities such as British 
Telecom, British Gas and the water industry were 
privatized as regulated monopolies. However, begin- 
ning with the divestiture of the electricity industry, the 
government began thinking more radically in order to 
secure a genuine movement towards market liberaliza- 
tion. Some freedom was introduced into the market by 
splitting up the generating business into a number of 
competing companies (Wharmby, 1993). Now the 
regional electricity supply companies can buy their 
electricity from a host of different generators in a truly 
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free market and, according to the government, benefits 
are passed on to all involved. 
The same benefits were envisaged by the government 
for rail users. Customers travelling from, say, Exeter to 
London would be in a position to choose between 
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and, by virtue of 
competition, receive a better service from either 
operator than available under the monopolized BR. 
Presumably, competition was also seen to offer PTEs 
and other such organizations a better deal. Take, for 
example, Centro, the operating arm of the West 
Midlands Passenger Transport Authority. Before rail 
privatization, Centro had to contract BR to operate its 
services. The Department of Transport (1992) 
observed: 
.. at present ... there is no choice of operator for the rail 
customer ... 
[however] liberalising access to the network 
will complement structural changes by providing the oppor- 
tunity for new operators to run services' (Department of 
Transport, 1992, p. 13). 
Therefore, as a result of the privatization process, 
Centro should in theory be free to contract whichever 
train operator offers it the most appropriate service 
arrangements, thus passing the benefits of competition 
onto rail users and taxpayers alike. 
In 1992, the government was enthusiastically 
endorsing the benefits to be derived from a competi- 
tive, privatized railway system. New Opportunities for 
the Railways promulgated that the new industry struc- 
ture would `improve the quality of railway services by 
creating many new opportunities for ... more competi- 
tion' (Department of Transport, 1992, p. 13). The Rail 
Regulator, who was appointed by the government to 
oversee corporate interaction within the new structure, 
was in `no doubt that the promotion of competition 
[will be] of fundamental importance to the future of 
the railway industry' (Office of the Rail Regulator, 
1994a, p. ii). In order to create a competitive environ- 
ment within the railway industry, however, the Govern- 
ment needed to find a way of ending BR's monopoly. 
In the event, it essentially experimented further with 
the methodology it employed whilst divesting the 
electricity industry and BR was fragmented into 92 
separate companies (Department of Transport, 1996). 
The structure of the new railway, devised to facilitate 
competition, is examined below. 
The structure of the new railway 
The methodology used by the Government to break 
BR's monopoly revolves around a common carrier 
(CC). The advantage of this methodology in BR's case 
was that it allowed the monopoly to be broken without 
the need for an entirely new infrastructure. This was 
achieved by separating ownership of infrastructure 
from service provision. The infrastructure owner is the 
CC because it provides customers with access to its 
assets (i. e. it `carries' them). The CC's customers are 
companies who in turn compete to offer their services 
to the public. 
In order to maintain its infrastructure, the common 
carrier must contract work out to suppliers through a 
system of competitive tendering. Although the CC is 
clearly still a monopoly, its significance is diminutive 
compared to its vertically-integrated predecessor. 
Furthermore, given that access provision is its 
dominant source of revenue, the CC is usually subject 
to market pressures via a financial incentive scheme 
which encourages the reliability of the network. In 
essence, then, the CC is a monopolistic fulcrum around 
which the competitive remainder of the industry can 
organize itself. 
In the British railway industry the CC is Railtrack. 
Railtrack has charge of the infrastructure (track, 
signalling, bridges, stations and so on), train-timeta- 
bling and the overall safety of the network. It is also 
obligated to both maintain and invest in the infrastruc- 
ture, and its operations are divided regionally into 
seven zones (Gibb et al, 1996). The remainder of the 
industry consists of a multitude of companies whose 
collective functions are to operate train services and 
fulfil any `support' duties required by the industry as a 
whole. To assist clarity, we have divided these 
companies into groups based upon the functions they 
would have performed under the BR regime (see 
Table 1). Within each group, individual companies are 
theoretically free to compete with each other to 
provide services to other groups on a commercial, 
contractual basis (Department of Transport, 1994). 
The interaction between these groups is represented in 
Figure 1. 
Whereas under BR all aspects of running the railway 
were dealt with by one company, it is apparent from 
Figure 1 that, in order to function within the new 
railway structure, a company must contract with many, 
if not all, of the other company-groups. The average 
TOC is used as an example: in the first instance, it 
Table 1 Company groups as defined by their functions within 
British Rail. After Department of Transport (1996) 
Central e. g. consultancies, research and telecommunica- 
tions services 
TOC Train Operating Companies running passenger 
services 
BRIS British Rail Infrastructure Services; e. g. track 
renewal/maintenance 
BRML British Rail Maintenance Limited; e. g. rolling 
stock maintenance/construction 
Freight Goods haulage companies 
RoSCO Rolling stock leasing companies 
GoCo Railtrack, Union Railways and European 
Passenger Services. Ownership was transferred 
from BR directly to central government before 
privatization (the latter two have now been 
combined as part of the Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link deal). 
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Figure 1 The interaction between company-groups in the new railway structure. 
must procure rolling stock. This it can do from a 
RoSCO. The TOC must then negotiate access to the 
infrastructure with Railtrack. Whilst doing this, it will 
normally also make arrangements to lease the majority 
of stations and depots situated upon its route network. 
The TOC is then in a position to offer the use of its 
stations to other TOCs with whom it shares route 
miles, and its depots to RoSCOs to undertake light 
rolling stock maintenance. Finally, the TOC will have 
to enter into various contractual agreements with 
Central group companies in order to secure support 
services such as telecommunications. As well as liaising 
with other ex-BR businesses, the average TOC will also 
involve itself with non-railway actors, such as local 
authorities. The latter will be the case in major conur- 
bations, through the funding of rail services operated 
by PTEs, and also in rural areas, in terms of station 
construction or rail-oriented tourism partnerships (see, 
for example, Charlton et al, 1995). 
The government's desire to maximize the potential 
for competition within the new railway has led not only 
to a complex operational structure, but also a circui- 
tous privatization. Each of the 92 businesses created by 
the break-up of BR has had to be prepared separately 
for divestiture. Furthermore, only 67 of these 
companies have been offered for outright sale. The 25 
TOCs were all offered to the private sector as region- 
ally-based franchises, to be won through a competitive 
tendering process (Department of Transport, 1994). 
The route-plan of the Great Western franchise is 
shown as an example in Figure 2. According to the 
Department of Transport (1996), 55 businesses were 
sold outright, and 13 TOC franchises let, between 
February 1994 and October 1996. Figure 3 provides a 
Paddington 
LONDON 
Waterloo 
Penzance Paignton Not to scale 
Figure 2 Route-network of the Great Western Trains Company Ltd. 
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Company group (companies in each group) 
Figure 3 Companies sold in the rail privatization process, February 1994-October 1996. 
breakdown of the number of businesses divested in 
each company-group. 
With Railtrack and a multitude of individual 
businesses designed to promote competition within the 
industry in place, the government's new railway struc- 
ture has created the theoretical potential for market 
liberalization. But the central contention of the present 
paper is that, despite this progress, the market is 
unlikely to be freed because the government is now 
taking regulatory measures to prevent the very competi- 
tive environment it initially set out to achieve. The key 
aspects of this apparent paradox are examined below. 
Modifying competition 
Although the Rail Regulator noted the fundamental 
importance of competition to the future of the new 
railway, he was already expressing doubts as to its 
viability as an organizing principle by July 1994, just 
4 months after the privatization process had officially 
begun (Office of the Rail Regulator, 1994a). However, 
the Regulator's concerns had already been foreseen by 
the government itself at this stage. Evidence to support 
this view can be found in regulatory mechanisms the 
government began to impose upon the industry. These 
mechanisms were implemented principally by two 
means: first, the nature of the contracts drawn up to 
formalize the working arrangements between individual 
companies within the industry; and second, guidance 
issued to the Rail Regulator. 
Contracts were drawn up on behalf of the individual 
companies by the government before, privatization. 
Many of them are still current and effectively dismiss 
any realistic competitive opportunities. For example, 
TOCs were theoretically given freedom to negotiate 
advantageous rolling stock leasing deals because they 
could choose between three, competing RoSCOs. In 
practice, however, this has not been possible because 
government-imposed contracts have been designed, 
according to the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising 
(1996a), to match the length of the first franchise 
period. Most rolling stock is therefore leased to TOCs 
on 8- or 10-year periods from 1 April 1994. Although a 
limited proportion of rolling stock is leased to the 
TOCs on a `short-term' basis (i. e. 4 or 6 years), the 
government has essentially removed any possibility of 
meaningful competition between the RoSCOs. TOCs 
are therefore held to ransom by de facto monopolists. 
The same is true among BRIS units theoretically 
competing for Railtrack's custom. Instead of creating a 
liberalized maintenance and renewal market, the 
government awarded fixed-term contracts to the BRIS 
companies on behalf of Railtrack before its divestiture 
(SBC Warburg, 1996). The net result is a collection of 
regional monopolies from whom Railtrack can extract 
none of the theoretical benefits of competition. 
As far as the provision of passenger train services is 
concerned, competition of any significance also appears 
unlikely to evolve. Indeed, if anything, the prospects 
are worse because whereas the companies in the above 
Central TOC BRIS BRML Freight RoSCO GoCo 
(27) (25) (20) (7) (7) (3) (3) 
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examples are profitable, almost all TOCs are supported 
by considerable government subsidy (Modern Railways, 
1995). TOCs use this subsidy in order to help finance 
rolling stock procurement, to gain access to the track 
and so on. In this sense, although only the TOCs 
receive financial support directly from government, the 
profitability of all 92 companies in the new railway 
structure depends upon public money in one way or 
another. In return for a predetermined level of state 
support, a TOC franchisee is legally obliged to provide 
a minimum service pattern, or Passenger Service 
Requirement (PSR), over all its routes (Department of 
Transport, 1994). This pattern is published prior to 
franchising in keeping with the government's commit- 
ment to protect the interests of railway users (House of 
Commons, 1993). 
In line with its desire to break up BR's monopoly, 
the government also requires the Rail Regulator and 
Franchising Director-whose key duty is to oversee the 
transfer of franchises from the public to the private 
sector-to promote competition in the provision of 
railway services (Office of the Rail Regulator, 1996; 
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, 1996b). However, 
so long as TOCs are not financially viable, the goals of 
protecting passengers' interests and promoting 
competition are largely incompatible. In fact, the intro- 
duction of competition into the provision of railway 
services could threaten the viability of franchises. A 
franchisee operating lucrative services between, say, 
Bristol and London, will be obligated not only to run 
those services, but also the host of other routes 
contained in its franchise region at the specified PSR. 
On the other hand, the structure envisaged by the 1992 
White Paper means that a new entrant wishing to 
provide additional railway services will be able to 
`cherry-pick'-i. e. operate trains at the most profitable 
times on the most profitable routes-without the statu- 
tory obligations of a franchisee. This could result in a 
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substantial decline in revenue for the incumbent 
franchisee whilst its subsidy remained static. Thus the 
franchisee's ability to cross-subsidize its network would 
be reduced dramatically, possibly resulting in 
bankruptcy. Despite provisions made by the 
Franchising Director to assume responsibility for the 
operation of train services should this scenario arise 
(Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, 1996a), it 
remains likely that the potential for franchise-wide 
service disruption would be considerable. Therefore, 
despite its initial enthusiasm for market liberalization, 
the government now supports the view that 'competi- 
tion between passenger train operators [should be] 
substantially restricted' (Office of the Rail Regulator, 
1994b, p. 2) to ensure the successful launch of the first 
generation of franchises. 
This restriction is effected principally through 
guidance from the government to the Rail Regulator. 
The Regulator's policy for moderating competition 
faced by franchisees is essentially to restrict new entry 
into the service provision market (Office of the Rail 
Regulator, 1994b). No significant new competition will 
be permitted on any route before 31 March 1999, and 
substantial restrictions will remain until 2002, by which 
time a review of the situation will have been 
conducted. However, even after 2002 the Regulator 
does not currently intend to permit any new competi- 
tion where it would discourage improvements to 
passenger rail services (Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising, 1996a). 
The few exceptions where competition is practicable 
in the new railway structure are found either where 
separate routes exist between destination pairs and are 
worked by different TOCs, or where two or more 
TOCs work the same route. In the case of the former, 
notable examples are services between London- 
Birmingham, London-Glasgow and London-Southend 
(see Figure 4). In general, however, incidences of this 
Great Eastern Railway 
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Figure 4 The routes of competing TOCs, London-Southend. 
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kind of competition are limited due to rationalization 
trends which have occurred from time to time in the 
recent history of Britain's railways (see, for example, 
British Railways Board, 1962). Furthermore, TOCs 
working between destination pairs on the same route 
(e. g. Plymouth-Exeter St David's) appear disinclined 
to compete with rivals. Representatives of TOCs have 
recently indicated at conferences the intention of their 
companies to work together, rather than compete, for 
the benefit of the railway industry as a whole (Save 
Our Railways, 1996). In this sense, together with the 
lack of new entry into the industry, most TOCs will 
retain effective regional exclusivity until 2002 (Office of 
Passenger Rail Franchising, 1996a); in other words, 25 
regional monopolies have, with only a few minor 
exceptions, replaced BR's national one. The majority 
of rail customers will therefore still be unable to 
choose their service provider for many years. 
Finally, the industry is also finding ways of returning 
itself to monopoly, or at least oligopoly, status without 
regulatory assistance. A marked trend of horizontal 
and vertical integration is becoming apparent as a 
handful of large corporate concerns acquire an 
increasing number of railway companies and 
franchises. National Express (the coach operator) 
integrated horizontally when it obtained the Midland 
Main Line and Gatwick Express franchises (Simonian, 
1996). This raises monopoly issues outside of the 
railway industry as National Express now operates both 
road and rail services to the East Midlands from 
London. Stagecoach, the acquisitive bus company, has 
integrated vertically by purchasing the RoSCO from 
which the franchise it already owned, South West 
Trains, leases its rolling stock (Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising, 1996c). The French-based refuse disposal 
group, CGEA, has secured the neighbouring Network 
SouthCentral and South Eastern franchises (Depart- 
ment of Transport, 1996; Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising, 1996d) and will in all likelihood bid for 
more. With regard to freight services, four of the seven 
freight operators created by the privatization process 
(Loadhaul, Mainline, Transrail and Rail Express 
Systems) have been sold to English, Welsh and Scottish 
Railways (E, W and S), a new company formed by a 
consortium led by Wisconsin Central Transportation 
(Department of Transport, 1996). Furthermore, E, W 
and S is believed to be considering the acquisition of a 
fifth freight company, Railfreight Distribution (Modern 
Railways, 1996). 
Prospects for the future 
The restructuring of the British railway industry was 
designed to break up BR's monopoly and create 
opportunities for competition. Evidence presented 
here, however, would seem to suggest that although a 
structure theoretically capable of achieving this aim is 
now in place, competition is largely being prevented by 
the imposition of a regulatory regime. In fact, the 
publicly-owned, national monopoly has begun simply to 
transmogrify into privately-owned, regional ones. 
Admittedly, the opportunity for competition to emerge 
in some areas of the industry could well present itself 
in the future-monopolistic contracts, for example, will 
certainly expire and be re-negotiable. However, it 
would seem unlikely that meaningful competition will 
ever emerge in service provision-the key area in 
which the government wished to encourage it-whilst 
the rail industry continues to run at a loss. Restrictions 
to new entry into the market are currently envisaged to 
last well into the first decade of the next century, and 
there is every certainty they will be extended if there is 
a chance that the financial solvency of a TOC could be 
jeopardized. What is more, if the present trend towards 
integration within the railway continues, the likelihood 
of meaningful competition arising anywhere in the 
industry-even after the re-negotiation of contracts- 
may quickly disappear. 
The CC methodology used by the government to 
privatize British Rail is therefore failing to meet one of 
its key objectives, namely to introduce a competitive 
spirit into the industry. Although intent on pursuing its 
ideology, the government appears to have failed in this 
case to acknowledge some of the difficulties involved in 
translating theory into policy. The CC methodology 
was efficacious when the electricity companies were 
divested because the industry was profitable. Competi- 
tion in the railway industry could threaten the viability 
of many services. Ministers realized this too late and 
despite spending considerable sums to implement the 
CC methodology-the industry's annual subsidy now 
stands at over £2 billion (British Railways Board, 
1995)-the government now finds itself regulating to 
prevent the very competition it wanted to create. 
Perhaps the government's most fundamental mistake 
was in fact viewing BR as a monopoly at all. BR should 
never have had to worry about competing with itself 
because it already had to rival other modes of trans- 
port. The restructuring of the railway industry designed 
to foster competition is therefore probably best viewed, 
in the light of evidence presented here, as unneces- 
sarily complex. 
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Abstract. The privatisation programme pursued by successive Conservative administrations in the 
1979-97 period was based on neoliberal values, and was aimed at the reduction of public sector 
involvement in industry by the promotion of a competitive 'free' market. However, despite this 
ideological objective, several large utility companies were privatised as regulated monopolies. Against 
this background, in a notable reorientation of privatisation policy, the Major administration 
attempted to secure a genuine movement towards market liberalisation when it divested British 
Rail (BR). An elaborate methodology was used to break BR's monopoly and establish a competitive 
market for the provision of passenger rail services. The authors argue that, notwithstanding the 
complexity of the rail sell-off, competition has not materialised and BR's monopoly has to all intents 
and purposes been reconstituted in the private sector. 
Introduction 
The dominant political ideology in Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s was that of 
the New Right, whose economic beliefs, based upon neoliberalism, prioritised reducing 
public sector involvement in society and the economy by promoting a `free' market 
driven by competition (Barry, 1987; Farnham and Horton, 1993; Green, 1987; Hayes, 
1994; King, 1987). For this and other reasons, the privatisation of public sector 
industries was of central importance to successive Conservative governments (Foster, 
1992; Heald, 1983), the most recent divestiture being that of British Rail (BR). A key 
objective of the Major administration was to end BR's monopoly and introduce a 
competitive structure into the provision of passenger train services (DoT, 1992). In 
pursuit of this aim, the railway industry was restructured and provisions were made 
to allow a "significant number of new companies" (Conservative Party, 1992, page 35) to 
operate train services on the network. 
The methodology employed to divest BR was one of the most complex in the British 
privatisation programme to date (Charlton et al, 1997). However, a primary assertion in 
the present paper is that, despite the complexity of the rail sell-off, meaningful com- 
petition has not materialised. Indeed we suggest that, somewhat paradoxically, the new 
railway structure is based on a comprehensive array of regulatory mechanisms designed 
to promote a form of surrogate competition. In this sense it would appear that, despite 
the Conservative government's commitment to a neoliberal agenda, the goal of market 
liberalisation was marginalised. Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the nature and 
potential impacts of the policy used to privatise BR. We examine the methodology used 
to promote competition in the provision of passenger railway services, reasons why 
competition has not materialised, and the regulatory mechanisms which have imposed 
surrogate competition on the industry. 
Statutory regulation and surrogate competition 
Privatisation has been variously defined and has many objectives (for example, see Kay 
and Thompson, 1986; Wiltshire, 1987). In essence, it is the transfer of at least part of the 
operations of a state-owned enterprise to private control (Heald, 1983). However, for 
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our purposes in the present paper, some further clarification is necessary. According 
to the basic tenets of neoliberal thinking (Hayes, 1994) and Conservative Party state- 
ments (see below), privatisation must not only achieve asset transfer, but must also 
ensure: (a) that the respective markets of divested companies are characterised by 
competition rather than by monopoly (to allow voluntary exchange between individ- 
uals); in order (b) that a genuine reduction takes place in the powers of the state to 
manage an industry (to diminish government control over the production of goods 
and services). 
Speaking before the sale of British Telecom (BT), the minister in charge of privatisa- 
tion, John Moore, noted that the long-term success of the privatisation programme "will 
stand or fall by the extent to which it maximises competition. If competition cannot be 
achieved, an historic opportunity will have been lost" (Moore, 1983, page 92). None- 
theless, the Conservatives ultimately sold the utilities as virtual monopolies guaranteed 
by statute (Moore, 1985) and were forced to adopt a form of regulation to govern the 
market. On divestiture BT, British Gas, the water industry, and electricity-supply 
industry became subject to 'economic' regulation in the form of 'RPI minus x'(1) 
(Littlechild, 1983), and'social'regulation designed to achieve specified qualities in service 
objectives (Foster, 1992; Rovizzi and Thompson, 1992; Thompson, 1990). The regulation 
of each privatised utility industry is administered by a dedicated 'independent' institu- 
tion <2 In combination, these regulatory mechanisms and institutions provide a form 
of 'surrogate' competition to the regulated industries; that is to say, they are designed 
to replicate the effects of actual competition by forcing prices down and efficiency up 
(The Economist 1995). 
By creating a set of regulated monopolies, "privatisation in the United Kingdom ... [came] to emphasise the virtues of denationalisation over, and even at the expense of, 
competition" (Kay and Thompson, 1986, page 31) and the state did not withdraw in 
any simple sense from the privatised sectors. Rather, policy substituted a previously 
'close' form of intervention-nationalisation-for 'intervention at a distance'-regula- 
tion. Even the `distance' of regulation might, in certain cases, be somewhat illusory. 
Although the utility regulators are technically independent in their day-to-day opera- 
tions, their brief was very much moulded by objectives and guidance that was issued by 
central government at the time of privatisation (Thompson, 1990). In addition, political 
interest in the economic affairs of the utilities has often resurfaced to the occasional 
dismay and humiliation of regulators (Jenkins, 1995; The Times 1996). 
At stake is, therefore, the form of intervention rather than its existence (Kay and 
Vickers, 1988; Thompson, 1990). Certainly, as suggested by Hancher and Moran (1989, 
page 131), much of what began as an intent to withdraw from the intervention arena 
resulted in "not so much a change in the content of rules, or a departure from regulatory 
objectives, [as] an adjustment to the means of enforcement": The privatisation of the 
utilities throughout the 1980s was as much-if not more-of an exercise in the for- 
mulation of regulatory mechanisms and institutions as it was an attempt to promote 
competition and reduce state influence over the utility industries. 
By the late 1980s, however, there was evidence to suggest that senior Conservatives 
had become dissatisfied with the lack of competition in the utilities markets, and 
structural reform resurfaced as a serious option when decisions were being taken over 
the sale of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) (Nash, 1994; Shaw, 1997). 
(I) 'RPI minus x' regulation requires that a firm keeps its price increases for specific products at a 
fixed level below the rate of inflation (retail price index-RPI) for a given number of years. 
(2) BT is regulated by the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel); British Gas by the Office of Gas 
Supply (Ofgas); the water industry by the office of Water Services (Ofwat); and the electricity 
suppliers by the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer). 
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In a notable reorientation of policy, the CEGB was fragmented into a number of 
competing companies, and new entrants were permitted to compete with former- 
CEGB companies (Wharmby, 1993). Despite initial concerns within the industry regarding 
the practicality of such a policy, the restructuring successfully assembled a competitive 
market and, by 1993, fourteen licences had been issued to new generating companies 
(Littlechild, 1993). As a result, the need for surrogate competition was eliminated 
and the industry is now free from statutory economic and social regulation. The 
privatisation of the CEGB therefore achieved not only transfer of ownership, but 
also liberalised the market and permitted a withdrawal of state power over the 
industry. The privatisation of BR-our central focus in this paper-essentially repre- 
sents further experimentation with the methods which had been used to divest the 
electricity-generating industry, and the nature and potential impacts of this divestiture 
are examined below. 
Competition, regulation, and the new railway 
In 1992, the Major administration published its White Paper New Opportunities for the 
Railways (DoT, 1992). The document contained proposals to restructure radically 
British Rail in preparation for privatisation. As with the electricity industry, explicit 
attention was paid to the need to end BR's monopoly and liberalise the passenger rail 
market. Despite claims by such pressure groups as Transport 2000 (1989) as well as 
railway-industry chairmen (BBC, 1996) that BR already faced vigorous competition 
from other transport modes, the Conservative government was determined to end what 
it saw as a monopoly in the operation of rail services in Britain (DoT, 1992). Demon- 
strating a commitment to market liberalisation, the Conservative Party's 1992 election 
manifesto noted: 
"... we believe that the best way to produce profound and lasting improvements on the 
railways is to end BR's state monopoly... .A significant number of companies 
have 
already said that they want to introduce new railway services as soon as the monopoly 
is ended. We will give them that chance" (Conservative Party, 1992, page 35). 
This was reiterated in the 1992 White Paper: 
"... the Government proposes to provide a right of access to the rail network for 
private sector operators of passenger services ... 
[and because of this] new operators 
will be allowed to provide services giving customers a choice stimulating improved 
services and value" (DoT, 1992, page 4). 
In a parliamentary debate on the future of the railway industry, the then Secretary 
of State for Transport, John MacGregor, stressed that the BR sell-off championed 
"the market and competition as the best way of showing what the travelling public ... 
want" (Hansard 1992, volume 213, column 1162). 
The 1993 Railways Act established the basis for the cessation of BR's monopoly 
and its vertical separation and division into as many as ninety-two separate businesses 
(DoT, 1996). The organisation was divided into two basic elements from 1 April 1994. 
Control of the whole rail infrastructure passed to Railtrack, which was thereby granted 
the status of a monopoly. Although this appears to be in contradiction of the aim of 
market liberalisation, it was in fact a step necessary to secure competition in the 
operations side of the rail industry (Charlton et al, 1997). The operations business 
was divided into ninety-one discrete companies which, before their transfer into the 
private sector, were placed into groups that reflected the nature of their activities (DoT, 
1994). The groups were: 
(a) train-operating companies (TOCs)-to provide passenger rail services. TOCs are 
considered in more detail below; 
(b) freight-to operate freight trains; 
760 R Gibb, J Shaw, C Charlton 
(c) rolling-stock companies (RoSCos)-three businesses established to lease rolling stock 
and locomotives to the TOCs; 
(d) central-to provide general support services to the industry such as telecommuni- 
cations, consultancy, and research; 
(e) British Rail Infrastructure Services (BRIS)-companies concerned with the main- 
tenance of track and signalling; 
(f) British Rail Maintenance Limited (BRML)-to undertake the overhaul of rolling 
stock and locomotives. 
In theory, the creation of a number of companies within each group provided the 
possibility of competition in attracting custom from Railtrack and rail businesses in 
other groups or, in the case of train operators, passengers and freight shippers (Charlton 
et al, 1997). 
The complex new industry structure required the creation of two new statutory 
bodies: the Offices of the Rail Regulator and the Franchising Director. At the simplest 
level, the Rail Regulator is responsible for granting and monitoring licences to TOCs; 
the approval of agreements between Railtrack and train operators; the protection of 
consumers; and the promotion of competition (ORR, 1995). The Franchising Director 
was given the roles of transferring the TOCs from the public sector to the private sector 
through the award of franchises; paying subsidies to TOCs; and, subsequently, of 
undertaking consumer-protection measures which complement those of the Regulator 
(OPRAF, 1994; 1996a). 
In the remainder of this paper we are primarily concerned with the competition 
and regulation issues surrounding the provision of passenger rail services. Whereas the 
roles of the Rail Regulator and Franchising Director in this regard are discussed in 
more detail below, fuller analyses of the interaction between the various actors in the 
new railway industry can be found elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, 
Charlton et al, 1997; DoT, 1994). 
Promoting competition between train operators 
Railtrack permits different passenger train operators to use its infrastructure after the 
negotiation of access contracts. Operators contracting with Railtrack can fall into two 
categories: franchised and nonfranchised. The passenger rail services previously oper- 
ated by BR have now passed to the twenty-five franchised TOCs, each let to the private 
sector for a finite period of between 7 and 15 years (OPRAF, 1997). Each TOC operates 
passenger train services on a specified route network; figure 1 shows the route plan of 
the Great Eastern TOC franchise as an example. 
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Figure 1. Route plan of the Great Eastern train-operating company (TOC) (not to scale). 
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Figure 2. Route plan showing routes of competing services provided by Chiltern Railways, Virgin 
Trains, and Silverlink between London and Birmingham (not to scale). 
Franchising represents a means of generating competition for the right to provide 
services or, in other words, competition for the market (Bradshaw, 1997). However, the 
Conservatives' desire to provide travellers with a choice of train operators also required 
the promotion of competition in the market. Many TOCs now share some track miles 
with at least one of their counterparts and competition between them is theoretically 
possible along such routes. An example is found in the London -Gatwick Airport line, 
which is worked by Gatwick Express, Connex South Central, and Thameslink. Alter- 
natively, certain destination pairs are served by separate lines which are worked by 
different TOCs and this also facilitates potential competition. Notable examples are 
London - Exeter, London-Southend, and London - Birmingham (see figure 2). 
The second category of passenger train operator, the nonfranchised, represents the 
"significant number of companies" (Conservative Party, 1992, page 35) to whom the 
Major administration sought to offer the chance of running railway services over and 
above those offered by TOCs. By negotiating an access contract with Railtrack, non- 
franchised operators can, in theory, compete with TOCs between any or all destination 
pairs on an 'open access' basis. These nonfranchised passenger train operators are not 
constrained to operate on all routes within a specific franchise: instead, they may choose 
to operate on only one route if they consider this to be the most profitable option. 
The establishment of Railtrack, the fragmentation of BR's passenger train service . 
operations, and the provision for competition from nonfranchised operators confirms 
that the Conservatives "restructured the railways in a manner which encourages com- 
petition between train operators in providing passenger services" (ORR, 1994a, 
page iii). Experimenting further with the methods which had been used to privatise the 
CEGB, the Conservatives reinforced their commitment to securing a genuine move- 
ment towards market liberalisation in the monopoly-privatisation programme. The new 
railway structure underlined the potential for surrogate competition to be replaced by 
actual competition, and for a reduction in the influence of the state over the industry. 
However, we argue below that, despite the restructuring of BR, competition has not 
materialised in practice. 
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Restricting competition between train operators 
Although the fundamental importance of a liberalised passenger rail market was 
emphasised strongly at the outset, ministers had begun to express doubts regarding 
the viability of competition as an organising principle by early 1993 (DoT, 1993; House 
of Commons Papers, 1993). Concern appears to have arisen when policymakers were 
faced with a potential conflict between promoting competition on the one hand, and 
maintaining the quality and quantity of rail services, many of which were loss making 
but considered socially necessary, on the other. Public and political concern regarding 
possible service cuts and fare increases after privatisation resulted in calls for reassur- 
ance that the level and extent of services would not be detrimentally affected by the 
plans (for example, see The Economist 1996; The Guardian 1995). For this reason, it was 
acknowledged as far back as 1992 that some degree of social regulation would be 
necessary in order to maintain the network. The Conservatives conceded that "subsidy 
will continue to be paid where necessary" in order to "sustain the current national 
network of services" (Conservative Party, 1992, page 35). The network now remains 
intact because all TOCs are required to operate the amount of trains specified in a 
Public Service Requirement (PSR) as a minimum. Although it does not function 
explicitly as a timetable, the PSR does set parameters, based largely on the service 
levels of 1992, within which the TOCs must design their timetables (OPRAF, 1996a). 
Competition between operators is impractical so long as franchises are legally 
obliged to maintain loss-making services specified in their PSRs. As Foster (1994) 
points out, because each TOC operates a set of train services-some highly lucrative, 
others less so-it needs to earn enough profit on its remunerative lines, given its level 
of subsidy, to ensure an adequate return on its whole operation. Meanwhile, open- 
access operators running services on lucrative trainpaths would not have the same 
obligation to maintain uneconomic services and would thus be able to undercut 
franchisees. The prospect of revenue dilution on high-earning routes would have 
prevented potential franchisees from planning their businesses with any reasonable 
degree of certainty. Indeed, they indicated that, at very best, they would require 
extremely high subsidies (not an option favoured by the Conservatives), and at worst 
they would refrain from bidding altogether (HC, 1992a). Faced with the prospect of rail 
privatisation either not proceeding or being extraordinarily expensive, the Major 
administration was forced to concede "that competition on routes to be franchised 
should be moderated to the extent necessary to ensure the successful launch of the 
first generation of franchises" (ORR, 1994a, page iii). In practice, this has essentially 
resulted in the abandonment of attempts to promote on-rail competition between 
operators. 
Competition in the railway industry is restricted by regulatory frameworks estab- 
lished both by the Rail Regulator and by the Franchising Director. In addition, of 
course, operational factors such as the availability of trainpaths also inhibit competition 
on many routes at certain times of the day. However, technical improvements in the 
future may render this factor less restrictive as has been the case in the past-for 
example, many new trainpaths were identified for Eurostar trains along the congested 
suburban routes in southeast England (HC, 1992b)-and it remains the case that the 
bulk of potential competition is currently subject to administrative, rather than opera- 
tional, restriction. 
Despite the initial vision of nonfranchised train operators competing with TOCs, 
the Rail Regulator currently restricts the entry of such `open-access' train operators to 
the market. No new entry will be permitted on any route nominated by TOCs before 
31 March 1999. After a review of the situation-being conducted at the time of writing 
(ORR, 1997a)-it is anticipated that "significant restrictions" (ORR, 1994b, page 19) 
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will permit only limited entry on certain nominated flows until 2002. However, even 
after 2002, the Regulator acknowledges that any further change to the existing regime 
will be incremental in nature, and that restrictions will continue where the presence of 
competition would discourage major improvements to passenger rail services (ORR, 
1994b). In cases where TOCs continue to run at a loss, or otherwise appear vulnerable 
to open-access newcomers, competition from nonfranchised operators will therefore 
remain largely absent. 
In addition to open-access restrictions, franchisees are afforded a large measure of 
protection from potential competition between themselves. The Franchising Director 
effects this on routes where TOCs share route miles through a policy of `compulsory 
interavailability' of tickets (OPRAF, 1996a). This policy enables the lead operator- 
usually the TOC with the greatest commercial interest in a particular route-to create 
fares and to require other TOCs running trains on the route to honour these fares in 
most instances. The compulsory-interavailability requirement can be lifted where it is 
considered "that the benefits of inter-availability will be outweighed by the potential 
benefits of price competition" (OPRAF, 1996a, page 186). Currently this is only true of 
the London-Gatwick Airport lines, and there are no plans to lift the requirement 
more widely (OPRAF, 1996a). 
Such regulatory intervention from the Franchising Director may in fact have been 
unnecessary given the apparent determination by many TOCs to work together, rather 
than compete, because of the mutual commercial advantages which can arise from 
cooperation which fosters harmony and stability in the provision of services (for 
example, see Save Our Railways, 1996). Certainly, evidence is emerging to suggest 
that the prospect of a higher total revenue from joint initiatives is more appealing to 
TOCs than is plundering each other's largely incontestable markets (ATOC, 1997; 
OPRAF, 1996a; Shaw, 1997). 
Against this background, there remains only one situation where effective liberal- 
isation of the passenger rail market might reasonably be claimed. This is in cases where 
destination pairs are served by separate lines operated by different TOCs (such as the 
London-Birmingham example shown in figure 2). Although some key passenger flows 
fall into this category, past rationalisation of the network has reduced the potential 
for competition between routes (for example, see BRB, 1962). Therefore, despite the 
Conservatives' original intention to produce a competitive passenger-train-service 
market, it is in fact the case that "the new railway structure is built on ... monopoly 
... 
The supply of passenger services is based on 25 territorial franchises with full 
protection from competition from new services" (Swift, 1997a, page 8). In other words, 
twenty-five regional monopolies have, with only a few minor exceptions, replaced BR's 
national one. 
TOCs and surrogate competition 
The creation of a new generation of privatised monopolies has obvious regulatory 
implications. Economic regulation in the passenger railway industry is needed in order 
to ensure `reasonable' fares for those using franchised services (OPRAF, 1996a). Details 
of this regulation are to be found in literature released jointly by the Department of 
Transport and the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF, 1996b). As in pre- 
vious divestitures, TOCs' fares are regulated by the `RPI minus x' formula. At present x 
stands at zero, but will increase to one in January 1999, where it will remain for four 
years. Currently, only certain fares are regulated, namely: unrestricted standard-class 
return fares (which permit outward and return travel on any train), some single fares 
for short journeys, `saver' fares (which, subject to certain conditions, offer a discounted 
rate for most journeys over 50 miles), and certain standard-class season-ticket fares 
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Table 1. A comparison of key commitments in the Passengers' Charters of British Rail (BR) and 
South Wales and West Railway (source: BRB, 1992; Wales and West Passenger Trains Ltd, 1997). 
BR (Regional) South Wales Improve- 
and West Railway ment? 
Punctuality 90% of long-distance 90% of long-distance yes 
trains to arrive within trains to arrive within 
10 minutes of schedule. 10 minutes of schedule. 
To improve to 92% 
by 1998. 
Reliability 99% of services to run. 99% of services to run. yes 
To improve to 99.5% 
by 1998. 
Compensation 20% of price paid for 20% of price paid for yes (one-off journeys) journey refunded if journey refunded if 
delayed for >1 hour. delayed for >1 hour. 
Increases to 50% refund 
for delays >2 hours. 
Compensation 5% discount on monthly 5% discount for monthly yes (season tickets) or longer season tickets season tickets if punctuality 
if punctuality <87% <87% or reliability <98% 
or reliability <98% for for preceding year. 10% 
preceding year. 10% discount if punctuality and 
discount if punctuality reliability both below these 
and reliability both thresholds. For annual 
below those thresholds. season tickets, discounts rise 
to 7% and 14%, respectively. 
Ticket office Maximum five minutes Maximum five minutes no 
queueing peak. Maximum three peak. Maximum three 
minutes off-peak. minutes off-peak. 
Information Timetables at all stations. Timetables at all yes 
Notice of engineering stations. Public address or 
work at affected stations. freephone, or information 
Notice in advance boards at all stations by 
if advertised on-board 1999.7 days notice of 
catering is cancelled. engineering work at 
affected stations. Advanced 
notice of cancellation 
of advertised on-board 
catering service. 
Disabled 48 hours notice for 24 hours notice for yes 
Travellers assistance at staffed assistance at staffed 
stations. stations. 
Train capacities Slam door: 10 standing Slam door: 0 standing. yes 
(journeys less for every 100 seated. Sliding door: standing at 
than 20 minutes) Sliding door: 35 standing a density of 1 passenger 
for every 100 seated. per 0.55 m2. 
including all weekly season tickets. Some PTEs are entitled to set fares in their commuter 
markets and, as such, these will remain unregulated by the Franchising Director. 
However, in London, Cardiff, Edinburgh, and Greater Manchester, the Franchising 
Director himself takes a comprehensive approach to regulating commuter fares. A 
performance incentive applies whereby a TOC's failure to meet agreed punctuality 
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and reliability standards can result in the price cap being adjusted to RPI minus 3 for 
certain tickets. Although the RPI-minus-1 formula is not as stringent as it is in other 
utility industries [for example, the formula used to regulate BT is RPI minus 7.5 (Office of 
Telecommunications, 1997)], it is still regarded by the Rail Regulator as "radical, almost 
socialist, planning by a Conservative `free market' government" (Swift, 1997b, page 7). 
Details of social regulation in the form of quality-of-service obligations are found 
in the Passenger Rail Industry Overview (OPRAF, 1996a). TOCs are expected to main- 
tain an operational environment at or above standards prescribed by the National 
Conditions of Carriage (NCC) (BRB, 1996). The NCC outlines the contractual obliga- 
tions which train operators have towards their customers, and TOCs must produce a 
'user-friendly' summary of the NCC in the form of a passengers' charter. Charters set 
out TOCs' commitments to operating punctual and reliable trains, as well as: ensuring 
acceptable train capacities; providing information on services, fares, and facilities; 
meeting the needs of disabled travellers; and disseminäting information in advance of 
delays and nonemergency engineering works. In all cases, TOCs' passengers' charters 
must contain provisions at least as favourable as those which were offered by British 
Rail. Some TOCs have elected to offer certain improvements over the standards 
aspired to by BR. A comparison, in table 1, of BR and Wales and West Passenger 
Railway's charters demonstrates this. In addition, TOCs are obliged to participate in 
ticketing and other schemes organised by the Association of Train Operating Compa- 
nies (ATOC) in order to secure the provision of network-wide products. Examples of 
such products are the National Rail Enquiries Service and discount-railcard schemes. 
The fines imposed in 1997 on TOCs for their failure to meet performance targets for 
the National Rail Enquiries Service (ORR, 1997b) confirmed the regulator's willing- 
ness to enforce service standards. 
In conclusion: regulation and continuing monopoly 
The privatisation of Britain's passenger railway services, as measured by the criteria 
proposed in this paper-and, indeed, Conservative Party policy statements (Conservative 
Party, 1983; 1992; 1997; Hansard 1992; Moore, 1983)-has not been an overwhelming 
success. Although assets have been transferred, what began with an intention to promote 
competition and reduce government involvement has resulted in the reconstitution of 
BR's monopoly in the private sector and the creation of a host of new regulatory 
mechanisms and institutions. 
It was noted above that the privatisation of the utilities was as much, if not more, 
of an exercise in the formulation of regulation as it was an attempt to promote 
competition and reduce the role of government in industry. This trend has indubitably 
continued in the rail sell-off, for a complex method of divestiture has spawned complex 
regulatory mechanisms and institutions designed to reconcile the apparently incompat- 
ible objectives of liberalising the passenger rail market and maintaining the integrity of 
the network. A regulatory `domino effect' developed in four stages. First, the conse- 
quences of mass service withdrawals dictated the imposition of social regulation in the 
form of subsidy and PSRs. Second, the threat posed to the completion of the franchising 
process by market liberalisation prompted regulation to prevent the very competition 
which ministers had originally wanted to promote. Third, economic regulation was 
necessitated by the reemergence of monopoly and, fourth, this was complemented by 
additional social regulation in the form of quality-of-service stipulations designed to 
provide a `surrogate' competition regime with comparable objectives to those imposed 
on the utility industries in the 1980s. 
Recent evidence indicates that other utility divestitures could, technology permit- 
ting, also have employed a degree of vertical separation at the time of divestiture 
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(Shaw, 1997). Genuine competition has recently been introduced into the gas market, 
some 10 years after privatisation, and the electricity-distribution industry is also set to 
be liberalised from 1998 (The Guardian 1997a; 1997b). However, in contrast to the 
utilities, much of the passenger railway industry operated and continues to operate at 
a loss. The Serpell Report (Serpell, 1983) concluded that almost 85% of the network 
would have to be shut down in order to run a commercially viable industry but, given 
public concern about its future, mass closure was always unlikely. As a result, difficulties 
were almost certain to be encountered in vertical separation because private sector 
companies would simply not compete with each other over the right to lose money. 
Moreover, despite the current review being undertaken by the Rail Regulator (ORR, 
1997a), it is doubtful whether it will be possible to liberalise the passenger rail industry 
significantly in the medium to long term owing to a continued dependence on subsidy. 
The extensive powers of the regulators to control the rail industry raise a number of 
important research agendas. Most importantly, more investigation is required into the 
nature, operations, and accountability of the industry regulators and their links with 
government and the private sector. With the regulators' ability to affect the profitability, 
service standards, and structure of the privatised railway industry, it is necessary for 
future research to build on work already undertaken to broaden understanding of the 
decisionmaking processes and the political economy of the regulatory environment. 
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Introduction 
There is a strong sense in which 'everybody knows' 
what geography is about. After all, it is studied in 
school compulsorily to the age of 14, and both the 
increasing incidence of overseas travel and the 
prevalence of maps and place descriptions in media 
reporting give geography an apparently uncompli- 
cated role as a descriptive support to the under- 
standing of everyday life. However, such a view is at 
variance with the core concerns of academics in 
geography-even those for whom 'place' is a major 
focus of interest. Numerous academic commenta- 
tors continue to highlight concerns that what we 
actually do bears little resemblance to 'popular' 
conceptions of the discipline (Unwin 1987; Crang 
1996). Such concerns have focused not only on the 
fact that the analytical and interpretive aspects of 
academic work are overlooked, but also that signifi- 
cant developments within the discipline have been 
neglected or misunderstood (Rawling 1996). 
Of course, these concerns about a divergence 
between academic and popular geographies are not 
new. it has long been argued that non-academic 
practitioners have been slow to catch up with devel- 
opments in academic geography, and divergences 
within the discipline have to some extent been 
amplified following each of the so-called paradigm 
shifts since the quantitative revolution (Strachan 
1984). The relationship between academic geogra- 
phy and school syllabuses is a helpful example: it is 
difficult and costly to review school syllabuses, and 
when changes do occur, they are often in response 
to wider educational and social developments, 
which do not necessarily give priority to the pre- 
occupations of university geographers (Rawling 
1996). One of the problems lies in the difficulty of 
identifying precisely which changes to school sylla- 
buses might produce an improved understanding of 
the academic contribution in geography. The 
approaches of conventional science, while very 
much under interrogation in some areas of the 
discipline (see, for example, Demeritt 1996), need to 
be taught not only as a foundation for appreciating 
the debates raging over its weaknesses, but also as 
the premise for responding to many of the most 
pressing dilemmas in environmental and technologi- 
cal spheres. At the same time, school students need 
to be introduced to the 'social' scientific approaches 
that are essential for understanding human environ- 
ment interactions, and to appreciate the scope that 
lies within the humanities for yielding insights into 
the ways in which processes such as language can 
construct our understanding of the world (see, for 
example, Barnes and Gregory 1997; Doherty 1997). 
School geography curricula have battled with such 
issues for generations, and yet the problem is still 
only partially resolved, as any lecturer faced with 
classes of fresh undergraduates will, we suspect, only 
too readily confirm. 
The Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute 
of British Geographers) (RGS-IBG) (1997,2) has 
acknowledged that 'public understanding of what 
geography is and what it has to offer often falls far 
short of reality'. As the issues of the 'new regional- 
ism' and the 'cultural turn' in human geography have 
begun to establish another new landscape for geo- 
graphical work, perhaps it is time once more to 
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revisit the debate about the links between academic 
preoccupations and conceptions of geography in the 
wider world. Again, then, we ask: if penetrating, 
insightful and prospectively useful geographical work 
is produced within academia, why does it often have 
little in common with what passes for people's 
perceptions of the subject outside of university 
geography departments? We propose that the 
answer may lie in a failure among academic geogra- 
phers to communicate the value of our work effec- 
tively to a wider audience. Over the years, some 
commentators have attributed the blame for such 
poor communications to the fragmentation of the 
discipline. Jenkins (1987) points out that any institu- 
tional response to challenges facing geographers is 
bound to be hampered by the disparate interests 
and responsibilities of various geographical com- 
munities. However, whilst Jenkins' observation is 
obviously important, any likelihood that geography 
will-or should-consolidate its fragments is at best 
minimal. We argue that the central issue, perhaps the 
key to understanding the divergent conceptions of 
popular and academic geography, relates more to 
the fact that we frequently fail to make our work 
visible and accessible. 
Invisibility and inaccessibility 
Communicating cutting-edge geographical research 
to wide audiences has, of course, always been 
problematic. Moreover, there are indications that 
matters are worsening, owing to pressures of change 
in the funding and culture of universities, and to 
increasing demands to publish within a narrowly 
prescribed range of titles determined by 'readings' of 
the RAE criteria. This often means that what we write 
is not especially visible beyond the confines of a 
specialized academic audience. ' The RAE (see, for a 
humorous account, Sugden 1997) gives academics 
little motivation to communicate their professional 
undertakings through a wider range of public forums. 
Lecturers are contracted to publish a consistent flow 
of research articles in learned journals, and this is the 
principal means through which promotion-in the 
widest sense-is obtained. The specialized nature of 
most journals means that they are usually known to 
only a handful of interested individuals and, as a 
result, even some of the most respected titles 
attract only a 'tiny' readership (Lee 1998,3). This 
is ironic, when one considers that one of the 
original purposes of the RAE was to enhance the 
communication of academic work. 
The problem, however, does not relate only to the 
visibility of our work; also at issue is its accessibility. 
The perceived demands of publication in learned 
journals have a tendency to encourage a style of 
language that all too easily lays itself open to chal- 
lenge for its impenetrability. Billinge (1983), for 
example, launched a scathing attack on writing 
within the 'humanist' geographical tradition. The 
terms of his critique are often directly applicable- 
indeed, probably more so-to some of the contem- 
porary writing that constitutes the 'cultural turn'. 
While geographical writing has not yet been exposed 
to the kind of ridicule meted out to postmodernism 
by Sokal's parody of 'cultural' writing (Sokal and 
Bricmont 1997; Swain 1998), the possibility is not 
altogether remote. Recent exchanges over the 
'geography of sleep' (Smith 1996; Hamnett 1997; 
Pile 1997; Smith N 1997) held both echoes of, and 
references to, the Sokal ariticle. It sometimes seems 
that some of the 'Mandarins' of Billinge's attack 
have produced a generation of followers for whom 
such writing is de rigueur, particularly where the 
inspiration derives from postmodernist sources. 
Having said this, it must of course be allowed that 
the task of analysis in which many of these writers are 
engaged is one that may not, in fact, be amenable to 
a kind of everyday simplicity. There is, indeed, an 
urgent task to be pursued in achieving a better under- 
standing of the processes from which our knowledge 
derives, and through which it is put into practice. This 
requires a careful, and probably specialist, language. 
Moreover, as academics, there is a reasonable case to 
be made for our undertaking the intellectual effort 
required to engage with thoughts expressed in such 
language. Academic theorizing has turned in upon 
itself for reasons more honourable than self- 
aggrandizement. Equally, however, there is an obliga- 
tion for us all to contribute to the task of rendering 
complex thoughts accessible-not only for those 
beyond the academy, but also, as is becoming in- 
creasingly apparent, to colleagues within. The urgent 
preoccupations of many with their own research pre- 
clude their learning a new style of discourse, although 
they nevertheless need to be made aware of the 
serious challenges to their practice that new analyses 
may present. We return to this issue later. 
Academy and impotency 
If, as Bassett (1996) has argued, there is a real 'crisis 
of the intellectual', whereby processes-such as 
expanded access to higher education, the universal- 
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izing tendencies of ready access to the internet, and 
the breakdown of an automatic expectation that 
research and intellectual expertise is located within 
the universities-lead to a tendency to undervalue 
scholarly activity, then the need for accessible com- 
munication becomes all the more imperative. A 
decade ago, Lee (1988,207) argued that academic 
geography had 
seemed to rediscover its self-confidence ... 
[by] dem- 
onstrating its relevance to the world of everyday reality 
and by showing how it is central to the development of 
the social and natural world. 
This was manifest, he argued, in the successful 
engagement of the (then) IBG with the media at its 
annual conferences, and by the formation of the 
Council of British Geography (COBRIG). Can we still 
assert such self-confidence in 1998? 
Referring to the influence of the journal he then 
edited, Lee (1998,3) now seems less convinced of 
his earlier argument. He notes that the effect of 
academic geographies on 'processes of power/ 
knowledge-with all their devastating social, material 
and environmental consequences-[are] infinitesi- 
mally small'. Blomley (1994,383), discussing those 
academic geographers who often refer to them- 
selves as 'oppositional, critical, progressive and even 
emancipatory', maintains that their work (he includes 
his own) is often presented 'in a language [which 
makes] sense only to the cognoscenti'. He continues 
to note that there is rarely any talk amongst the same 
cognoscenti of the purchase of critical ideas beyond 
the pages of academic journals, and suggests that 
although we often assume that 'what academics do 
will make a difference ... 
how and where are left 
unclear'. The apparent daily manifestations of our 
failure to do anything effective about reasonably 
well-understood and devastating threats to human 
life, ranging from the problems of indebtedness to 
climatic change, environmental risk and ethnic 
cleansing, provide ample evidence that Blomley is 
right to challenge the nature of our contribution. 
This challenge relates directly to the long-standing 
ethical criticism that people who are frequently the 
focus of our work-such as those whose lives are 
subject to devastating challenges-may be unable to 
benefit from their participation in research projects if 
the potentially useful academic responses to their 
problems are communicated ineffectively (Kimmel 
1988). Nevertheless, as the new debate about ethics 
in geography has revealed, there are complex issues 
still to be resolved. Where do our responsibilities lie 
in a world where postmodernism challenges the 
certainties of Enlightenment thinking, with its claims 
to grand theory and an ethical stance to match 
(Smith D 1997)? For some, the response lies in 
establishing the basis of a new 'normative turn' 
in social theory (Sayer and Storper 1997); for others, 
in asserting the primacy of an 'ethics of care', 
deriving from the work of Gilligan (1982). This 
debate notwithstanding, what is quite clear is that 
issues of ethical responsibility regarding the implica- 
tions of our work are very much a defining charac- 
teristic of the challenge we face in communicating 
academic geography. However, ethical issues within 
the discipline, as in much of academia generally, 
have a tendency to be the concern of a relatively 
small group of interested individuals. 
If the claim stands up that we have an ethical 
responsibility to communicate our work visibly and 
accessibly, then the development of a credible code 
of ethics, which includes such responsibility, is an 
important step for the discipline. However, the pro- 
cess of designing and implementing this kind of code 
might run counter to entrenched professional values, 
which do not prioritize such communication as a 
means of career advancement. For example, dis- 
seminating current issues and concerns in geography 
via outlets such as the Geographical magazine is 
confined, we would suggest, to those who already 
have some sympathy with the issues raised here. But 
academics who write for these outlets must fre- 
quently do so without-or even at the expense 
of-acknowledgement in the formal evaluative sys- 
tems of their own departments. Despite the modest 
circulation and impact of learned geography jour- 
nals, most academics continue to publish their 
research findings solely through these outlets, 
because efforts to make work visible and accessible 
by, for example, publishing press articles or works of 
scholarly synthesis (eg textbooks) are sometimes 
regarded pejoratively by peers. So long as visiblity 
and accessibility are not viewed universally as 
meritorious, a kind of elitist culture prevails, which 
effectively maintains an ivory tower around 
academic undertakings, and hinders attempts made 
by those beyond its walls to understand them. It has 
to be recognized that the capacity to engage with lay 
approaches to the understanding of space and place, 
and the ability to link issues of physical environ- 
mental change to the impacts of management 
strategies, stand alongside cutting edge research at 
the very heart of the geographical endeavour. 
Unless, as a community, we are able to disengage 
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from this tendency towards communicating ineffec- 
tively, we may well forfeit any credible claim to a role 
in contributing to the solution of contemporary 
problems. In addition, we may lay ourselves open to 
attack, based on the failure of others-wilful or 
otherwise-to understand the intentions of our 
work. 
In the past, influential people who misunderstood 
the potential contribution of a great deal of academic 
work identified various 'problems' with academia, 
and sought to'fix' them on the profession's behalf. In 
the 1980s, Lady Thatcher regarded many academic 
pursuits as irrelevant (usually 'social' ones-she was 
a research chemist by training) and a waste of 
taxpayers' money. She spoke 'of universities "push- 
ing out poison" ... and [she] resented giving them a 
penny for doing so' (Jenkins 1995,142). Her 'fix' 
was to reduce government support-both financially 
and in a wider, cultural sense-for academia through 
a series contentious policy decisions. Indeed, only 
through a Lords' amendment did the 1988 Education 
Reform Act guarantee academic staff 
freedom within the law to question and test received 
wisdom and to put forward new ideas and controversial 
or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in 
jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges. (Griffith 1989, 
59) 
As Jenkins (1995,147) understates, 'it is remarkable 
that a modern liberal government should have found 
this so unpalatable a clause'. A similar interpretation 
of this issue by the Blair government (which, it now 
seems, is not altogether impossible) could result in 
further such undesirable policy decisions. Academic 
ivory towers do not sit well with the rhetoric of 
transparency, public accountability and difficult 
choices, which has seemingly been carried over into 
the new administration from the old. Realizing a 
wider understanding of academic geography could 
even, in an extreme scenario, be central to the 
long-term survival of our profession. 
Towards a convergence 
How can academic geographers make their work 
more visible and accessible to those beyond 
university geography departments? Before outlining 
some tentative suggestions, it is necessary to raise 
two important points. First, we do not seek to 
advance a simplistic (and elitist) Enlightenment 
conception of academic 'knowledge-production' for 
lay 'knowledge-consumption'. On the contrary, 
improved academic communication, capable of 
engaging the widest possible audience, is equally 
consistent with Irwin's (1993) conception of a 
citizen-orientated science. Second, we recognize the 
perhaps limited value of proposing quasi-Utopian 
strategies, whose adoption and implementation 
would be beyond the immediate influence of the 
majority of academic geographers (a recasting of the 
RAE to include 'visible and accessible communi- 
cation' as a ranking criterion might be an example). 
Having said this, however, the RGS-IBG has recently 
announced a renewed commitment to raising the 
profile of academic geography (RGS-IBG 1998) 
and, with this in mind, we offer three suggestions 
concerning ways in which those of us within the 
organization might help to facilitate such action. 
Firstly, there is a need to review the values we 
attribute to different forms of published communi- 
cation within, and beyond, academia. There needs to 
be a change in culture within universities to recog- 
nize the importance of the task of synthesis, and in 
particular the production of textbooks for both 
school and undergraduate study. Davey et al (1995, 
25) concur with others (see, for example, Johnston 
1992) when they note that: 
Within geography, most significant advances in 
knowledge-empirical, theoretical, methodological- 
will continue to be published first in the professional 
journals. But the wide dissemination and explanation of 
new ideas, including to an extent their evaluation and 
their creative linking with other ideas, will continue to 
be the function of upper-level and elementary text 
books. It is these too that will first inspire the scholars of 
the future, as well as contributing to the quality of 
education that students receive. 
Publishers are well aware of the pressures on 
academic geographers to produce journal articles 
rather than textbooks (see the comments of Vanessa 
Lawrence, quoted in Davey et at 1995,16), and are 
also inclined to the belief that textbooks are not likely 
to be written by people whose work is at the 
research frontier. Of course, that is not to deny that 
many geography 'classics' have been written from 
the cutting edge, albeit not in the first place explicitly 
as textbooks (David Harvey's The condition of post- 
modernity is an obvious example). Nevertheless, 
the publishers represented in Davey et al (1995) 
argue that, in future, students themselves rather than 
their lecturers must increasingly be seen as the 
principal target of the academic textbook writer, in 
view of increasing university class sizes, diminishing 
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opportunities exist for direct interaction between 
undergraduates and academic staff. This in itself will 
demand a clearer and more direct form of communi- 
cation, and enhance the potential of academic 
geography to access an audience beyond the 
student body. 
Encouraging increased textbook production will 
not just benefit students-it should also improve the 
level of communication amongst academics. We 
have already noted that the demands of our profes- 
sion place many constraints upon our ability to 
recognize and respond to challenges levelled at 
some branches of academic inquiry. If, for example, 
the postmodern questioning of 'scientific' practice is 
genuinely important, and requires a redirection of 
scientific endeavours, then it is essential that the 
questions are couched in language that can be 
accessed by those to whom they are addressed. 
When scientific practitioners can dismiss a 'Manda- 
rin' challenge as 'typical postmodern nonsense that 
nobody can understand', they perhaps feel safe in 
concluding that nothing serious is being said. 
Second, there can be an increase in the emphasis 
that academic geographers place on their interaction 
with professional audiences beyond universities. 2 A 
number of the research groups within the RCS-IBC 
(such as the Higher Education Study Group and the 
Planning and Environment Research Group)-and, 
indeed the RGS-IBG itself-already see this as an 
explicit dimension of their purpose, and seek to forge 
and enhance connections between different geo- 
graphical communities. Such interaction is achieved 
in various ways, from conferences and forums, which 
can lead to joint publication and research output, to 
encouraging consultancy work and job exchanges 
(Chalkley 1995). Other organizations use similar 
methods to inform professionals of their work. 
Groups such as Eurofem have emerged in an attempt 
to realize the implications of 
findings in the field of 
planning that have demonstrated the exclusion of 
women and gender from analyses of urban 
develop- 
ment (Vaiou 1994, cited in Booth and Gilroy 1996). 
Eurofem seeks to bring the insights of academics 
concerned with analysing women's perspectives to 
bear upon the development of an urban environment 
that meets the needs of its users, of 
both sexes and all 
ages, more effectively (Booth and 
Gilroy 1996). 
Third, the above strategies can be complemented 
by enhancing direct communication with the wider 
public. As well as helping to refocus 'popular' con- 
ceptions of the nature of geography, this would also 
ensure a comprehensive response to the ethical 
criticism that research participants are unable to 
benefit from project results. Large public audiences 
can obviously be reached through outlets such as 
National Geographic or the Geographical magazine, 
and through an increased engagement with the 
popular media. In addition, however, a limited range 
of reciprocal schemes exist that encourage interac- 
tion between academics and those who participate 
in their research projects. Public participation in 
planning continues to benefit from the contributions 
of geographers in both urban and rural settings, 
and charitable bodies such as the National Asthma 
Campaign, commission work by geographers, which 
results in publication that communicates directly 
with sufferers (Taylor 1995). 
It will be apparent that none of the above sugges- 
tions is particularly pioneering. This is because, just 
as the problem of 'divergent geographies' has 
existed for a long time, so too have the potential 
solutions. It is perhaps unnecessary to advance'new' 
strategies until already-existing ones have been tried 
out properly; rather, our challenge as academic 
geographers is to revisit the debate and devote more 
resources to turning perennially potential solutions 
into actual ones. Endeavours of this kind can be 
difficult, and many will no doubt question the validity 
and value of time spent on them when the pressures 
are on to demonstrate the need for continuing 
support for academic research through conventional 
channels such as the RAE. However, we believe that 
such questions will be missing the point. By ignoring 
the challenge to make our work more visible and 
accessible-in effect, to maintain the popular con- 
ception of geography as a descriptive aid rather 
than as a penetrating, insightful and potentially useful 
contribution to human development-academic 
geography could, in fact, as we noted above, 
jeopardize its future claim to external support. 
Geography has much to offer in understanding the 
contemporary world, as global processes of change 
alter the nature of space in social and economic 
relationships, and as physical and environmental 
processes present outcomes with spatial patterns, 
which must be managed if they cannot be reversed. 
Visible and accessible communication of academic 
geography would not only begin to address the 
divergence between 'popular' and academic 
branches of the discipline, but could also help 
resolve how and where the work of academics 
makes a difference. Of course, a question remains as 
to whether this is what the majority of academic 
geographers actually want. 
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Notes 
1 The consequences of this, even within the academic 
community, have been revealingly discussed by Sidaway 
(1997), whose survey also suggests that the quality of 
what we communicate in the specialized journals may be 
under threat. Such a likelihood adds a further twist to the 
already complex demands of the call presented here for 
wider communication and dissemination of the results of 
our academic work. 
2 In particular, we refer to policy-makers, business leaders, 
politicians, educators and other such groups. 
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What about the competition? 
Privatisation, we were told, would open up the railways to the free market. 
Jon Shaw thinks we need more government intervention to make it work 
ohn Major's government, in its anxiety to promote service Thameslink, currently operate subsidy-free. If other operators 
competition, created an elaborate structure for the post- were to "cherry-pick" by running trains along a TOC's most 
privatisation railway. British Rail was split into 92 compa- profitable lines at the busiest times, then the TOC's ability to 
nies which were either franchised (25 train operating compa- cross-subsidise would be reduced and its financial performance 
nies, or TOCs) or sold outright (all the remaining businesses), would be weakened. As it is, the subsidy declines (or, in Gatwick 
and the idea was that competition between them would limit the Express and Thameslink's cases, the premium payable to the 
need for regulation and thereby remove the "dead hand of the government increases) year on year, and many TOCs will have 
state" from the industry. major problems averting financial catastrophe even without the 
BR's successor companies were sold between two and three introduction ofon-rail competition. A declining subsidy profile 
yearsago. Butwhere are the "management skills, flairand entre- is tantamount to on-rail competition in this sense. 
preneurial spiritofthe private sector" which ministers predicted The second problem is more philosophical. What is the point 
would "provide better services for the public"? The punctuality ofon-rail competition? Despite theTories' fixation with the con- 
and reliability oftrains, the key indicators by whichTOCs' per- cept, it obviously misses the real point that train operators are 
formance is monitored, are no better now than they were under already in competition with other modes of transport, notably 
BR. Branch-line services are being cut back. Customer com- the private car. As long as train operators are forced to keep tabs 
plaints are at their highest levels ever. The government has been on what their counterparts are up to, it makes it more difficult for 
forced to convene rail "summits"towarntheindustry that itsper- them to concentrate on the key issue of improving their services 
formance is not good enough. to entice travellers off the road and on to the rails. 
Free marketeers may argue that the main reason for Companies will While TOCs continue to require subsidy-and for the 
the railways' underperformance is that competition foreseeable future many will - the case for on-rail rUg'gie to ' between train operators-the linchpin of rail privati- 
avoid d 
competition simply doesn t stack up; passenger rail 
isaster i i f sation policy-has largely failed to materialise. The ded with n the rame- services cannot yet be prov 
Tories were forced to constrain the market because even without workofafree market. Efforts to "getthe government 
they realised that there would be fewer bidders for competition out", 
far from being redoubled by the regulator, need 
franchises if there was unfettered competition. to be abandoned. Ministers have to work out how 
Franchises usually give the winning bidder exclu- 'ý ý they can best get the government back in again. 
sive access to a revenue stream - they represent competition That said, the minister responsible, John Prescott, has had to 
for the market rather than in it- so the prospect of further com- review his options carefully. Renationalisation, for instance, is 
petition after the tendering process was not popular among not on. Apart from new Labour's ideological objections, return- 
potential bidders. Why should they buy a TOC if someone else ing the railways to the public sector makes no sense for practical 
could take all oftheir fare revenue away? The rules that prevent reasons. By European law, the rail businesses sold outright (all 
"on-rail" competition are so strict that John Swift QC, until ofthem except the TOCs) can only be bought back by the gov- 
recently the rail regulator, observed that "the supply of passen- eminent at their true market value, and this is significantly more 
ger services is based on 25 territorial franchises with full protec- than it was when BR was sold (for example, Railtrack's share 
tion from competition from new services". But then, before he value has increased more than threefold since privatisation). 
was replaced last November, Swift had a change of heart. He Furthermore, the level of investment needed in the rail indus- 
argued that the time was right to alter the competition rules and, try outstrips what any government would be prepared to commit 
asofthisSeptember, they willberelaxed toallow direct rivalry to. In the past, successive administrations, both Labour and Con- 
between operators. servative, viewed the railways as a low priority and starved BR 
No doubt the right-wing ideologues are delighted, but will of sufficient investment capital. There is no reason to suppose 
things improve far rail users? Probably not. There are two main this would change. One benefit of privatisation per se is that it 
problems with on-rail competition. The first is economic. frees industry from public-sector financial constraints, so the rail 
Because eachTOC is contracted to runa host ofservices-some companies are able to raise their own investment capital from the 
lucrative, others not- it needs to earn enough profit on its remu- financial markets. Prescott's recent talk about taking poorly per- 
nerative lines, which itthen combines with apredetermined sub- forming franchisees back into the public sector is misguided. 
sidy from the government, to ensure an adequate return on its Prescott has also had to ensure that any changes he does imple- 
whole operation. Only two TOCs, Gatwick Express and ment do not significantly alterthe structure ofthe railway: what- 
1100 t. }. a 6 33 ox- 
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ever the inadequacies of the Tories' organisational legacy, fur- 
ther meddling will only create more uncertainty in the industry. 
As Chris Green, former InterCity director and now chiefexecu- 
tive at VirginTrains, has pointed out, various ambitious schemes 
over the past two decades have made British railway managers 
world-beaters at restructuring. It's a pity they couldn't have con- 
centrated on running the trains. 
New Labour's approach equates more to the now-familiar 
Third Way. The answer is neither state ownership nor free- 
marketeering, but tougher state guidance. To forgo renationali- 
sation does not mean that the government cannot significantly 
strengthen its hand. Prescott has just appointed a new rail regu- 
lator, Tom Winsor, who is known to be critical of the pro-market 
approach adopted by Swift. Winsor will almost certainly make 
things tougher for the industry when he 
takes up his post in July. Moreover, the 
new Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), 
now running in shadow form and 
chaired by Sir Alastair Morton, can 
address other problems in the current 
regulatory regime. This is a hotch- 
potch of ill-defined responsibility 
(despite the free-market orientation of 
rail privatisation, there are nine regula- 
tors covering different aspects of the 
industry), too complex and famously 
*ineffective. Players in the new rail 
. 
industry simply pass the buck when 
things go wrong, and no one is in a 
-position to take a strategic, long-term 
view of the railways' future. 
Some changes are needed straight- 
away, and the regulation of Railtrack 
is an obvious starting point. Railtrack 
is the only true monopoly left in the 
industry as it owns all the infrastructure 
(track, signalling, stations and so on). 
The company is legendarily riskaverse 
- its commercial strategy has been said to resemble that of a 
public-sectorutility-and Swiftdid little to persuade itto behave 
more entrepreneurially. For example, the growth in passenger 
numbers has prompted TOCs to run more trains, and "pinch 
points" - bottlenecks - are developing all around the network. 
These are beginningto cause delays to existing services and will 
prevent the addition of new ones. Railtrack forecast minimal 
growth at the time of flotation and has done little to alleviate 
them. However, it is likely that Railtrack foresaw a strengthen- 
ing of its regulation following the appointment of Swift's suc- 
cessor and has recently announced a considerably expanded 
investment programme (£27 billion over the next ten years) 
which the company hopes will satisfy him. And it is important 
that it does: a common industry expression is that "a railway is 
only as good as its permanent way", but with the infrastructure 
under Railtrack's stewardship this has not been very good at all. 
The TOCs'trading environment, a matter for the SRA, also 
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needs reviewing urgently. The introduction of on-rail competi- 
tion should be abandoned for the time being. In return for the 
additional financial security this would accord many TOCs, the 
government could then start to demand better standards of per- 
formance. Passengers' charters, which allow TOCs to run trains 
up to 10 minutes late and claim they are on time, are a nonsense 
and clearly need rewriting. Moreover, TOCs can "stretch" their 
timetables if they think that certain trains will be delayed, and 
this has resulted in advertised journey times between certain 
stations increasing beyond those of 100 years ago. The list of 
shortcomings in TOC regulation is virtually endless. 
In the longer term the SRA will have to consider more sweep- 
ing redefinitions of the franchise terms. Prescott has recently 
announced that he will accept applications from TOCs to 
lengthen their franchises (currently 
between five and 15 years) provided 
they "make it worth his while". Great 
North Eastern Railway has invested 
heavily in its business and has wit- 
nessed huge organic growth since pri- 
vatisation. As a result, it is running out 
ofcapacity and wants to invest in a fleet 
of new tilting trains in return fora fran- 
chise extension. The Deputy Prime 
Minister's willingness to consider 
such applications is generally to be 
welcomed, although he will have to be 
confident that any deals he negotiates 
are at least as good asthose he could get 
from hopeful bidders in future compet- 
itive franchising rounds (anexception- 
ally difficult task-you can reasonably 
ask, "howwill he know? "). In addition, 
by granting franchise extensions he 
may preclude the SRA from redefining 
some franchise boundaries in the 
future, should it deem this necessary 
(and it probably will: 25 franchises is 
too many to permit significant economies of scale). 
A safe, fast, punctual, reliable railway is essential if more and 
more people are to be lured out oftheir cars, and tougher regula- 
tion will play a crucial part in securing one. Private enterprise is 
notoriously sceptical of red tape and government interference, 
but in the passenger rail industry it may well be seen as a bless- 
ing in disguise. As subsidies continue to fall, the train operators 
will need to attract much higher patronage levels; it is now more 
or less certain thatsome operators will fail overthe coming years 
unless they are able to maintain substantial revenue growth 
throughout their franchise periods. The strategic vision the gov- 
ernment is promising can help them do that, but only ifministers 
learn from the mess of the original privatisation and carefully 
think out their strategy f irst. 
Jon Shaw is a transport researcher at the University of 
Plymouth, and is co-writing a book about rail privatisation xxi 
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The competitive spirit re-awakens the ghost of railway monopoly 
Jon Shaw*, Clive Charlton, Richard Gibb 
Department of Geographical Sciences, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK 
Abstract 
The 1921 and 1993 Railways Acts were both designed to increase the quality and efficiency of railway services through major industry 
restructuring. Aside from the fact that the 1921 legislation did not concern itself with privatisation (the rail industry already operated in 
private hands in the early 1920s), the two Acts appear strikingly dissimilar at first glance because of the very different policies, and their 
associated ideologies, adopted by each to accomplish its aims. Whilst the 1921 Act sought to eliminate competition from the passenger 
railway industry and promote monopoly, its 1993 counterpart was formulated to achieve precisely the opposite. However, this paper 
challenges the existence of a gulf between the two pieces of legislation. We argue that the 1993 Railways Act, far from liberalising the 
passenger rail market, has created a trading environment which shares key characteristics with that established in the 1920s. This paper 
therefore explores the conflicting methods and the policy outcomes of the 1921 and 1993 Railways Acts. 01998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All 
rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The 1993 Railways Act (House of Commons, 1993) 
provided for the divestiture of British Rail (BR), one of 
the most complex 'natural monopoly' sell-offs in the 
privatisation programme of the 1979-97 Conservative gov- 
ernment. Rather than simply divesting BR as one unit (like, 
for example, British Telecom), the Conservatives' intention 
was to improve the quality and efficiency of passenger train 
services by restructuring the railway industry in order to end 
BR's monopoly and promote competition (Department of 
Transport, 1992). In its attempt to facilitate market 
liberalisation, the Major administration fragmented BR 
into 92 separate companies, many of which were designed to 
compete with each other (Department of Transport, 1996). 
Despite the intense public and political interest generated 
by the 1993 Railways Act (see, for example, The Guardian, 
1995; The Economist, 1996), governmental reorganisation 
of the railways on this scale is not without precedent in 
Britain. The Railways Act (1921) also aimed to improve 
the quality and efficiency of railway services through 
major industry restructuring. Aside from the fact that the 
1921 legislation did not concern itself with privatisation (the 
rail industry already operated in private hands in the early 
1920s), the two Acts appear strikingly dissimilar at first 
glance because of the different methodological approaches 
used by each to restructure the railway industry. Far from 
being a manifestation of a neoliberal policy agenda, the 
* Corresponding author. 
1921 Act was derived in a period of increasing political 
interventionism following World War One (Gray, 1995). 
Accordingly, the Act sought to eliminate competition 
from the railways and instigate a territorially based, mono- 
polistic trading environment heavily regulated by govern- 
ment. However, this paper challenges the existence of a gulf 
between the two pieces of legislation. 
More than three years after the rail privatisation process 
officially began in 1994, competition in the provision of 
passenger train services has generally not materialised and 
regionally based, regulated monopolies are beginning to 
emerge (Charlton et al., 1997). It is therefore the central 
contention of the present paper that, somewhat paradoxi- 
cally, the 1993 Act achieved a broadly similar organisa- 
tional outcome to that intended by its 1921 counterpart. 
Despite their contradictory ideological frameworks, both 
Acts created a passenger rail industry predominantly char- 
acterised by monopoly and associated governmental regu- 
latory mechanisms. The paper begins to explore this 
unlikely association of policy outcomes through an exam- 
ination of the background to, and methods contained in, the 
i1921 Railways Act. The contrary objectives of the 1993 Act 
are then considered, before discussion turns to highlight how 
the two pieces of legislation share similarities in key areas. 
2. Background to the 1921 Railways Act 
The railway industry in Britain has been subject to the 
play of political ideologies throughout its history. Indeed, 
0967-070X/98/$19.00 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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the formulation of railway policy in the decades preceding 
the 1921 Railways Act owed much to the philosophies of 
governance espoused by influential parliamentarians. The 
opening of the first significant passenger line, the Liverpool 
to Manchester, occurred in 1830, a time described as 'exem- 
plifying the historical paradigm of a liberal civilisation' 
(Gray, 1995, p. 26). Accordingly, politicians believed at 
first that competition in a free market would sufficiently 
encourage railway companies to operate efficiently and con- 
tinually improve their customer service (Perkin, 1971). 
However, regional monopolies, such as the Great Western, 
quickly began to emerge as railway companies amalga- 
mated in an attempt to secure economies of scale from 
larger operations (Simnett, 1923). 
Simply put, monopolies exclude competition and thus are 
able to maximise profits by abusing their market position. 
Although monopolistic practices on the railways were 
recognised by Parliament in the 1830s (see, for example, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1839), contemporary governments 
demonstrated a commitment to laissez-faire principles 
through their reluctance to intervene in the affairs of the 
industry. By 1840, however, railway policy had moved 
towards curbing the abuse of monopoly power through the 
establishment of a regulatory regime. The Regulation of 
Railways Act (1840) and the Construction of Future Rail- 
ways Act (1844) represented early governmental attempts to 
introduce to the railway industry what might be conceptua- 
lised as `surrogate competition', so-called because it was 
designed to replicate the effect of actual competition by 
forcing prices down and efficiency up (The Economist, 
1995). Mechanisms used to achieve this can be categorised 
as economic regulation, where attempts were made to con- 
trol companies' tariffs, and quality of service regulation. 
The latter was designed to complement economic regulation 
by guarding against a deterioration in output quality as rail 
firms strove to operate within tariff controls. Such measures 
in the 1844 Act dictated inter alia acceptable train frequen- 
cies and speeds. These categories of economic and quality 
of service regulation will be referred to throughout the 
paper. 
From 1840 onwards, governmental influence over the 
railway industry gradually increased as a result of a con- 
fused and contradictory regulatory policy. On the one hand, 
successive governments maintained an ideological desire to 
encourage competitiveness, and this manifested itself in 
efforts to promote `anti-trust' style regulation. On the 
other hand, increasingly stringent economic and quality of 
service regulation was necessitated to combat expanding 
regional monopolies which materialised precisely owing 
to the failure of anti-trust measures (see, for example, 
Parliamentary Papers, 1840,1845,1852,1872). Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, parliamentarians had 
begun to despair at the inefficacy of railway policy: 
... committees and commissions carefully chosen 
have, for the last thirty years, clung to one form of 
competition or another ... [however] no means 
have 
yet been devised by which competition can be 
permanently maintained (Parliamentary Papers, 
1872, p. xviii). 
Increasingly, reflecting the New liberal (or 'intervention- 
ist') political tide sweeping late-nineteenth century Britain 
(Gray, 1995), pressure mounted upon governments to aban- 
don altogether what remained of their commitment to a 
competitive railway industry. A notably more intervention- 
ist stance was advocated, involving either the amalgamation 
and comprehensive regulation of regional monopolies or 
outright nationalisation (Robbins, 1962; Parris, 1965). In 
the event, however, the railway industry was first taken 
under full governmental control as a result of the outbreak 
of World War One, rather than the influence of political 
ideology. 
By the War's conclusion, many railway companies were 
in a parlous financial state as industry-wide losses had, 
according to official estimates, reached an annual figure of 
anything between £45 and £100 million by 1920 (The 
Times, 1920). (The accuracy of these estimates was subject 
to contemporary debate, however: see, for example, The 
Times, 1919a, b. ) Although a high proportion of the losses 
were attributable to the war effort, railway finances had been 
worsening for some time before 1914 (Waghorn, 1905). 
Despite the trend towards amalgamation, the competition 
which remained had resulted in much wasteful investment 
and a continuous fall in the value of railway stocks and 
dividends (The Times, 1921a; Waghorn, 1905). The econo- 
mies of scale produced through unified working practices 
during the War were seen by government officials and rail- 
way managers to have been beneficial to both railway com- 
panies and consumers. For example, the acting chairman of 
the Railway Executive Committee commented: 
... 
I cannot think that our railways will ever again 
revert to the independent and foolish competitive sys- 
tem which obtained before this war broke out. The old 
system possessed manifold evils, not the least being 
the wastefulness of competition ... 
If we are to get the 
really useful and tangible result of what has been done 
in the war ... there must 
be vastly more co-ordination 
between the various companies (Railway Gazette, 
1917, p. 726). 
Parliamentarians and railway interest groups began to 
focus their attention on finding a long-term solution to the 
political and economic dilemma posed by the railway indus- 
try. For a brief period following the armistice 'nationalisa- 
tion [was] in the air' (Sheridan-Jones, 1919, p. 471) and 
state-ownership of the railways was the favoured option 
for certain groups, such as the Labour Party and the 
National 
Union of Railwaymen (NUR) (The Times, 
1921b). 
Nationalisation was also publicly discussed as a possibility 
by government ministers (Aldcroft, 1975). However, the 
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prospect of such increased government involvement in 
society was less acceptable to others: 
... 
having won a great war for liberty, during which 
only the nation's strength and endurance saved us 
from government, we seem to be in danger of surren- 
dering our liberty and putting our heads under a yoke 
imposed by bureaucratic bunglers (The Economist, 
1919, p. 172). 
Ultimately, a combination of factors resulted in 
nationalisation as an option being left unexplored in the 
1920s. Chief among these was public opinion, which largely 
concurred with the sentiments of The Economist (Sherrington, 
1928; The Times, 1919c), and the fact that the performance of 
state-run railways overseas had frequently proved disappoint- 
ing (Dyos and Aldcroft. 1971). However, solutions to the `rail- 
way problem' were still perceived by government to be most 
appropriately sought by itself rather than the railway industry. 
The debate shifted towards the further amalgamation and 
comprehensive regulation of the railways, a course of action 
which, although stopping short of nationalisation, did guaran- 
tee a sizeable and active role for the state in the industry's 
future. 
Neither the majority of railway companies nor their 
shareholders objected in principle to further amalgamation 
(see, for example, The Economist, 1920,1921) because it 
was viewed as a logical extension of the process promoted 
by themselves throughout much of the 1900s. The govern- 
ment's document Outline of proposals as to the future 
organisation of transport undertakings in Great Britain 
and their relation to the State (Parliamentary Papers, 
1920) proposed that the 100 or so railway companies still 
in existence (Simmons, 1978) should be formed into five or 
six groups. All direct competition between the groups was, 
as far as possible, to be eliminated and, in the absence of any 
market forces, economic and quality of service regulation 
was proposed in order to act as surrogate competition to 
prevent the abuse of monopoly power. 
The Railways Bill appeared before Parliament in May 
1921 and represented a decisive shift away from the 
laissez-faire principles which had influenced railway policy 
so heavily in the previous century. By eliminating market 
forces and elevating the role of statutory supervision to 
maximise the public good, the Bill can be seen to hold 
much in common with the prevailing mood of increasing 
political interventionism. Following some amendments, the 
Bill received Royal assent in August 1921. Attention is now 
turned to the specific methods employed by the Act to trans- 
late political ideology into policy. 
3. Provisions of the 1921 Railways Act 
the opening paragraph of the 1921 Act noted: 
With a view to the reorganisation and more efficient 
and economical working of the railway system of 
Great Britain railways shall be formed into groups 
(Railways Act, 1921,11 and 12 Geo., 5: 1(1)). 
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Considerable debate regarding the nature of the groups 
had ensued following the publication of the 1920 White 
Paper. The search for economies of scale played a key 
role in reducing the overall number of groupings from five 
or six, as envisaged in the White Paper, to four. Care was 
taken not only to keep together in one group those lines 
which had previously operated close working agreements, 
but also to saddle financially strong lines with their 
weaker neighbours in order to facilitate a degree of cross- 
subsidisation (Sherrington, 1928). Thus, concerns regarding 
the financial viability of a single Scottish grouping resulted 
in the East and West Scottish groups being attached long- 
itudinally to their English counterparts. 
Each of the four groups was designed as a territorial 
monopoly in order to avoid the duplication of services 
which had existed before the war. The `big four'-the 
London, Midland and Scottish (LMS), the London and 
North Eastern (LNER), the Great Western (GWR) and the 
Southern (SR) railway companies (see Fig. 1)-were verti- 
cally integrated entities created by processes of amalgama- 
tion and absorption. Each group comprised a number of 
`amalgamated companies' which in turn absorbed a 
number of 'constituent companies'. Table I shows how 
this process worked for the Southern Railway. The exact 
Table I 
Formation of the Southern Railway Group. Source: Railways Act (1921) 
11 and 12 Gco.. 5 
..... I Ti)(, Southern Group 
The Londm and SorAn WehIem Ra, way Company 
The London. Br, lI anA South Coast 
Railway Company, 
The South Eastern Railway Congany; 
The London Chatham and Dwer Railway Company 
P 0 The South, f astern aril CLatham R2rtwav 
CenTa rr, Manapinp Committee 
Ine Brbgwate, Panway Company 
The Brighton ann Dyke Hallway Coe pang, 
The Freshwater, yamwuth ehe Newport 
(isle of Wight) Railway Company. 
0 The Nayluq Railways Company. 
0 The Isle of Wight Railway Company. 
The Isle of Wight Central Railway Company 
1 " Tiro Lee-on-tha-Solen Railway Company. 
1 The Mid Kant Railway (Bromley to St May Cray) 
1 Company: 
.1 " The Plymouth and Dadrnoor Railway Company 
TM Votona Stehen and PwN¢e Raewey Conpaey 
TIM PlynquM, DenOtgntt and South 
Western Jenction Railway Gngany 
Removing competition from the railway industry 
required a major restructuring exercise and, to this end, 
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methods to be followed in the amalgamation and absorption 
process were presented in a brief but specific manner by the 
1921 Act. Sections 4 through 10 made provisions for the 
preparation, approval, terms and conditions of amalgama- 
tions and absorptions, as well as establishing a tribunal to 
deal with related difficulties should they have arisen. 
Legislators were not entirely successful in their attempts 
to establish territorial monopolies. Competition for traffic 
remained, particularly around the `frontier' regions where 
companies' territorial boundaries collided. Traffic between 
London and Exeter, for example, was carried by both GWR 
and SR, and many LMSR and LNER routes were duplicated 
in the North West (Mellor, 1994). Indeed, the absence of 
monopoly conditions in some districts led a GWR senior 
manager to conclude in an internal report that competition 
was as keen as ever (Great Western Railway, 1924). Pockets 
of competition remained in existence on the railways 
throughout the inter-war years and, in this sense, it is per- 
haps more exact to regard the big four as virtual, rather than 
actual, territorial monopolies. Nevertheless, the Act 
formulated a regulatory regime very much contrived for 
keeping a monopoly industry in check. Economic and qual- 
ity of service regulation was designed to act as surrogate 
competition, `with a view to securing and promoting the ... 
interests of the public, or of trade, or of any particular local- 
ity (Railways Act, 1921,11 and 12 Geo., 5: 16(1)). 
The 1921 Act established the Railway Rates Tribunal 
(RRT) to administer and enforce the economic regulation 
of the big four. The RRT was given wide powers and func- 
tions in all matters related to charges levied by the railway 
companies. Whilst primary consideration was given to the 
regulation of freight tariffs, passenger rates were also sub- 
ject to statutory control. The initial function of the RRT was 
to approve new tariffs proposed by the railway companies. 
Each of the big four was obliged to submit a schedule of the 
standard charges it desired to levy. Following deliberation 
and consultation with interested parties, the RRT set the 
standard charges at levels it deemed acceptable (which 
may or may not have corresponded with those submitted 
by the railway companies). With but a few exceptions, no 
variation either upwards or downwards from the standard 
charges was permitted without the permission of the RRT. 
Although the general intention of regulating fares was to 
prevent the abuse of monopoly power, the Act acknowl- 
edged the need to ensure the financial viability of the rail- 
ways. To this end, the new rates were set at a level which 
would provide for an annual net revenue equivalent to that 
of 1913, a year in which the railways had operated at a 
reasonable profit. 
In the longer term, the RRT was empowered by sections 
28 through 61 of the Act to function as a fares' watchdog 
designed to resolve queries relating to (for example) the 
variation or cancellation of existing charges or the introduc- 
tion of new charges. Railway companies were also subject 
to periodical reviews of their charges by the RRT to ensure 
that revenue did not exceed the 1913 equivalent value. If, on 
any such review, the RRT found the average annual net 
revenue to be in excess of this value, the tribunal would 
modify the offending company's standard charges so as to 
effect a revenue reduction in subsequent years. 
The 1921 Act was less specific with reference to quality 
of service regulation. Responsibility for upholding this 
regulation mostly rested with the Railway and Canal Com- 
mission. The Act noted that in order to: 
... 
[secure] the interests of the public ... the 
Com- 
mission may ... 
by order require ... the company or 
companies to afford such reasonable railway services, 
facilities and conveniences upon and in connection 
with its undertaking or their undertakings (Railways 
Act, 1921,11 and 12 Geo., 5: 16(1)). 
The Commission and the Minister for Transport were also 
empowered to request companies to make alterations, exten- 
sions and improvements to existing works, so long as such 
projects did not prejudicially affect the interests of existing 
Fig. 1. Operating territories of the 'big four'. After Freeman and Aldcroft 
(1985). 
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stockholders. Importantly, the `big four' were ordered to adopt 
schemes for co-operative-rather than competitive-working. 
A key problem of creating railway territories, particularly from 
the passengers' point of view, was that cross-country travel 
remained inconvenient because of the need to negotiate territor- 
ial boundaries. In an attempt to rectify this, the Act required each 
amalgamated company to provide proper points of exchange to 
maximise the convenient forwarding of passengers and freight 
between itself and another amalgamated company. Further, the 
companies were obliged by the Act to operate their trains at times 
which expedited this, and to provide through rates and fares to 
destinations beyond their own jurisdiction. 
Although nationalisation as an option was not pursued in 
the 1920s, the government nevertheless ensured a sizeable 
and active role for itself in the future of the railway industry. 
The state's decision to safeguard the public interest by seek- 
ing amalgamations to promote economies of scale resulted 
in the formation of regional `monopolies', each subject to 
considerable economic and quality of service regulation. 
This organisational arrangement lasted until the railways 
were finally nationalised in 1948 (Ellis, 1959). It is not the 
intention of the current paper to discuss the process of rail- 
way nationalisation in detail; however, an authoritative 
account can be found in Gourvish (1986). The perpetuation 
of an interventionist political mood, through the decades of 
welfare state consensus (Sked and Cook, 1990), precluded 
serious discussion regarding a future role for the industry 
outside of the public sector. However, the election to power 
of the Conservative Party in 1979 once again brought the 
societal role of the free market sharply into focus, and atten- 
tion turned towards the divestiture of nationalised indus- 
tries. Although the railways were not privatised until the 
early 1990s, debates regarding private sector involvement 
in the industry began shortly after the Conservatives 
assumed power (Zahariadis, 1995,1996; Gibb et al., 
1996). The text now turns to explore the background to, 
and methods used in, the privatisation of British Rail. 
4. Privatising British Rail 
Following the nationalisation of the big four, the British 
Railways Board (BRB) was established. Although it was 
assumed that BRB would break even after a short time 
this target was not met and, by 1979, BR's financial situa- 
tion was considered disastrous-subsidy requirements had 
exceeded £600 million every year since 1975 (Redwood, 
1984). The loss-making performance of nationalised indus- 
tries in general was an irritation to many Conservatives 
throughout the 1970s. Indeed BR, according to one minister, 
was no more than one of the `lame duck' state-owned com- 
panies, `part of the soft morass of subsidised incompetence' 
(quoted in Blackaby, 1978, p. 55). The reaction against the 
performance of nationalised industries was part of a more 
general shift within the Conservative Party away from the 
interventionist principles of the welfare state consensus. 
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Increasingly embraced was the neoliberal ideology which, 
in short, looks to reduce public sector involvement in 
society and the economy by promoting a `free' market 
driven by competition (Friedman, 1962,1980). Free 
marketeers within the Conservative Party published various 
documents whilst in opposition (see, for example, The Right 
Approach, Conservative Party, 1976; The Right Approach 
to the Economy, Conservative Party, 1977) concerning 
measures which could be taken to achieve these goals, 
and key among them was the privatisation of state-owned 
industries such as BR. 
Following the 1979 general election, the Queen's speech 
of that year outlined 'proposals [which] will reduce the 
extent of nationalised and state ownership and increase 
competition by providing offers of sale' (McLachlan, 
1983, p. 21). Progress in these areas with regard to BR 
initially revolved around rationalising the industry's activ- 
ities in an attempt to prepare it for privatisation at a future 
stage (Gibb et al., 1996). Particularly radical was the pro- 
posal of the `rail conversionists', who argued that railway 
lines should be concreted over in order that cars might 
instead make use of the premium city-centre to city-centre 
route paths (Redwood, 1984). The Serpell Report (Serpell, 
1983) investigated ways of improving the railways' short- 
term financial prospects. In order to turn BR into a profitable 
entity, the Report concluded that 84% of the rail network 
needed closing, a move which would have reduced BR's 
route miles from around 11,000 to just 1,630. Although 
less dramatic options were also proposed by Serpell, the 
Report's suggestions encountered hostility and the Trans- 
port Secretary assured Parliament that although the report 
constituted a `basis for decisions and for action ... the extreme 
options were not acceptable' (Hansard, 1983, Cols 489,499). 
It is argued by Gibb et al. (1996) that a coherent policy for 
privatising BR started to crystallise in the early 1980s. To 
begin, some of BR's peripheral assets, such as Sealink, Brit- 
ish Transport Hotels and non-operational property, were 
divested. Selling BR's subsidiaries had a profound effect 
on the subsequent debate regarding privatisation by estab- 
lishing a precedent. Whereas some years before commenta- 
tors and the public alike had believed that BR would 
'remain for all time in public ownership', the former Parlia- 
mentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, Ian Gow, argued 
that `the climate of opinion and the experience of recent 
years has [sic] transformed that belief' (Lynch, 1988, p. 
12). Rightist think-tanks began to focus upon the formula- 
tion of a method by which BR could be privatised. Despite 
attempts to streamline the industry's operations, BR 
remained a loss-making industry and a straightforward 
divestiture was far from guaranteed. The retention of 
some state subsidy was clearly inevitable if Serpell-style 
cuts in service provision were to be avoided. Moreover, 
the Conservatives were ideologically committed to ending 
BR's monopoly. Of course, many contested the assertion 
that BR constituted a monopoly given that it already faced 
fierce inter-modal competition. Certainly this was (and 
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remains) the view of pressure groups such as Transport 2000 
(1989) and railway industry chairmen (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1996). However, the Conservatives' position 
originated from the view that BR constituted a monopoly as 
it was the only provider of train services (Department of 
Transport, 1992). In this sense, therefore, the BR sell-off 
became doubly complex. Not only did it trade unprofitably, 
but there was also the perceived need to introduce a com- 
petitive spirit into the railway industry. 
Proposals put forward in the mid-1980s partially 
addressed the industry's finances, promoting the idea of 
cross-subsidisation, but largely disregarded direct on-rail 
competition as an option (Beesley and Littlechild, 1983). 
More concerned with market liberalisation, Gritten (1988) 
espoused the regional division of BR into vertically inte- 
grated independent companies, each based upon a major 
route corridor. The proposal involved the introduction of a 
host of competitive companies operating trains on track 
owned by the independent regional companies. However, 
such plans were seen as unworkable by groups such as 
Transport 2000 (1989), principally because of two potential 
operational difficulties: first, the negotiation of through traf- 
fic across the territories of several different railway compa- 
nies; and second, the ability of track owners to prioritise 
their own train services to the detriment of competitors. In 
the view of BR itself the least damaging privatisation option 
was to sell off the railway industry as a whole (Financial 
Times, 1989), although the Conservatives remained hostile 
to this approach because it made no provision for on-rail 
competition (Gibb et al., 1996). Ministerial attention turned 
to proposals initially proffered by the Adam Smith Institute 
(ASI) in 1987 (Irvine, 1987). The ASI's report rested on the 
claim that industry ownership could be divided between 
tracks and trains. A national track authority would lease 
track time to private companies running competing rail ser- 
vices between destination pairs. Such a proposal was 
denounced by BR chairman Sir Robert Reid, who viewed 
a fragmented railway `with lots of little companies which 
are not properly coordinated as a great disadvantage to [his] 
customers because there will be constant friction' (Financial 
Times, 1989, p. 10). Nevertheless, the model upon which 
the privatisation was ultimately based can be viewed in 
many ways as similar to the proposals of the ASI. 
In 1992, the Conservative Party formally announced its 
intention to pursue the privatisation of BR within the life- 
time of the 1992-97 parliament (Conservative Party, 1992). 
The pursuit of competition in the provision of passenger 
train services was afforded the highest priority, being 
viewed as a mechanism capable of improving quality and 
efficiency on the railways: 
... we believe the best way to produce profound and 
lasting improvements on the railways is to end BR's 
state monopoly ... We want to give the private sector 
the opportunity to operate existing rail services and 
introduce new ones (Conservative Party, 1992, p. 35). 
The 1992 White Paper New Opportunities for the Rail- 
ways (Department of Transport, 1992), used by the Major 
administration to formally present its vision of how BR's 
denationalisation would take place, stated that: 
... one part of BR will become a track authority, 
Railtrack 
... [and] new operators will be allowed to 
provide services, giving customers a choice and sti- 
mulating improved services and value (Department of 
Transport, 1992, p. 4). 
The proposals were implemented by the 1993 Railways 
Act (House of Commons, 1993). The Act provided for the 
privatisation of the railway industry and, of specific 
importance in terms of the present paper, the creation of a 
framework through which BR's monopoly could be ended 
to liberalise the passenger train service market. The text 
now turns to examine this framework. 
5. The 1993 Railways Act 
Unlike in the 1921 Act, the exact methodology to be used 
in order to achieve the Conservatives' objectives was not 
outlined by the 1993 legislation. In fact, the imprecise word- 
ing of the Act-it is little more than enabling legislation in 
many respects-is one of its most striking features. It is 
likely that a degree of flexibility was required in the legisla- 
tion because policy makers were `still thinking through the 
details of how [they proposed] to carry through privatisa- 
tion' (Nash, 1993, p. 317). The enormity of the restructur- 
ing, combined with the lack of an international parallel, 
rendered the plans somewhat experimental in nature (House 
of Commons Papers, 1992). Accordingly, the retention of 
some leeway to `fine tune' the policy, in order to surmount 
difficulties as and when they arose, was advantageous. With 
reference to the physical restructuring of BR, the Act noted: 
... 
The Secretary of State may, after consultation with 
the [BR] Board ... give the 
Board directions with 
respect to: (a) the nature and objects of the company 
which is to be formed; (b) the manner in which, and 
the time within which, it is to be formed (House of 
Commons, 1993: 84 (2) (a) (b)). 
By virtue of this clause, Ministers were effectively given 
licence to create whatever they wished from the BR monolith. 
In the event, however, BR was fragmented into 92 separate 
companies (Department of Transport, 1996). The creation of 
so many new businesses was a result of the common carrier 
(CC) methodology used to restructure the railway industry. 
The advantage of forming a CC was that it allowed BR's 
monopoly to be broken without the need for an entirely new 
infrastructure. This was accomplished by separating owner- 
ship of the infrastructure (track, signalling, bridges and so on) 
from maintenance and train service provision. 
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The infrastructure owner. Railtrack. is the CC because it 
provides train operators with access to its assets (it 'carries' 
them). The operators in turn compete to offer their services 
to the public. In order to maintain its infrastructure, Rail- 
track must contract work out to competing suppliers. Focus 
in the present paper is on the provision of passenger train 
services: a review of the functions of, and interaction 
between, other actors in the industry can be found elsewhere 
in the literature (see. for example, Charlton et al., 1997). Of 
course. Railtrack is still a monopoly and, although the for- 
tnation of such a company appears to oppose the objective 
of' market liberalisation, it is in fact a necessary paradox- 
the CC is a kind of monopolistic fulcrum around which the 
competitive remainder of the industry can organise itself. 
Railtrack is legally entitled to function as the sole 'net- 
work licensee'. As such, and in keeping with its role as the 
CC. Railtrack must allow train operators to use its infra- 
structure through access contracts. Section 17 of the 1993 
Act notes how this procedure facilitates the competitive 
provision of train services: 
... 
directions (may he givenI to a facility owner IRail- 
track] requiring him to enter into an access contract 
The purpose for which directions may be given is 
that of enahling the beneticiaty to obtain ... 
from a 
facility owner whose railway facility is track. permis- 
sion to use that track for the purpose of the operation 
of trains on that track by the beneticiary (House of 
Commons. 1993: I7 (1) (2) (a)). 
Those train operators negotiating access contracts 
with Railtrack fall into two categories-franchised and 
non-franchised-and these contracts are overseen by a 
government-appointed Rail Regulator. Franchised Train 
Operating Companies (TOCs) are let to the private sector 
for a finite period. The 25 TOCs lease almost all of their 
physical assets, having been established essentially as 
people businesses in order to assuage the inevitable transfer 
of franchise ownership. Each TOC operates passenger train 
services along specified routes within a specified region and. 
together, the TOCs assume responsibility for those services 
previously worked by BR (OPRAF, 1996). The creation of 
25 TOCs has led to a complex geographical arrangement of 
their operating territories (see Figs 2-4). Because of this 
complex geography, many TOCs share at least some track 
miles with one, or maybe mre, of their counterparts. and 
competition along these routes is theoretically possible. A 
good example cif this is the Chester to Holyhead line, where 
customers are served by both North Western Trains and 
Virgin Trains. Moreover. 'frontier' regions, similar to 
those created by the 1921 Railways Act, have also been 
created. In this way, Londoners travelling to (for example) 
Exeter are still in a position to choose their preferred train 
operator (see Fig. 5). 
Non-franchised passenger operators represent the 
significant number of companies' (Conservative Party, 
1992, p. 35) to whom the Major administration sought to 
offer the chance Of running new railway services. By nego- 
tiating an access agreement with Railtrack, these companies 
can theoretically compete with franchised TOCs between 
destination pairs on an 'open access' basis. In this way. 
non-franchised passenger operators do not operate within 
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a specific territory; instead they may choose to operate 
solely on one route should this be deemed the most profit- 
able option. 
By fragmenting BR's passenger operations and devolving 
the responsibility for their operation to territorially based 
companies, the 1993 Act can immediately be seen to 
share some organisational purpose with its 1921 counter- 
part. Indeed, the Conservative Party declared this as its 
intention by noting 'we want to restore the pride and local 
commitment that died with nationalisation ... and recapture 
the spirit of the old regional companies' (Conservative 
Party. 1992, pp. 35-36). Beyond the existence of regional 
companies, however, the conflicting ideological objectives 
of the two Acts are reflected in the differing organisational 
structures they created. The 1921 Act tackled the 'railway 
problem' by creating four vertically integrated territorial 
groups, designed to eliminate competition from the industry 
as far as possible. In contrast, the 25 TOCs are generally 
asset-less franchises who gain access to the infrastructure 
from Railtrack on a contractual basis. This is in order to 
Fig.. l. Operating territurirs of Ihr ti rnirr Regional Kaikkac, IO('.. 
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facilitate competition, not only between incumbent 
TOCs-where they share route miles or 'frontier' 
regions-but also between TOCs and open access 
newcomers. 
To briefly recap, the dominant economic ideology 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s was neoliberalism, 
seeking to maximise the role of the free market in society. 
A key policy objective of the Conservative government was 
to improve the performance of the railway industry by lib- 
eralising the passenger train service market. This is in some 
contrast to the 1921 Railways Act, which was formulated in 
a period of' increasing political interventionism and sought 
to eliminate competition from the railway industry. How- 
ever, it is the central contention of the present paper that the 
1993 Act has, in fact, achieved a broadly similar policy 
outcome to that intended by the 1921 legislation, namely 
a passenger railway industry predominantly characterised 
by monopoly and associated governmental regulatory 
mechanisms. Attention is now turned to why this 
is the 
case. 
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6. The re-appearance of monopoly 
Although the Conservatives had originally emphasised 
the fundamental importance of competition to the future 
of the passenger rail industry, they expressed doubts regard- 
ing its viability as an organising principle in 1993 (Depart- 
ment of Transport, 1993). Such concerns most likely arose 
from two basic problems, both explicitly interlinked. In 
the first instance, 24 of the 25 TOCs were (and still are) 
unprofitable and relied upon considerable government sub- 
sidy (Modem Railways, 1995). The continued payment of 
such subsidy was almost certainly related to a degree of 
political realism exercised by the Conservatives. Perhaps 
due to cuts which had been proposed by reports in the 
early 1980s, the privatisation of BR became electorally 
unpopular and the public sought reassurance that the 
levels and extent of services would not be detrimentally 
affected by the privatisation plans (see, for example, The 
Economist, 1996). For this reason, the Major administration 
acknowledged as far back as 1992 that 'subsidy will con- 
tinue to be paid where necessary' in order to `sustain the 
current national network of services' (Conservative Party, 
1992, p. 35). The second problem was (and, again, remains) 
related to the amount, and routing, of train miles which 
TOCs were expected to cover in return for their subsidy. 
Each TOC is required to operate at least the amount of trains 
specified in its Public Service Requirement (PSR). The pur- 
pose of a PSR is to ensure the provision of a minimum level 
of services across a TOC's franchise region. Whilst not 
functioning explicitly as a timetable, it does set parameters, 
based largely on the `national network of services' of 1992, 
within which the TOC must design its timetables (OPRAF, 
1996). However PSRs, by their very nature, render TOCs 
uncompetitive, and this issue is explored now. 
A franchisee operating lucrative services between, say, 
Manchester and Birmingham, is obliged to run those ser- 
vices and a whole host of other routes contained in its fran- 
chise region. On the other hand, a non-franchised new 
entrant on the same route, although ineligible for govern- 
ment subsidy, would be able to `cherry pick'-i. e. operate 
trains on the most profitable routes at the most profitable 
45 
times-without the statutory obligations of a franchisee. 
This could result in a substantial decline in revenue for 
the incumbent franchisee whilst its subsidy remained static. 
Thus the franchisee's ability to cross-subsidise its network 
would be reduced, and the profitability of the TOC would 
diminish. Given this scenario, potential franchisees were 
dissuaded from bidding for contracts which presented 
them with the threat of financial uncertainty or even insol- 
vency (The Guardian, 1993). The success of the rail priva- 
tisation project was therefore jeopardised and, despite its 
initial enthusiasm for market liberalisation, the Major 
government was forced to accept that the objectives of pro- 
moting on-rail competition and maintaining socially neces- 
sary, loss-making services were manifestly conflicting. 
Accordingly, it modified its views when it announced that 
`competition on routes to be franchised should be moderated 
to the extent necessary to ensure the successful launch of the 
first generation of franchises' (ORR, 1994, p. iii). 
Just as the methodology used to restructure the industry 
was not made explicit by the 1993 Act, details regarding the 
mechanisms employed to restrict competition were absent. 
Outlined instead was the duty of the Rail Regulator and the 
Franchising Director to act upon guidance (objectives, 
instruction and guidance in the case of the Franchising 
Director) issued by the Secretary of State from time to 
time (ORR, 1995; OPRAF, 1996). Guidance regarding the 
need to substantially restrict competition in the provision of 
passenger train services was non-specific in form, and the 
composition and implementation of relevant policies were 
left to the Rail Regulator and Franchising Director. The Rail 
Regulator restricts the entry of non-franchised, open-access 
competitors to the service provision market. No new entry 
will be permitted on any route nominated by incumbent 
TOCs before 31 March 1999. Following a review of the 
situation, `significant restrictions' (ORR, 1994, p. 19), 
which will permit only limited entry on certain nominated 
flows, will remain until 2002. However, even after 2002, the 
Regulator acknowledges that any further change to the exist- 
ing regime will be incremental by nature, and restrictions will 
continue where the presence of competition would discourage 
major improvements to passenger rail services (ORR, 1994). 
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Therefore, so long as TOCs continue to run at a loss-or 
appear vulnerable to the threat of open-access newcomers- 
this kind of competition is likely to remain largely absent. 
Given that the Directors of Railtrack see `little prospect for. . 
. 
increased rail usage in the near to medium term' (SBC 
Warburg, 1996, p. 13), restrictions excluding newcomers 
look set to remain well into the twenty-first century. 
The Franchising Director, who supervised the transfer of 
franchises from the public to the private sector, promotes a 
great degree of harmony in the pricing strategies of nearly 
all TOCs who share route miles through a policy of com- 
pulsory inter-availability (OPRAF, 1996). By virtue of this 
arrangement, the lead operator-usually the TOC with the 
greatest commercial interest in a particular flow-creates 
through and inter-available fares and requires other TOCs 
which run trains on the flow to honour them. This require- 
ment does not extend to advance purchase, train-specific 
fares such as APEX. Nevertheless, OPRAF itself acknowl- 
edges the limitations such a policy places upon the operation 
of a competitive market. The compulsory inter-availability 
requirement will only be lifted by the Franchising Director 
if `he considers that the benefits of inter-availability will be 
outweighed by the potential benefits of price competition' 
(OPRAF, 1996, p. 186). Currently, the only passenger flow 
where the latter is considered to outweigh the former is that 
between London and Gatwick Airport. There are no plans to 
lift the requirement more widely at present. Interestingly, 
though, the policy of compulsory inter-availability may 
have been unnecessary as representatives of TOCs who 
share route miles have recently indicated at conferences 
the intention of their companies to work together, rather 
than compete, for the benefit of the railway as a whole 
(see, for example, Save Our Railways, 1996). 
With competition so heavily restricted throughout most 
of the passenger railway industry, there remains only one 
area where it is practicable in the new structure. Coinciden- 
tally, this is where the big four could compete for traffic 
following the 1921 Railways Act: in the `frontier' regions 
where TOCs' territorial borders collide. Although some key 
passenger flows fall into this category-London-Exeter 
was mentioned earlier but other examples are London- 
Birmingham, London-Southend or London-Glasgow- 
instances of this kind are more limited now than in the 
1920s owing to rationalisation trends which have occurred 
in the recent history of Britain's railway industry (see, for 
example, British Railways Board, 1962). Despite the 
original intention of the 1993 Railways Act to produce a 
competitive passenger train service market, it is in fact the 
case that most TOCs will retain `effective exclusivity' for 
the foreseeable future (OPRAF, 1996, p. 65). In other words, 
25 regional monopolies have, with only a few minor excep- 
tions, replaced BR's national one. 
The mechanisms used by the Rail Regulator and the Fran- 
chising Director to restrict competition in the provision of 
passenger train services confirm the first of two key simi- 
larities between the policy outcomes of the 1921 and 1993 
Acts. Despite their significantly different methods and ideo- 
logical underpinnings, both Acts effectively legislated to 
produce a passenger rail industry characterised by mono- 
poly. The 1921 Act, formulated in a time of increasing 
political interventionism (Gray, 1995), restructured the rail- 
way industry to create four, vertically integrated railway 
companies. The big four were territorially based, and virtual 
monopolies in the sense that they faced competition from 
other railway companies only in `frontier' regions. In con- 
trast, the 1993 Act aimed to promote competition in the 
industry through the common carrier methodology. 
Twenty-five regionally based TOCs were created and 
designed to face competition not only from each other- 
where two or more companies share route miles-but also 
from open access newcomers. However, it is apparent from 
evidence presented so far that difficulties encountered 
throughout the legislative process, such as the need to main- 
tain socially necessary, loss-making services, significantly 
altered the Act's intended outcome. The diminutive exis- 
tence of, and prospect for, competition within the passenger 
rail industry necessarily means that the 1993 Act is failing to 
meet one of its key objectives as TOCs are trading in 'effec- 
tive exclusivity'(OPRAF, 1996, p. 65). TOCs parallel the 
big four in the sense that they too are, generally speaking, 
virtual monopolists facing meaningful competition only in 
frontier regions. The ability of monopolists to maximise 
profits by abusing their position has already been discussed 
in this paper. Regulatory measures taken by the 1921 Act in 
order to prevent the abuse of monopoly power were 
conceptualised as surrogate competition. Such regula- 
tion has also been imposed upon TOCs, and is explored 
below. 
7. TOCS and surrogate competition 
Surrogate competition has been divided into two cate- 
gories for the purposes of this paper, economic regulation 
and quality of service regulation. The economic regulation 
of TOCs is effected through provisions made in franchise 
agreements. Unlike in the 1921 Act, no mention of specifics 
is made in the 1993 legislation. The 1993 Act instructs the 
Franchising Director that he must stipulate the provision of 
`reasonable' fares in the franchise agreement if he considers 
that passengers' interests so require (House of 
Commons, 
1993: 28 (2)). The mechanism employed to achieve this is 
the RPI minus `x' method, created in the early 1980s to 
regulate British Telecom (BT). The 
fundamental require- 
ment of RPI minus `x' is that regulated 
firms keep price 
increases at a fixed level below the rate of inflation for a 
given number of years (Thatcher, 1993). In this way, TOCs 
theoretically receive an incentive to increase efficiency as 
they are allowed to retain any profits they make within the 
specified period. Currently, `x' is set at zero, 
but will 
increase to one in January 1999 where it will remain 
for 
four years. The Franchising Director has also indicted 
that 
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the price cap is likely to remain at RPI minus one after 
January 2003 (OPRAF, 1996). 
Only certain fares are regulated, namely: unrestricted 
standard class return fares (which permit outward and return 
travel on any train); certain single fares for short journeys; 
`saver' fares (which, subject to certain conditions, offer a 
discounted rate when used on most journeys over 50 miles) 
and certain standard class season ticket fares including all 
weekly season tickets (OPRAF, 1996). In certain commuter 
markets, PTEs are entitled to set fares and, as such, these 
will remain unregulated by OPRAF. In London, Cardiff, 
Edinburgh and Greater Manchester, however, a more com- 
prehensive approach is taken to regulating the price of fares. 
A performance incentive regime applies to all season tick- 
ets, whereby failure to meet punctuality and reliability stan- 
dards set within the franchise agreement can result in the 
price cap being increased by two percentage points to RPI 
minus three. 
Quality of service regulation is again stipulated within the 
franchise agreement, details of which are contained in the 
Passenger Rail Industry Overview (OPRAF, 1996). TOCs 
are expected to maintain an operational environment at or 
above standards prescribed by National Conditions of Car- 
riage (NCC) (British Railways Board, 1996). The purpose 
of the NCC is to outline the contractual obligations train 
operators have towards their customers. Each TOC is 
bound to produce a `user-friendly' synopsis of the NCC- 
a passengers' charter-in order that customers may obtain a 
clear understanding of the services they can expect to 
receive. In particular: 
the Franchising Director expects franchise operators 
to provide a commitment to publish independently 
audited figures, comparing actual performance with 
agreed standards for punctuality and reliability and 
to explain what compensation is available if per- 
formance falls below an acceptable level (OPRAF, 
1996, p. 82). 
The passengers' charter is also expected to outline TOCs' 
commitments in other areas of their operational environ- 
ment such as: ensuring acceptable train capacities; provid- 
ing information on services, fares and facilities; meeting the 
needs of disabled travellers; making alternative arrange- 
ments to transport passengers if services are disrupted; 
and disseminating information in advance of delays and 
non-emergency engineering works. Finally, TOCs are 
obliged to participate in ticketing and other schemes orga- 
nised by the Association of Train Operating Companies 
(ATOC), in order to secure the provision of network-wide 
products to customers. Examples of such products are the 
national rail enquiries telephone service and discount rail- 
card schemes. 
The existence of surrogate competition in the new railway 
structure is the second key similarity between the policy 
outcomes of the 1921 and 1993 Acts. In both cases, 
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surrogate competition was necessitated in order to prevent 
the abuse of virtual monopoly power. An exhaustive com- 
parison of the two Acts' regulatory minutiae is beyond the 
parameters of the current paper. However, it is important to 
note one ironic difference between the different regulatory 
regimes, namely that the surrogate competition measures 
which resulted from the supposedly market-oriented 1993 
Act are notably more comprehensive than those imposed by 
the specifically interventionist 1921 legislation. To illus- 
trate, the RPI minus `x' regulation, to which the TOCs are 
subject, makes no attempt to guarantee train operators rev- 
enue at a favourable level as was the case in the 1921 leg- 
islation. In terms of quality of service regulation, a 
comparable equivalent to the NCC was not imposed upon 
the big four. 
To some degree, the extent of the TOCs' statutory obli- 
gations may reflect the different regulatory experiences of 
the governments of the 1990s and the 1920s. Legislating to 
prevent the privatised utilities, such as British Telecom and 
the water industry, from abusing their monopoly positions 
provided the Thatcher and Major administrations with an 
unrivalled opportunity for experimentation with, and the 
development of, suitable and effective regulatory mechan- 
isms. Equally, however, it is probable that such exacting 
regulation was a result of the electoral unpopularity of the 
rail privatisation programme. The likelihood that public opi- 
nion dictated the maintenance of subsidies, and the intro- 
duction of PSRs, has already been discussed. However, 
evidence also exists to suggest that political and consumer 
pressure groups were instrumental in determining the com- 
prehensive and stringent nature of surrogate competition. 
Partially because of reports which predicted, among other 
things, post-privatisation fare increases of between 50 and 
130%, the rail sell-off became the most unpopular privatisa- 
tion ever undertaken by a British government (The Guar- 
dian, 1993; The Economist, 1996). In May 1995, the policy 
of economic regulation of fares, `a multi-billion pound 
sweetener to get passenger backing for privatisation' (The 
Guardian, 1995, p. 1), was announced by the Franchising 
Director. Although this is not to suggest that a change in 
policy was necessarily forced by a disgruntled electorate, it 
is one of a number of examples where specific regulation not 
included in the 1993 Act was imposed following obvious 
public consternation. 
8. In conclusion 
The railway industry in Britain has long been subject to 
the play of political ideologies. Although the industry was 
initially developed in a laissez-faire environment, govern- 
mental regulatory involvement from 1840 reflected the 
newly fashionable mood of increased political intervention- 
ism (Gray, 1995). A significant manifestation of the 
deepening interventionist trend was the 1921 Railways 
Act. The Act was formulated with a view to eliminating 
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the role of the market from the provision of passenger train 
services as far as possible, and four regional `monopolies' 
were created in an attempt to improve the quality and 
efficiency of the industry. The Act's provisions ensured a 
sizeable and active governmental role in the future of the 
railway industry by establishing regulatory mechanisms and 
institutions-so-called surrogate competition-to prevent 
the big four from abusing their monopoly powers. The 
operational arrangement created by the 1921 Act lasted 
until the outright nationalisation of the big four in 1948 
(Ellis, 1959). 
Following the election to power of the Conservatives in 
1979, political focus shifted away from interventionist 
ideals towards the neoliberal philosophy of the competitive, 
`free' market. Improving the quality and efficiency of train 
services by removing Britain's railways from the public 
sector was explored throughout the 1980s (Zahariadis, 
1995,1996; Gibb et al., 1996), and BR was ultimately 
privatised as a result of the 1993 Railways Act. In direct 
contrast to the intentions of the 1921 Act, a key objective 
of the Conservatives was to re-introduce free market prin- 
ciples into the provision of passenger train services by 
ending BR's monopoly and promoting on-rail competition. 
However, despite the contrary objectives of the two Acts, 
the present paper has shown that their policy outcomes 
have, in fact, been broadly similar in two key areas. First, 
the 1993 Act has also established monopolistic regional 
train operators. Although the Act provided the theoretical 
potential for liberalising the service provision market, the 
Major administration faced difficulties, such as the need to 
maintain socially necessary, loss-making services, which 
undermined the viability of competition as an organising 
principle. As such, measures restricting competition have 
been established to guarantee TOCs `effective exclusivity' 
(OPRAF, 1996, p. 65) in their operations. Second, surrogate 
competition has been imposed upon the TOCs by the 1993 
Act. The re-emergence of monopolies forced the 
Conservatives to introduce economic and quality of service 
regulation in order to prevent TOCs from abusing their 
monopoly positions. Somewhat paradoxically, the surrogate 
competition introduced as a result of the supposedly market- 
oriented 1993 Act has been shown to be notably more 
comprehensive than that imposed by the specifically 
interventionist 1921 Act. By achieving a policy outcome 
comparable with the 1921 legislation, the 1993 Railways 
Act has largely failed to meet one of its key objectives, 
namely to introduce competition into the provision of 
passenger train services. Rather than the market determining 
the future of the industry, the state, through regulation, 
retains effective control. Early indications given by the 
recently elected Labour administration suggest that, if 
anything, the role of statutory regulation in the British 
railway industry is likely to further increase over the 
coming years. It remains to be seen whether, as the first 
generation of franchises expire, such governmental 
influence will once again remove the responsibility for 
running Britain's passenger train services from the private 
sector. 
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